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Murphy v. Schilling
389 N.E.2d 314
Ind.
1979
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*1 Mary MURPHY, Appellant L.

(Plaintiff below), SCHILLING,

Keith Trustee of Fairfield

Township, Tippecanoe County, Indiana, Elly, Murtaugh

Ronald James F. Martin, Individually

Albert E. and as

mеmbers of the Board of Fair Township, Tippecanoe County,

field In

diana, Sendak, and Theodore L. Attor

ney Indiana, General of the State of

Appellees (Defendants below). 2-577A186,

Nos. 579S135.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 22, 1979. *2 1975, Murphy sued the September, Trustee, of the Ad-

Township the members Attorney General of visory Board and the ground on the Indiana for her commission requirement constitutes the freehold of law arbitrary an denial of under the Fourteenth Constitu- Amendment to the United States I, 12 and 23 of tion and Article Following the Indiana. Constitution of facts, rendered the trial court stipulation the defendants. judgment filed in the Court of appeal The was fully by Septem Appeals and was briefed ber, September 1977. Murphy petition filed a appellant re transfer, only 15 months alleging that which she 48-month term for mained urged thеrefore originally was elected. She immediately grant this Court to transfer disposition of the issues and render a final Chosnek, appel- Lafayette, Edward error in Unfortunately, due to an raised. lant. Court, the by this handling of the case Sendak, Gen., Arthur Atty. Theo. L. oversight misplaced. The case bundle was Gen., Perry, Deputy Atty. Thaddeus Indian- when earlier brought attention was to our Hoffman, apolis, Lafayette, J. Frederick a motion year appellees filed this appellees. moot, the term appeal since dismiss had Murphy was elected of office for which GIVAN, Chief Justice. way con appellant has in no expired. The petition This cause is on to transfer under her delay in the decision tributed to 4(A)(10). emergency provisions of AP. filed a brief by has this Court. She facts, according stipulation by The to a has to the motion to dismiss opposition parties, Mary L. plaintiff-appellant are that issues us to decide the requested specifically Murphy is a bona fide resident of Fairfield questions arising in the case. Since County. No- Tippecanoe On recur, and appeal likely are raised 5, 1974,Murphy duly vember was elected as this Court delay was the fault of Advisory a member of the Board of Fair- will deсide the appellant, that of and not Township, field which election was certified The motion to dis on their merits. issues following Tippe- day by the Clerk of the hereby miss is overruled. However, when Mrs. canoe Circuit Court. legislation view that The traditional Murphy attempted to assume the duties equal protec will be sustained ground the office refused on the she was any it is shown to challenge take office tion if qualified that she was not legiti relation to rational or reasonable under IC 17-4-28-1 § [Burns 1974]. years been purpose has in recent requires Advisory mate State statute members of of the United States refined decisions Board to be resident freeholders of the in statute Where the township. Murphy no real estate in Court. owns based Hence, legislative an- volves classifications Township. Fairfield at the first affecting “fundamen Board, “suspect criteria” meeting nual of the up now be will rights”, va- tal the enactment appointed Albert E. Martin to fill the necessary to to be only if it is shown position. cant held implement a compelling Hovey As the Court stated in State interest. State ex Schilb v. Kuebel Riley (1889) rel. 21 N.E. Ind. 502; Shapiro L.Ed.2d v. 890, 891: Thompson (1969) immediate “Offices class under 600. Appellant argues that be- every mention not such as elector Township Advisory cause the Board statute *3 may solely hold justly right claim a to on right” involves the “fundamental to hold voter, ground the that he is a and all public employs “suspect office and a classi- offices, voters entitled to hold but are wealth, fication” on apply based we should they Legislature offices the which exacting this judicial level of review in ad- may persons by competent pre- restrict to judging constitutionality. its qualifications scribing what shall be the It is somewhat unclear whether a factual of those who enter them. It is within the situation, bar, as in the case at is to be by Legislature, of the virtue of treated process under the due clause or the general power, require its to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth be officers of class shall selected Amendment. See Zablocki v. Redhail from political parties, different or that (1978) ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‍374, 673, 434 U.S. 98 S.Ct. 54 L.Ed.2d they рersons be peculiar shall skill and (Stewart, 618 J. concurring); San Antonio experience.” School Rodriguez (1973) District v. 411 U.S. However, Assembly the General has not 1, 1278, 93 (Stewart, S.Ct. 36 16 L.Ed.2d J. given statutory been create carte blanche to concurring). Nevertheless, appellant office-holding. qualifica- restrictions No alleges the statute both violates constitu- may arbitrary capricious; tions rath- be provisions, tional we will consider the con- er, they be must reasonable based together. tentions grounds substantial which are natural and It has been a longstanding princi subject inherent in the matter the enact- ple of constitutional law that where a state ment. ex Marion State rel. Buttz v. Cir. Ct. grants purpose the franchise for the of se 7, (1947) 225 Ind. 72 N.E.2d 225. Where an lecting persons public office, to serve in it requirement holding public absolute of- for may deny not also the franchise to certain arbitrarily precludes ficе unfairly bona persons in arbitrary capricious man fide candidates from service without a le- ner. Any limiting classifications the fran gitimate exclusion, purpose justify to chise be “must tailored so that exclusion the statute will not survive constitutional . necessary to achieve the articu protection attack on grounds. Lubin goal.” lated state Kramer v. Union Free 709, (1974) 1315, v. Panish 415 94 S.Ct. U.S. (1969) 621, School 632, District 395 U.S. 89 702; (1972) 39 L.Ed.2d Bullock v. 405 Carter 1886, 1892, S.Ct. 583, 592. See 134, 849, U.S. 92 S.Ct. 31 L.Ed.2d 92. Wesberry also (1964) 1, v. Sanders bar, long so as the statuto 84 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481. holding restrictions on eligibility right mere granted to vote by where Township Board legislature member ipso does not facto create the arbitrаry are not right but bear rational rela public to hold office. Our Constitu legitimate purpose tion to the of the tion statu has committed to the General Assem tory scheme, bly they will not deemed viola- right to be determine what additional rights tive offices be to shall ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‍created and manner in which shall of law. rel. v. be State ex Miller filled. There is no 565, (1973) constitutional or McDonald 260 Ind. 297 N.E.2d right public innate hold denied, office. legislature Offices created cert. 94 U.S. are privileges; aspirants (1974); City Forks v. offices (1971) must strictly comply with the Warsaw conditions of Ind. N.E.2d officeholding. denied, State ex rel. cert. Workman v. (1909)

Goldthait 172 Ind. 87 N.E. (1972). 133. L.Ed.2d 80 through original advisory pay a share of township pur this interest payments, board statute was enacted in 1899. Its rental we think his pose greater levying provide was to the actual too far removed from township taxpayers, who bore the entire striking down the justify the tax to burden supporting schools and particular the ease bar. statute in government. Miller Jackson charges owner of real Whether the 503, 512, 102, 106. 178 Ind. 99 N.E. cover his additional rent his tenants empowers The act board to oversee immaterial, for tax assessment is operations trustee re respon- the owner must all cases assume quiring the trusteе submit payment. Fur- sibility for their ultimate board’s approval budget an annual for the thermore, no since non-freeholders coming year report and an of his annual little, taxes, any, if incen- there is expenditures previous year. IC tax-paying them to freehold- tive for treat 17-4-28-1, 3, excep 5. With three but *4 imposi- the equity and fairness in ers with tions, the board has sole to recom To hold this tax rates. property tion of mend county to the council salaries and the be to create would statute unconstitutional benefits paid ap to be to all and elected whereby those who perverse situation the pointed township. officers of the IC township govern- pay support to taxes 17-4-28-1.1, 1.3, au 1.5. The board is §§ those who mercy at the of ment would be levy property thorized to taxes on the real do not. in the township expenses. IC all 17—4-28-1,2. The is further vest board only that statutory requirement ed duty money with the to borrow in the township may serve on resident freeholders emergency event an exists expendi has sound and substantial advisory boards a ture of any sums not included in the exist is in The restriction basis in law and fact. ing levy. estimates and 17—4-29-3. IC § unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or not funds, The borrowed as as interest wеll legiti but bears a rational relation thereon, eventually paid by will of course be statute was purpose for which the mate generated on real from levies it does not We therefore hold enacted. township. property in the In the case at of equal operate deprive non-freeholders bar, locally-generated all rev 99.28%of tax by reason process of law protection or due enues real emanate from such levies on right. of a denial of a fundamental property. that be Appellant contends further legislature The concern of thе that town ownership to property cause the criteria of ship taxpayers protected by be such adviso advisory is township board serve on the clearly boards that the reve twofold: “traditionally disfavored” clas based on the generated nue ex property from taxes be wealth, should be the statute sification of pended frugal and manner in a efficient judicial higher level of subjected to be property tax rates Board of Harper Virginia v. review. Under level equitable maintained at a fair 1079, 663, (1966)383 86 S.Ct. Elections U.S. which impose will not an burden intolerable 169, the statute argued, it is 16 L.Ed.2d tax. bearing weight those We be declared unconstitutional. should the sole of this tax Freeholders are source proposition. In more accept cannot They revenue. have a direct stake in Independent case of San Antonio recent expenditure imposi of local monies and the (1973) 411 Rodriguez v. U.S. District School tion of property tax rates. Converse 1278, 16, 1, Mr. Justice 36 L.Ed.2d ly, those residents who do not own issue, citing two addressed similar real Powell an concern indirect First, it was not controlling. over factors as recognize taxes. we While school-financing case that the City shown in that proposition in Phoenix v. Kolod disadvan ziejski 204, 1990, peculiar (1970) system operated 26 90 U.S. S.Ct. as indi- effectively tage any fairly class definable may that a renter gent composed persons township advisory whose board member in- comes are designated poverty beneath the impermissible is not an to freeholders 22-23, level. U.S. at at S.Ct. Thus, applying wealth classification. Here, 36 L.Ed.2d at Rodriguez, 36-37. as in classifica- legislative test traditional appellant has not demonstrated tions, find that reasonable this statute is requirement operates freehold to discrimi- not purpose rational in and does scope, in indigents. nate No evidence has offend the clause. tending any been adduced to show relation- however, case of Appellant, points to the ship ownership between wealth and the Turner Fouche real in Fairfield of which 24 L.Ed.2d the facts fact, the State as a whole. we would quite similar to those at In that bar. note that it is not all that uncommon to case, invidiously the Court struck down as persons wealthy find quite living who are discriminatory requiring a statute school apartments rented persons officially Never members to be freeholders. board as indigent prop- classifiеd residing real theless, the Court refused to exclude erty which own. might “possibility that other circumstances Second, in Rodriguez personal the lack present themselves in which a financial resources did engender not ab- qualification office-holding could sur deprivation solute education. U.S. at . . . scrutiny vive constitutional 1291-2, 93 S.Ct. at 36 L.Ed.2d at 37. Nor a direct shown correlation ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‍opinion at 581. It is our that the statute in *5 ease at bar. Admittedly, the failure own type at bar statute to is the of property real complete occasions a denial of referring. Supreme which the Court was opportunity to serve on a ad- its In the Turner case the Court rested visory board. previously not- primarily on the fact 15% decision ed, we see arbitrarily no classify- basis for budget of the local school funded was ing those who own real and those Here, property. on real how- taxes do narrowly-defined who not into twо ever, per- record does not indicate classes of haves and In have-nots. other of centage township’s budget derived words, the fact person officially that a is only rele- from real taxes. The indigent termed reason of his annual figure stipulation vant in this of facts per income doеs not se mean that such Indiana, in case is that taxes con- person will not be an real owner of of tax locally-generated stitute 99.28% all consequently permitted and will not be comparable figure appears No revenues. serve on the board. opinion, the Turner and we at liber- аre not essence, appellant In asks this Court to ty such to infer a fact from case. “extend its most exacting scrutiny to re- Furthermore, we think that fact that view a that allegedly discriminates [statute] property taxpayers bear the burden of large, diverse, amorphous and nearly locally-gеnerated 100%of all tax rev- class, only by unified factor” common of enues underscores our State’s interest vital being township. non-freeholders in the As utilizing particular statutory scheme. concluded, Mr. Justice Powell the statute permits only Our statute who those has none of the traditional indicia sus- body local taxes to serve on the which sets pectness: the class is not “saddled with the rates such taxes. We therefore hold disabilities, subjected to such a his- statute that this is not unconstitutional un- tory purposeful treatment, unequal Turner der the rule. relegated to position political pow- such a provision requiring township adviso- erlessness as to extraordinary command protection board members to be freehold- majoritarian from the resident political process.” not transgress guarantees at ers does 36 L.Ed.2d at Accordingly, 40. and within the must conclude that restricting statute the United and States Indiаna Constitutions. Accordingly, granted transfer and court is affirmed. (Plaintiff

judgment of the trial KUHN, Appellant Dorothy below), PRENTICE, HUNTER, PIVARNIK and JJ., concur. (Defendant KUHN, Appellee Charles

DeBRULER, J., opinion. dissents with below). Justice, DeBRULER, dissenting. No. 1-678A171. Fouche, In Turner v. 567, the ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‍United Indiana, Appeals Court of applied Court States District. First qualifications for hold- clause to 9, 1979. May

ing public was office. There the Court Georgia faced with a statute which created Rehearing Denied June 1979. boards, mem- school set their size at five bers, required each member of them to con-

be a freeholder. In this case we are

fronted with a which creates the statute board, member- advisory sets its three,

ship mem- requires that each

ber of it be a freeholder. Both boards

make influence financial decisions which ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‍delivery availability government

services to freeholder and nonfreeholder. Indiana, Georgia, as in a freeholder

any person who owns real estate. Both

Georgia and the Indiana town- school board

ship advisory statutory authori- board

ty levy on real estate situated *6 jurisdictions.

within their This property taxpayers in both

renders the real subject danger excessive

cases to the Indeed, regard,

taxation. in this

Georgia purposes, board levied for school

while the Indiana board levied vestiges township government, any such

strong case can be made out that

danger greater Georgia was much in the

situation. The Court concluded requirement the freeholder invidiously

Georgia scheme was discrimina-

tory in violation of the applicable and regard

clause. I that ease as we like- requiring

decisive here and as requirement

wise invalidate the freeholder holding the Indiana

advisory board.

Case Details

Case Name: Murphy v. Schilling
Court Name: Indiana Supreme Court
Date Published: May 22, 1979
Citation: 389 N.E.2d 314
Docket Number: 2-577A186, 579S135
Court Abbreviation: Ind.
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