William 0. Murtagh, M.D., seeks review of the nonfinal order denying his motion seeking a temporary injunction. He sought to preclude former patient Lynn Hurley from making allegedly defamatory statements to his patients and prospective patients. Dr. Murtagh argues that because the defamation served as the verbal act of tortious interference with business relationships, the trial court erroneously determined that injunctive relief was inapplicable as a matter of law. While we agree that the court erred in determining that injunctive relief is not an available remedy, we nonetheless affirm because Dr. Murtagh failed to present evidence to establish a clear legal right to an injunction.
The unsworn amended complaint alleged that Hurley had tortiously interfered with Dr. Murtagh’s business by making defamatory statements to Dr. Murtagh’s patients with the intent to cause Dr. Murtagh financial harm and to induce the patients to terminate them relationships with Dr. Mu-rtagh. The complaint also alleged that some of Dr. Murtagh’s patients had terminated their relationships with him as a direct result of Hurley’s defamatory statements and that this caused him to lose revenue. Dr. Murtagh sought a temporary injunction to preclude Hurley from continuing to make the allegedly defamatory statements.
Hurley opposed the temporary injunction on legal grounds. Hurley claimed that an injunction was not a proper remedy because there were adequate legal remedies and an injunction violated Hurley’s constitutional right of free speech. Hurley argued that injunctions are not proper in
In its order denying injunctive relief, the trial court did not provide any legal reasoning beyond citing to the three cases relied upon by Hurley. On appeal, Dr. Murtagh contends that the trial court erred in determining that injunctive relief was inapplicable as a matter of law. He argues that the cases relied upon by the trial court are distinguishable because they did not involve an independent legal ground for entering an injunction. He asserts that his independent legal ground is his claim for tortious interference with a business relationship based on Hurley’s verbal actions. Dr. Murtagh relies on
Zimmerman v. D.C.A. at Welleby, Inc.,
Our review of the above cases reveals that Dr. Murtagh’s position is correct. In
Murphy,
the Daytona Beach Humane Society filed a complaint alleging that the defendant was attempting to hamper the Society’s operations by approaching members and public officials and using correspondence and publications to falsely attack the Society’s management and officers.
The chancellor entered a temporary injunction, but the First District quashed the order based on its determination that it was not a proper case for issuing a temporary injunction. Id. at 923-25. The court explained that generally courts would not restrain alleged defamation “in the absence of some other independent ground for the invocation of equitable jurisdiction regardless of whether the defamation is personal or relates to one’s property.” Id. at 924. The court reasoned that in defamation cases, the aggrieved party has an adequate legal remedy. Additionally, it noted that equity jurisdiction has been limited to protecting property rights. Finally, it explained that such relief would infringe on the constitutional right to free speech and press and the right to trial by jury. Id.
The
Murphy
court relied on
Reyes v. Middleton,
“that a court of equity will never lend its aid, by injunction, to restrain the libeling or slandering of title to property, where there is no breach of trust or contract involved, but that in such cases the remedy, if any, is at law, and that the alleged insolvency of the libelant, in such cases, will not, of itself, authorize the interference of the court of equity.”
Murphy,
In
United Sanitation,
a private garbage collection company sought to enjoin the City of Tampa from denying it a permit to collect garbage.
In
Weiss,
the wife’s former attorney in a dissolution proceeding filed a motion for attorney’s fees and for a charging lien.
On appeal, the wife argued that the court was acting outside its jurisdiction by entering an injunction in the fee dispute.
Id.
at 760. The Fifth District agreed based on its determination that the attorney had not filed a pleading requesting an injunction and entry of such without a proper pleading and notice was improper. The court also stated, “In the absence of some other independent ground for invoking equitable jurisdiction, equity will not enjoin either an actual or threatened defamation.”
Id.
The court cited to
United Sanitation
for the proposition that “in-junctive relief is generally unavailable” to enjoin defamation.
Weiss,
The above three cases stand for the proposition that injunctive relief is unavailable to enjoin a person from making allegedly defamatory statements unless there are independent grounds for invoking equitable jurisdiction. As the First District noted in
Murphy,
the situation of one’s interfering with another’s business provides such an exception to the general prohibition against injunctive relief.
Murphy,
In
Zimmerman,
a builder filed a complaint alleging defamation and intentional interference with prospective business relationships against occupants of its condominium units. The builder alleged that the occupants had placed themselves outside the builder’s sales office and were picketing, telling prospective customers falsehoods about the builder, and displaying signs reflecting such falsehoods.
The trial court granted the builder’s motion for a temporary injunction, and the Fourth District affirmed in part. Id. at 1376. The court explained that a party seeking injunctive relief must show (1) irreparable harm, (2) an inadequate legal remedy, and (3) the existence of a clear legal right. Id. at 1372-73. The court reasoned that the harm was irreparable and the legal remedy was inadequate because it would be very difficult to determine how many sales were lost and the amount of lost profits in an action for damages. Id. at 1373. The court also concluded that the builder had established a clear legal right to injunctive relief by presenting “proof to a reasonable certainty of the cause of action stated in the complaint.” Id.
In evaluating this third requirement, the court looked to see whether the builder had established the following elements of tortious interference with an advantageous business relationship:
“(1) the existence of a business relationship under which the plaintiff has legal rights, (2) an intentional and unjustified interference with that relationship by the defendant, and (3) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of the business relationship.”
Id.
(quoting
Symon v. J. Rolfe Davis, Inc.,
The court also addressed the occupants’ argument that the injunction interfered with their constitutional right of free speech.
Id.
at 1374-76. The court recognized authority standing for the pi*oposition that equity will generally not be used to enjoin a person from making allegedly defamatory statements.
Id.
at 1375. However, the court noted an exception for cases in which such defamatory statements are “uttered or published incident to another tort.”
Id.
The court explained that such defamatory statements constitute “verbal acts,” which “ ‘are published or made as a part and parcel of a course of conduct deliberately carried on to further a fraudulent or other unlawful purpose,’ ” and that injunctive relief to prevent irreparable injury based on these verbal acts was proper.
Id.
(quoting
West Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor,
Based on this analysis, the court upheld the injunction in part, stating as follows:
We approve the trial court’s finding that some of the activities enjoined constitute or are incident to conduct which constitutes intentional interference with potentially advantageous business relationships, and that the rights thus tor-tiously violated are entitled to be protected by equitable intervention in the form of a temporary injunction.
Id. at 1376. However, the court determined that the portion of the injunction prohibiting peaceful picketing and displaying of signs improperly interfered with the occupants’ constitutional right of free speech. Thus, the court disapproved that part of the injunction.
In this case, as in
Zimmerman,
the complaint alleged defamation and intentional interference with prospective business relationships. Additionally, here the complaint asserted that the defamation caused current patients to terminate their relationships with Dr. Murtagh and that
That said, Dr. Murtagh has not established entitlement to an injunction because he did not present “proof to a reasonable certainty of the cause of action stated in the complaint.” The record reflects that Dr. Murtagh did not present any evidence that demonstrated or would allow an inference that Hurley’s conduct “had a deleterious effect on” Dr. Mu-rtagh’s business. Instead, Dr. Murtagh presented evidence as to statements made by Hurley and Dr. Murtagh’s opinion that these statements “crossed the line” and “influenced” the patients. Dr. Murtagh improperly attempts to rely on the allegations in his unsworn complaint that Hurley’s activities caused current customers to terminate their relationships with Dr. Mu-rtagh and that his revenue had decreased. Thus, Dr. Murtagh has not established a clear legal right to a temporary injunction, and we affirm.
Affirmed.