Murphy v. BronsteinMurphy v. Bronstein
Lead Opinion
This is аn appeal from the dismissal of a suit by John and Nancy Murphy seeking to gain visitation rights to their two minor grandchildren in the custody of their mother, Mary Murphy Bronstein, and adoptive father, Alvin C. Bronstein.
The complaint alleges the Murphys are the paternal grаndparents of the children and acknowledges the children have been legally adopted by their stepfather. The сomplaint also alleges the children spent much time in the Murphys’ home prior to the divorce of their son and Mrs. Bronstein.
Thе Bronsteins moved to dismiss. The parties agreed that the motion be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Alabamа Rules of Civil Procedure. After hearing the court found as a matter of law it did not have discretion to hear the case bеcause the adoption by the stepfather severed any rights of the paternal grandparents. It is from this judgment that the Murphys appeal.
The main issue on appeal is whether the trial court has discretion in a domestic relations casе to hear a request by the paternal grandparents for visitation “rights” to their grandchildren when the natural mother has subsequently remarried, and the natural father has consented to the stepfather’s adoption of such children.
Courts have jurisdiction over custody of children independent of
The Bronsteins cite § 26-10-5(b), Code 1975, for the proposition that upon entry of final order of adoption, that not only thе natural parent’s (or parents’) legal relationship with respect to the child ceases, but that the grandparents’ legal relationship also ceases since it is a derivative of the parents’. Furthermore, they cite several cаses from other states which hold the legal effect of adoption was either to end all legal relationship with the сhildren or to make the children legal strangers to the bloodline of their natural father. Our courts have not adopted suсh principle in matters such as the present case. The authority of our circuit court to hear matters which may involve the welfare of children, particularly those already under its protection, is not limited to so-called legal or bloodline relationships. Our courts are always open to consider any matter which may affect the welfare or best interest of a child. Of course, legal relationships, whether natural or established by law, are of primary consideration in any case. However they are not preemptive. The paramount consideration is the welfare of the сhild, and all other rules pertaining to child custody are subservient to this main principle. Parks v. Parks,
Section 43-4-3, Code 1975 states:
“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as debarring a legally adopted person from inheriting property from his natural parents or other kin.”
In determining other factors relevant to the custody question we would direct thе trial court and counsel’s attention to An-not.,
We therefore reverse and remand this case with directions to the trial court to hear the merits of the grandpаrents’ petition and determine from the facts if such visitation is in the best interest of the children.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring specially).
At the common law grandparents did not have any legal right to visitation with their grandchildren. This was especially true where the parents denied the grandparents thе opportunity to communicate with the children. It was felt that parental authority was of paramount importancе and that that authority should not be weakened by any interference. Put another way, the parents should be allowed to determine with whom their children should associate. See generally,
Case law and statutes have developed in the United States that give grandparents limited rights to visitation. Section 30-3-3 of the Alabama Code of 1975 (1982 Supp.) grants the trial court the discretion to award visitation to grandparents. However, the statute appears to be limited and does not specifically deal with what effеct adoption has on that statutory right. I note that in the instant case the grandparents do not contend that § 30-3-3 applies specifically to them. The divorce proceedings have already been terminated with custody and visitation determined.
Other states with similar statutes have held that the adoption cuts off any rights the natural parent had, and derivatively, any rights that grandparents might have possessed.
Other courts have based their decisions on the right of the parents to determine with whom thеir children should associate.
Still other courts have held that the adoption does not automatically terminate thе grandparents’ visitation rights and that proper proceedings would be necessary to determine if visitation would be in the child’s best interest.
In this instance, since the triаl court found that the adoption itself as a matter of law required the trial court to take the action it took I concur in the result that the grandparents are entitled to be heard.