Muro v. Target Corp.Muro v. Target Corp.
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- Before:
- Ripple
After receiving an unsolicited Target Visa card in the mail, Christine Muro brought this action, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, against Target Corporation, Target National Bank and Target Receivables Corporation (collectively “Target”). Ms. Muro alleged that Target had violated sections 127 and 132 of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”),
I
BACKGROUND
The basic facts of this case are straightforward. In light of the procedural posture of this case, we must construe them in the light most favorable to Ms. Muro. See Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir.2009).
Under its Autosubstitution Program, Target mailed unsolicited Visa Cards, along with an updated credit agreement, to Target Guest Card holders. 2 Guest Card holders had the option of activating their Visa Cards upon receipt. Once a Visa Card was activated, the corresponding Guest Card immediately was deactivated and any balance remaining on the Guest Card was transferred to the Visa Card.
Ms. Muro applied for and received a Guest Card on April 4, 1998. In December 1999, she paid the balance owed on her Guest Card and requested that her account be closed. She received no further
II
DISCUSSION
A. The Section 1642 Claim
In Count I of her complaint, Ms. Muro alleged that the unsolicited issuance of Visa Cards to Guest Card holders violated section 1642 of TILA. This section provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o credit card shall be issued except in response to a request or application therefor. This prohibition does not apply to the issuance of a credit card in renewal of, or in substitution for, an accepted credit card.”
Ms. Muro brought her
The court then denied the motion for class certification on the
[a]ll persons who were mailed a Target Visa Card without first requesting or applying for said card, and who did not at the time hold any active Target-branded credit card, including Target Guest Card holders who had cancelled their Guest Card[s] prior to issuance of the Visa Card.
R.102 at 21. The court determined, however, that certification of this alternative class also would be improper because Ms. Muro had failed to demonstrate that such a class was “so numerous that joinder of all members [was] impracticable.”
Williams v. Chartwell Fin. Servs., Ltd,.,
204 F.3d 748, 760 (7th Cir.2000) (citing
Ms. Muro subsequently settled her individual
1.
At the outset, we pause to make clear the narrow issue presented by this case. This case does not present the more frequently encountered situation that we confronted in Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 513 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir.2008). There, we noted that, if a plaintiffs individual claim becomes moot while his appeal of the denial of his motion for class certification is pending, that appeal is not moot “because unless and until the appellate court affirms the denial of the motion to certify a class, there may be people other than the plaintiff with a legally protected interest in the suit.” Id. at 786. In Wiesmueller, the plaintiffs individual claim was mooted by intervening events, rather than the plaintiffs voluntary settlement of his claim; here, by contrast, we are confronted with the question of whether a named plaintiff in a putative class action can settle her own claim and still appeal the court’s denial of her motion for class certification. The Supreme Court recognized that this was an open question in United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 n. 10, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980), and it declined to answer the question at that time.
In exploring this issue, our starting point must be the Supreme Court’s decision in Geraghty. There, the Court made clear that the named plaintiff in a putative class action possesses, in effect, dual rights: (1) his personal substantive rights; and (2) his rights as a member of a class in the putative class action. As we have just mentioned, however, the Court did not answer, although it noted, the problem of whether a plaintiff who has settled his substantive claim should be permitted to appeal the court’s refusal to certify the class.
The Court’s decision in
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper,
445 U.S. 326, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980), decided the same day as
Geraghty,
is our next guidepost. In that case, holders of credit cards issued by the defendant bank sued the bank for damages and sought to represent their own interests as well as those of a class of similarly situated customers. They claimed that the bank had violated the National Bank Act,
The card holders then appealed the district court’s refusal to certify the class. The court of appeals held that the case had
While Roper certainly sheds light on the path before us, it does not provide us with an answer to the precise question presented in this case: whether an individual who settles her individual claim nevertheless may appeal the denial of a motion for class certification. As our colleagues in the Fifth Circuit remarked in Dugas v. Trans Union Corporation, 99 F.3d 724, 728 (5th Cir.1996), it would be unwise for us to believe that the Court answered a question in Roper that it expressly and unambiguously had left open that same day in Geraghty.
2.
In the wake of Geraghty and Roper, several courts of appeals have confronted the issue of whether a prospective class representative who has settled his personal claim can appeal the denial of class certification; those courts have acknowledged that a plaintiff seeking to appeal such a ruling must have a personal stake in the definitive adjudication of the class-certification issue. See, e.g., Richards v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 453 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C.Cir.2006); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 945 F.2d 1188, 1191, 1191 n. 5 (D.C.Cir. 1991). Most of the circuits that have considered the issue have held that “a named plaintiffs unqualified release of claims relinquishes not only his interest in his individual claims but also his interest in class certification.” Toms v. Allied Bond Collection Agency, Inc., 179 F.3d 103, 105 (4th Cir.1999) (collecting cases); see Seidman v. City of Beverly Hills, 785 F.2d 1447, 1448 (9th Cir.1986). There is, however, disagreement as to whether a reservation of the right to appeal the class certification issue is alone sufficient to permit a prospective class representative who has settled his individual claim to appeal the class certification ruling.
Our neighbor to the west, the Eighth Circuit, in
Potter v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc.,
329 F.3d 608, 612-15 (8th Cir.2003), and more recently in
Anderson v. CNH U.S. Pension Plan,
515 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2008), has made it emphatically clear that, in its view, the mere recitation in a settlement agreement that the plaintiff reserves the right to appeal the denial of class certification is not sufficient to create the sort of concrete interest in the class certification issue that
Roper
requires.
See Anderson,
515 F.3d at 827;
Potter,
329 F.3d at 614 n. 3.
5
The court relied heavily on the opinion of the Fourth Circuit in
Toms,
179 F.3d at 105-06, and emphasized the centrality of the Article III case-or-controversy requirement to the question of whether a settling plaintiff retains an interest in appealing the denial of class certi
By contrast, some other courts emphasize Geraghty’s and Roper3s characterization of the proposed class action representative as possessing, separate and apart from his individual substantive interests in the litigation, a procedural interest in the resolution of the class certification issue. These courts apparently believe that a reservation of the right to appeal the class certification issue in a settlement agreement is sufficient to give the proposed class representative standing to appeal the class certification issue without any further showing of a concrete interest in the resolution of the issue. See Dugas, 99 F.3d at 729 (dicta). Indeed, one circuit might permit a proposed class representative who settles her individual claims to appeal the denial of class certification even without an explicit reservation of the right to appeal that issue. See Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir.1984). 6 See also Nichols v. Mobile Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 675 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (by implication). But see Armour v. City of Anniston, 654 F.2d 382, 384 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (per curiam).
We believe that the decisions of the Fourth and Eighth Circuits exhibit a higher degree of faithfulness to the rationale of Roper that there be an actual case or controversy at all stages of the litigation, including the appeal of the class certification issue. A voluntary settlement by the prospective class representative often means that, as a practical matter, the settling individual has elected to divorce himself from the litigation and no longer retains a community of interests with the prospective class. Only if issues personal to the prospective class representative remain alive in the litigation can a court be assured that there remains sufficient concrete adverseness to ensure that the class certification issue is presented in a truly adversarial manner and, consequently, will be litigated comprehensively and clearly. An abstract interest in a matter never has been considered a sufficient basis for the maintenance of — or the continuation of— litigation in the federal courts. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206-08, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).
3.
We now turn to an application of these principles to the case before us. On December 11, 2007, Ms. Muro accepted Target’s offer of judgment with respect to
Under these circumstances, we can discern no live, concrete controversy between Ms. Muro and Target that can justify permitting her to appeal the district court’s determination with respect to the certification of the class.
4.
Even if we were to determine that Ms. Muro has the right to appeal the class certification issue, we would have no hesitation in holding that the district court did not clearly err in denying Ms. Muro’s motion for class certification of her
The factual differences between Ms. Muro’s claims and the claims of her fellow putative class members are significant; as a result of these differences, certain provisions of TILA that apply in Ms. Muro’s case may not apply to most of her proposed fellow class members. TILA’s prohibition against issuing credit cards in the absence of a request or application “does not apply to the issuance of a credit card in renewal of, or in substitution for, an accepted credit card.”
Moreover, with respect to the class in which Ms. Muro could claim membership, those who received an unsolicited Visa Card but who did not have a Target Guest Card at the time, the district court correctly concluded that Ms. Muro had made no showing of the numerosity of such a class.
B. The
Ms. Muro
next
claims that the Autosubstitution program violated
We have not had occasion to address with any specificity when an account is “open” for the purposes of
In addition, we agree with the district court that the same admissions that render the
The district court also denied Ms. Muro’s motion for class certification with respect to the
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Notes
. Ms. Muro’s complaint also sets forth claims based on state law. She has not appealed the grant of summary judgment on any of these claims. Her arguments on appeal germane to those state claims are therefore moot, and we shall not address them.
. Target Guest Cards (“Guest Cards”) differ from Target Visa Cards (“Visa Cards”) in several ways. Guest Cards have ten- or twelve-digit account numbers and may be used only in Target stores. Visa Cards have sixteen-digit account numbers, may be used outside of Target stores, and have higher credit limits, cash advance options and different terms and conditions.
. The district court, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Muro, accepted as true her claim that she had closed her Guest Card account.
. According to Target, the Autosubstitution Program’s primary purpose was to replace its existing card holders’ Guest Cards with Visa Cards.
. That court, however, did note that a plaintiff may have a continuing interest in the class certification issue if he ” ‘retains an interest in shifting costs and attorney fees to the putative class members.’ ” Anderson v. CNH U.S. Pension Plan, 515 F.3d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Potter v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 329 F.3d 608, 614 (8th Cir.2003)).
. In Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir.1984), the Eleventh Circuit noted that it found “no meaningful distinction between the settlement of the claim . . . at issue and the expiration of the claim in Geraghty for purposes of the ability of the named plaintiff to pursue an appeal of the denial of certification.” Neither Love nor the other cases from the Eleventh Circuit explicitly say that the named plaintiff retains an interest in the class certification issue even in the absence of any mention of the issue in the settlement agreement, but the absence of any mention of the need for such a reservation makes this reading the most plausible. See also Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1246-47 (11th Cir.2003); Martinez-Mendoza v. Champion Int‘l Corp., 340 F.3d 1200, 1215-16 (11th Cir.2003); Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1383 n. 16 (11th Cir. 1998).
. We express no opinion as to whether those class members whose open Guest Cards were “autosubstituted” successfully could claim, on some other basis, that the Autosubstitution program “issued” new Visa Cards that were neither a renewal of nor a substitute for their Guest Cards.
. Although we have not gone so far as to define the meaning of “open,” this court has discussed the issue of when a duty to make disclosures arises under
. The provisions of Regulation Z are afforded substantial weight. In Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 358, 93 S.Ct. 1652, 36 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973), the Supreme Court evaluated whether the Federal Reserve Board exceeded its authority by promulgating the “Four Installment Rule” of Regulation Z. The Court concluded that, because Congress “delegated to the Federal Re serve Board broad authority to promulgate regulations necessary to render [TILA] effective,” the rules promulgated under that authority “will be sustained so long as [they are] reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.” Id. at 365-69, 93 S.Ct. 1652 (citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Cetto v. LaSalle Bank Nat‘l Ass’n, 518 F.3d 263, 274 (4th Cir.2008) (stating that “we must accord strong deference to Regulation Z”); DBI Architects, P.C. v. Am. Express Travel-Related Servs. Co., 388 F.3d 886, 892 (D.C.Cir.2004) (noting that “courts owe deference to the Board‘s regulations and its interpretation of its regulations under TILA” (citations omitted)). This court has recognized that “[t]he official staff opinions of the Federal Reserve Board construing TILA and Regulation Z are binding on this court unless they are demonstrably irrational.” Walker v. Wallace Auto Sales, Inc., 155 F.3d 927, 931 n. 5 (7th Cir.1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted).