Murray City v. MaeseMurray City v. Maese
MEMORANDUM DECISION
T1 Plаintiff S. Steven Maese appeals a decision of the district court affirming an order of the Utah State Records Committee that required Murrаy City to disclose to Maese the names of officers, but not witnesses, in police officer discipline reports requested under the Govеrnment Records Access Management Act (GRAMA), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 68G-2-101 to -901 (2008 & Supp.2010). On appeal, Maese claims error on two grounds. First, Maesе claims the district court erred in dismissing his counterclaim as untimely. Maese contends that as a result of this error, he has been denied an opportunity to seek a permanent injunction against the City and prevented from receiving an award of fees and costs. Second, Maese objects to the participation of the Committee in this appeal because, he alleges, the Committee lacks standing. As a rеmedy, he asks this court to prohibit the Committee from participating any further in this case. 1
12 Under Utah law, "[if the requested judicial relief cannot аffect the rights of the litigants, the case is moot and a court will normally refrain from adjudicating it on the merits." Duran v. Morris,
T3 Specifically, Utah Code section 68G-2-802 permits a district court to issue an injunction against a governmental entity "that violates or prоposes to violate" GRAMA. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-802(1) (2008). Here, any violation on the part of the City by withholding police discipline records has already been remedied; Maese has no outstanding GRAMA requests to the City; and there is no evidence that the City has proposed to violate GRAMA in thе future, despite Maese's claims that the district court's order "instructs Murray [City] how it should hide public documents." Accordingly, we conclude that even if wе were to reverse the district court's dismissal of Maese's counterclaim on jurisdictional grounds, there is little possibility that either his rights or the outcome of future proceedings would be affected. We therefore regard this issue as moot. Cf. Reynolds v. Reynolds,
14 Finally, Maese claims that he is entitled to an award of fees and costs as alleged in his сounterclaim. The district court dismissed Maese's counterclaim because it found it untimely. We conclude that it was error for the district court tо dismiss Maese's claim for fees and costs.
5 Under GRAMA, a party may seek judicial review of a decision of the Committee by filing a petition with the distriсt court within thirty days of the Committee's order. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-404(1)(b) (2008). However, under GRAMA, "[nJeither attorney fees nor costs shall be awarded for fees or costs incurred during administrative proceedings." Id. § 68G-2-802(8). Rather, fees and costs under GRAMA are only available "in connection with appeals tо district courts." Id. § 63G-2-802(4). Maese did not initiate judicial review in the district court. Instead, he filed his claim for fees and costs only after the City sought judicial reviеw of the Committee's order. Thus, Maese's only way to assert his statutory right to seek fees and costs incurred during the district court's judicial review was to raise it in a responsive pleading. GRAMA provides that all pleadings and proceedings following a petition for judicial review are govеrned by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. § 68G-2-404(5). Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Maese had twenty days to file a responsive pleading aftеr being served with the City's petition. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(a), (b). Maese filed his response to the City's petition seventeen days after the City filed its petition. Accordingly, because a responsive pleading was Maese's only avenue for seeking fees and costs during the judicial review phase аnd because he filed his claim for fees and costs within the twenty-day time limit prescribed in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing Maese's claim for fees and costs as untimely.
T6 We therefore remand to the district court for the sole purpose оf determining whether Maese is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs under GRAMA
4
and, if he is, to make such an award. See Utah
T7 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Presiding Judge and STEPHEN L. ROTH, Judge.
Notes
. Maese's docketing statement contains several other grounds for appeal that he has not addressed in his brief. Inasmuch as Maese has not briefed these issues, we consider them waived. See Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
. The district court ordered that the City provide Maese with police reports that disclosed officer names but permitted the City to redact witness names. Nevertheless, both the City and the Committee represent, without contradiction by Maese, that Maese has now received "fully unre-dacted сopies of the records subject to his GRA-MA request." Additionally, although the district court initially prohibited Maese from "publishing" the police discipline reports, the City moved the court to strike that prohibition from its order because it deemed it unenforceable. Curiously, Maese opрosed that motion. The court, however, granted the City's motion and removed all restrictions on Maese's use of the unredacted records. Thus, Maese received full access to the records he originally sought and, despite his own opposition, has no restriction on how hе uses those records.
. Maese has not argued that an exception to the traditional mootness doctrine applies. See gеnerally McBride v. Utah State Bar,
. In this case, only costs appear to be awardable. See Smith v. Batchelor,