Lead Opinion
Mаryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland’s general statute of limitations, ordinarily requires a civil lawsuit to be filed within three years from the date
“[w]hen a cause of action subject to a limitation under Subtitle 1 of this title accrues in favor of a minor or mental incompetent, that person shall file his action within the lesser of three years or the applicable period of limitations after the date the disability is removed.”
We are asked in this appeal whether a defendant can be equitably estopped from asserting limitations when threats by the defendant have allegedly prevented or otherwise frustrated the plaintiff from bringing suit within the applicable limitations period. Without foreclosing that possibility, we nonetheless shall hold that under the circumstances presented in this case, Appellants’ claims are barred for a want of timely prosecution.
I.
The genesis of this appeal reaches back nearly twenty years to the 1970’s when twelve of the Appellants were students at the Catholic Community Middle School of South Baltimore, Inc. The Archdiocese of Baltimore, Division of Catholic Schools (“Archdiocese”), employed John Joseph Merzbacher as an instructor at that school. According to the Appellants,
In January of 1994, Merzbacher was indicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for the rape and sexual child abuse of Elizabeth Murphy, an Appellant in the case sub judice. On June 8,1995, a jury convicted Merzbacher of those crimes, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment plus ten years.
On January 6, 1994, Appellant Murphy filed the first of fourteen civil complaints filed by Appellants in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against Merzbacher and the Archdiocese. Murphy, along with the other Appellants, sought compensatory and punitive damages for various intentional and non-intentional torts resulting from their alleged sexual abuse by Merzbacher.
The Archdiocese responded with a Motion to Dismiss asserting Maryland’s three-year statute of limitations.
Following discovery, the Archdiocese filed a new Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, [a Motion] for Summary Judgment, once again pleading limitations as a defense. On October 26, 1995, the circuit court issued a Memorandum and Order granting summary judgment in favor of the Archdiocese, concluding that although threats may estop a defendant from asserting limitations, Appellants’ claims were nonetheless barred since Merzbacher’s threats ceased long before “the victims reached the age of majority [and] the three year period of limitations period that followed.” Judgment was similarly entered in favor of Appellee Merzbacher on November 16,1995.
Because they contained common issues of law and fact, the court consolidated Appellants’ cases for “the purposes of discovery, pre-trial matters, and appellate review.” That Order issued on November 21, 1995, and served as a final and joint judgment in favor of Merzbacher and the Archdiocese in all of the Appellants’ cases. Appellants then noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. We issued a Writ of Certiorari on our own motion before consideration of the cases by the intermediate appellate court. Such other facts as necessary are incorporated into the discussion below.
II.
As this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in Appellees’ favor, our sole task is to determine whether the trial court was legally correct. Beatty v. Trailmaster,
In assessing the court’s actions below, we point out that ‘"ordinary principles governing summary judgment ... continue to apply when the issue on summary judgment is limitations[.]” O’Hara v. Kovens,
We have previously observed that a statute of limitations is nothing more than “the legislature’s judgment about the reasonable time needed to institute [a] suit.” Doe v. Maskell,
“Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost. (Internal citation omitted). They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate between the just and unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay. They have come into the law not through the judicial process but through legislation. They represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate.”
Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson,
Ordinarily, our statute of limitations begins to “accrue” on the date of the wrong. The assumption, of course, is that “a potential tort plaintiff is immediately aware that he [or she] has been wronged [and] is therefore put on notice that the statute of limitations” is running. Harig v. Johns-Manville Products,
Otherwise, we have consistently held that our statutes of limitations are to be strictly construed, and absent a legislative creation of an exception, we “ “will not allow any implied or equitable exception to be engrafted upon it.’ ” Garay v. Overholtzer,
III.
Appellants endeavor to persuade us that Merzbaeher and the Archdiocese should be equitably estopped from asserting limitations or alternatively, that this Court should recognize an exception to the general statute of limitations under a theory of duress. In our view, however, there is no meaningful distinction between the two theories advanced by Appellants. Rather, duress and estoppel share a cause and effect relationship. It is upon the grounds of duress that Appellants seek to estop Merzbaeher and the Archdiocese from asserting limitations.
Estoppel by Duress
a.
Desрite our historically strict stance on statutes of limitations, this Court first intimated in 1972 that “unconscionable, inequitable, or fraudulent act[s] of commission or omission upon which another relie[s] and has been mislead to his [or her] injury,” may equitably estop a defendant from raising limitations as a defense under a general statute of limitations.
A few months later, a similar result obtained in Nyitrai v. Bonis,
“where the inducement for delay or the hindrance to the commencement of an action has ceased to operate before the expiration of the limitation period so as to afford the plaintiff ample time thereafter in which to institute his action prior to the running of the statute of limitations, he cannot excuse his failure to do so on the ground of estoppel.” (Citations omitted).
Stated succinctly, “equitable estoppel will not toll the running of limitations absent a showing that the defendant ‘held out any inducements not to file suit or indicated that limitations would not be pleaded,’ ” Booth Glass, supra,
b.
The inducements to which Appellants point are Merzbacher’s alleged threats. Although a novel application of the estoppel rule in Maryland, we, like the First Appellate District of the Courts of Appeal of California, agree that such an application is “plausible.” See DeRose v. Carswell,
In a case factually similar to the instant case, the Supreme Court of California considered the timeliness of a sexual assault claim under the one-year statute of limitations set forth in California’s Tort Claims Act. As that court observed
“[e]stoppel most commonly results from misleading statements about the need for or advisability of a claim; actual fraud or the intent to mislead is not essential.9 (Internal citations omitted). A fortiori, estoppelmay certainly be invoked when there are acts of violence or intimidation that are intended to prevent the filing of a claim. (Original emphasis).”
John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist.,
New York takes a similar view of limitations with respect to estoppel by duress in minority sexual assault cases. See Zoe v. Frederick F.G.,
Although Appellants suggest otherwise, California parallels the New York approach. For example, in DeRose, supra, the First Appellate District of the Courts of Appeal of California rejected a sexual abuse victim’s claim that “threat[s], and fear of harm from the defendant” prevented her from filing suit within the applicable limitations period because “she did nothing to pursue her claims even after [the defendant’s] conduct [that gave rise to the estoppel] ceased.”
In so holding, that court observed that:
“[the plaintiff] expressly alleged that [the offensive] conduct occurred ... “when she was approximately four years old and until she was 11 years old (1966-1973).’ The Court in ... Lobrovich [, supra] held that five weeks were sufficient time for the plaintiff to institute an action after the conduct giving rise to an estoppel ceased. In this case, [the plaintiff] had a year to file suit as an adult.”
Despite the holding in the above cases, Appellants direct our attention to John R., supra. Although the precise issue in John R. was the timeliness of a minor’s claim against the Oakland Unified School District (“District”) for alleged acts of sexual molestation by a teacher under the doctrine of respondent superior, the estoppel argument raised against the District is identical to the argument Appellants press here. In order to fully appreciate the relevance of John R., a review of its pertinent facts and law will serve to illuminate the present controversy.
c.
Fourteen year-old John R. was allegedly molested by his mathematics teacher over a period of several months, with the last act occurring in February, 1981. Ten months later, in December, 1981, John R. reported the alleged incidents to his father. John’s mother in turn shared her son’s accusations with the District that same month. Shе was advised to let the police, who were promptly notified by the District, intervene. John’s mother then contacted an attorney, who advised her to wait for criminal charges to be substantiated prior to pursuing any civil remedy. For reasons not relevant here, the criminal charges against the teacher were eventually dismissed. See John R.,
Thereafter, John’s parents brought suit on his behalf and in their own right against the teacher and the District. At the trial’s outset, judgment was entered in favor of the District on all counts, based upon, inter alia, limitations.
Under California law, limitations ordinarily do not accrue against a minor until he or she
A California intermediate appellate court reversed, concluding that at least with respect to the limitations issue, the plaintiffs should have enjoyed the benefit of the “delayed discovery” doctrine. John R.,
Though questioning the soundness of the lower appellate court’s application of “delayed discovery,” the Supreme Court of California nonetheless thought a remand to the trial court was in order so that the court could determine whether the District should be еstopped from asserting limitations under what could fairly be called a theory of vicarious equitable estoppe
Noting that the trial court failed to undertake such an analysis of the timeliness of John R.’s claims, California’s highest court ordered that factual findings be made with respect to “(1) whether any threats were in fact made by the teacher, (2) when the effect of any such threats ceased, or (3) whether the plaintiffs acted within a reasonable time after the coercive effect of the threats ceased.”
IV.
There is a critical, and in our view, dispositive difference between facts of John R. and the case sub judice. The running of the California statutes was not tolled by John R.’s minority, and the cessation of his teacher’s conduct triggered the statutes’ march towards finality. Thus, John R. and his parents were arguably deprived of a portion of their limitations period by the alleged acts and omissions of the defendants. But see n.
Ҥ 5-201. Persons under a disability.
(a) Extension of time.—When a cause of action subject to a limitation under Subtitle 1 of this title accrues in favor of a minor or mental incompetent, that person shall file his action within the lesser of three years or the applicable period of limitations after the date the disability is removed.
(b) Exception.—This section does not apply if the statute of limitations has more than three yеars to run when the disability is removed.”
Appellants concede that none of them had any contact with Merzbacher whatsoever after reaching the age of majority, and some of the Appellants’ last contact with him occurred well before that time. Thus, by their own admissions, Appellants enjoyed the full limitations period provided to them by the General Assembly.
Nonetheless, Appellants attempt to elude this inconvenient fact by two different, but related routes. First, they maintain that “as a general rule ... whether a cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact that may be taken from the jury only when the court determines as a matter of law that the suit was not instituted within the proper time.” James v. Weisheit,
Appellants also maintain that the policy reasons undergirding statutes of limitations militate towards tolling in the instant case. In the Appellants’ view, those policies are not implicated when, as here, their claims are not fraudulent, the witnesses are presently available and willing to testify, the evidence is still fresh, and no inconvenience would accrue to Merzbacher or the Archdiocese. See generally Doe v. Maskell, supra,
We disagree for several reasons. First and foremost, we conclude as a matter of law that under the applicable principles of estoppel, no jury could find that Appellants acted within a reasonable period of time following the cessation of Merzbacher’s conduct. There was absolutely no evidence that Merzbacher made any threats to the appellants or that he engaged in any overt acts after 1980, and consequently during the three-year period which followed their attaining the age of majority, that prevented Appellants from filing timely actions. Minority is a valid excuse for not commencing suit within the three year general limitations period; unsubstantiated fear of retaliation is not.
Under this Court’s holding in Nyitrai, supra, if the cessation of the defendant’s conduct affords the plaintiff ample time thereafter in which to institute his or her action prior to the running of the statute of limitations, he or she cannot raise an estoppel argument to bar a defense of limitations.
Further, as we indicated in Doe v. Maskell, supra, a statute of limitations is nothing more than a legislative judgment about the amount of time needed to initiate a suit.'
Also, whether or not the concerns prompting statutes of limitations are absent in the instant case is quite beside the point. Again, it is neither the duty nor the province of this Court to rewrite a legislative enactment simply because it is socially useful or judicially expedient to do so. That function belongs solely to the General Assembly.
Accordingly, we hold that in view of the fact that Merzbacher’s alleged threats ceased before any of the Appellants reached the age of majority, their failure to maintain their actions within the applicable limitations period after that date was unreasonable as a matter of law and absolutely bars their claims against Merzbacher.
Y.
Appellants also contend that Merzbacher’s alleged threats should be imputed to the Archdiocese to similarly prevent it from raising limitations as a defense to Appellants’ claims. Because we conclude that those claims are barred against Merzbacher, Appellants’ claims are likewise barred against the Archdiocese. Thus, we need not reach the issue of whether Merzbacher’s conduct should be imputed to the Archdiocese for the purpose of applying equitable tolling principles.
JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
ELDRIDGE and RAKER, JJ., dissent.
Notes
. Sharon Bruce, Jane Doe, Mike Doe, Maryland Lewandowski, Bryan House, Elizabeth Murphy, James Doe, Katherine Micolowski, Mary Doe, Melody Smith, Steven Melnick, Angela Farley, Jane Roe and Edward Blair.
. Petitioners Bryan House and Angela Farley were never enrolled in the Catholic Community Middle School, although Mr. House did attend summer classes at the school on an informal basis and lived with Merzbacher for a period of time. Ms. Farley was apparently a friend of Mr. House. Both maintain that they were victims of Merzbacher’s attacks.
. Merzbacher’s sentencing took place on July 21, 1995.
. John J. Merzbacher v. State of Maryland, No. 1400, September Term, 1995,
. To the extent Appellants’ Complaints alleged counts of assault, those claims are governed by Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 5-105 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article which provides that “[a]n action for assault ... shall be filed within one year from the date it accrues.” Otherwise, Appellants’ claims are subject to Maryland’s general three-year statute of limitations. It provides:
"§ 5-101. Three-year limitation in general.
A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced.”
. Petitioners do not attempt, and indeed cannot attempt, to argue that they were only recently aware of their injuries. Such an argument would strain credulity. See, e.g., Doe v. Archdiocese of Washington, et al.,
. In Chandlee v. Shockley,
. Then Maryland Code (1957, 1972 Repl.Vol.), Art. 57, § 1 provided that ”[a]ll actions of account, actions of assumpsit, or on the case ... shall be commenced, sued or issued within three years from the time the cause of action accrued[.]”
. This view of estoppel is consistent with Maryland law. In Knill v. Knill, this Court observed that it has consistently viewed equitable estoppel as
" 'the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise have existed, either of property, of contract, or of remеdy, as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse and who on his part acquires some corresponding right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy.' ”
. The Lobrovich court held that "[i]f there is still ample time to institute the action within the statutory period after the circumstances inducing delay have ceased to operate, the plaintiff who failed to do so cannot claim an estoppel.” Lobrovich v. Georgison,
. In so holding, the Supreme Court of California opined that "assuming plaintiffs can establish their case, it would plainly be inequitable to permit the [District to escape liability only because the teacher’s threats succeeded in preventing his victim from disclosing the molestation until the time for filing a claim against the [District had elapsed. We conclude that, for purposes of applying equitable estoppel, the time for filing a claim against the [District was tolled during the period that the teacher’s threats prevented plaintiffs from pursuing their claims.”
John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist.,
. In light of the facts as alleged by the plaintiffs in John R., its holding gives us pause. Equitable estoppel will bar a defendant from raising limitations as a defense so long as the defendant’s voluntary conduct prevented the plaintiff from filing suit within the applicable limitations period, and the plaintiff pursued his or her claim within a reasonable amount of time following the cessation of the events prоmpting the estoppel. The plaintiffs in John R., however, expressly acknowledged that the teacher’s acts were disclosed to the parents ten (10) months after the molestation had terminated and that the plaintiffs delayed their suit pending the resolution of criminal charges against the teacher on the advice of their attorney. The first claim against the teacher and District was thus not brought until fifteen (15) months after the teacher’s alleged conduct had ceased.
While conceivably the teacher’s actions could have delayed plaintiffs’ suit beyond the 100 day limitations period set forth in Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2, no such assertion can be made with respect to the plaintiffs’ failure to apply for leave to file a late claim within one year as required by Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.4(b). Indeed, plaintiffs’ own counsel instructed them not to file suit until resolution of the criminal proceedings. That aside, the defendant’s conduct in no way prevented plaintiffs from filing suit within the two months after John R. disclosed the abuse. Stated otherwise, there was no cause/effect relationship between the defendant's conduct and plaintiffs’ failure to comply with § 911.4(b).
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The majority reaches a result that allows Merzbacher to profit from the threats, violence and intimidation which he used to prevent the plaintiffs from maintaining actions against him based on the repeated rapes and abuse which Merzbacher inflicted upon the plaintiffs. This result is unconscionable. It is also inconsistent with this Court’s prior opinions. Moreover, the result is not in accord with the public policies underlying statutes of limitations. Under the extraordinary circumstances presented, I would apply principles of estoppel and/or duress and allow the plaintiffs in these cases to pursue their civil claims against Merzbacher.
I.
In determining whether summary judgment was properly granted in these cases, this Court must view all evidence, and inferences derived therefrom, against the moving parties. Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore,
A.
A brief review of each deposed plaintiffs testimony is as follows.
Jane Doe
While Jane was a student at the Catholic Community Middle School, Merzbacher continuously fondled her in front of other students. After Jane informed her father that Merzbacher had unsnapped her bra during class, Jane’s father complained to the principal, and warned Merzbacher not to touch his daughter again. (E. 153).
“[Merzbacher] was furious that I told my father about the incident in the classroom, and he told this guy, he said, tell her what I did to the last girl’s father who came to this school and complained about me ... [and] the guy told me that he had killed the girl’s father. And I was hysterical, and I can remember being so upset that he was going to kill my family.” (E. 154).
About a year after this incident occurred, Merzbacher “drove by [Jane’s neighborhood] in his car like real slow, and he gave me that look like ... hе was going to kill me or something. And, ... I was having such bad nightmares after that, and that’s when I tried to commit suicide, because I didn’t see no way out. I couldn’t tell my mother. I couldn’t tell my father. I couldn’t tell anybody.” (E. 159).
James Doe
Throughout the period during which Merzbacher taught James at the Catholic Community Middle School, Merzbacher fondled James’s buttocks and other private areas in front of other students, “raped” him, and forced him to fondle female students. (E. 116-118). Merzbacher also physically abused James by kicking him, twisting his arm, and throwing books at him. By threats of harm, Merzbacher forced James to beat up other students.
Angela first met Merzbacher when he drove her boyfriend Bryan to meet her on a street corner. After parking at an A & P market, Merzbacher got in the back seat of the car with Angelа, grabbed her hair, pulled out a gun and began to rape her. (E. 264-265). After Angela tried to jump out of the car, Merzbacher warned her that if she continued to resist him, he would “blow [her] fing head off,” and that if she ever told anyone, he would kill her, her sister and Bryan. (E. 265). Still holding the gun, Merzbacher then forced Bryan to rape Angela. (E. 266). During the next eight months, Merzbacher raped Angela approximately thirty times either at the Catholic Community Middle School or at the Rockaway Beach Fire Department. (E. 267). Each time Merzbacher would tell Angela not to tell anyone or he would kill her family. On one occasion, Angela’s mother overheard Merzbacher make inappropriate comments to Angela over the telephone. Thereafter, when Angela’s mother saw Angela getting into Merzbacher’s car, she chased the car through the community of Essex and then called the police. After this incident, Merzbacher threw beer bottles into the swimming pool at Angela’s home and continued to threaten Angela, warning her that if she reported him, “no matter when it was, how old I was or where I lived, that he would kill me and my family.” (E. 269).
Mary C.
When Mary C. was in eighth grade, Merzbacher would fondle her, lift up her skirt, pinch her breasts, and shove the stem of a smoking pipe into her vagina. (E. 328, 344). During this year, Merzbacher also raped Mary C. at the Rockaway Beach Fire Department. (E. 344). After raping her, Merzbacher pinned her hair to the floor with his foot, and forced three male students to rape her. Mary C. was aware that Merzbacher had a gun in his possession and that “he wasn’t afraid to use it at that point.” (E. 346). Shortly thereafter, Merzbacher approached Mary C. in the storage room of the school and began kissing her. When she resisted, he slammed her against the wall, put his hands around her throat, and told her that if she ever pulled away from him again, he “would kill her.” (E. 347). Merzbacher continued to make similar threats to her approximately three to four times a week. He also threatened the safety of her father, a Baltimore City police officer, several times. On one occasion, Merzbacher pulled Mary C. out of class and asked, “[Mary C.], what’s your father doing here? You’re not blabbing are you? He better not get too nosey or I’ll kill him.” (E. 330). Holding a gun to her head, Merzbacher also warned, “Who’s gun do you think could blow a bigger hole in someone’s head— mine or your father’s?” He added, “My gun could blow a hole so big in Johnny Law’s head.... ” (E. 330).
On another occasion, Merzbacher approached Mary C. after school and asked her if she was pregnant. When she expressed uncertainty, Merzbacher told her that she “better not be” and that, if she were, he would “shoot her.” (E. 347-348). He further threatened Mary C. by telling her that, if she were pregnant, he would “shoot [her], yank it out with a hanger and let [her] bleed to death, or he would knock [her] down the stairs.” After picking up Mary C. and her date from a school dance, Merzbacher also threatened that if she ever said anything about what he had done to her, he would kill her. (E. 349). Mary C. did not report Merzbacher’s conduct to the authorities because “Merzbacher and I had an agreement. If I kept my mouth shut, he wouldn’t Mil me. If I did certain things that he said to do, I stayed alive, and I carried that with me.” (E. 351).
Elizabeth
On one occasion, Merzbacher pulled out his revolver, spun the chamber, pointed it at Elizabeth’s face and pulled the trigger. Although the gun did not discharge on that day, Elizabeth recalls another afternoon when Merzbacher also played “Russian Roulettе”
“had a book, a set of fake books and he had a bottle of sherry ..., I had never tasted alcohol before, and he gave me this sherry and then he removed my underwear and raped me while he sat on his desk chair. I was eleven, and he used that pattern repeatedly. Sometimes in that storage room was when he would also pull out his revolver and point it at my head when he raped me.” (E. 462).
Merzbacher “had no qualms about pulling [the gun] out and letting you know he had it, that it was around____” (E. 462).
One afternoon, Merzbacher raped Elizabeth in the storage room with the gun to her head. He shouted, “I will blow your fucking brains out if you ever tell anyone what I have done to you at any point in time. I will find you, I will come and get you.” (E. 463). Merzbacher also warned Elizabeth, “I will kill your father, I will kill your family. You’re a bad little girl. Who would believe you anyway? [B]ut I will fucking blow your brains out.” (E. 463). Several years after the abuse had ended, Elizabeth returned to the Catholic Community Middle School and spoke with the principal about Merzbacher. Elizabeth warned her that Merzbacher had been “brutal” to several male and female students, and that he had frequently raped her. Most importantly, Elizabeth expressed concern that Merzbacher not be allowed to continue teaching at the school. In response, the principal said, “Liz, I think you should forget it and get on with your life, people change.” (E. 466).
Mary Doe
Merzbacher fondled Mary on a daily basis, pulling up her skirt with a stick and grabbing her in her private areas. (E. 192). During a rehearsal for a school play, Merzbacher asked Mary to go to the storage room and fill up his cоffee mug. Merzbacher and a male student approached Mary in the storage room from behind, and Merzbacher began fondling her. He then instructed the male student to take Mary’s clothes off and get on top of her. Holding a long-bladed knife, Merzbacher told Mary that he would kill her if she did not stop screaming. Merzbacher then “took the knife and he stabbed a banjo that was next to my head and he told me that if I didn’t shut up, my face would be next.” (E. 193). On a separate afternoon, Merzbacher kept Mary after school, sat on top of her, unbuttoned her blouse and bit her on the breast.
Steven
Steven’s first encounter with Merzbacher was in the sixth grade when Merzbacher suddenly started punching Steven, throwing him against the locker and beating him up. (E. 378-379). Thereafter, Merzbacher would force Steven to engage in oral sex with him after class. (E. 380). This type of abuse continued through the year and the next two years, and would frequently occur in front of other teachers. (E. 381). Merzbacher would threaten Steven by telling him that Merzbacher had connections to the “mafia” and to other “hit men” who could get him at any time, and by showing Steven where he had shot his gun through the wall. (E. 380). More than once, Merzbacher would point the gun at Steven, telling him if “you ever tell anybody, I’ll kill you. I’ll kill your father, I’ll kill your mother, I’ll kill your whole family.” (E. 381). The principal once confronted Merzbacher about his abuse of Steven before a classroom of students. In the principаl’s presence, Merzbacher choked Steven, pulled his tie, punched him and kicked him, and said
Bryan
Bryan first met Merzbacher when he was returning a fireman’s coat to the Rockaway Beach Fire Department. There, Bryan recalls that Merzbacher would “laugh,” “cuss,” and drink beer with thirteen and fourteen year old students. (E. 299).
“[i]f you pissed John off, he would threaten to have some thugs from South Baltimore come down and beat you to death. But his more specific threats, I mean the threats that I overheard him make and that I firmly—that I honestly did believe him, and I know John probably better than the rest of those students do.... [B]ut there was also a look of ... pure ... evil, that he would sit ... across that table from me at dinnertime and he would be mad, and he would take a glass plate and sling it up into the air and let it bounce off a glass table that I was sitting at, and if it shatterеd, he was all the more happy, and he would stare at me with the cigar in his mouth and his eyes—I mean, he sat there and looked at you, and nobody could look any worse than John Merzbacher when he wanted to instill fear in you. And the night he told Mary [C.] that he would kill her, he had been drinking, and I believed every word of that, as well as the night he told me. I mean, I have no doubt in my mind that he meant it when he told me that, and he used to tell me that it wasn’t a matter of wanting to kill me or whether anger would drive him to do it or betrayal,----he would have to kill me to prevent himself from going to jail. And this is what he told me. And he told me this time and time again____” (E. 303-304).
One evening when Bryan and Merzbacher were sitting in Merzbacher’s car, Merzbacher “pulled that hammer [of the gun] back that night to where a flip of his finger would have blew my skull apart, and he told me that if I ever said anything ... he would have to kill me.” (E. 304). After Merzbacher was indicted, Bryan “had nightmares where he’s after my children now, and, ... I wake up in a panic to where I don’t realize that I’m still in a dream.” (E. 310).
Throughout the period when Katherine attended Merzbacher’s class, Merzbacher would frequently grab her, push her against the blackboard, put his finger into her vagina, and grab her breasts, in front of the class. (E. 420). Katherine specifically described one incident where
“I was sent in there [the storage room] to wash his coffee mug out, and when I went and was washing his coffee mug out, he came in and started kissing my neck, kissing down my neck and grabbing my hair, and that’s when the original threat that he said to me, you know, ‘Shut your mouth, if you ever breathe a word of this to anybody no matter where you are, no matter how old you are, I will track you down and I will blow your fucking head off.’ ... and I was terrified because I didn’t know what next was going to happen.” (E. 420).
Katherine did not report Merzbacher’s conduсt because “I was terrified. When you go through something like that, I mean, I still am in terror. I still am petrified. When I lay my head down at night, I see that man’s face and I have nightmares.” (E. 421). Merzbacher continued to threaten Katherine even after she had graduated from middle school. Approximately twenty times, Katherine’s neighbor approached her and said “Mr. John said to tell Big Momma hello, and don’t ever forget.” (E. 423). Soon thereafter, Merzbacher spotted Katherine crossing the street, slowed down his car and “with that evil conniving grin he has and that little chuckle stopped and stared over at me, and it petrified me. If the ground could have opened up and I could have crawled in, I would have.” (E.423).
Sharon
Merzbacher began pulling up Sharon’s uniform and fondling her when she was in the sixth grade.
During Sharon’s final year of middle school, Merzbacher began to approach her in the storage room where the coffee machine was located.
Mike Doe
Merzbacher first began abusing Mike when Mike was in the sixth grade at the Catholic Community Middle School. Merzbacher would pull Mike’s hair, punch him in the arm, smack him in the head and touch him in his private areas and his buttocks.
Melody
When Melody attended the Catholic Community Middle School, she studied in an empty room across the hall from Merzbacher’s classroom. (E. 512). Consequently, she frequently witnessed Merzbacher physically and sexually abusing his students. Melody specifically viewed one female student sitting on Merzbacher’s lap with her underwear’ down to her ankles. The principal responded to Melody’s concern over this incident by telling her that the student “was having a problem with the elastic in her underwear.” (E. 515). Upon learning that Melody had complained to the principal, Merzbacher threatened her several times. For example, he told her that he would “blow [her] fucking head off” if she did not stop complaining. (E. 513). Several of Merzbacher’s students also attacked Melody when she was going up the stairs and “held me around my neck so I couldn’t turnaround to see them, and they threw me down on the ground and my lip was busted and my nose was busted. And they held my head down and they kept hitting me and punching—kicking me----” As the children walked away, they said that it “came from John.” (E. 518).. Merzbacher also approached Melody on one occasion and “held the gun right [against me] and told me if I didn’t keep my mouth shut, ... I wouldn’t have to worry about having my studies in the library. I’d be in my fucking coffin.” (E. 519). Even years after Melody grаduated, she never discussed Merzbacher with her husband because “I was too scared---- I believed that he would find me and kill my kids. I believed him. I believed that he would find me no matter where he was, what
B.
In January 1994, Merzbacher was arrested and charged with several counts of rape and sexual child abuse. Thereafter, most of the plaintiffs felt safe enough to come forward and discuss the abuse with either their families, the State’s Attorney, a private attorney or the police. Until this time, however, the plaintiffs, who were repeatedly threatened at gunpoint to remain silent, still believed that their safety, and that of their families, was in jeopardy. As the testimony set forth above demonstrates, Merzbacher had repeatedly warned them that, if they reported him, he could find them “no matter where they were” and would kill them and their families. Mike Doe testified that “[u]p to [when Merzbacher was arrested,] I had been afraid because he had threatened my life and I feared for my wife and I feared for my family’s lives, but when I saw him with his handcuffs on and all these other people were coming forth and he was in jail, I felt I was safe enough to come forth----” (E. 236). Mary C. testified that “I think [that Merzbacher has not threatened me since I came forward] because he is in custody. Some type of type of custody. I think if he were free to walk the streets without being observed, I think I would have been contacted.” (E. 352). Melody stated: “I came forward ... when he was in jail, when I knew he had already been locked up.” (E. 523). Bryan came forward “four days after the story [about Merzbacher’s arrest] was on the front page of the Sun Paper.” (E. 308). Angela reported the abuse when “Mеrzbacher was arrested,” and she “figured he was in jail.” (E. 270). Katherine reported Merzbacher “after he was arrested and then I felt like there was a little bit of safety there.” (E. 430).
Several plaintiffs also testified that, because of the large group of former students who came forward to report Merzbacher, there was “safety in numbers.” (E.g., Elizabeth’s testimony at E. 472). Katherine testified that “I would have never come out by myself with this. Never.” (E. 430). The State’s Attorney and the police detectives also assured many of the plaintiffs of their continued safety and protection from Merzbacher if they disclosed the abuse. Elizabeth stated that “I have the protection of the State’s Attorney or the police assuring me if I so much as fall up a step, Merzbacher is going to be the first person they look toward.” (E. 477). And Jane Doe testified that “[the detective] assured me that I would be safe if I told him. He said, don’t worry, you’ll be totally safe---- I assumed [Merzbacher] was going to be arrested, and then I’ll be safe.” (E. 166).
Thus, only after Merzbacher was arrested and after the plaintiffs were assured of their safety, did they believe that they could come forward with their claims against Merzbacher. There is absolutely no evidence in the record indicating that, prior to this time, the plaintiffs did not believe that they coidd come forward without endangering themselves or their families. Moreover, in light of the evidence, the plaintiffs’ fears were obviously not unreasonable.
II.
A.
Almost 150 years ago, this Court held that, where barring an action on the ground of limitations “would be unjust and inequitable,” the defense of limitations “should not be sanctioned,” Steuart v. Carr, 6 Gill. 430, 440 (1848).
More specifically, this Court has repeatedly taken the position that a defendant will be deemed to have waived the dеfense of limitations or will be estopped from relying upon the running of limitations when the defendant “asked the [plaintiffs] to forbear bringing suit against him,” Leonhart v. Atkinson,
When a rapist and child abuser holds a gun to his young victim’s head and threatens to shoot the victim, as well as kill the members of the victim’s family if the victim ever discloses the rape and abuse, the conduct of the rapist and abuser clearly amounts to an inducement not to file suit. It is more than the equivalent of “askfing]” the victim “to forbear bringing suit.” Leonhart v. Atkinson, supra,
The majority opinion states that treating Merzbacher’s “alleged threats” as “inducements” is “a novel application of the estoppel rule in Maryland” (majority opinion at 535). This is not quite accurate.
While not discussed by the majority, this Court’s opinion in Bayshore Industries v. Ziats, supra,
This Court, in unanimously affirming the claimant’s judgment against Bayshore Industries, indicated that the threats amounted to duress sufficient to preclude the employer’s reliance on the statute of limitations, saying (
“The threat that Bayshore would bar the appellee from future employment is similar to a threat to cause the loss of present employment. A threat of the latter type has been held in suits for personal injuries to amount to duress sufficient to avoid a release by an employee in favor of an employer. Holmes v. Industrial Cotton Mills Co., 64 F.Supp. 20 (D.C.S.C.) (Present employer); Wise v. Midtown Motors (Minn.), [231 Minn. 46 ]42 N.W.2d 404 (threat by present employer, release to former employer); Perkins Oil Co. of Delaware v. Fitzgerald (Ark.), [197 Ark. 14 ]121 S.W.2d 877 (threat to discharge the injured employee’s stepfather, then the only breadwinner in the family, and to blacklist him with other employers in a like business); and Huddleston v. Ingersoll Co. (Colo.), [109 Colo. 134 ]123 P.2d 1016 (threat to discharge another). See also annotation,20 A.L.R.2d 743 , at 751.”
The Court went on to hold that the coercion “amount[ed] to clearly inequitable conduct” and that “[t]he employer should be estopped from profiting by such conduct.”
A provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act applicable in the Bayshore Industries case, former Maryland Code (1957), Art. 101, § 39(c), did relieve a claimant of the bar of limitations if the failure to file a timely claim “was induced or occasioned by fraud, or by facts and circumstances amounting to an estoppel,”
Furthermore, the Court’s opinion in Bayshore Industries relied most heavily on Chandlee v. Shockley, supra,
“The Maryland case which is perhaps closest to the instant case insofar as estoppel to plead limitations is concerned is Chandlee v. Shockley,219 Md. 493 ,150 A.2d 438 . In thаt case the plaintiff had been injured in an automobile collision in which the driver of the other car, who was the defendant’s decedent, had been killed. Suit was not filed against the administratrix until more than six months after her qualification, and the administratrix demurred to the declaration on the ground of limitations under § 112 of Article 93 of the Code (1957). This Court held that the time limitation contained in that section was a limitation on the right and not merely on the remedy and hence that the defense could be raised by demurrer. This Court further held (over the dissent of two Judges) that the allegations of the amended declaration as supplemented by a bill of particulars were sufficient to estop the administratrix from asserting the defense of limitations. These allegations were, in brief, that a representative of the decedent’s insurance company, who was authorized to act for the administratrix,had assured the plaintiffs counsel that if settlement efforts failed, the defense of limitations would not be pleaded. § 112 of Article 93 contained no proviso similar to that contained in § 39(c) of Article 101 of the Code (1957)—a difference which was pointed out in the dissenting opinion. The majority relied heavily upon Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 178 F.2d 253 (C.A.4th.) (cert. den.339 U.S. 919 [70 S.Ct. 621 ,94 L.Ed. 1343 ]), in which the filing of suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act was delayed beyond the statutory period because of erroneous information given by a railroad claim agent as to the time within which suit could be brought. This Court quoted from Scarborough a passage containing this statement: ‘The ancient maxim that no one should profit by his own conscious wrong is too deeply imbedded in the framework of our law to be set aside by a legalistic distinction between the closely related types of statutes of limitations.’ That ancient maxim is also recognized as the law of this State.... ”
Consequently, the general equitable principle that “ ‘no one should profit by his own conscious wrong,’” Chandlee v. Shockley, swpra,
B.
The majority opinion at one point appears to accept the principle that “a potential tort plaintiff can as much be induced to delay his or her action by an affirmative threat, as he or she can by a false promise” (majority opinion at 535), and that, in this situation, a defendant may be estopped from relying upon the bar of limitations. Later, however, the majority refuses to apply this principle to the present cases “for several reasons.” The “[fjirst and foremost” reason is that, as a matter of law, “no jury could find that Appellants acted within a reasonable period of time following the cessation of Merzbacher’s conduct.” (Majority opinion at 542). The majority continues by concluding that “unsubstantiated fear of retaliation is not” a “valid excuse for not commencing suit within the three year general limitations period” (ibid.).
The majority’s description of the plaintiffs’ fear of retaliation as “unsubstantiated” is utterly amazing. Every single one of the plaintiffs were threatened with death by Merzbacher. He also threatened to kill their families. The threats were “substantiated” by holding a gun to their heads, by shooting guns in their presence, by shooting a gun over their heads, by physical abuse, by a knife, and by bringing someone to tell the students that Mеrzbacher had killed a girl’s father because the girl had complained about Merzbacher. I do not know how Merzbacher’s threats could be more “substantiated” unless he had carried them out and killed one or more of the plaintiffs.
The majority’s view that the plaintiffs acted unreasonably, as a matter of law, when they failed to come forward before limitations had run, and thus before Merzbacher was apprehended, shows an incomprehensible disregard for the coercive effect of holding a loaded gun to a person’s head, and particularly to a child’s head. I simply cannot fathom the majority’s lack of appreciation for the fear that conduct such as Merzbacher’s could reasonably instill in young rape and sexual abuse victims. While the majority states that “no jury could find that” the plaintiffs acted within a reasonable period of time, I doubt that many rational jurors would find otherwise.
The majority emphasizes that Merzbacher’s conduct towards these plaintiffs ceased long before limitations had run (majority opinion at 542). Although the majority’s reliance on such a factor might be warranted under entirely different circumstances, the majority’s view totally ignores the nature and reality of the threats in these cases. The threats, and the heinous conduct backing them up, were deliberately calculated to have, and reasonably did have, effects into the indefinite future. Allowing the defendant Merzbacher to successfully take the position
While purporting to recognize that one may be estopped from relying on limitations, the majority’s final reason for not applying the principle in these cases is as follows (majority opinion at 542-543):
“[A] statute of limitations is nothing more than a legislative judgment about the amount of time needed to initiate a suit____ Appellants implore this Court to ignore that judgment and substitute its own. Recognizing the peculiar difficulties visited upon those of tender years who are injured in their minority, our Legislature has already determined the amount of time reasonably needed to bring an action after reaching the age of majority. We cannot disturb that determination.”
This statement makes the majority’s recognition of the estoppel principle completely illusory. If a reasonable time after the defendant’s tortious conduct for bringing suit is always the time period set forth in the statute of limitations, a defendant could never be estopped from relying on limitations. Under the majority’s view, in every case where the plaintiff filed suit after limitations had run, the plaintiff would have waited an unreasonable length of time based on the legislative judgment. The majority’s theory cannot be reconciled with decisions such as Bayshore Industries v. Ziats, supra,
The flaw in the majority’s reasoning is that an estoppel to rely upon a legal principle does not contradict or infringe upon that legal principle. Otherwise, there would be no concept of equitable estoppel. To hold that a defendant, because of his own conduct, may not take advantage of a particular legal proposition, including a statute of limitations, does not subvert or contradict that legal proposition. The particular law remains the same; the defendant, because of his conduct, simply is not allowed to take advantage of the law. Merzbacher should not be allowed to take advantage of his successful threats in these cases.
C.
Not only is the plaintiffs’ position in the present cases supported by the principles set forth in this Court’s prior opinions, but the plaintiffs’ position is supported by decisions elsewhere applying estoppel and/or duress to bar a defendant, accused of sexual abuse, from raising limitations as a defense. These decisions involve far less egregious facts than those presented in the cases at bar.
For example, the Supreme Court of California applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel in John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist.,
“[Ujnder the reasoning of a number of recent Court of Appeal decisions ..., the facts alleged in the complaint, if proven, might well demonstrate that the claim was timely filed under a theory of equitable estoppel----
* * # :H * #
“Estoppel most commonly results from misleading statements about the need for or advisability of a claim; actual fraud or the intent to mislead is not essential---- A fortiori, estoppel may certainly be invoked when there are acts of violence or intimidation that are intended to prevent the filing of a claim. [Citations omitted]. And here, the teacher’s threats to retaliate against John if the boy reported the incidents of sexual molestation allegedly did just that.
“Although the teacher’s alleged threats in this case were no doubt motivated largely by self-interest, rather than to prevent John from filing a claim against the district, it would clearly be inconsistent with the equitable underpinnings of the estoppel doctrine to permit the district to benefit by such threats---- [W]e have no hesitation in concluding that the teacher’s threats may be taken into account in resolving the procedural status of plaintiffs claims against the district.”
A New York court adopted a similar position in Anonymous v. Anonymous,
In Jones v. Jones,
Most recently, the California Court of Appeals considered whether a child abuser should benefit from the statute of limitations in Christopher P. v. Mojave Unified School Dist.,
“Several circumstances are particularly important in this case. First, the directive not to tell was made by a teacher, a recognized authority figure, to an 11-year-old student. Students generally are expected to follow their teacher’s directives. Second, the statement was made in conjunction with a sexual molestation. A common trait of ‘child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome’ is the child’s failure to report, or delay in reporting the abuse. The very nature of the underlying tort deters the molested child from reporting the abuse. [Citations omitted]. Thus, a molestation coupled with a directive not to report the incident may well deter a child from promptly reporting the abuse and thereby protecting his or her right to redress under the Tort Claims Act....
“Accordingly, we conclude the circumstances presented by this case, if established, are sufficient to support an estoppel. A directive by an authority figure to a child not to tell anyone of the molestation is a sufficient inducement of delay to invoke an estoppel. Whether the District is estopped from asserting as a defense appellant’s failure to comply with the claims statutes presents a question of fact for the trial court.”
D.
The public policies underlying statutes of limitations similarly do not support the majority’s position under the circumstances presented in these cases. For example, the primary policy underlying these statutes is “fairness to the defendant—providing assurance that no ancient obligations remain, and relieving him of defending against a claim after ‘evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.’ ” Harig v. Johns-Manville Products,
These concerns underlying statutes of limitations, however, are not present in the cases at bar. In these cases, where the allegations involve repetitive and extreme acts of physical
The majority opinion states that the inapplicability to the present circumstances of the public policies underlying statutes of limitations “is quite beside the point.” (Majority opinion at 543). The majority goes on to indicate that not applying the statute of limitations amounts to “rewriting] a legislative enactment” and that such “function belongs solely to the General Assembly.” Such rigidity with regard to the application of statutes of limitations is not consistent with the previously discussed opinions of this Court declining to apply statutes of limitations because of the defendant’s conduct. It is not consistent with this Court’s opinions adopting the discovery rule. See, e.g., Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., supra,
E.
To reiterate, this Court has long held that a defendant’s reliance on the running of limitations “should not be sanctioned by a Court” where it “would be unjust and inequitable.” Steuart v. Carr, supra,
A more appropriate case than the present ones for applying these principles could hardly be imagined. The repeated heinous conduct by the defendant Merzbacher, coupled with the threats at gunpoint to the victims’ lives and the livеs of their families, is virtually unprecedented in any civil case heretofore coming before this Court. Merzbacher’s threats were successful until he was apprehended by the authorities. To allow Merzbacher to profit from his successful egregious criminal conduct is outrageous.
RAKER, J., concurs with the views expressed herein and joins this opinion.
. The principles of estoppel and duress, while spoken of interchangeably by the majority, are analytically different. Estoppel focuses primarily on the conduct of the defendant, and “operates as a technical rule of law to prevent a party from asserting his rights where it would be inequitable and unconscionable to assert those rights.” Savonis v. Burke,
. While there were actually fifteen plaintiffs, there were only twelve who were deposed. One of the plaintiffs committed suicide before a deposition could be taken, and the other two were unavailable for deposition.
. The defendant Merzbacher's deposition was taken, and he did not contradict any of the facts set forth in the plaintiffs’ depositions. Merzbacher pleaded the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination in response to most of the questions asked during his deposition.
. Although normally we do not in opinions set forth references to the record extract before this Court, in light of the extreme nature of Merzbacher’s conduct which was repeatedly testified to in these cases, I have decided to do so. "E” references are to the pages of the record extract filed in this Court.
. James testified that if he did not fondle the female students or beat up several of the male students, Merzbacher would “get" him and "hurt” him. (E. 117). Since the seventh grade, James was aware that Merzbacher had a gun in his possession, and that he would use it at any time. In fact, on one occasion, James saw Merzbacher shoot the gun at street signs as Merzbacher drove students around in his car. (E. 115),
. I have deleted all references to the plaintiffs’ actual surnames where they may have appeared in the deposition transcripts.
. While Merzbacher was still on top of Mary, thе principal entered the room. After warning Merzbacher that she did not want his door locked, the principal left the room. (E. 196-197). No disciplinary action was taken.
. A similar event occurred when another Sister entered Merzbacher’s classroom while he was grabbing students. The Sister "gave him a look ... just like, John stop it.” No further action was taken. (E. 385).
. Although Bryan was not enrolled in the Catholic Community Middle School, he frequently attended Merzbacher’s class. (E. 298). Bryan described how Merzbacher would "grab [students] in the crotch or push them up against the car and lean them over the hood ...” (E. 300). On one occasion, Bryan witnessed Merzbacher walk up behind the principal and place his hands on her breasts and on her buttocks. In response, the principal simply "giggled and backed away.” (E. 310). Bryan also recalls confronting another school teacher, who was a priest, when he was drinking beers with Merzbacher and other students. According to Bryan, the priest began to drink beer with Merzbacher and the young students. (E. 311).
. Bryan witnessed Merzbacher shoot his gun on two occasions. On the first occasion, Merzbacher shot a gun through the front windows of Chesapeake High School, shattering the windows and narrowly missing a janitor inside the school lobby. (E. 313). On a separate occasion, Merzbacher stopped his car to talk with some girls, and a van hit him from behind. When the men attempted to exit the van, Merzbacher shot five bullets into the van. After the van drove off, Merzbacher went home to get a sawed-off shot gun. After searching for hours, Merzbacher found the parked van and shot it seven times. (E. 313).
. Katherine’s fear of Merzbacher escalated when she learned that he worked "for 911," and could, Katherine believed, find her wherever she was living. (E. 425).
. Merzbacher also referred to Sharon as "Candy Bar” in front of other students and teachers. (E. 63).
. As the testimony of several witnesses disclosed, it was Merzbacher’s pattern to direct students to fill up or clean his coffee mug in the storage room. After the students would enter the storage room, Merzbacher would approach them and sexually and/or physically abuse them.
. Mike also witnessed Merzbacher touching the breast of the principal when she entered the classroom to hand Merzbacher some papers. According to Mike, the principal “had an embarrassed look on her face and she backed right out of the classroom.” (E. 238).
. During this year, Mike recalls seeing a bullet hole in the wall in the back of Merzbacher’s classroom. (E. 234).
. Mike further described the effect of Merzbacher’s threats on his life as follows:
"This living in fear all them years, I mean unless you have been in a similar situation, you don’t know what it’s like to have to live in fear, to have to worry about someone killing you or killing someone else, and having something that you want to tell someone but not being able to, to have a threat on your life.... ” (E. 240).
. In addition, the 1963 opinion in Bayshore Industries directly refutes the majority’s assertion that "this Court first intimated in 1972 that ‘unconscionable, inequitable, or fraudulent act[s] of commission or omission upon which another reliefs] and has been mislead to his [or her] injury’ may equitably estop a defendant from raising limitations as a defense under a general statute of limitations.” (Majority opinion at 533). In fact, the majority itself in footnote 7 of its opinion goes on to cite earlier cases standing for the same principle. The principle was recognized as early as 1848 in Steuart v. Carr,
. Although the claimant had been laid off two days after her accident because Bаyshore Industries had completed the order on which she was working, the company had allegedly promised to re-call her.
. Judge Henderson’s dissenting opinion in Chandlee v. Shockley,
. Two of the cases discussed below involve the application ol’ estoppel to bar only the perpetrator's employer from raising limitations as an affirmative defense. Nonetheless, the rationales used by these courts are equally persuasive in the present cases against Merzbacher.
. Because the charges against the teacher were dismissed by the plaintiffs at the trial level, the court limited its discussion to the applicability of equitable estoppel against the school district.
. As the majority opinion indicates, the trial court's grant of summary judgment in these cases, including the ground underlying that grant, was equally applicable to Merzbacher and the Archdiocese. For purposes of the summary judgment, the court drew no distinction between the two defendants. Consistent with the settled principle of Maryland procedure "that an appellate court will ordinarily limit its review of the granting of summary judgment to those grounds relied upon by the trial court,” IA Const. Corp. v. Carney,
. See, e.g., Article 47 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.