18 Ala. 727 | Ala. | 1851
Lead Opinion
The indictment in this case is framed under the ISth section of the 4th chapter of the Penal Code, which provides that “ every one who shall inveigle, steal, carry or entice away any slave, with the view to convert such slave to his own use, or the use of any other person, or to enable such slave to reach some other State or country, where such slave may enjoy freedom, such person shall, on conviction, be punished by confinement in the penitentiary, not less than ten years.” Clay’s Dig. 419. The testimony tended to prove that the
The 25th section of the 4th chapter of the Penal Code provides as follows: “Every person, who shall fraudulently or feloniously steal the property of another in any other Slate or country, and shall bring the same within this State, may be convicted and punished in the same manner, as if such larceny had been committed in this State; and in every such case, such larceny may be charged to have been committed in any county, in or through which such stolen property may have been brought.' Clay’s Dig., 420. It is manifest that the evidence proves an offence against the 25th section of the 4th chapter of the Penal Code, and not against the 18th, under which the indictment is framed; yet we are constrained to hold, that it was admissible. In the case of Williams v. The State, 15 Ala. 259, the indictment charged the prisoner with the larceny of a slave, according to the precedents of the common law; the evidence tended to show that the slave was stolen in Tennessee and brought into this State; and upon this evidence he was convicted and the sentence prescribed by the 18th section of the 4th chapter of the Penal Code was pronounced against him. This court reversed the judgment, holding that the punishment prescribed by this section of the Code could only be pronounced, when the indictment was framed upon it. But whether any punishment could be imposed, when the indictment is framed, as at the common law, was not decided in that case. It was said, however, that the proof did not sustain (he indictment. In the subsequent case of Ham v. The State, 17 Ala. 188, the indictment was a common law indictment, charging the felonious taking to have been committed in the county of Perry, but the evidence showed that the slave was stolen in Mississippi and! brought into this State; the conviction was held to be erro
I have said that one cannot be convicted of the larceny of a
2. The next question' we ■ propose to examine is, whether a runaway slave is the subject' of - larceny. Independent of any decisions upon the subject, I should not entertain a doubt but tliat larceny may be committed in stealing a runaway slave. If property'be found in the high-Way, arid the finder knows'the owner, but instead of restoring it to the owner, he converts it to his own use, such conversion amounts to a felony. — 2 Russ.
3. The next inquiry is, whether it was necessary to introduce the laws of Louisiana, to show that the taking would have constituted a larceny in that State. It is manifest that it is not the crime committed in Louisiana, that our Statute intended to punish; neither our courts, nor our Legislature have power ■beyond the limits of our State; we can neither define, nor punish crimes committed against the laws of another country; but we can define and punish crimes committed here. It is not, therefore, the larceny committed in Louisiana that constitutes the offence, but it is the bringing of the stolen property into this ■State. We have the right to forbid this, and may punish for the violation of our law commanding that it shall not be done» Seay v. The State, 3 Stew. 123. Whether, therefore, the felonious taking of the property of another in the State of Louisiana be criminally punished in that State or not, is immaterial; but the inquiry here is, whether the property was taken in Louisiana under such circumstances, as would constitute larceny in this Stale, if the act was committed here. If the taking in Louisiana would amount to larceny according to our laws, and the property be brought feloniously into this State, the crime is complete, without regard to the laws of Louisiana.
4. The last question, we deem it necessary to notice, is this:
After the best examination of all the questions growing out of the case, we feel constrained to hold that there is no error in the record, and the judgment must be affirmed. It is, however, doe to myself to say, that but for the previous decisions of this court, construing the Statutes under which the prisoner was convicted, my own reasoning would have led to a different result; but not being able to say, without doubt, that those decisions are incorrect, I yield to them as authority atsd unite in affirming tiae judgment*
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in affirming this judgment, but do not agree with the Chief Justice altogether in his reasoning. 1 I think the decisions of this court, which he reluctantly follows, give to the Statute a very correct construction, as may be easily shown. The two sections of the Statute which he has quoted, taken together, merely make the stealing of the slaves in Louisiana, and bringing them into Montgomery county by the thief, a stealing of them in Montgomery, and, so far from presenting the legal anomaly he supposes, furnish a striking analogy to the ordinary case of indicting the thief in one county, into which he brings property which he has stolen in another. In that case, the asportation into the county of the venue constitutes the felony in that county, as by these sections the asportation into the county of Montgomery, though the property was stolen in another State by the prisoner, constitutes the larceny in Montgomery.
This State certainly has no right to punish for breaches of the criminal law of another State; but it has the right to say, if thieves from other States bring the stolen property here, they shall be deemed guilty of stealing it here, and shall be “ convicted and punished” as if they had stolen it here. “ In the same manner,” says the act — that is, the indictment is the same, and the venue may be laid in any county through which ite has conveyed the stolen property. The prisoner is presumed-to know the law which makes this larceny, and when charged with stealing in this State, he has but to apply the facts to the
The plain meaning of the two sections is, that if a person ■ steal property in another State or country and bring it here, his bringing it here makes him guilty of stealing it here-, and he may be convicted and punished precisely as if he had stolen it here; and thus the Statute relieves the State from the necessity of describing accurately the manner in which the offence was committed.