68 F. 908 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York | 1895
On August 30, 1894, the appellants imported and entered for duty at the port of New York certain worsted dress goods. The importers claimed they were dutiable at 50 per cent, ad valorem, under paragraph 283, Schedule K, of the tariff act of August, 1894. They were classified for duty at 12 cents per square yard arcl 50 per cent, ad valorem, under the provisions of paragraph 395, ¡¿Schedule K, of the tariff act of October 1, 1890. The board of general appraisers sustained the assessment, and the importers appealed. The single question presented by the appeal is whether these goods are dutiable under the earlier or later act.
It is admitted that these goods are made from the fleece of the sheep, and are, in that sense, a product of wool. The earlier tariff acts provided rates of duty on manufactures of wool differing from those on manufactures of worsted, and recognized wool and worsted as different materials. The tariff acts of 1890 and 1894, while retaining the distinction in terminology, provided the same rates of duty for woolen as for worsted goods. The courts have repeatedly recognized and enforced this distinction between wool and worsted, and have uniformly held that manufactures of worsted were not manufactures of wool, within the meaning of the tariff acts. Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137; Riggs v. Frick. Taney, 100;
“The tariff act itself, however, recognizes a difference between woolen and worsted articles; between goods composed of worsted and goods composed of wool.- We find the words ‘wool’ or ‘worsted’ used in contrast at least six times in this very schedule; and the examination of successive tariff acts, back to, I think, 1810, shows an unbroken continuance of such contrasting use. It seems plain, therefore, that the words ‘woolen cloths,’ used in the paragraph on which the defendant relies, are to be taken as including only those woolen cloths which are not worsted, or composed of worsted, within the meaning of those terms (that is, ‘worsted,’ or ‘composed of worsted’), as used in this tariff.”
In five of the instances above referred to as illustrations of this distinction the rates of duty were the same. The schediile in question is entitled “Wool and Manufactures of Wool.” It is well settled that the title of an act may legitimately be resorted to as an aid in determining legislative intent when that intent is otherwise ambiguous. But the supreme court of the United States has recently held, in Hollender v. Magone, 149 U. S. 586, 13 Sup. Ct. 932, and Seeberger v. Schlesinger, 152 U. S. 581, 583, 14 Sup. Ct. 729, that such titles to the schedules in a tariff act are merely, intended as general suggestions of the character of the articles within such schedule. < Under the above title are included not only articles made from the fleece of the sheep, but also those made from the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca, and other animals, and certain manufactures of flax and cotton. It is not claimed by the government that the paragraph in question refers to goods made from the hair of animals other than sheep, or to any goods except such as are composed of wool or worsted. In Reiche v. Smythe, 13 Wall. 162, 164, and Maddock v. Magone, 152 U. S. 368, 371, 14 Sup. Ct. 588, it is held, in reference to the construction of tariff acts, that when the same word is used in successive acts, and special meaning was attached to said word in a former act, it will be presumed, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intention, that it was intended that said word should receive the same interpretation in the later act. It is claimed by the government that such evidence of a contrary intention is furnished in this case by the policy of the government as indicated in the letters and official documents already referred to, and in the considerations of inconvenience which would arise from the construction contended for by the importer. That the distinction was directly brought to the attention of congress and acted upon by it; that congress has failed to use the word “worsted” in said paragraph 297; that under the title “Wool and Manufactures of Wool” are included articles not composed of wool,— strongly suggest that congress may not have intended to include “worsted” under “manufactures of wool,” and seem to rebut the claim of the counsel for the government that congress intended to give to the word “wool” a different signification from that which it had previously borne. The opinion of the supreme court of the United States in Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 15 Sup. Ct. 508, states the guiding principles of construction and interpretation in
Fed. Cas. No. 11,825.