46 Pa. 508 | Pa. | 1863
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered, February 25th 1868, by
This was an action of ejectment, brought by Rebecca Nathans against Michael Murphy and his wife Margaret Murphy, to recover the possession of a lot of ground in the borough of Pottsville. The lot belonged to the plaintiff prior to, and until the 10th of September 1847. On that day articles of agreement were made between her agent, Nathan Nathans, and Michael Murphy, by which it was agreed that she should sell the lot to
Such being the condition of the titles of the parties, it is manifest that the right of the plaintiff to recover depends upon the question whether Mrs. Murphy knew of the mortgage given by Woodside, at the time when the conveyance was made by him to her, unless the fact, if it be a fact, that Mrs. Foy paid the purchase-money for her daughter, without notide of the mortgage, enables Mrs. Murphy to defend under her. The court beloiv instructed the jury that this did not put Mrs. Murphy in any better position than she would be in if she had made the purchase and paid the money herself, if she knew at the time the deed was delivered to her, of the existence of the mortgage from Woodside to the plaintiff. This it is insisted was error, and it is argued
It might be added that if, as Mrs. Foy testified, Mrs. Murphy was present when the1 purchase-money was paid, and the deed to her was delivered, she could not innocently conceal her knowledge of the prior mortgage, permit the money to be paid, a deed to be made out to her, and then claim to stand in the position of a bond fide purchaser.
Nor could the court have affirmed any of the points proposed by the defendants below, without manifest error. If the evidence given at the trial is believed, it leaves no reasonable doubt that Mrs. Murphy knew well of the mortgage to Rebecca Nathans, when she took the conveyance from Woodside. Indeed the proof is, that 'Woodside was her agent in the transaction, made so doubtless for the very purpose of giving the mortgage for the remaining purchase-money unpaid to Miss Nathans, rather than having it given by herself, a married woman. She said Woodside was her agent. So did Woodside himself, and so did Michael Murphy her husband, through whom a part of the original purchase-money was paid. It is true, the title of a bond fide purchaser is not to be affected by vague and indefinite rumours, but the evidence in this case is most direct and positive that the agent of Mrs. Murphy had notice, and, when all considered, it is hardly less positive that she knew of the mortgage herself. It was then quite impossible for the court to charge the jury that the plaintiff could not recover. And clearly it could not have been affirmed that a written acknowledgment by Mrs. Murphy that she knew of the mortgage when she took her deed, and that it was understood she should pay it, was of no effect, no matter when it was made.
We discover ño material error in the admission of evidence. The agreement between Nathan Nathans, who acted as an agent for Rebecca Nathans, and Michael Murphy, followed as it was by proof of Murphy’s partial payments, and of the deed to Wood-side made at Murphy’s instance, by proof that Mrs. Murphy said Woodside was her agent, and by his subsequent conveyance to her, was admissible as a link in the chain of title, and as showing the agency of Murphy himself. It may be, that if the testimony of Mrs. Foy be assuriied as verity, and a complete account of the
The only remaining assignment of error is that the verdict is erroneous. This is not assignable for error. It is probably meant that the court erred in entering judgment on the verdict as found. The jury found in favour of the plaintiff, with six cents damages and six cents costs, but attached to it a condition that the verdict should be set aside on the payment by the defendant of the amount of the mortgage, with interest on or before a day specified.
It must be admitted this was not a ease for a conditional verdict. The defendants had either a clear legal title or nothing. They had no equity to be protected. But the opportunity given to them to redeem the land, is not a matter of which they can complain. It was an error in their favour. In fact this part of the verdict was mere surplusage, the finding of an immaterial matter. It has not in any manner injured the defendants. It does not stand in the way of their trying the title in a new ejectment, if they think it worth the trial. We cannot reverse the judgment for this reason.
The judgment is affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the general statements in the opinion of Mr. Justice Strong, just read, and upon the main facts of the cause it has been rightly decided. I have but little doubt that the transaction between Nathans, Murphy and wife, Woodside and Mrs. Foy, were nothing but a consummation of the original purchase of Murphy for his wife; the payment of the purchase-money by Mrs. Foy being but an advance of the money by her to Mrs. Murphy, to enable her to complete the purchase.
I am not sure that the opinion intends to assert the broad doctrine that a bond fide purchase by a parent with his own money, without notice of the secret encumbrance, and the taking of the deed in the name of the child, with a view to a gift or advancement, will be avoided in favour of the encumbrance; because of a prior independent knowledge of the child of the encumbrance acquired outside of the parent’s negotiation for the purchase. I should judge not, relying upon many expressions exhibiting Mrs. Murphy’s own connection with the purchase, such as her obtaining the deed from Woodside — its being a fraud in her to take the deed for anything more than the grantor had left to convey, and especially the conclusion that there was no error in submitting the case to the jury on the question whether Mrs. Murphy, at the time she purchased and received the deed from Woodside, knew of the mortgage. The fact also is referred to as having weight, that she was present at the making of the deed; and it is also stated that the payment was in effect as if the money had been given to the grantee in the deed, and by her paid to the grantor. With this view of the facts bearing upon the ease as tending to show that the transaction was Mrs. Murphy’s, and not Mrs. Foy’s, I have no objection to the doctrine taught in the opinion. But if it be intended to teach a different one, that a parent’s own bond fide purchase and payment of his own funds is to be destroyed by the independent and disconnected knowledge of his child (and much of the reasoning looks in this way), then I dissent.
The testimony of Mrs. Foy was, that she is a foreigner, came into this country in September 1848, and made the purchase in the following October, that she negotiated the purchase with Woodside herself, and paid the price, $2000 in British gold, and directed the deed t,o be made to her daughter, Mrs. Murphy. That she knew nothing of the mortgage; that Murphy had no agency in the purchase, and provided no money; that she knew nothing of the agreement between Murphy and Nathans; knew nothing of Woodside’s agency for Mr. and Mrs. Murphy. This testimony raised the question fairly which was presented in the defendants’ first point. The answer of the court was that this
Now, it is conceded that when a parent takes a conveyance in his child’s name, no resulting trust for the parent exists; and it was unfortunate for the defendants’ counsel he insisted on this trust as the ground of his argument, for it seems to have directed attention from the question how far the parent’s purchase-money is affected by his child’s knowledge, granting that the conveyance vests the title without a resulting trust. In every other case a trust does result where one buys property with his own money, and takes the deed in the name of another. Why is it the rule is not so in the case of parent and child? Because, as it is always stated, the parent intends the grant to he a gift to the child. A gift of what? Money? No, the only thing given is that which the deed conveys — land. The parent never gave the money. Had he intended that, he would have given money. He intended a higher gift, one more permanent; less likely to be squandered. The form of the thing is the evidence, viz., the conveyance. He did not intend to give money, because he gave land. On what principle of sound reasoning — nay, on what principle of justice itself, can it he imputed to me that I have given money to my child when all my conduct, and the strongest reasons, prove it otherwise ? I go out, I look around, I fix my eyes on a home for my child, something substantial, which cannot run away like water. I bargain for it; I put into it my hard earnings, the work of a lifetime, and indulging in all the fond hopes of a parent about to be realized, that I will seat my child comfortably in a home before my eyes take their last look upon earth, I complete my purchase, and take the deed which I intend to present to him, with my blessings and my prayers for his welfare. Now, am I to be told that this is no more than if I had given my money to my child, and that because he happened to he aware of facts of which I was wholly ignorant, all my labour and toil are vain, all my hopes are crushed, all the hard earnings of days of weary labour are to be swept away by construction — that a court will say my rights are nothing, and I can convey nothing by the deed which was mine, except so far as 1 intended to part with it myself to my child ?
I contend that this is contrary to the plainest principles of justice, destructive of the noblest impulses of the heart, and violative of the best feelings of our nature. Nature has her voices, which call loudly and imperatively upon the law, and this is one of them which ought not to call in vain.
What is one of the strong foundations of the law of trusts, to which we have lately returned with newly-infused vigour, after a season of wandering ? It is that right of control over his own property which'the parent should possess, in order to secure it
Believing that this is not exactly within the mind of the court, though the reasoning leads that way, and concurring in the result, I yet feel it my duty to put this opinion on record, to testify on. my part that no such doctrine should be gathered from this case.