MURPHY v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.
No. 97-1992
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued April 27, 1999—Decided June 22, 1999
527 U.S. 516
Stephen R. McAllister argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Kirk W. Lowry.
James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the
William J. Kilberg argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Thomas G. Hungar, Brian J. Finucane, and James R. Holland II.*
JUSTICE O‘CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), dismissed petitioner Vaughn L. Murphy from his job as a UPS mechanic because of his high blood pressure. Petitioner filed suit under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act),
I
Petitioner was first diagnosed with hypertension (high blood pressure) when he was 10 years old. Unmedicated, his blood pressure is approximately 250/160. With medication, however, petitioner‘s “hypertension does not significantly restrict his activities and ... in general he can function normally and can engage in activities that other persons normally do.” 946 F. Supp. 872, 875 (Kan. 1996) (discussing testimony of petitioner‘s physician).
In August 1994, respondent hired petitioner as a mechanic, a position that required petitioner to drive commercial motor vehicles. Petitioner does not challenge the District Court‘s conclusion that driving a commercial motor vehicle is an essential function of the mechanic‘s job at UPS. Id., at 882-883. To drive such vehicles, however, petitioner had to satisfy certain health requirements imposed by the Department of Transportation (DOT).
At the time respondent hired him, petitioner‘s blood pressure was so high, measuring at 186/124, that he was not qualified for DOT health certification, see App. 98a-102a (Department of Transportation, Medical Regulatory Criteria for Evaluation Under Section 391.41(b)(6), attached as exhibit to
Petitioner brought suit under Title I of the ADA in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The court granted respondent‘s motion for summary judgment. It held that, to determine whether petitioner is disabled under the ADA, his “impairment should be evaluated in its medicated state.” 946 F. Supp., at 881. Noting that when petitioner is medicated he is inhibited only in lifting heavy objects but otherwise functions normally, the court held that petitioner is not “disabled” under the ADA. Id., at 881-882. The court also rejected petitioner‘s claim that he was “regarded as” disabled, holding that respondent “did not regard Murphy as disabled, only that he was not certifiable under DOT regulations.” Id., at 882.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court‘s judgment. 141 F. 3d 1185 (CA10 1999) (judgt. order). Citing its decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F. 3d 893, 902 (CA10 1997), aff‘d, ante, p. 471, that an individual claiming a disability under the ADA should be assessed with regard to any mitigating or corrective measures employed, the court held that petitioner‘s hypertension is not a disability because his doctor had testified that when petitioner is medicated, he “functions normally doing everyday activity that an everyday person does.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. The court also affirmed the District Court‘s determination that petitioner is not “regarded as” disabled under the ADA. It
II
The first question presented in this case is whether the determination of petitioner‘s disability is made with reference to the mitigating measures he employs. We have answered that question in Sutton in the affirmative. Given that holding, the result in this case is clear. The Court of Appeals concluded that, when medicated, petitioner‘s high blood pressure does not substantially limit him in any major life activity. Petitioner did not seek, and we did not grant, certiorari on whether this conclusion was correct. Because the question whether petitioner is disabled when taking medication is not before us, we have no occasion here to consider whether petitioner is “disabled” due to limitations that persist despite his medication or the negative side effects of his medication. Instead, the question granted was limited to whether, under the ADA, the determination of whether an individual‘s impairment “substantially limits” one or more major life activities should be made without consideration of mitigating measures. Consequently, we conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the grant of summary judgment in respondent‘s favor on the claim that petitioner is substantially limited in one or more major life activities and thus disabled under the ADA.
III
The second issue presented is also largely resolved by our opinion in Sutton. Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he is not “regarded as” disabled because of his high blood pressure. As we held in Sutton, ante, at 489, a person is “regarded as” disabled within the
As a preliminary matter, we note that there remains some dispute as to whether petitioner meets the requirements for DOT certification. As discussed above, petitioner was incorrectly granted DOT certification at his first examination when he should have instead been found unqualified. See supra, at 519-520. Upon retesting, although petitioner‘s blood pressure was not low enough to qualify him for the 1-year certification that he had incorrectly been issued, it was sufficient to qualify him for optional temporary DOT health certification. App. 98a-102a (Medical Regulatory Criteria). Had a physician examined petitioner and, in light of his medical history, declined to issue a temporary DOT certification, we would not second-guess that decision. Here, however, it appears that UPS determined that petitioner could not meet the DOT standards and did not allow him to attempt to obtain the optional temporary certification. Id., at 84a-86a (testimony of Monica Sloan, UPS’ company nurse); id., at 54a-55a (testimony and affidavit of Vaughn Murphy). We need not resolve the question whether petitioner could meet the standards for DOT health certification, however, as it goes only to whether petitioner is qualified
The only issue remaining is whether the evidence that petitioner is regarded as unable to obtain DOT certification (regardless of whether he can, in fact, obtain optional temporary certification) is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioner is regarded as substantially limited in one or more major life activities. As in Sutton, ante, at 491-492, we assume, arguendo, that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations regarding the disability determination are valid. When referring to the major life activity of working, the EEOC defines “substantially limits” as: “significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.”
Again, assuming without deciding that these regulations are valid, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he is regarded as disabled. Petitioner was fired from the position of UPS mechanic because he has a physical impairment—hyperten-
The evidence that petitioner is regarded as unable to meet the DOT regulations is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioner is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs utilizing his skills. At most, petitioner has shown that he is regarded as unable to perform the job of mechanic only when that job requires driving a commercial motor vehicle—a specific type of vehicle used on a highway in interstate commerce.
Consequently, in light of petitioner‘s skills and the array of jobs available to petitioner utilizing those skills, petitioner has failed to show that he is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs. Rather, the undisputed record evidence demonstrates that petitioner is, at most, regarded as unable to perform only a particular job. This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that petitioner is regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. See Sutton, ante, at 492-493. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly granted summary judgment in favor of respondent on petitioner‘s claim that he is regarded as disabled. For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., ante, at 495, I respectfully dissent. I believe that petitioner has a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA because, assuming petitioner‘s uncontested evidence to be true, his very severe hypertension—in its unmedicated state—“substantially limits” his ability to perform several major life activities. Without medication, petitioner would likely be hospitalized. See App. 81. Indeed, unlike Sutton, this case scarcely requires us to speculate whether Congress intended the Act to cover individuals with this impairment. Severe hypertension, in my view, easily falls within the ADA‘s nucleus of covered impairments. See Sutton, ante, at 496-503 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
Because the Court of Appeals did not address whether petitioner was qualified or whether he could perform the essential job functions, App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.