*1
Murphy
Michigan
Bell
v
v MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY
MURPHY
5).
(Calendar
11, 1994
Argued January
No.
96265.
Decided
Docket No.
31, 1994.
August
Following
in
in the
Dennis Wainman
course
the death of
Michigan
Telephone
employment
Company,
Bell
work-
his
with
widow,
compensation
paid
his
er’s
death benefits were
Can-
dace,
his
children. When she remarried
and
two
Michigan
Murphy,
ceased
of benefits to
Charles
Bell
17.237(335),
418.335;
voluntarily
pursuant
her
to MCL
MSA
but
pay
expira-
for the two children until the
continued
benefits
418.321;
period required MCL
MSA
tion of the 500-week
17.237(321). Thereafter,
Murphy sought
Candace
benefits be-
children, aged
yond
and
the 500-week
for her
thirteen
nine,
provisions of
and 335 of the
on the basis of the
§§
compensation
permitting payments
act
worker’s
that,
argued
although
Michigan
children
children.
at the
500-week
were under sixteen
end
period, they
longer
dependent on
deceased father
no
were
their
they
adopted by
and there
Charles
because
had been
showing
dependency
their
on
was no factual
continued
the continuation of
father. A
referee ordered
deceased
Compen-
until the children were sixteen. The Worker’s
benefits
Appeals,
Appeal
Danhof,
The Court of
sation
Board affirmed.
JJ.,
Shepherd
C.J.,
Doctoroff,
and
remanded
clarifica-
and
128256).
remand,
(Docket
that
the wcab ruled
tion
No.
On
331, 335,
obligated
and 353 to
§§
Bell was
remand,
eighteen. After
until the children
benefits
were
P.J.,
Appeals,
I. B.
Sullivan,
and Mackenzie
Court of
curiam,
JJ.,
per
holding
opinion
in an
that
Torres,
reversed
weekly
ordering
permissive
of continued
for the
basis
concluded,
dependency.
recipient’s
It
is the
continued
Materials, Inc,
Packing
Mich
on the basis
Theodore
(1976),
factually
adopted
child who is
ceases
father,
in this case
on the deceased
presumption
destroyed
adoption
the rationale for
conclusive
their
father and
on
deceased
the children’s
relationship
adoptive
legal
as-
which the
father
created
children, thereby
legal obligation
provide for the
sumed the
supplanting
relationship
rise to
the statu-
(Docket
128256).
plaintiff
tory presumption
appeals.
The
No.
separate opinions,
Supreme
In
held:
Court
statutory
conclusive
contin-
*2
age
expiration
ues until
of sixteen.
the
After the
of the 500-
period,
may
paid
depen-
week benefit
benefits
continue to be
to
sixteen,
age
dents under
without
factual
a
determination of
hearing
dependency,
the
at
discretion of the
referee.
joined by
Riley,
Boyle,
Justice
stated
Justice
that the conclu-
presumption
automatically
dependency
sive
of
terminates at
statutorily
period.
the end of the
mandated 500-week
There-
after,
the continuation of benefits to
under a cer-
age
discretionary
Compensa-
tain
is a
the
decision of Worker’s
Commission,
Appellate
requiring
finding
tion
a factual
of con-
dependency.
finding
contrary
tinued
A
to the
is
the
outside
scope
Disability Compensation
of the Worker’s
Act and consti-
tutes the sanction of economic waste.
clearly
legislative
Section 341
indicates the
intent
to main-
presumption
dependency except
tain the conclusive
of
as stated
"may”
act. The
otherwise in the
use of the term
instead of
discretionary,
mandatory,
"shall” in 321 indicates
rather than
specifically requires
action.
Section
the termination of
dependent
upon remarriage
to
benefits
a
wife
and a reassess-
331(l)(b)
payable
dependent
ment of
to
benefits
children. Section
require
presumption
dependency
does not
the continued
of
age
remarriage
for children under the
of
cases of
sixteen in
of
surviving spouse
period.
the
or the end of the 500-week benefit
presumption
it
who
Instead
defines
is entitled
conclusive
i.e.,
dependency,
sixteen,
age
of total
children under the
of
presumption
long
rather than
the
how
conclusive
remains in
effect.
case,
presumption
dependency
In this
the
of
was terminated
period
at the end of the 500-week
the terms of
and
upon
it was incumbent
the claimants to establish a continued
dependency
justify
factual
in order to
further benefits.
joined by
concurring
Brickley,
Griffin,
Justice
Justice
in
part
dissenting
part,
stated that
there is a conclusive
sixteen,
presumption
dependency
age
despite
of
until
but
its
automatically
age
existence benefits are not
continued until
Rather, continuing
may
sixteen.
benefits
be awarded at the
magistrate.
discretion of the
presumption
dependency dispels
While
conclusive
of
need for a factual determination of
and renders the
benefits,
dependent eligible
guarantee
for
it
further
does not
Dependency
that such benefits will be awarded.
was intended
to,
continuing
guarantee
prerequisite
of
but not a
benefits.
a
automatically
the end
Benefits are not to be awarded
at
magistrate
statutory
period;
has discretion
500-week
rather
benefits,
deny continuing
continuing
may
to
benefits
award
dependent persons.
wholly
Levin, joined by
Cavanagh,
Justice
and Justice
Justice
Chief
may
Mallett,
a referee
order the
stated that
beyond
expiration
compensation death
worker’s
benefits
statutory
for a child who was
the 500-week
limitation
parent’s
adopted by
person
death.
another
after
compensation
provides
if death results
The worker’s
act
injury,
payable
are
for 500 weeks from the
from an
benefits
if,
death,
expiration of the
date of
and that
at the
500-week
twenty-one years
age,
period,
less
a
is
than
employer
order
continue to
referee
twenty-one.
person
until
The act
reaches
explicitly provides
that a child under the
sixteen
further
presumed
support
conclusively
wholly
on
Merely
provisions
employee.
the act
deceased
because
beyond 500
of death benefits
weeks
the continuation
terms,
permissive
underage dependents
it
does not
are stated
not
*3
of
does
follow that
conclusive
Reading
act in its en-
until
of sixteen.
continue
permissiveness
concept
tirety,
of
to find
it is
with the
consistent
to order the continuation of
referee
no discretion but
that a
has
dependent is
until a
sixteen.
benefits
provides
questions regarding who
the act
Section
dependency
is
of the
are
and
extent
employee,
injury
date
of an
determined as of the
of the
time,
right
any
at
death
becomes fixed
that the
to
benefits
conditions,
subsequent change
except
irrespective
any
321, 331,
specifically provided
335.
Neither
otherwise
in §§
331,
permissive
nor the
"referee
order”
§§
provides.
language
specifically otherwise
321 and 335
§§
case,
Thus,
questions concerning
extent of the
in this
dependency
must
as of
date
children’s
be determined
father,
right
any
injury
death benefit
of their
and their
death, irrespective
fixed
the date of his
became
as of
adoption
including
by
subsequent change
their
in conditions
regard
they
Murphy,
to whether after
and without
Charles
adopted
factually
their
they
on
continued to be
were
father.
deceased
and remanded.
Vacated
(1993)
422;
App
Lacey (by & T. for the Jones Michael defendant. Today upon we are called to consider Riley, presumption
the duration of the total involving in cases minors entitled to death benefits Disability Compensa- 321 of the Worker’s language tion Act. The at statutes issue makes clear that the conclusive dependency automatically terminates at the end of statutorily period. the after, mandated 500-week There-
the continuation of discretionary under a certain is a decision of Compensation Appellate the Worker’s Commission. discretionary A decision to continue benefits re- quires finding a factual of continued statutory in order to conform with the mandates logic Finally, of the wdca. behind this mode of procedure elementary: employers obligated is pay death benefits under the wdca should not be required statutory presumption death benefits after the expired
has or has other- showing wise been terminated statute without a finding contrary of continued need.1 A outside scope of the wdca and constitutes the sanction of economic waste.
i *4 driving Dennis Wainman was killed while a employment truck in the course of his with Michi- Rotary Co, 526, 532; Cf. Webster v Electric Steel 321 Mich (1948) (the compensation NW2d 69 failure the worker’s spouse’s remarriage commission to lower an award after a constituted "the imposition award). penalty upon employers” required of a reversal of an Murphy Michigan Bell v Riley, February, Telephone Company gan 1972. Bell paid compensation were to death benefits Worker’s In widow, Candace, two children. June and his his Murphy. Mich- remarried to Charles she was igan Bell thereafter ceased of benefits 17.237(335), pursuant 418.335; MSA her MCL pay voluntarily for the benefits but continued expiration of the until 500-week two children 17.237(321). period required by 418.321; MCL MSA petitioned Murphy Thereafter, Candace aged hearing thir- her claim that the children beyond nine, teen and were entitled benefits period, §§ 321 and 335 of 500-week on basis compensation act, as chil- the worker’s although Michigan argued that, dren. Bell age at the children were under sixteen longer period, they end of the 500-week no were they dependent on deceased father because their adopted and there had Charles been showing no was factual of continued on their deceased father.
A
referee ordered the continuation of
sixteen,
until
children were
and the
Compensation Appeal Board affirmed.
Worker’s
The Court
On
Appeals
for clarification.
remanded
remand,
that
ruled
wcab
obligated
§§ 331, 335, and 353 to
was
benefits until
eighteen. After
the children were
Appeals
opin-
remand,
in an
the Court of
reversed
holding
per curiam,
for the
ion
basis
weekly
permissive ordering of continued
benefits is
concluding,
dependency,
recipient’s
continued
Packing Materials, Inc,
on
basis
Theodore
(1976),
152;
dency legal relationship and created a in which adoptive legal obligation father assumed the provide thereby supplanting children, for the legal relationship gave statutory rise presumption. (1993). granted appeal. 444
We
leave to
Mich 866
ii
starting point
inquiry
The
of this Court’s
is to
interpret
consider
how
statutes
involved.
statutory
The cardinal
rule of
construction is to
give
Legisla-
discern and
effect to the intent of the
Farrington
Petroleum, Inc,
ture.
v Total
442 Mich
(1993).
201, 212;
hi A specific question arewe asked to answer is whether the conclusive period.
terminates Accordingly, at end the 500-week appropriate inquiry it is to focus our provisions on certain of the wdca. We are aided particular provision statutory in our search to Riley, determine the existence and extent of recipients. 418.341; for death benefits MCL MSA 17.237(341) provides:
Questions as to who constitutes *6 extent of their shall be determined injury employee, as the date of the to the right fixed any their death benefit shall become time, irrespective any subsequent as of such change except in speciñ conditions as otherwise cally provided [Emphasis in sections 331 and 335. d.][2] adde language, clearly legisla-
This which indicates the presumption tive intent to maintain the conclusive except requires interpreta- otherwise, as stated no regarding point pre- tion the conclusive sumption prescribed is erased under circum- Farrington, Franks, Dussia, stances. See su- pra. disregards Creative construction that the re- appro- moval of the conclusive priate circumstances would therefore violate the legislative mind, in turn intent. With this we now may to consideration of the statutes wherein one removing find the circumstances conclusive presumption._ language unchanged of this statute has remained since before present day, despite sweeping
Dennis Wainman’s death changes in in made the wdca the last decade. Furthermore, inquiry involved in this this Court’s into the issue properly begins case import with consideration of 341. Its title and its § govern specific purpose is to the while the evidence the fact that its any presumptions dependency, existence and extent of other statutes define situations best described ment. categories as of entitle- (5th ed), Singer, Statutory 2B Sutherland Construction See ("Where 51.05, general p subject one statute deals with a terms, subject part of the in a more and another deals with a same possible; way, if but if there is detailed any treat the two should be harmonized conflict, Accordingly, required prevail”). will we are the latter paramount to sentences other the mandates of appear facially when taken out of inconsistent statutes context. 447 Mich Riley, J.
B 17.237(321) provided, First, 418.321; MSA MCL part, as follows at for death benefits in relevant injury and death: the time of the decedent’s from the date of period of 500 weeks [F]or expiration of the 500-week death. If at the partially dependent person is wholly such hearing age, a referee than 21 less employer . . to continue to . order the portion thereof weekly compensation or some 21. person . . . reaches the until such [Em- phasis added.] language emphasized The ary indicates discretion ruling on the nature of a referee’s following expi of continued benefits period. fact, In use ration of the 500-week "may” indicates term discretionary, instead of the term "shall” *7 mandatory, action. It rather than hearing anomalous to hold that would be the continuance of death bene referee must order fits after the 500-week To do so would
period as a matter of law.
quoted language
nullify
of
precedent,4
§ 341 in
of
would
violation
established
legislative
intent
in
321 of
violate the clear
hearing
preserving
referees,
Far
discretion in
see
supra,
rington, Franks,
Dussia,
lead
and would
forcing
employer
pay continued death
to
an
to
in cases where the
has
benefits even
legal
terminated and the
and economic status
Comm,
220,
App
Angelus
194 Mich
See Lake
v Oakland Co Rd
(1992) ("The
224;
the term 'shall’ in a statute
Second, provides also specifically the wdca dependent termination of benefits payable upon remarriage wife and a reassessment bene- children. At the time of fits payable death, 418.335; Dennis Wainman’s MCL MSA 17.237(335) provided:
Upon remarriage dependant of a wife receiv- ing compensation, the sation payments upon such shall cease compen- to her of the balance of the she would otherwise have been which in no to exceed the sum of entitled but event Where, expiration .... 500- at the $500.00 depen- period, any wholly partially such or week age, person dent referee the until such reaches the is less than employer order the to continue to thereof, compensation, portion or some weekly dependent person
wholly
partially
[Emphasis
of 21.
added.]
short,
In
are ordered to reassess
hearing referees
at the end of the 500-
of children
remarriage
in
as well as to
period
week
case
an
wives.6
formerly
terminate
award
part
There is no indication of
intent on the
pre-
the conclusive
Legislature
to continue
statutory
after
sumption
of total
living parent
of children
the case
whose
emphasized
of note
lan-
Worthy
remarries.
5See,
Regents,
App
e.g.,
Wayne
State Univ
188 Mich
Reisman
(1991) ("Statutes
526, 536;
are to be construed to avoid
guage regarding the facts whether exercise discretion support may Thus, referees a continued award.7 of for the children order continued employees of the discretion as an exercise deceased granted § To remove in 321. §in 335 as well as certainly judicial violates fiat this discretion inquiry Legislature for a factual intent of clear into dependency on continued the nature remarriage part even in cases the without consideration of a child sur- of the added concerns Farrington, rounding legal adoption. Franks, See supra. Dussia, 17.237(331)(l)(b) 418.331(l)(b); Third, MSA MCL require the continued does not dependency spouse surviving remarriage cases period. end of the 500-week benefits or the pre- provision Rather, sumption calls for the conclusive complete dependency "[a] child physically age years, if or over under the earning incapacitated mentally . . . .” It is from language §of 331 that individuals from the clear relationships having prescribed with a deceased employee are under the of sixteen and who are wholly dependent. is not What treated as Legislature particularly in- clear is whether years, found of sixteen tended for the 331(l)(b), represent date for a termination Keeping presumption. in mind that we conclusive are and a reasonable reading provide required an harmonious ambiguous language, see effect to 331(l)(b) supra, Speaker, we conclude House only its and not defines status §331(l)(b) length. words, controls In other presump- question to the conclusive who is entitled long complete and not how tion of presumption remains. conclusive accompanying text. See n 3 and *9 103 Opinion Riley, J. target addition, 500 §§ 321 and In both period of death as a critical from the date weeks disregard attempt Any of death benefits. cases negate concept commonality that the would this Legislature important enough to men- considered tion twice.8 presumption provided
Indeed, it is the conclusive 331(l)(b) supports the dissent. How- §in that best inappropriate above, ever, it noted and as involving presumption to the statute extend this remarriage. presumption We conclude that nullify § not the termination 331 does statutory following 500-week the conclusion of the period provided §in it would violate because legislative previously described. clear intent give Moreover, an harmoni- we are constrained reading to different stat- and reasonable effect ous subject, arguably see address the same utes Twp, supra, Speaker Huron without House legislative creating intent absurd results.9 presumption on the termination of the conclusive happening together events, of certain with con- afforded referees order discretion requires occur, tinued benefits after these events 331(l)(b) quali- § relates to the the conclusion dependent and not fication of an individual as a presumption depen- long how the conclusive dency lasts.10 Legislature beyond sum,
In it is doubt that the 8 See n 4. n 5. See noted, presump previously for the termination of a As calls § set forth in 331 and §§
tion of
335.
under circumstances
However,
type
lan
331 does not contain the
of termination
hand,
negative
guage
the other
found in
and 335. On
§§321
331(l)(b)
implication
is that children over the
of sixteen are
of §
dependency.
of total
not entitled to the conclusive
Thought
exception,
light,
which in
in this
331 does contain an
reading of these statutes in concert. See
turn leads to an harmonious
Twp, supra.
Speaker and Huron
House
intended the termination sumption circum- under certain are the end of the stances. These circumstances remarriage. statutory 500-week See 17.237(321), 418.321, 418.335; MCL MSA 17.237(335).
iv *10 presumption While it is clear that the conclusive 331(l)(b) absolute, §in not it is more contained is problematic to which of the circumstances discern 335) (§ remarriage 341, i.e., §in or the contained conclusion of the 500-week (§ 321),
period opera- is inquiry Moreover, tive under facts. is these complicated legal adoption further of the dependents unnecessary However, it involved. is question at this time defen- resolve this dant continued to because
pay death to the two adoption children after their remarriage and their mother’s up to the end of the 500-week period.11 Accordingly, pre- we conclude that sumption was terminated at period end of the under the terms of 500-week upon § it the claim- and that was incumbent ants establish a continued factual justify holding in order to further benefits.12 This appropriate ensures the continuation of benefits in providing hearing cases, while referees with the opportunity to exercise the discretion that is so clearly part statutory scheme. It also avoids remarriage strongly Mention of the 335 on 500-week suggests regarding a common factor between 321 and 335 the date §§ presumption dependency, provided after which the conclusive 331(l)(b), However, expires. required resolution of this issue is not under the facts of this case. presumption, In the absence of this one must resort underlying rule that it is a burden to factual claimant’s establish See, 18, 24; dependency. e.g., Speidel, v 270 Mich Runnion NW (1934). Brickley, forcing employers the absurd result is continued benefits where there no further need. argued qualified conclusion, In it not enjoy are entitled conclusive dependency. Disagreement arises regarding presumption may whether this be termi- dependent’s reaching nated before a on a certain happening specifically thé delineated events. prohibition emphasized It must be against that there is no following a continuation of benefits long occurrence as one or more these events as statutorily referees, within their discretion, authorized conclude continued ben- required. However, efits are the burden of estab- lishing a need of continued benefits rests with the party same who must establish the initial entitle- ment, i.e., the claimant.
Accordingly, would affirm we the decision of the Appeals Court of and remand the case to the wcac proceedings regarding for further whether claim- ants are entitled to a continuation of death bene- fits.
Boyle, J., J. Riley, concurred with (concurring part dissenting J. in Brickley, part). Although agree in I with Justice Levin’s presumption conclusion the conclusive of de- pendency disagree age sixteen, in until I remains effect holding
with Justice Levin’s presumption effect of this an is to mandate award dependents age of to benefits under sixteen follow- ing expiration period. of the 500-week benefit statutory provisions Rather, I the relevant believe construing can be best harmonized necessary, always sufficient, condition as a but not inter- for the continuation of benefits. Under this pretation, depen- the conclusive Mich Brickley, age merely dency six- enables eligible benefits; extension for an remain teen to require automatically the award it does not continuing dependents. Accord- these to benefits disagree- express my separately ingly, I write regarding this issue ment with Justice Levin (cid:127) my interpretation expound the relevant on to statutory provisions.
i THE OF DEPENDENCY PRESUMPTION CONCLUSIVE pre- the conclusive concludes that Justice Levin operative dependency1 sumption until remains magistrate age requiring sixteen, to award con- age tinuing sixteen, until birthday irrespective oc- of whether the sixteenth initial 500-week benefit curs before or after the expired.2 I in Justice While concur has Compensation Disability Act in effect 331 of the Worker’s Section part: provided pertinent in Dennis Wainman’s death at the time of (1) presumed following persons conclusively shall be employee: wholly dependent support upon a deceased (b) years, age A of 16 or over 16 child under the incapacitated earning upon physically mentally from if parent parent. living at the time of the death of such with whom he is questions dependency, ... In all other cases part, be determined in accordance with the
whole or shall 418.331; fact, injury. may time of the as the fact be at the [MCL 17.237(331).] MSA post at 120: See Merely provisions of the act for the continuation because underage dependents beyond are of death benefits 500 weeks permissive may stated in terms—"the referee order”—it does does presumption of not follow that the conclusive not continue until the reaches the of sixteen. permissive if referee order” means that Even "the *12 payment obliged to continuation of the referee is not order the Murphy Michigan Opinion by Brickley, presump- Levin’s conclusion that the conclusive dependency age until tion of remains viable six- presumption teen, I cannot conclude this mandates an automatic award of benefits to those dependents upon expiration sixteen the Instead, that, of the 500 weeks. I initial would hold presumption dependency while the conclusive dispels the need for a factual determination dependent eligible and renders the guarantee benefits, further it does not that such benefits will be awarded. statutory
A careful examination of the relevant provisions Legislature establishes that envi- being prerequisite to, sioned as a but guarantee continuing of, not a At benefits. provided: death, time of Dennis Wainman’s If death injury, employer results from the pay shall wholly ... employee, upon earnings his support at injury, weekly equal the time of the 2/3 of average wages weekly his for a 500 weeks from the date of death . ... If at expiration period wholly of the 500-week such partially dependent person or of is less than 21 age, may employer referee order the to continue weekly compensation portion partially some thereof until such wholly or dependent person [Emphasis reaches the of 21. added.]
It is evident from this section that are automatically not to be awarded at end twenty-one of death benefits from sixteen to or sixteen to be, eighteen, entirely as the case it would be consistent concept permissiveness, discretion, with the anor area of entirety providing, read sive act its because the conclu- dependency, that the referee has no discre- depen- tion but to order the continuation of benefits until dent is sixteen. *13 108 447 Mich Opinion Brickley, J. person. dependent wholly weeks, to a even magistrate to award
Rather, discretion has Legisla- continuing instance, In this benefits. persons contemplated in which situation a ture undeserving dependent, yet wholly bene- be continuing seeking any 321, § claimant fits. Under expiration following initial 500 partially depen- wholly or must be either weeks age twenty-one. these If both under dent and magistrate has discre- met, then criteria are continuing benefits; benefits are such tion to award automatically words, In other awarded. not to be prerequisite necessary is a while guarantee continuing benefits, an it alone does not award of benefits. Dennis Wainman’s 335 at the time of
Section provided yet of a situa- illustration another death Legislature contemplated that a tion in which person may wholly dependent denied continu- be ing benefits. remarriage dependent of a wife receiv
Upon payments ing compensation, such wife] [to compensation, any, if . . . further shall cease person wholly either or payable to the shall be support at dependent upon deceased for partially (b) provided in of section death as subdivision his Where, expiration of the 500-week . . . at the 331. wholly partially or period, any such age, a years person is less than employer to continue to may order the referee thereof, portion weekly compensation, or some dependent person wholly partially until such compensa 21. age reaches when the dependent child shall cease tion to age years, if at the reaches the child mentally physically neither nor years he is child earning, or when the incapacitated from Brickley, of 16 and thereafter is self- reaches [Emphasis supporting for 6 months. added.][3] Under claimant must 321, twenty-one years both and less than age4 eligible continuing in order to be benefits. requirements satisfied, have been After both magistrate deny has discretion to award or contin uing benefits. Legisla-
It evident from these sections that the wholly ture envisioned situations in which even *14 continuing dependent persons could denied ben- dependency is efits. While often the determinative provisions factor, it from that is clear these Legislature necessarily it did deem to be dis- not prereq- positive. dependency Rather, it viewed as a satisfy must in order to uisite that a claimant eligible continuing become benefits. fact,
In examination of Justice Levin’s a careful interpretation §§ 321 that it and confirms 335 position concerning weight a similar advocates to be accorded a effect,
dependency In determination. dependency also views Justice Levin continuing necessary but not sufficient for benefits. by Justice This conclusion is best illustrated exceptions articulated in Levin’s discussion § that under 321 a 341.5 Justice Levin asserts magistrate deciding continuing whether to order 3 amended, changing from has, This section been criteria sixteen, eighteen respectively. twenty-one and sixteen 4 section, language of the claimant must be Under the amended this eighteen years age. n 3. under See stated, pertinent part: Section as to who constitutes extent Question dependency
their be determined as of the date of shall any injury employee, right death benefit and their time, irrespective subse- become fixed as of such shall except specifically quent change in as otherwise conditions 321, 331, provided and 335. in sections Mich Brickley, dependent only is if the determine need benefits magistrate deter twenty-one;6 need not under dependency determi dependency because mine injury. it Since time of at the made nation was magistrate order has discretion that the is clear acknowledg essentially benefits,7 is Justice Levin necessary for, ing dependency not but is beyond the of, of benefits an award determinative 500-week § 321. under interpretation 335 is also Justice Levin’s § 335 It concludes this view. accord with only provides whether the determination eighteen of 500 dependent the end at is under eighteen, is under If a weeks.8 light continuing magistrate In benefits. order has determination the fact that of already acknowledg- made, Justice Levin’s been continuing discretionary nature ment of supports is not the view necessarily of continu- merit an award sufficient to ing benefits.9 121-122. 6 Post at course, age twenty-one. Assuming, that the 123-124. 8 Post at *15 however, language arguably note, 335 contained § 9 I particular, contrary position.
supports In 335 stated: a compensation any dependent child shall The of age age years, if at the of 18 when the child reaches cease of mentally physically years inca- nor he or she is neither age earning, of 16 pacitated years the child reaches the from or when self-supporting If the child is for 6 months. and thereafter thereafter, dependency self-supporting shall be ceases to be [Emphasis reinstated. added.] reinstated, stating "dependency” it could be By must be that the synonymous dependency with com- is from the statute that inferred This, however, comport interpretation pensation. advanced above with the does not to, prerequisite dependency not a but in which is dispel of, guarantee compensation. serve to Two comments should language emphasized brought above. about discomfort First, emphasized in a manner consis- sentence could be read Murphy Michigan Ill Brickley, examples potential These are indicative of a inconsistency position. in Justice Levin’s Justice necessary Levin asserts that is both continuing and sufficient for an award of persons age dependency, sixteen, but that though necessary, necessarily is not sufficient for continuing an of award benefits to over question sixteen. The thus becomes whether there support dichotomy interpreta- is textual for this tion.
Because the sole distinction under the relevant groups statutes between these two is the conclu- presumption dependency applicable sive age begin by examining sixteen, those under I dependency. conclusive At the time perti- death, § stated, Dennis Wainman’s part, nent
(1) following persons shall be conclusively presumed wholly dependent support upon employee: deceased (b) A child under the of 16 years, or over physically if mentally incapacitated earning upon parent from with whom he or living she is at the time of the death of such parent. ... In questions all other depen- cases dency, in part, whole or in shall be determined in fact, accordance with the as the fact be at the injury time of the .... 418.331; MSA [MCL 17.237(331).] interpretation tent with the reinstated continuing advanced above—that and, hence, again eligible once becomes interpretation, benefits. Under this a child who ceases to self-supporting again eligible once becomes for benefits. Second, Legislature I "dependency” have noted that did not use interchangeably suggests and "benefits” which Legislature "dependency” equivalent did not intend to be the Any appears contrary "benefits.” inference to that effect legislative intent. *16 Mich Brickley, being of the effect determined whether It must be dependent” presumed wholly "conclusively the of a factual determination differs from effects dependency. way, does the conclu- Put another of sive nature transform dependency presumption of
of the magis- discretionary aspect of the continuing under benefits trate’s award decision obligation compulsory §§ 321 335 into a it does not. benefits? I believe award such statutory provision I that this would conclude compels supports that the conclusion neither nor dependent conclusively presumed to be claimants automatically entitled to an award are also simply provision continuing Rather, this benefits. age of are sixteen states that children conclusively dependent presumed wholly on be living they employee with whom are deceased of this at presumption time of death. effect conclusive defendant-employer preclude
is to depen- presenting from on the issue of evidence dency; attempt establish that it cannot self-supporting. inis This conclu- fact prohibit presumption, however, the the does not sive presenting regarding employer from evidence part need on the diminished for such benefits dependent’s parents guardians. this It is the distinction presumption allows conclusive discretionary nature continuing benefits to be reconciled.
Accordingly, I hold there a conclu- would presumption age sixteen, sive until despite presumption, but that the existence of this automatically not until benefits are continued continuing may rather, sixteen; magistrate.10 awarded at discretion One wonder what benefit derives from dependency, given guaran presumption it does not conclusive tee the short, In this relieves continuation benefits. *17 113 Separate Opinion Levin, J. of of the Court I vacate the decision would Appeals to the wcac for and remand the case opinion. proceedings with this consistent further Brickley, Griffin, J., with J. concurred (separate opinion). Levin, The worker’s com J. provides "may pensation order” act that a referee employer pay continue to death benefits an to expiration beyond the 500-week to a the of (if eighteen any dependent dependent who is under 1 335) remarried, § wife of the deceased worker has dependent having dependent’s showing dependency, the and from to make a of factual parents guardians having it or from to relieves benefits, at until such time as the show a financial need for such defendant-employer least produced has sufficient evidence to establish that longer continuing dependent’s parents are no in need of benefits. the interpretation in the conclusive Does this of ability dependent. entails a determination of the seems that the those effect abolish not, dependency? distinguishes if the child’s I think one between parents’ ability support support himself and the to the dependency; question the of the latter The former involves dependent’s parents’ financial need. It compensation designed pay scheme was benefits to dependent parents’ persons who were both and whose financial interpretation Under the condition evinced a need for such benefits. above, anytime employer of advanced an contests the continuation two-pronged inquiry. First, benefits, magistrate engage a would in a is Second, dependent? parents the child help? magistrate do the child’s need financial affirmative, inquiries the If both of these are answered the continuing with his dis- should award benefits consistent cretion. (1969 Disability Compensation PA 335 of the Act Section Worker’s death, 317), provided: in effect at the time of Dennis Wainman’s Upon remarriage dependent receiving compen- the of a wife sation, upon payment payments of shall cease the to her such compensation to which she would otherwise the balance of the been entitled but in no event to exceed the sum have $500.00, compensation, any, payable if and further shall be wholly partially dependent upon person deceased either or (b) support provided in of section for at his death as subdivision compen- A referee shall determine the amount of 331. payable weekly portion thereof that shall be to such sation or wholly remaining dependent person partially weeks for the or Where, expiration compensation. at of the 500-week person
period, any wholly partially dependent is less such or employer age, hearing years referee order than 447 Mich Separate Opinion Levin, (if age dependent twenty-one years or under 321).2 remarried, §
wife not has compensation, weekly portion or some to continue to thereof, dependent person wholly partially such or until compensation age of 21. The reaches age reaches the shall when the child child cease physically years years, neither nor 21 mentally if he is at earning, incapacitated when the child reaches from or self-supporting of 16 If such and thereafter ceases, shall be re- months. instated. Such to deceased status payable compensation, any, remaining if shall be dependent upon wholly partially person either death, provided support in the time of at the his 418.335; remarriage MSA case of a wife. [MCL 17.237(335).Emphasis added.] *18 eighteen by change 1985 to to 335 was amended PA 103 Section employer age may twenty-one the which a referee order the from to continue to tion of amendment renumbered quoted to who, expira- pay compensation to a the at period, twenty-one. The 1985 500-week was less than the language 335 335 to the of § constitute § (1) (2): following and the above as subsection subsection persons apply shall to all who are entitled to This section compensation receiving compensation this receive act on the effective date of attained the or are this and have not subsection who years on effective date of this 18 the subsection. text) (see not 321 n 2 for the The 1985 act did amend to reduce 91-0286, Corp, eighteen. Taylor Chrysler wcac, v leave to The (1994), Court, Appeals 445 938 denied has may dent the Court and this Mich provide continues to that the referee ruled therefore employer compensation depen- pay to a order the to continue to who, expiration period, of the than at the 500-week is less twenty-one. (1969 Compensation Disability 321 of the PA Section Worker’s Act 317), death, provided the the effect at time of Dennis Wainman’s following death benefit: injury, employer pay, If results the or death from shall however, paid, subject, provisions cause to be to the of section 375, depen- provided, to in 1 of the methods hereinafter employee, wholly dependent upon earnings his dents of the for support injury, weekly payment equal the time at average wages weekly from 2/3 of his for a of500 weeks death, dependent; for 1 $64.00 the date of but not more than expiration $69.00 . ... If at the 500- partially dependent period any wholly person week such age, may less referee order the than Michigan Separate Opinion Levin, J. depen case, the worker’s In instant deceased appear parties remarried, wife and dent agree of the deceased worker are that the children eighteen.4 they after are not entitled to benefits question presented a referee is whether payment continued of benefits be order that father at were on their for children who although the mother remar- he was killed the time killed, new husband the father was her ried after adopted children, it has not thereafter the children continued been shown factually dependent father. on their deceased may order the would hold that a referee
We children, of benefits continued Appeals, affirm the order the Court of reverse award to the chil- which affirmed an of dren wcab although adopted by they the man she were after her husband’s death. married
i remarriage Following work- of the deceased pay Michigan widow, bene- Bell continued er’s voluntarily until the two children fits expiration, September 1981, of the 500- on period. Bell then ceased week the two children. benefits for *19 plaintiff mother, Mur- Candace The children’s compensation weekly employer or some to continue to person partially dependent portion wholly or thereof until such 17.237(321). 418.321; Empha- age of 21. MSA reaches [MCL sis added.] 3 Wainman, Dennis a is the widow of Plaintiff Candace employee, Michigan Telephone Company killed while who was February, widow driving in 1972. Wainman’s Bell truck June, 1973. remarried 4 12, 1981, September expired the effective on before The 500 weeks 1985 amendments. date of the by eighteen Kelly 1985. nor Sean had reached Neither 447 Mich by Separate Opinion Levin, petition
phy, of her claim for a filed a beyond entitled to were the children period. 500-week provides of the act section
Still another conclusively age of sixteen child support presumed on for .5 Kelly and Sean was thirteen worker deceased (1969 Disability Compensation PA Act 331 of the Worker’s Section death, provided 317), concerning dependency Wainman’s at the time of Dennis in effect purposes of death benefits: for (1) presumed persons conclusively following shall be The support upon employee: wholly dependent a deceased be for (b) 418.331; years .... A child under the [MCL 17.237(331).Emphasis added.] MSA (1969 Disability Compensation PA Act Section 353 of the Worker’s 215), by of Dennis PA in effect at the time as amended pur- death, concerning dependency similarly provided Wainman’s partial incapacity: incapacity poses of benefits for total (1) 361, dependency purposes of 351 to shall For the sections be determined as follows: (a) depen- following conclusively presumed to be shall be support upon injured employee: dent for an
(ii) years of 16 .... A child under (2) injured employee Weekly payments an shall be reduced any dependent provided child or the additional amount spouse age dependent when such child either reaches the or other becoming 16 ceases for a of 6 of 18 or after support than 1/2 of his from such months to receive more physically injured employee, if such time he is neither nor at earning, spouse mentally incapacitated from or when such shall injured spouse, when final decree from his divorced child, spouse or other shall be deceased. such (3) payments shall be made for increased An increase in this act not so numbers of conclusive as defined dependent 418.353; injury employee. an at the time of the [MCL 17.237(353). Emphasis MSA added.] (MCL 418.351; 17.237[351])provides pay- MSA for the Section 351 “total,” incapacity for work is and § ment of benefits while the *20 Murphy Michigan Bell 117 Separate Opinion by Levin, J. period on old when the 500-week ended nine September 12, 1981.
Michigan although that, chil- Bell countered period dren were under sixteen when the 500-week ended, longer dependent they were no on their because their mother’s new hus- deceased father Murphy, adopted band, had them and Charles showing that the children there was no factual dependent continued to be on their deceased fa- ther.
ii referee ordered the continuation of they until benefits for the children were sixteen. Appeals The wcab affirmed. The Court of re clarification, ruled on manded wcab actually obligated remand that Bell was paying until to continue eighteen. the children were 6 Appeals citing reversed, The Court of Packing this Ma Court’s decision Theodore v (1976). terials, Inc, 152; 240 Mich NW2d 255 A Appeals The Court of said that "it is clear from providing the context” of the sections of the act that a "referee order” the continuation of the payment compensation beyond the 500-week death benefit for a until such person twenty-one, reaches the or in the remarriage case of of the worker’s person eigh- widow, until such reaches the permissive ordering teen, "that the for the basis (MCL 418.361; 17.237[361]) provides of benefits MSA incapacity "partial.” while the for work is (1993). 422; App Mich 505 NW2d 447 Mich Separate Levin, J. *21 recipient’s weekly contin- is the benefits
continued dependency.”7 ued pro- Appeals act as of construed
The Court period, viding the referee the 500-week that after pay compen- to continue "could order defendant Kelly only actu- if were Sean sation benefits ally upon natural fa- their deceased providing that Theodore as Court read ther.”8 The "factually adopted, he ceases a child is after dependent also father. The Court on”9 his deceased reasoning in concluded, Theo- on the basis of the "destroyed adoption dore, the rationale presumption the children’s for the conclusive dependency upon . . . .”10 father their deceased adoption "created a The Court continued Murphy] relationship legal as- [Charles in which provide legal obligation the chil- sumed legal relationship supplanted for- dren and presumption giving merly to the conclusive rise upon Wainman, Dennis the children’s natural father.”11 their deceased App 430. 200 Mich its conclusion: The Court restated compensation Clearly, payment the five- benefits after period Thus, is based on whether child hundred-week benefit factually dependent. the conclusive 331(b) wholly years is that a child under the of sixteen § support upon employee with whom a deceased employee living of the death of the the child is parent at the time pay compensation require employer does not an expiration the five- 321 or 335 after the § § [Id., p period. hundred-week benefit 430.] 335, n 5 for n 1 for the text of n 2 for the text of See 331(l)(b). the text of § App 200 Mich 431. 9Id. 10Id., p 432.
11Id., pp 432-433. Murphy Michigan Bell Levin, Separate Opinion
B adopted Theodore, In the children were injured he was second husband before mother’s Court in Theo- and died. observations light situa- be read in factual dore should presented. The deceased worker died tion there adopted by had another after his children been man. control the instant
Theodore does not decision case.
c disagree with conclusion We also *22 pertinent Appeals that the because sec- Court of tions provide may that the "referee the act of beyond , of the the continuation weeks order” payment dependents who are of death benefits twenty-one eighteen, the basis for "that weekly permissive ordering bene- the of continued recipient’s dependency” continued deter- fits is the as the conclusion of mined as a factual matter of period.12 the 500-week
hi Disability Compensa- A of the Worker’s section provides specifically child under tion Act conclusively age be the presumed of sixteen "shall support upon wholly dependent say explicitly "at the conclusion of 500- The Court did not adoption period,” implicit its but that in conclusion week super death after their father’s of children Charles dependency presumption of a child under the the conclusive sedes (see dependency 5), provision act the and of sixteen n death, right to a death as of date of shall determined " time, irrespective any such become 'fixed as of benefit shall accompanying change subsequent n 14 conditions ....’” See in text. 447 Mich Separate Opinion by Levin, J. employee.”13Merely provi-
a deceased because the sions of the act for the continuation of death beyond underage dependents 500 weeks to permissive may are in stated terms—"the referee pre- order”—it does not follow that the conclusive sumption does not until continue reaches the of sixteen. permissive may if
Even "the referee order” obliged means that the referee is not to order the continuation of of death benefits from twenty-one eighteen, sixteen to case or sixteen to as the may entirely be, it would be consistent with concept permissiveness, or an area of discre- entirety providing, tion, to read the act its depen- because of the conclusive dency, that the referee has no discretion but depen- order the continuation of benefits until the dent is sixteen.
IV permissive Nor do we read the form—"the ref- negating specific provi- eree order”—as "[qjuestions sion in another section of the act that as to who constitutes and the extent their shall be determined as of injury employee, right date of the and their death beneñt shall become ñxed as of such irrespective any subsequent change time, *23 except speciñcally provided conditions as otherwise added.) (Emphasis 321, in sections 331 and 335.”14 13See n 5 for text of 331 in effect at the time of Dennis Wain- man’s death. Disability Compensation Section 341 of the Worker’s Act of 1969 (1969 317) PA in effect at the time of Dennis Wainman’s death provided: dependents as to who constitutes Questions and the extent of dependency
their shall be determined as of the date of the Mukphy Separate Opinion by Levin, 321, 331, 335, sections, The three and adverted specifically provide” § in 341 do not "otherwise specifically pro- "except the as otherwise and thus support language view § 341 not the vided” does question the the death benefit should that whether underage beyond an for be continued weeks finding dependent based on a of factual should be expiration the 500-week as period, the at other time or times or some before eighteen, twenty-one the case reaches or child may be.
A pro- exception, "except as otherwise The first 321,15 the the section of in section” concerns vided spells limitation on out 500-week act pro- specifically That section also death benefits. expiration 500-week "[i]f vides at any dependent person is less than such” employer twenty-one, may order” the the "referee expiration to continue to benefits after right any injury shall become fixed as of such employee, death benefit their time, irrespective subse- change specifically quent except conditions as otherwise provided in The death benefit shall sections and 335. directly by payable to the be recoverable thereto, guardians legal trustees. In case of or their entitled compensation dependent, proportion of a his the death pro Upon payable surviving dependents rata. shall be the death of person dependents compensation shall No cease. all who is a nonresident shall be excluded as deemed, injured employee shall No of an be alien. during proceeding any any employee, party the life in interest to of of such by him for the enforcement collection compromise compensation, respects nor as thereof claim for 418.341; 17.237(341).] employee. such MSA [MCL stating concept in 341 set forth Section reiterates presumed conclusively persons questions of not fact, as the dependent fact with the "shall determined accordance injury.” be at time of See n 5 text. *24 447 Mich Separate Opinion by Levin, J. period dependent age the 500-week to a child until twenty-one.16 expiration period”
The "at the of the 500-week language expiration 321, §of like the "at the period” language provides 335, the 500-week §in only expiration for the determination as of the the 500-week whether the is less twenty-one. language than Neither nor the may language § "referee order” of 321 "otherwise specifically provides” questions whether underage an child is shall not be "de- injury” employee. termined as of the date of specifically provide” § Nor does 321 "otherwise "right death benefit shall” not injury. "become fixed” as of the date of specifically provide” § Nor does 321 "otherwise "subsequent change that a in conditions” shall be deciding taken into consideration in whether the pay- "referee order” a continuation of the pursuant "right ment of death benefits any death benefit” that became "fixed” as of the injury. date of colleagues
Our do not contend that 321 "other- speciñcally provides.” wise
B exception, "except spe- The second as otherwise cifically provided” 331,17 § concerns the section of the act that states that a child under the presumed conclusively wholly sixteen is de- pendent support employee. on the deceased specifically This section thus forth sets a conclu- As set forth in n the 1985 amendment did not amend 321 to change twenty-one eighteen. from 17See 5n for text. Separate Opinion by Levin, J. is that a child sixteen sive dependent on the deceased.18 obliged, because if the referee not
Even *25 language, may to the order referee order” "the continuation of payment from death benefits of eighteen, twenty-one the or sixteen to as to sixteen may conclude, be, of conclu- because the case we sixteen, until that of sive to the no discretion but order referee has the dependent is until the continuation of benefits sixteen. colleagues § "other- do not contend that 331
Our specifically provides.” wise
c specifi- exception, "except as The third otherwise provided” cally 335,19 the of §in section concerns dependent respecting remarriage of a wife. the act provides specifically that That section also period, expiration the 500-week "[w]here, at the of dependent twenty-one any or, as than such” less eighteen, amendment, the a of result may employer continue "referee order” expiration the 500-week benefits after age twenty-one period dependent until child eighteen. or period” expiration "at the of the 500-week expiration
language § 335, like the "at provides only period” § 321, the 500-week expiration 500- as of the the determination dependent period than is less whether week concerning concept questions that This section also restates date of shall determined as of the who constitutes right fixed injury irrespective then become to a death benefit shall condition, following any subsequent change in the language: questions determined in accordance "shall be 5). (see fact, injury” may n be at the time of with the the fact text. See n 447 Mich Separate Opinion by Levin, J.
eighteen. language Neither that nor the "referee may language specifi- order” of 335 "otherwise provides” cally question whether an un- derage child is shall not be "determined injury” employee. as of the date of specifically provide” Nor does 335 "otherwise "right death benefit shall” not ” "become, injury. fixed as of the date of Nor does specifically provide” § 335 "otherwise that a "sub- sequent change in conditions” shall be taken into deciding, consideration in whether the "referee may order” a continuation of the death benefits. language
The "referee order” does not itself specifically provide” "otherwise whether the deter- injury mination is to be made as of the date of or expiration as of the of the 500-week *26 periodically thereafter. colleagues Our do not contend that 335 "other- specifically provides.” wise
D We conclude that because provides (cid:127) "[qjuestions § 341 that as to who constitutes and the extent of their shall be determined as of injury employee, the date of the and right any their death benefit shall be- irrespective come fixed time, as of such of any subsequent change except in conditions specifically provided as otherwise in sections (emphasis added); 321, 331 and 335” (cid:127) § 321, neither 331 or nor the "referee language order” §§ of 321 and 335 specifically provides,
otherwise Murphy Michigan Bell Levin, Separate concerning questions in the instant case dependency” are children’s the "extent of the required by the date § 341 to be determined injury father, and of their right
(cid:127) death benefit” became "their death, "irre- the date of his "fixed as of” any subsequent change spective in condi- tions,” adoption by including
(cid:127) Mur- their Charles regard phy, after to whether and without adopted they they continued were factually fa- on their deceased ther.
E by the 1985 reinforced in this conclusion We are remarriage concerning § 335, amendment providing dependent wife, a compensation child shall cease to a "when the child reaches self-supporting If the for 6 months.
thereafter self-supporting thereafter, child ceases to be be reinstated.”20 shall earnings by language suggests a de- That pendent not be material would child before sixteen longer though, factually, child was no even dependent. earnings by concerning language a child That the kind of "otherwise is sixteen is after he she *27 any dependent compensation child shall payment The age age years, if of 18 at child reaches when the years cease of 18 pacitated years mentally physically inca nor she neither he or is earning, of 16 or when the child reaches from self-supporting the child for 6 months. If and thereafter thereafter, self-supporting shall ceases reinstated. 17.237(335) by 418.335; amended MSA [MCL PA 103.] 447 Mich Separate by Levin, J. provided” specifically language Legisla- providing ture had in mind in that who constitutes dependents, dependency, and the extent of their injury, shall be determined as of the date of right any death benefit shall become fixed irrespective any subsequent time, as of such change except specifi- in condition as otherwise provided cally §§ 331 and 335. specifically provides,” Section 335 "otherwise respect with to a child who is sixteen and one-half compensation older, shall self-supporting cease if he has been for six months. specific provision for the case in which the compensation child earns after the of sixteen indicates that absent such circumstances question whether the child ais is to be determined the referee as of the date of injury/death regard provides, to, without §as 341 "any subsequent change in conditions.”
In case, the referee and the wcab instant they may exercised whatever discretion have un- language der by directing "the referee order” the death benefits be continued until eighteen. children reach Michigan Bell cites no case21in which the wcab, Appeals
the wcac or the Court of held that factual of the children is to be deter- mined as of the conclusion of the 500-week light of the circumstances then obtaining._ We would resolve doubts in favor of the wcab/wcac construc tion of the law and exercise of discretion until it is shown ligitant, erred, they who asserts that that what was ordered in this practice case is inconsistent with the as reflected in earlier decisions of the wcab or the wcac. *28 Separate Opinion by Levin, J.
VI It does not follow from a decision "may order” means that there an element discre- tion, on the magistrate remand should con- sider adoptive the financial circumstances of the deciding father of the "need” child for an continued compensation. award of mother, Candace Murphy, children’s was obligated support legally them before and after they adopted were by Charles Murphy. question
I whether the Legislature intended that widow, often required to return to the work force herself, support supplement and to the worker’s compensation children, benefit herself and her obliged be provide amount that otherwise paid by would be the employer continuing as compensation under the order” "may language. reading order,”
Another of "may assuming that it is a directive to decide the question of continu- ing accordance with the facts as facts at the conclusion of the 500-week period rather than as of the date of is that injury, the magistrate should consider the financial condi- tion of the child without regard provided to monies by others who have supplemented the worker’s compensation mother, benefit—the grandparents, live-in boyfriend, husband, brothers and sisters the deceased or parent widow, and an adoptive father. magistrate might
The look at social security benefits,22 payments disability under an erisa plan, bonds, child’s stash war any scholarship earnings. and the money, child’s view the inquiry is limited to the child’s financial condition as of the conclusion 70A Am Jur 2d, Social Security Medicare, 362, p 317. LAug 447 Mich Levin, Separate period, regard the 500-week without to monies voluntarily that others have contributed or are legally, adoptive in the. case mother an obliged provide, father, eliminates the adventi- *29 ability pro- tious circumstances of the mother’s to generosity family vide, the members, whether force, she returned to the remarried, work whether, remarried, if she has her new husband adopted children, and his financial circum- stances. thing say employer
It is one that the to shall not required pay be to to continue benefits if the personal child’s financial im- circumstances have proved point longer to he where no needs quite benefits, and another to look to those "le- obligated provide support gally” to to substitute employer. gener- A child of a deceased worker-father would ally have been on the deceased father support. generally The deceased father would support have continued to the child until the child eighteen was if the father had not died a work- "may language related accident. The order” magistrate require authorizes the referee or employer to provide to continue to benefits in the of the shoes deceased father after the 500 weeks personal unless the child has other or income has self-supporting. become question Legislature
We whether intended that mother who have returned to the work only force died, because her husband or a man additionally steps who marries her into the adoptive shoes of the deceased worker as the fa- required children, ther be to relieve employer obligation to continued bene- beyond eigh- fits the 500 until weeks the child is eighteen teen. Continued benefits until the child is compensation money is additional for the the child 1994J Opinion by Separate Levin, J. probably
would have received from the deceased eighteen father until he was or had become self- supporting, not had the father lost his life in a work-related accident. point ques- view,
From an administrative we compensation magistrates tion worker’s whether experience generally have the decide make required the kind of that would decisions if they are henceforth decide whether moth- adoptive er’s income cient, anor father’s income is suffi- having support in mind other needs for children, themselves and other relieve em- ployer obligation provide continuing ben- efits.23 again noteworthy Legislature pro-
It is that the right vided that the child’s to benefits terminates self-supporting when the child becomes for six Legislature he months after is sixteen. The thus only event, *30 event, stated one one that would employer obligation provide relieve the continuing benefits. focus on was the child’s not income on the income of the mother or of her adoptive new husband ofor an father.
Vacated and remanded to the wcac. C.J., J., concurred Cavanagh, Mallett, with Levin, J._ magistrate going living, Is the to decide standard whether family vacation, house, the smaller take should live a smaller drive a car, etc.?