185 Pa. 260 | Pa. | 1898
Opinion by
The appellant instituted this proceeding to obtain a divorce ’ from his wi fe on the ground, as ho alleged, that she had wilfully and maliciously, and without reasonable cause, deserted him and persisted in such desertion for a period of more than six months prior to the commencement of his suit. The appellee denied the charge and demanded a trial by jury. The controlling question of fact presented by the issue thus made was whether there was a causeless, wilful and malicious desertion of the husband by the wife. The jury found from the evidence in the case that there was not such a desertion of him by her
The parties were married on September 9, 1891, and have not lived together since September 20, 1893. Very soon after their marriage it became apparent that their domestic relations were unpleasant, and that the husband’s profane denunciations of the alleged extravagance and inefficiency of his wife in the performance of her household duties might terminate in their mutual estrangement, if not in their permanent separation. It is to his credit however, and it is frankly conceded by Iris wife, that he never struck her or threatened her with personal violence. Her brief visit to the World’s Fair at Chicago in June, 1893, in company with her brother, and at her own expense, appears to have greatly displeased him, and this, together with some minor matters relating to supplies for the family, led him soon after her return to say to her “ I will do the providing in the house; I see you don’t want to work, and you have no right in my house at all, except to sit in a chair,” to which she replied, “ If that’s all the rights I’m to have in your house I won’t stay in it.” In accordance with her reply to his unkind and unwarranted assertion or statement of her position, and probably influenced somewhat by his previous treatment of her, she left .his house and did not return to it until September 20, 1893. Her return was not solicited or desired by her husband. He saw her in the house but he did not speak to her. The table was set for supper and he ordered his housekeeper to clear it, saying “ we don’t want no supper.” When she went with her child from the house to the spring where the housekeeper had gone for a pail of water, her husband was in the house, and when they returned to it he was sitting on the porch and the house was closed. He refused to allow her to enter it, although her own and baby’s wraps and her purse were in the bedroom where she laid them on her arrival in the afternoon. Her account of the occurrence of that night, including her removal at a late hour to his farm house a mile and a half away from his home, and'her description of the accommodations provided for her there, cannot be reconciled with a purpose on his part to admit her to his dwelling or to make suitable provision for her maintenance and comfort at the place to which he sent her, or elsewhere. She distinctly testified that before she was
No good reason appears for calling in question the sincerity and good faith of Mrs. Musgrave in returning to the home of her husband. But it was at once apparent from his conduct that she was not welcome there, and it is a fair inference from the evidence that he determined to close it against her when he could do so without forcibly expelling her from it. The opportunity to carry out this intention was presented on the day of her return, and he appears to have promptly availed himself of it. Neither his own nor Blunt’s explanation of the closing of the house against her was convincing or satisfactory.
The conduct of the appellant was notice to his wife of his determination to exclude her from his home, and it may fairly be considered as involving his consent to her leaving him and establishing for herself a home elsewhere. Her departure with her child from the farm house the next morning was manifestly prompted by a belief, founded upon his reception and treatment of her the night before, that he desired to get rid of her, and so prompted it was at least excusable, and cannot be justly
We think, upon due consideration of the assignments of error
Judgment affirmed.