Murphey v. BushMurphey v. Bush
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Evans
The firm of W. R. Murphey & Company was composed of W. R. Murphey, J. T. Murphey, and others. This firm was largely indebted to Ambrose Murphey, and in 1885 the members of the firm sold out its business to him in part payment of its indebtedness to him. A partnership agreement was entered into on August 31, 1885, between J. T. Murphey and Ambrose Murphey, by the terms of which the latter was to furnish the capital, to consist of the depleted stock of goods of W. R. Murphey & Company, valued at $4,730, and other goods to supplement the stock, not to exceed $2,500, in value. The stock of merchandise, as thus supplemented, was to be the separate property of Ambrose Murphey. The storehouse was also to be furnished by him. J. T. Murphey was to personally superintend the business, keep the books, buy all goods, and hire and pay such assistants as might be necessary to carry on the business. No firm debts were to be ■contracted beyond the supplemental purchase of $2,500 of goods, ■except by the express agreement of both partners; nor were any *717goods to be sold on credit, except upon the express understanding of both parties. The incidental expenses of the business, such as coal, lights, stationery, etc., were to be paid out of the business. Neither partner was to draw out of the business, whether in goods or money, more than $100 per month, unless by consent of the other partner. The profits of the business were to be equally divided between the partners, and were to be ascertained as follows : “ Stock shall first be taken, including money, notes, and accounts; then enough goods shall be set aside for Ambrose Murphey equal in value at cost to amount to capital stock put into business by him; and if not enough goods to replace the capital stock, then more shall be replaced with solvent notes and accounts ; and if not enough notes and accounts, then by any other property of business; then the balance, whether in goods, notes and accounts, or money, or other property, to be divided equally between parties.” Beginning in September, 1885, and extending over a period until February 7, 1887, W. H. H. Bush bought goods from the firm of J. T. Murphey & Company to the amount of $1,198.33. The various purchases were charged on the books • of the firm to Bush. The firm of J. T. Murphey & Company was dissolved by mutual agreement of the partners on February 9, 1887, and by the terms of the dissolution Ambrose Murphey was to take the stock of merchandise and notes and accounts, settle all claims against the firm, and if any balance remained it was to be equally divided between J. T. and Ambrose Murphey, after deducting the amount of the capital invested by the latter. On February 6, 1888, J. T. Murphey & Company, for the use of Ambrose Murphey, brought suit in the superior court of Monroe county against W. H. H. Bush for the principal sum of $1,198.33, alleged to be due for goods purchased of J. T. Murphey & Company and set out in. an attached bill of particulars. The defendant filed a plea of the general issue, and subsequently amended his plea by averring, in substance, among other things, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, because of an agreement with J. T. Murphey, made at the time the goods were purchased, that the defendant was to purchase the goods and the amount of the purchases was to be in settlement of a debt which the firm of W. R. Murphey & Company was due him, which debt was in excess of the value of the articles purchased, and that in a fair accounting *718between Ambrose and J. T. Murphey, Ambrose Murphey had received from the assets of the firm of J. T. Murphey & Company sufficient funds to discharge all the firm debts and leave a balance due J. T. Murphey, sufficient to pay the account sued on; wherefore defendant prayed an accounting between J. T. and Ambrose’ Murphey, and if from such accounting it appeared that Ambrose Murphey was indebted to J. T. Murphey, that .the amount of the indebtedness be applied to the payment of the account sued on. The case was referred to an auditor, but before a hearing before him was had, Bush died and his administrators were made parties defendant in his stead. The auditor reported that the plaintiff was entitled to recover $594.59 principal, besides interest. Both the plaintiff and the defendants filed exceptions of law and of fact to the auditor’s report. ’ While the judge of the superior court had these exceptions under considerationj Ambrose Murphey died, and the suit afterwards proceeded in the name of J. T. Murphey, as surviving partner, for the use of the administrators of the estate of Ambrose Murphey. The court overruled the exceptions of law, disapproved the exceptions of fact, and made the report of the auditor the judgment of. the court. Plaintiff and the defendants sued out bills of exceptions complaining of the judgment. The questions presented by the two bills of exceptions are so intimately related that they may with propriety be considered together.
Auother exception of law filed to the auditor’s report was that he “ erred in not passing upon the objection of the defendants to the testimony of Ambrose Murphey, which was that he was an incompetent witness for the reason that Bush, the opposite party, was dead.” What has just been said in regard to the competency of T. E. Murphey as a witness and the ruling of the auditor in regard thereto disposes also of this exception.
The plaintiff excepted to the ruling of the auditor that T. E. Murphey “ was incompetent, on account of the death of W. H. H. Bush, to testify to anything except what would be contradictory to the evidence of Bush delivered at a former trial of the case, a brief of which was introduced in evidence before the auditor.” How this ruling operated to the prejudice of the plaintiff does not appear, as the exception taken to the auditor’s report does not disclose what testimony the plaintiff sought to elicit from the witness in addition to that which the auditor admitted. This being so, neither the trial court nor this court could undertake to say that the ruling of the auditor was attended with any injury to the plaintiff. Allen v. Kessler, 120 Ga. 319.
Counsel for the defendants insist that even though Ambrose Murphey may not have actually known of the arrangement with J. T. Murphey under which Bush bought the goods, yet the books of the firm disclosed the transactions, and Ambrose Murphey might have known, was bound to take cognizance of the facts, and could not, after negligently failing to inform himself as to how the business was being conducted, be heard to assert that his partner acted beyond the scope of his authority. In support of this position the case of Sparks v. Flannery, 104 Ga. 323, is cited and relied on. In that case one of the members of a partnership sought to escape liability on a contract made in’ behalf of the firm by his copartner, after the partnership had received the fruits óf the contract, upon the technical ground that the con*722tract was not one within the scope of the partnership business; that his partner therefore was without authority to bind the firm thereby, and he could not be held personally liable, because he did not authorize the making of the contract nor have any knowledge concerning it until after suit was brought. The transactions had under the contract covered a period of nearly two years and were duly entered upon the books of the firm; and it was held that as the partner who sought to repudiate the contract had full opportunity to know the facts, but neglected to inform himself as to the manner in which the business was being conducted and remained quiescent for so long a period and until the transactions came to a close, he was estopped from urging the technical defense set up by him, as the law would impute knowledge to him of what he should have known. The present case is, upon its facts, quite different. The plaintiff does not seek to repudiate a contract, made in behalf of the partnership, upon the technical ground that such a contract was not within the scope of the partnership business; but the plaintiff does repudiate a private contract made with Bush by one partner, for his individual benefit, whereby partnership assets were misappropriated and a fraud perpetrated upon the other partner. The doctrine of equitable estoppel has no application. Unless, as matter of fact, Ambrose Murphey assented, expressly or impliedly to the sale of the goods to Bush on the terms agreed on between him and J. T. Murphey, Bush was a wrong-doer and became liable as such. Neither Bush nor his legal representatives can be heard to say that Ambrose Murphey was bound to use due diligence in discovering the fraud that was being perpetrated upon him, and if he neglected to use the means at hand of discovering it, he is estopped from complaining thereof, since it has been fully consummated. He was not bound, as against Bush, to watch his partner and see that he conducted the business as he should have done. Sargent v. Henderson, 79 Ga. 268. The goods were, in the first instance, charged upon the books of the firm against Bush. By an undated entry, which was presumably made by J. T. Murphey just before the dissolution of- the firm took place, the account of Bush was charged against him; but the evidence shows that this fact was not discovered by Ambrose Murphey or his agents until some weeks after the dissolution and after the bpoks were turned over *723to Mm. He lost no time in then repudiating the agreement between his partner and Bush, and commenced suit to recover the value of the goods sold thereunder. Only upon the idea that ‘Ambrose Murphey became aware of this agreement shortly after it was made and impliedly gave his assent thereto, were the defendants entitled to a finding in their favor upon the issue whether or not he had ratified the unauthorized acts of his partner, and upon this issue the finding of the auditor was rightly upheld by the court below.
Judgments affirmed, with directions.
All the Justices concur, except Candler J., absent, and Lumpkin, J., not presiding.