210 Mass. 188 | Mass. | 1911
The instructions as to liability under which a general verdict was returned for the company were largely, if not wholly, predicated upon Haskell v. Boston District Messenger Co. 190 Mass. 189, and portions of the opinion, defining the implied contract or duty of the defendant in that case and the care required in the selection of messengers, were quoted as applicable in the case at bar. But the ground upon which the defendant was exonerated in that case rested upon the contract with the plain
It is contended by the defendant, that it was accustomed to substitute for the messenger who answered a patron’s call, and to whom the carriage and delivery of parcels had been committed by the patron, another messenger to perform the service, if the convenient management of its business required the change, and the jury were instructed that the substitution could be properly
The defendant sent Tierney not as its. messenger but as its clerk, and the jury upon the uncontradicted evidence could have found, that the plaintiff believing him to be a messenger, not only gave him specific directions for his guidance, but entrusted to him alone the duty of delivery. No express contract having existed for want of a mutual understanding between the parties, and the defendant as a bailee for compensation having voluntarily accepted the gowns to be forwarded, and assumed the control and care of them, their subsequent delivery by Tierney to the defendant’s employee and messenger boy, one Sehwatz, whom he selected, did not constitute Sehwatz the plaintiff’s servant or agent.
The defendant was fully informed of the nature and particulars of the service required. If through the negligence of Tierney in misdirecting the bundle when he returned to the defendant’s office, or through the negligence of Sehwatz, as'the jury would have been warranted in finding upon the evidence, the gowns were never delivered to the plaintiff’s customer, the defendant would be liable for the loss. Newhall v. Paige, 10 Gray, 366. Maynard v. Buck, 100 Mass. 40, 47. Wood v. Remick, 143 Mass. 453. American District Telegraph Co. v. Walker, 72 Md. 454. Sleat v. Fagg, 5 B. & Ald. 342. The plaintiff’s first, second and fourth requests should have been given, and the instructions, that Sehwatz was the plaintiff’s servant for whose conduct the defendant would not be responsible, unless the jury found that the defendant did not exercise ordinary care in his selection and employment, were erroneous.
The plaintiff’s third request, that-the defendant might be found liable for conversion if the jury were satisfied that in response to the plaintiff’s order the defendant agreed to send a messenger to her place of business, and instead sent its servant, who was not authorized to act as messenger, but who without disclosing his want of authority wrongly received the bundle, which was never delivered as she directed or returned to the
But in connection with the fourth count and this request, it should be noticed, that if contrary to the plaintiff’s directions the bundle or parcel was delivered to the wrong person, the delivery would be a conversion, as neither Tierney nor Schwatz was the plaintiff’s servant. The rule is well stated by Mr. Justice Foster in Hall v. Boston & Worcester Railroad, 14 Allen, 439, 443: “ A misdelivery of property by any bailee to a person unauthorized by the true owner is of itself a conversion, rendering the bailee liable in trover, without regard to the question of due care or degree of negligence. This is a well established legal principle, applicable to every description of bailment. . . . And a delivery to an unauthorized person is as much a conversion as would be a sale of the property, or an appropriation of it to the bailee’s own use. In such cases neither a sincere and apparently well founded belief that the tortious act was right, nor the exercise of any degree of care, constitutes a defense even to a gratuitous bailee.”
The plaintiff also excepted to the instruction, that “ if the jury find that the plaintiff delivered to the defendant’s messenger boy a package containing articles of great value without notifying the defendant or its messenger boy that said package did contain articles of great value, the plaintiff was not in the exercise of due care and cannot recover,” and “ that if the package was delivered and no notice of its contents was given to the company, or to anybody representing it, then this plaintiff is not entitled to recover.” No evidence appears that the company had established any rules or regulations exempting it from liability, if packages of ordinary merchandise which it engaged to deliver were lost in transportation, nor was there proof of a general custom, that in common with other companies engaged in a similar business only packages of small value were received. In the absence of such evidence these instructions, and the further in
The exceptions to the admission of evidence really involve the measure of the plaintiff’s damages. The gowns, having been made to order for a particular customer, may have had no market value, and evidence of the cost of the labor and material was competent as bearing upon the question.
We have considered the exceptions so far as argued by the plaintiff, and for the reasons stated there must be a new trial.
Exceptions sustained.