1 Ga. App. 155 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1907
Meacbam, by his next friend, brought an action in the. city court of Augusta against George S. Murphy, to recover
The first request to charge was in these words: “I charge you further that if plaintiff’s injuries were caused by an ill-judged attempt to prevent any injury, when if plaintiff had remained quiet the injury would not have occurred, there can be no recovery in this case against the defendant. A person has in general the right to presume that others are endowed with ordinary sense and discretion, and that these characteristics will control their conduct in a natural way, in the face of great danger; and any act of the plaintiff which is not of this description is one for the result of which no recovery can be had; and if plaintiff’s act resulted from a rash apprehension of danger which did not exist, and the injury which plaintiff sustained is to be attributed to rashness and imprudence, plaintiff is not entitled to recover from the defendant.” The court was not required to give any charge which in any part was erroneous or not adjusted to the facts in any part, and therefore we do not quote the whole of the lengthy request. Suffice it to say that there was no evidence in this case that the plaintiff made any attempt of any kind to prevent the injury. The evidence is undisputed that he remained quiet. And the rule as to ordinary sense and discretion, requested, would have had to be modified to suit the facts of a case like this, where the person referred to was a child of the tender age of eleven.
The second request was in these words: “I charge you that in
The third request is as follows: “I charge 3rou further, that if the plaintiff exercised ordinary care to avoid any accident, and plaintiff’s injuries were received on account of the intervening act of the animal, the damages would be too remote to recover of the defendant in this case. If you should find in this ease that the plaintiff drove too near the steep embankment in order to avoid threatened danger, and in order to prevent such clanger acted in an ill-judged and imprudent manner, the defendant would not be liable.” This request was subject to the objections mentioned as to both of the two former requests, and was properly refused by the trial judge. Upon careful review of the record, we are constrained to say that we find no error of law assigned which would authorize interference by this court. The determination of the truth of the transaction being exclusively the province of the jury, we need only remark that their finding was fully authorized; and the evidence, knowledge of which was acquired at the trial,