100 Tenn. 100 | Tenn. | 1897
This cause was decided for defendant by the Chancellor, and his decree was reversed
The very interesting question is presented whether petipleum oil ' is a mineral or not. It arises upon the construction of a deed which conveyed certain lands, reserving to the grantor ‘ all mines, minerals, and metals in and under the land.” Subsequent conveyances -were made to third persons without reservation, and the present owners hold under a deed conveying in fee simple and making no reservation and no reference to “ mines, minerals, and metals in and under said land.”
The Chancellor was of opinion that petroleum was not embraced in the term ‘ ‘ minerals. ’ ’ The Court of Chancery Appeals reversed this holding in a very exhaustive, elaborate, learned, and able opinion, and cite the dictionaries, legal and otherwise, the encyclopedias, and many works of science, and a large array of .legal authorities holding to the same effect, and they state that, after a most exhaustive search, they have been able to find but one case holding a contrary doctrine. We .can neither elaborate nor improve upon the holding of the Court of Chancery Appeals, and are content to affirm their holding and adopt their opinion as our own.
It is next said that the present owners are protected in their fee simple title to the land by the statute of limitation of seven years. The cause was heard upon an agreed statement of facts, and the
Upon all the points raised we are of opinion the Court of Chancery Appeals is correct, and their decree is affirmed, and the opinion of that Court, delivered by Judge M. M. Neil, is appended and made the opinion also of this Court.
The following is the opinion:
“Neil, J. The questions in this case arise from the following agreed state of facts:
“‘We, William T. Murray, as complainant, and
££ ‘1. It is agreed that John B. Rodgers, on the twenty-fourth day of October, 1853,. sold and conveyed to Mathias Wright a certain tract of land in the thirteenth civil district of Fentress County, Tennessee, bounded and described as follows [here described], in which deed said John B. Rodgers reserved to himself, his heirs and assigns, all mines, minerals, and metals in and under said land. Said Wright conveyed said land by general warranty deed, without any reservation of said mines, minerals, and metals, and whatever title said deed communicated under the facts hereinafter set out, passed to the defendant, James A. Allred, to the portion claimed by him by regular chain of conveyances from Rodgers, through Wright and others, which purported to convey an estate in fee, except the deed from Rodgers to said Wright, which reserves the mineral interest as above stated. And said Allred and those through whom he claims, have been in the actual, open, and notorious possession of said land, under color of title, for more than seven years, claiming adversely to the world to the extent of their title papers, which definitely identifies the land intended
“‘2. That said John B. Rodgers, during his life, and his heirs after his death, have claimed said i mines and minerals and metals, including petroleum oil and natural gas, until the same passed out of them and passed into William T. Murray by judicial sale, who now owns whatever 'title they owned in said land before said sale.
“‘3. The said William T. Murray, by his agent, went on to said portion of the land last mentioned in said Rodgers’ deed, claimed by said Allred, and proposed to drill for petroleum oil and natural gas, and was refused the right to do so by said Allred, who conveyed the same to one Lewis Choate, and warranted the title, the said Allred contending that
“ ‘ 4. Complainant, Murray, contends that petroleum oil and natural gas are included in the words mines, minerals, and metals, , and especially so as there is nothing else for the reservation to operate upon, and that the possession of the said Allred and those through whom he claims does not extinguish the title of the said mines, minerals, and metals,' (1) because the facts stated, which are relied upon to effect the bar of the statute of seven years, are not sufficient to establish the character, of adverse holding that would effect a bar of his rights or perfect the title of defendants; (2) because their possession was consistent with the complainant’s title; (3) the said Murray contends that no cause of action would accrue in such case until the adverse holder invaded mineral rights, and that the cultivation of the soil was not such invasion, and therefore no statute of limitations runs as to said reservation.
“ ‘And it is further agreed that the Hon. T. J. Eisher, Chancellor of the Fifth Chancery Division of the State of Tennessee, may pass upon said facts and render such decree as the law and the facts may warrant. The Chancellor and the Supreme Court, in case of appeal, will consult any and all
“ Upon this state of facts, the Chancellor decreed as follows : That the words mines, minerals and metals did not include oil and gas; also, that there had been seven years adverse holding under the deeds purporting to convey an estate in fee, and this vested the defendant with a perfect title in fee, including the title to oil and gas, and that the adverse holding of James A. Allred and those under whom he claimed had extinguished the title of John B. Rodgers, claiming under the adverse reservation as to the mines, minerals, and metals. He thereupon dismissed complainant’s case, and rendered judgment against Murray for the costs. An appeal was prayed and granted, and errors were assigned as follows:
‘ ‘ (1) The Chancellor erred because he did not find, as a matter of law, that the deed from Rodgers to Wright expressly reserved to himself all of the petroleum oil interest in the land conveyed, and that by the subsequent judicial sale Rodgers’ title in the same vested in complainant.
“¿(2) The Court erred because he did not hold, as a matter of fact, viz.: It not appearing at what time Wright sold the land, and consequently it not appearing how much of the time that the land was
“‘(3) The Court erred because it does not hold that, as a matter of law, the possession of the defendants was consistent with complainant’s title, and that there being a double ownership in the land, no cause of action could accrue in his favor so long as the owner of the surface only exercised his legal rights. The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the mineral rights in the land were invaded. ’
“The first question to be determined is whether petroleum oil is included within the language of the reservation of mines, minerals and metals.
“In the Century Dictionary petroleum is defined: ‘An oily substance of great economical importance, especially as a source of light, appearing naturally oozing from crevices in rocks, or floating on the surface of water, and also obtained in very large quantities in various parts of the world by boring into the rock; rock-oil.’
“‘Various opinions have been expressed concerning the origin of petroleum,’ says Prof. S. F. Peck-ham, in the American Cyclopedia.'’ ‘Until quite .re
‘ ‘ Clearly, from this description of the substance, it could not, in any sense, fall under the terms metal or metallic. The question, then, to be determined is: Does it fall within the term ‘mines and minerals ? ’ ”
“In 2 Rapalje & Lawrence’s Law Dictionary, 821, it is said: ‘In the most general sense of the term, minerals are those parts of the earth which are capable of being got from underneath the surface for the purpose of profit. The term, therefore, includes coal, metal ores of all kinds, clay, stone, slate, and caprolites. (Surface means that part of the land which, is capable of being used for agricultural purposes. Midland Rail Co. v. Checkley, L. R., 4 Eq., 19; Heat v. Gill, 7 Ch., 669; Attorney General v. Tomblin, 5 Ch. D., 762.) A mine is a work for the excavation of minerals by means of pits, shafts, levels, tunnels, etc., as opposed to g, quarry where the whole excavation is open. While unreserved, minerals form part of the land, and as such are real estate. When severed, they become personal chattels.’
“In 15 Am. & Eng. Ene. L., 500, the fol
‘ ‘ In that case the question was whether the mineral stone paint passed under the terms ‘ mines and minerals. ’ Upon this question the Court, in that case, says: ‘The character of the substance of stone paint, as the witness called it, is given fin the bill, and the correctness of the description there given is admitted in the answer and confirmed by the evidence. It is a substance similar in general appearance to red shale, so soft as to be easily cut with a knife when first excavated, but differing in appearance from the surrounding earth. It is found in regular strata or bowlders of different sizes. It hardens when exposed to the air, and when broken up and ground, it is used as a paint, and is valuable for that purpose. The manner in which it is procured from the earth, and its particular location below the surface, are particularly described by a witness who was the foreman in carrying on the works. They commenced working in an old shaft which had been used for raising copper ore. As they proceeded with the excavation, the depth of the paint stone was about one foot in eight or ten, perhaps a little
“‘The analysis,’ the Court continues, ‘only establishes the fact that it is not a metalliferous ore. If the terms, mines and minerals, used in the deed, could, by any fair construction, be confined to me
“‘Can this stone paint, then, be fairly and naturally embraced in the term mineral? It is a body which is destitute of organism, and which naturally exists within the earth. It is below the surface, distinguished from the ordinary earth. It is in strata, and is acquired by ordinary means of mining. Also, Professor Eoremus says that it is not in veins, but in strata, and that he would not call the mode of extracting it mining, yet this test of it would exclude salt from the class of minerals, for salt, too, is found in strata, and not in veins, and is obtained by shafts, and by the same mode of operation by which this matter is excavated from the earth. It is valuable for its mineral properties, and by a cheap and easy process of grinding is converted into a merchantable article adapted to the mechanical and ornamental arts. It is embraced in the definition given by men of science to the term mineral. In Bakewell’s Mineralogy, p. 7, it is said, ‘The term mineral in common life is generally applied to denote substances dug out of the earth or obtained from mining.’ In Cleveland’s Mineralogy, p. 1, the
“In a note to the case of Dunham v. Kirkpatric, appearing on page 698 of 47 Am. Rep., the following appears: ‘Freestone is a mineral within a reservation in a deed. Bell v. Wilson, L. R., 1 Ch., 303. Coal oil is a ‘mineral product.’ Thompson v. Noble, 3 Pittsb., 201. Petroleum is a ‘mineral, and a part of the realty.’ Stoughton’s App., 88 Pa. St., 198: Coal is a ‘mineral.’ Henry v. Lowe, 73 Mo., 96. In Tucker v. Linger, Eng. Ct. App., 46 L. T. (N. S.), 894, it was held that flint stones, turned up by the plow in the course of husbandry, were ‘ minerals ’ within a reservation to the lessor of ‘ mines and minerals, and quarries of stone, brick-earth and gravel pits. ’ This holding was affirmed by the House of Lords. 8 App. Cas., 508. In Ross v. Wainman, 14 M. & W., 859, the Court said that the word, ‘ though more frequently applied to substances containing metals, in its proper sense, inchides all fossil bodies or matters dug out of mines.’ And in David v. Roper, 3 Drew., 294, it was restricted to such products as are worked by means of mines. More recently, however, in Hext v. Gill, L. R., 7 Ch. App., 699, the natural meaning of the term was said to be: “Every substance
“In the case of Williamson v. Jones (W. Va.), reported in 25 L. R. A., 222, the following language is used by Mr. Justice Holt: ‘The authorities now very generally — universally, so far as I have examined them — hold petroleum to be a mineral, and as much a part of realty as timber, coal, or iron ore, except that, in proper cases,' its mobility as a subterranean liquid must be taken into consideration, as in the case of salt water, etc. The Courts of the State of Pennsylvania have had many cases, some involving rights of great value, in which the point arose, and have examined the question thoroughly, considering it with great care with reference to its being property where it is found, and its character and nature in general as property.’
“‘Oil is a mineral, and, being a mineral, is a part of the realty.’ Funck v. Haldeman (1866), 53 Pa., 229, 249.
“In the case of Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 5 L. R. A., 731 (130 Pa., 235), the Master said: ‘ Gas is a mineral, and while'
“We have found only one authority opposed to the conclusion that petroleum is a mineral. That is the case before referred to of Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. St. Rep., 36 (S. C., 47 Am. Rep., 696). The great weight of authority is not only op
‘ ‘ In the light of these authorities, we are bound to hold that petroleum is a mineral, and that it falls within the terms of the reservation in the deed
The result is that the decree of the Chancellor must be reversed with costs, and a decree entered here affirming the decree of the Court of Chancery Appeals for the complainant in accordance with this opinion.