183 Iowa 739 | Iowa | 1918
I. On the 26th day of August, 1915, plaintiff and the defendant Charles V.. Keesey entered into a written ¡contract whereby '¡plaintiff agreed to convey to defendant a section of land in Cass County, North Dakota, for an expressed consideration of $56,750, to be paid by defendant’s assuming and agreeing to pay mortgages amounting to $23,000, and the conveyance to plaintiff of a 305-acre tract located in Dallas County, Iowa, subject to a mortgage of $12,000. On December 7, 1915, defendant’s attorneys wrote plaintiff that he elected to rescind the contract, upon the ground that same was procured by fraud. This action is brought to compel the -specific performance of the contract. The petition is in the usual form for such purpose, and alleges- that the defendant Alta Keesey is the wife of her codefendant.
The defendant Charles V. Keesey answered, admitting the execution of the contract, and alleged that plaintiff, through Charles Murray, its agent, represented to him, before the contract was entered into, that the Dakota land be
The defendant Alta Keesey, for separate answer, in substance adopts the material allegations of her husband’s answer, and alleged that the Dallas County land was the homestead of herself and husband, which had never been ad-measured or set off from the rest of the tract, and that the contract was invalid. Other issues tendered by the pleadings need not be set out in detail.
The plaintiff company, of which Charles Murray was president, was, at the time of the transactions in question, in the real estate business in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and
On January 25, 1915, William M. Miller and Avife, by warranty deed, conveyed said premises to1 W. IT. Woods and F. M. Hallam for a consideration of $40,000, and on November 3, 1915, William Hamilton Woods, F. M. Hallam, and F. J. Lahl, of Monmouth, Illinois, and the plaintiff herein, by Frank C. Murray, its agent, entered into a written contract, by which the parties named agreed to convey the Dakota land to plaintiff, at an expressed consideration of $61 per acre, on the basis of 635 acres; and, on December 1, 1915, William M. Miller and wife executed a warranty deed conveying the Dakota land to Charles V. Keesey, defendant herein, for an expressed consideration of $57,200. When offered in evidence, the following was endorsed on the back thereof: “This deed not used and to be cancelled or discharged;” and on January 15, 1915, William M. Miller, and wife conveyed said premises to Joseph W. Sullivan, for au expressed consideration of $57,200; and on January 17, 1916, the said Joseph W. Sullivan and Avife executed a Avarranty deed conveying said Dakota land to plaintiff.
Defendant claims that he was induced by one Duff, a local agent of plaintiff in Dallas County, to accompany him to Minneapolis for the purpose of negotiating a sale or exchange of his farm. Upon his arrival, he met some of the members of plaintiff’s firm, but had no conversation with them concerning the land, and went from there with defendant to Castleton, where they met Charles Murray, and, accompanied by him, looked at various tracts of land, including that described in the contract.
Charles Murray, in substance, denied the alleged fraudulent representations, and it might be urged from his testimony that defendant acted upon his own judgment, wholly uninfluenced by anything that was said to him by Murray concerning the land. Both plaintiff and defendant offered evidence of the value of the Dakota and the Dallas County land. As usual, the witnesses varied considerably in their judgment as to market values. Each side called six witnesses, those called by plaintiff fixing the value of the Dakota land at from $75 to $100 per acre; whereas defendant’s witnesses testified that it was worth from $65 to $80, only one of whom, however, placed its value above $65. Plaintiff’s witnesses fixed the value of the Dallas County land at from $120 to $125, the majority favoring the latter estimate; whereas defendant’s witnesses testified that this land was worth from $135 to $140 per acre, the latter figure being the one favored by the majority. Murray did not .testify as to
As we understand the evidence, some time after the contract in question was executed, plaintiffs entered into a contract for the purchase of the Dakota land from Woods, Hallam, and Labi, at an agreed consideration of $G1 per acre, on the basis of 635 acres.
Most of the legal questions discussed by counsel are ruled by a long line of prior decisions of this court, and we will not, therefore, go into much detail in the discussion thereof. We have stated the testimony, in substance, upon which the defendant relied to establish the allegation of fraud cou-‘ tained in his answer.
It wms said by us in Hetland v. Bilstad, 140 Iowa 411, that “statements of value or of quality may be made with • the purpose of having them accepted as of fact, and, if this is done and so relied on, they are to be treated as the parties designed they should be, namely, representations of fact.” See, also, Hise v. Thomas, 181 Iowa 700, and cases therein cited.
The trial court found that -defendant was induced to enter into the contract by the fraudulent representations of Charles Murray, the agent of plaintiff; and, upon a careful reading of the record, we reach the conclusion that its finding is fully sustained thereby. The statements and representations of Murray as to the value of the Dakota land are shown to have been wholly false; and that they were, known by him to be false is abundantly established by the evidence. It was shown that plaintiff maintained an office at Castleton, near the land, and was, at the time, authorized to sell the same at $60 or $61 per acre. The advantage obtained by plaintiff in the transaction was very large, and the trial court found that the contract was unconscionable. We -are not disposed to disturb the finding of the district court upon this question, or its finding that the transaction upon the part of plaintiff was fraudulent.
We need not set out the particular provision of the contract referred to; but it is apparent from the record that both parties contemplated and intended an exchange of properties, and not a sale of the tract for cash. All of ihe negotiations between the parties contemplated that the defendant would convey the Iowa land, subject io certain encumbrances, in exchange for the Dakota tract, subject also to mortgage encumbrances. In view, however, of our con- ■ elusion that the contract was procured by the fraud of plaintiff, it is unnecessary for us to construe the same, and it is immaterial which construction should prevail. If the same were construed as a contract strictly for the exchange of properties, it could not be enforced, for the reason that plaintiff at no time elected to accept a conveyance thereof, exclusive of the homestead; and, if construed in accordance with the contention of counsel for appellant, its fraud in the procurement of the contract is conclusive against it.
The facts do not bring the case within the exception noted, nor do they support the alleged estoppel. The rule contended for by counsel for appellant has often been applied; but, for reasons already stated, it cannot avail upon this appeal.
IV. In compliance with the terms of the contract, defendant, at the time of its execution, gave plaintiff his note for $6,000, as earnest noney- to be returned to him when the deeds were exchanged; but plaintiff negotiated said note to a bank in Illinois, which brought suit thereon against him in the Federal court, and defendant paid same before judgment. The court awarded him judgment for the amount of said payment, with interest on his counterclaim. Complaint is made by counsel for appellant of this ruling of the court; but it is frankly conceded by them that, if there were fraud in the inception of the-contract, the judgment of the court was proper. It is, therefore, unnecessary for us to discuss this question.
We have carefully read the entire record, and are convinced that the judgment of the trial court is right. It is, therefore,- — Affirmed.