88 Pa. Commw. 491 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1985
Opinion by
This is an appeal by Mary C. Murphy (Plaintiff) from an order of the Court of 'Common Pleas of Montgomery County sustaining a preliminary objection in the nature of demurrer, filed by the Township of Abington and Albert Herrman, the Township Man
Subsequent to her husband’s death, Plaintiff, pursuant to Section 1 of the Act of June 26, 1976, P.L. 424, as amended, 53 P.S. §891 (Act 101), determined to apply to the Department of General Services, (DGS) Bureau of Risk and Insurance Management (Bureau) for the $25,000 in death benefits provided for surviving spouses of firefighters killed in the performance of their duties. Section 1 of Act 101 provides in pertinent part:
In the event a ... firefighter is killed in the performance of his duties, such political subdivision within 30 days from the date of death shall submit certification of such death to the Commonwealth. (Emphasis added.)
As part of the application procedures Plaintiff submitted to the Township a Report of Death form and requested that the Township process the form. This form appears in the regulations promulgated by DGS. See 4 Pa. Code §89.11.
The Report of Death form states that it is to be completed by the political subdivision or Commonwealth agency. In addition to spaces for general information such as the decedent’s name, address, social security number, date of injury, date of death, and the name of the decedent’s superior officer, the form contains the following question, “At the time of injury
The Township has refused to complete the form because it maintains that Mr. Murphy was not killed in the performance of his duties. It is the Township’s contention that by completing the form it is certifying not only that Mr. Murphy died (a fact not in dispute) but, in addition, it is also certifying that he died while in the performance of his duties. The Township takes the position that by completing the form it certifies that death occurred in the performance of duties and that this position is contrary to the Township’s position in Mr. Murphy’s workmen’s compensation claim. No law has been cited, however, to indicate that certification of this form would estop the Township from defending a workmen’s compensation claim.
Plaintiff argues that because of the question on the form relating to whether the decedent was performing duties at the time of death, the Township, by completing the form, certifies only that the decedent died, not that he died while performing his duties. Plaintiff thus reasons that completion of the form is a ministerial duty and that mandamus is a proper remedy where the Township has refused to complete the certification. Proceeding under this theory Plaintiff, after the Township notified her of its refusal to complete the form, filed a complaint in mandamus. The
Our determination of whether Plaintiff’s petition for mandamus was properly dismissed depends upon the construction of Section 1 of Act 101. The issue to be determined is whether Section 1 requires the Township to certify only the fact of death, or the fact of death and that death occurred during the performance of duties. The Township maintains that the word “such” appearing in the phrase “such death” can refer only .to death in the performance of duties, rather than to the unmodified noun “death”. According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 2283 (1966), the adjective “such” modifies “death” as “having a quality already or just specified” or as being “of the sort. . . previously indicated.” While we cannot dispute the existence of the dictionary definition of “such”, we do not ascribe to the legislature such a meticulous attention to dictionary definitions in every law that it passes. If the word “such”, modifies the noun it precedes by importing to that noun qualities previously indicated, then we are in a quandary to explain the word “such” in the phrase “such political subdivision”, which phrase appears in the very same sentence of the statute in question. The words “political subdivision”, or a synonym for them, do not appear previously in the sentence. Therefore, it is our view that the legislature has used “such” in
We are guided by Section 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C. S. §1921 (c), which sets forth matters which may be considered in ascertaining the intent of the legislature, including the following :
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
Using these criteria as a guideline, we shall examine the two possible interpretations presented by the parties.
This Court has already recognized that Act 101 is “social legislation” and must, therefore, “be construed liberally in order to effectuate its beneficent purposes.” Seybold v. Department of General Services, 75 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 118, 122, 461 A.2d 353, 355 (1983). Moreover, the purpose of Act 101 can be ascertained from its official title which reads “An Act providing for the payment of death benefits to the surviving spouse or children or parents of firefighters, ambulance service or rescue squad members or law enforcement officers killed in the performance of their
Plaintiff’s construction of the statute, however, appears more in keeping with its remedial nature. Under Plaintiff’s theory the Township need only certify that a death occurred. It is difficult to imagine that this fact would be in dispute. The issue of wheth
-. We now consider the specific consequences which would result if the Township’s position is adopted. The Township maintains that because it must determine whether death occurred in the performance of duties, discretion is involved in its act and, thus, mandamus will not lie. It argues, in addition, that Plaintiff’s remedy for a situation where the Township refuses to complete the form is to appeal to common pleas court pursuant to Section 752 of the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa. C. S. §752. We must agree that a decision as to whether death occurred in the performance of duties would require a judgment determination and .would not be an appropriate situation for mandamus. But, a certification of the fact of death itself requires no discretion and would be appropriate for a mandamus action. The obvious consequence of the Township’s position is that it ignores the practical reality that a specific agency structure within DGS, governed by explicit and detailed regulations, already exists to handle claims of eligibility for death benefits. Under Plaintiff’s theory, however, because the Township must only certify the fact of death, all claims would go directly from the Township to the Bureau and all appeals, if taken, would be to the DGS hearing' examiner. Thus, the existing agency structure would be utilized. We, therefore, believe that when the ■ consequences of each interpretation are examined, Plaintiff’s argument is the better one.
In Biega v. Aliquippa School District, 15 D. & C. 3d 619 (1980) the trial court held that mandamus was proper to compel a local agency which conducted a hearing on the suspension of certain .school teachers to issue an adjudication. The trial court did not attempt to dictate the result of the adjudication, but
Order
Now, April 2,1985, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, No. 88-04339, dated August 15, 1983, is hereby reversed. This case is remanded to the said Court for the issuance of an order to the Township consistent with this opinion.
We find the Township’s argument that DGS’s authority to promulgate regulations is questionable to be totally unsupported and completely without merit. DGS has enacted its regulations pursuant to Section 2404.1 of the Administrative Code of 1929, Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, as amended, 71 P.S. §634.1, added 6y Section 1 of the Act of January 27, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1624. Section 2404.1 of the Administrative Code of 1929 states in pertinent part:
The Secretary of Property and Supplies, ex officio, is hereby authorized and his duty shall be to transact business as a licensed insurance broker for the purpose of contracting all insurance and surety bonds for any department, board, agency or commission of this Commonwealth and for the General State Authority, the State Public School Building Authority or any other State authority or commission created by law.
Thus, the responsibility for transacting business to contract all insurance for Commonwealth agencies rests with the Secretary of DGS (formerly termed the Secretary of Property and Supplies). Part of the administrative scheme the Secretary has established pursuant to this duty is the Bureau of Risk and Insurance Management (Bureau) whose function it is to process death benefit claims. DGS has also promulgated regulations establishing a due process hearing procedure for appeal from Bureau determinations. 4 Pa. Code §§89.21-89.35. It is apparent when examining Section 2404.1 of the Administrative Code of 1929 and Section 1 of Act 101 in pari materia that the Secretary of DGS has acted, pursuant to a grant of statutory authority, to set up an administrative process to facilitate the death benefit claims.
Having determined that a hearing lies with DCS and not the court of common pleas, we reject the Township’s contention that Plaintiff’s mandamus action was an attempted substitute for its failure to appeal to common pleas court within 30 days of the time the Township notified Plaintiff of its refusal to complete the Report of Death form.