102 Minn. 52 | Minn. | 1907
This is an action of ejectment brought October 12, 1906, in the district court of the county of Dakota, to recover from the defendant the possession of a strip of land one hundred feet wide running through lot 6, section 36, township 115, range 17, in the county of Dakota, which the plaintiff claims to own in fee. The defendant .claimed title to the land by adverse possession and at the close of the evidence the.
The facts are undisputed. Lot 6, which includes the land in question, was a part of the grant of lands to the state of Minnesota for the use of its schools. The state never conveyed or parted with its title in fee thereto until May 31, 1904, when it executed and delivered patent therefor to the plaintiff. This patent conveyed the entire lot in fee to the plaintiff, if the defendant had not then gained title to the strip, which is the subject-matter of this action, by adverse possession. The defendant entered into possession of the strip of land under color of title twenty five years prior to the commencement of this action, and ever since has been in the exclusive possession thereof, using it as a part of its right of way.
The sole question which the facts stated raise is whether, in view of the character of the title of the state to its school lands, title thereto can be acquired by adverse possession. This is necessarily so; for, if the state had not lost its title to the strip of land by the defendant’s adverse possession, the plaintiff is the owner thereof. The defendant concedes the correctness of the general rule that statutes of limitations do not operate against the state or general government, unless-there be an express provision or necessary implication to that effect, and that title to public land cannot be acquired by adverse possession. Maas v. Burdetzke, 93 Minn. 295, 101 N. W. 182, 106 Am. St. 436.
It is, however, the contention of the defendant that the statute of this state (R. L. 1905, § 4072) expressly or by necessary implication provides that title to the school lands of the state may be acquired by adverse possession. The original of section 4072 was section 12, c. 66, G. S. 1866 (G. S. 1894, § 5142), which provided that “the limitations prescribed in this chapter for the commencement of actions shall apply to the same actions when brought in the name of the state, or in the name of any officer, or otherwise, for the benefit of the state, in the same manner as to actions brought by citizens.” This court, in the case of City of St. Paul v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 45 Minn. 387, 48 N. W. 17, held that the provisions of this section of the statute of limitations applied to actions brought by the state, whether brought in its sovereign capacity to enforce rights as to property held by it in trust for the public, or in its proprietary capacity.
The statute, making statutes of limitations applicable to the state, to which reference has been made, must be construed' with reference to the school land' grant and the provisions of the state constitution accepting the grant and providing for the sale of the land. Section 18 of an act of congress entitled “An act to establish the territorial government of Minnesota,” passed March 3, 1849 (9 St. 408, c. 121), known as the “Organic Act of Minnesota,” reserved sections 16 and 36 of every township for the purpose of being applied to schools of the territory and future state. This was supplemented by section 5 of the act of congress passed February 26, 1857 (11 St. 167, c. 60), authorizing the people -of Minnesota to form a state government. This section granted to 'the state sections 16 and 36 of the public lands in every township within the state for the use of schools, provided the grant should be accepted by the constitutional convention, and, if it were, then its terms should become obligatory on the United States and the state of Minnesota. The convention, and the people of the state by their approval and ratification of the constitution, accepted the grant of sections 16 and 36 for the use of the schools of the state, and safeguarded the trust by providing that the proceeds of .such trust lands should remain a perpetual school fund, and that no
The decision in the case of Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U. S. 267, 23 Sup. Ct. 671, 47 L. Ed. 1044, is an interesting and authoritative one. In that case the railway company, brought ejectment to recover from the defendant a portion of its right of way, to which the defendant claimed title by adverse possession under the statute of limitations of this state. 84 Minn. 152, 86 N. W. 1007, 87 Am. St. 342. The supreme court of the United States held that, although the plaintiff’s right of way granted to it by the United States, was amenable to the police power of the state, yet an individual could not acquire title to any portion thereof by adverse possession under the statute of limitations of the state. In its opinion the court, after stating that the grant of the right of way was for a specific purpose, said: “This being the nature of the title to the land granted for the special purpose named, it is evident that to give such efficacy to a statute of limitations of a state as would operate to confer a permanent right of possession to any portion thereof upon an individual for his private use would be to allow that to be done by indirection which could not be done directly.”
We are, then, of the opinion that, if the statute under consideration must be construed as authorizing the acquisition of title to the school lands of the state by adverse possession, it violates in this respect, not
Order reversed and a new trial granted.