157 Mass. 248 | Mass. | 1892
1. There was evidence that the defendant ratified the making of the contract of sale in his name. It
2. The contract was dated “ Springfield, Mass.,” and the real estate was described as the “ house and lot 343 Worthington Street.” It appeared that the house 343 Worthington Street, Springfield, was well known, and that the lot “ was well defined by monuments consisting of fences.” Any description in a deed or contract of sale of real estate from which the property can be exactly located is sufficient, although paroi evidence is necessary to apply the description to the land and fix the boundaries. This description was sufficient. Hurley v. Brown, 98 Mass. 545. Mead v. Parker, 115 Mass. 413.
3. The only remaining exception is to the refusal of the presiding judge to rule that there was “ no evidence in the case to justify a finding that the fourth instalment, falling due February 7, 1889, was either paid or tendered to defendant, and that as to this instalment she was in default, so that her action cannot be maintained.” It was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the fourth instalment was either paid or tendered to the defendant, if he had, in breach of his contract, refused to receive the third instalment, and if she showed him her willingness to perform the contract, and he declined to accept her performance of it, and declined to perform his part of it. Linton v. Allen, 154 Mass. 432. The defendant testified that he fre
The plaintiff might prove a breach of contract on the part of the defendant without showing that he conveyed the property to anybody else, or that she had formally demanded a conveyance to herself. In the absence of a full report of the evidence touching the defendant’s alleged breach of contract, it is to be presumed that the case was properly submitted to the jury, and that their verdict was warranted. At all events, it does not appear that the judge should have given the instruction requested.
Exceptions overruled.
“ If you find, upon the evidence, that after the making of the contract by the agent it was brought to the knowledge of the defendant, and he accepted the act of his agent, and adopted that act and made it his own, then it is as though the defendant, on the 7th day of May, 1888, had himself signed the memorandum or agreement, and delivered it to the plaintiff. And you may proceed as though on that day the minds of the parties met, and the agreement was made which was incorporated in this instrument and delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff.”