92 So. 694 | Miss. | 1922
delivered the opinion of the court.
The appellant was indicted, tried, and convicted for the murder of Virgil Pryor, and sentenced to a'life term in the state penitentiary.
The body of the deceased was found in a millrace in a badly decomposed, condition, but several witnesses testified positively to his identity and also to the identity of his clothing and shoes. The theory of the state was that the deceased was killed by the appellant and others on or about the 27th day of September, 1921, being the fourth Tuesday of the said month. The deceased had been working with a brother of the appellant and lived at his house. The appellant and said brother, Warren Múrphy, and another man named Jim Cash, whq was a brother-in-law of
It is insisted that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction, and the case of Hogan v. State (Miss.) 90 So. 99, is relied on with other cases. We have carefully considered the evidence produced by the state, and weighed it by the rules announced in the Hog ah Case, supra, and have reached the conclusion that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdet. It is true that there are conflicts between Avitnesses for the defendant and the Avitnesses produced by the state, but in the light of the jury’s verdict Ave must assume the facts and circumstances testified to by the state’s Avitnesses to be true. Taking those facts to be established in accordance Avith the rules on circumstantial evidence, Ave think the testimony for the defendant presents a case of conflict for the jury’s decision, and that Ave are not authorized to hold that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction.
It is next insisted that instruction No. 4 for the state is reversible error. This instruction reads as folloAvs:
“The court charges the jury for the state that, if they believe from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that there Avas an unlawful agreement between Joe Murphy, Warren Murphy, and Jim Cash, or between Joe Murphy and either Warren Murphy and Jim Cash, to unlawfully take the life of the deceased, and that in pursuance to this conspiracy or agreement the defendants charged in this indictment, or either of them, killed and murdered the deceased as charged therein, then the defendant Joe Murphy is as truly guilty of murder as though he had actually committed the homicide by himself alone.”
This instruction is an instruction upon conspiracy and is not intended as a definition of .murder. Instruction No. 1 for the state defines murder, and the instructions for
It is also objected that the court erred in admitting evidence that the deceased and the defendants engaged in the manufacture of intoxicating liquors. This proof was produced by the state for the purpose of showing motive, and it is supplemented by proof in the record' that the defendant stated that the deceased had been talking too much. Whenever the commission of another offense tends to establish a motive for the killing, and where the motive is a material question in issue, it is competent to introduce evidence of another offense which tends to prove motive. It was therefore not error to admit this evidence in this case.
It was also contended that it was error to permit the brother of the deceased to testify to the conversation in jail between Jim Cash and another party in which Cash made incriminating statements against himself and the other defendants. In a case of this kind it is competent to admit such statements because the establishment of appellant’s guilt may, and it probably did, embrace establishing the guilt of one of the other defendants who actually committed the crime, appellant being present, consenting, aiding, and abetting therein. It was permissible for the state therefore to establish the guilt of Warren Murphy as the person who actually did the killing, and the appellant’s and Cash’s guilt as accessories before the fact, or as joint actors, being present aiding and abetting therein. It was also insisted that it was error to not grant a continuance of the case because of the absence of the witness Houston for the defendant, whose testimony would have corroborated other witnesses as to the appellant’s presence at home at the time the killing is supposed to have taken place in the swamp. The record does not show whether the witness was served with process, and there was no effort to show in the motion for a new trial the facts by the affidavit of the said Houston, or by his testimony in court,
There being no reversible error, the judgment will be affirmed.
Affirmed.