Murray v. AlonsoMurray v. Alonso
William R. Murray, an attorney appearing pro se, sued various Tuscaloosa and Birmingham health care providers, alleging that they had failed to diagnose and treat an alleged injury to his left bicep. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favоr of all of the defendants. Murray appealed from the summary judgment.
On September 28, 1990, Murray was involved in a scuffle with a Tuscalоosa Municipal Court bailiff. Murray contends that the bailiff grabbed his left arm at the bicep and threw him against a plate glass structure. On the day of this alleged injury, Murray went to the emergency room at West Alabama General Hospital in Northport, Alabаma, and was examined by Dr. Jimmy Tu, who diagnosed Murray as having multiple contusions to his left medial bicep. Dr. Tu prescribed an anti-inflammatory drug and instructed Murray to elevate his arm and keep ice on it. Additionally, Dr. Tu told Murray that the soreness should go away in time, but tо return for a checkup if it did not. Murray did not return to Dr. Tu for treatment after September 28, 1990.
Approximately three and one-hаlf months later, Murray went to the emergency room at the University of Alabama at Birmingham Hospital (“UAB”), where he was examined by Dr. Dеbbie Sanford. The examination revealed chronic left shoulder and arm pain. The diagnosis was that Murray suffered from either a questionable rotator cuff injury or osteoarthritis. Dr. Sanford arranged a follow-up visit with Dr. Jorge E. Alonso, an orthopedic specialist at UAB. After the referral to Dr. Alonso, Murray received no further treatment from Dr. Sanford. Dr. Alonso noted that Murray hаd nearly a full range of motion in his left arm. Murray’s X-rays did not reveal an injury to his left bicep. After diagnosing Murray as having bicep tendinitis, Dr. Alоnso arranged for Dr. Donald H. Lee, also an orthopedic specialist, to give a second opinion. Dr. Lee’s diаgnosis was bicep tendinitis; however, because Murray’s complaints were more related to headaches and а radiating type of pain, Dr. Lee referred him to the neurology department at UAB. Dr. Lee last examined Murray in November 1991.
Some 14 months later, in January 1993, Murray was examined by Dr. Edward D. Hillard, who diagnosed Murray'as suffering from a ruptured bicep tendon. Soon thereafter, Murray filed this action. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment, supported by their affidavits and by the medical records of Murray’s treatment. Murray responded to the defendants’ summary judgment motions by submitting to the trial court a narrative statement of the facts on which his action was based, photographs of the arm he alleged had been injured, and certified copiеs of his medical records from Dr. Hil-lard. The trial court entered a summary judgment for the defendants.
One moving for a summary judgment has the initiаl burden to make a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact (i.e., that there is no dispute as to any material fact) and that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Ala.R.Civ.P.; McClendon v. Mountain Top Indoor Flea Market, Inc.,
Rule 56 must be read in conjunction with the “substantial evidence rule,” § 12-21-12, Ala.Code 1975, for actions filed after June 11,1987. See Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County,
This Court recently reiterated the proсedure a trial court must follow in ruling on a summary judgment motion in a professional malpractice case. “[Ojnce the defendant offers expert testimony on his behalf (albeit his own opinion), ... the defendant is entitled to a summary judgment, unless the plaintiff counters the defendant’s evidence with expert testimony in support of the plaintiffs claim.” Pettigrew v. LeRoy F. Harris, M.D., P.C.,
In Jones v. Bradford,
“1) where a foreign instrumentality is found in the plaintiffs body following surgery; 2) where the injury сomplained of is in no way connected to the condition for which the plaintiff sought treatment; 3) where the plaintiff emрloys a recognized standard or authoritative medical text or treatise to prove what is or is not proper practice; and 4) where the plaintiff is himself or herself a medical expert qualified to evaluate the doctor’s allegedly negligent conduct.’ ”
Murray’s case does not come within any of these exceptions. In response to the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, Murray argued that he should not be required to produce a medical expert in order to dеfeat these motions because, he contended, his injury was obvious to the average layperson. He included photographs of his arm taken at various times after he says he was injured. Although Murray’s response included passing references suggesting that local libraries had available medical treatises describing his condition, he did not cite a specific text. Certified copies of Dr. Hillard’s records of Murray’s condition, which Murray filed with the trial court, did not suggest that any of the defendants breached the applicable standard of care. We must, therefore, affirm the summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
AFFIRMED.