587 S.E.2d 223 | Ga. Ct. App. | 2003
A Chatham County jury found Richard James Murphy “guilty but mentally ill” of criminal damage to property in the second degree, OCGA § 16-7-23 (a) (1). Following the denial of his motion for new
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
Pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-131 and Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.4, Murphy pled not guilty by reason of insanity and served notice of his intention to raise the issue of insanity at trial. Murphy testified on his own behalf, admitting the conduct charged in the indictment, and presented the testimony of one expert forensic psychologist.
1. Murphy contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of three similar transactions which occurred in 1986, 1991, and 1994. Each involved Murphy’s smashing glass windows of business premises after closing hours and then remaining at the scene until arrested. The trial court admitted the evidence for the purpose given by the State, to show Murphy’s bent of mind and course of conduct. Murphy contends, as he did at trial, that the State actually intended to use the evidence for an improper purpose, specifically to show that Murphy had been adjudicated sane at the time of those acts.
Bent of mind and course of conduct are proper purposes for similar transaction evidence. Gardner v. State, 273 Ga. 809, 810 (2) (546 SE2d 490) (2001). In this case, the trial court carefully limited the jury’s consideration of the similar transaction evidence to these purposes, both when the evidence was admitted and in the final charge. Because “qualified jurors under oath are presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions,”
Murphy further contends on appeal that the 1986 incident was too remote in time and that the similar transactions evidence was unduly prejudicial because it was not needed to prove a disputed issue. But Murphy failed to object to the similar transactions evidence on these grounds at trial.
*64 In order to preserve an objection upon a specific ground for appeal, the objection must be made at trial upon that specific ground. Objecting on specific grounds waives the grounds not asserted. The rule is that the scope of review is limited to the scope of the ruling in the trial court as shown by the trial record and cannot be enlarged or transformed through a process of switching or shifting.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Parrish v. State, 237 Ga. App. 274, 280-281 (4) (514 SE2d 458) (1999).
For these reasons, this enumeration presents no basis for reversal.
2. Murphy contends he was entitled to a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. In Georgia,
[defendants are presumed sane, and a defendant claiming insanity bears the burden to prove [his] insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Because the jury rejected [Murphy’s] insanity defense at trial, we must determine on appeal whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [he] was insane at the time of the crime. Unless the evidence of insanity is overwhelming, the jury’s determination that the defendant was sane should be upheld.
(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Boswell v. State, 275 Ga. 689, 691 (2) (572 SE2d 565) (2002).
Murphy contends that the State offered no evidence to rebut the evidence he introduced that he was insane at the time of the crime. Indeed, Murphy presented the only expert testimony, and the expert testified that Murphy suffers from a disordered and delusional thought process which renders him incapable of distinguishing right from wrong. As the Supreme Court of Georgia has held, however, “[t]he jury ... is not bound by the opinions of expert witnesses. It may look to, among other things, the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and other circumstances connected with [Murphy’s] acts in determining [his] sanity. The jury also may decide what credibility and weight to give the expert[’s] opinion[ ].” (Footnotes omitted.) Boswell v. State, 275 Ga. at 691 (2). In this case, the evidence showed that Murphy was mentally ill, but the jury also heard sufficient evidence to support its decision that Murphy knew right from wrong at
Judgment affirmed.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
(Citations omitted.) Smith v. State, 267 Ga. 372, 374 (3) (477 SE2d 827) (1996).
See Boswell v. State, 275 Ga. at 690-691 (1):
[A] defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity if, at the time of the criminal act, the defendant did not have the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act or a mental disease caused a delusional compulsion that overmastered [his] will to resist committing the crime. A defendant who is not insane may nonetheless be found guilty but mentally ill if, at the time of the crime, the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] committed the crime and had a disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life. When a delusional compulsion is the basis of an insanity defense, the delusion must be one that, if it had been true, would have justified the defendant’s actions.
(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.)