Murchinson v. StateMurchinson v. State
On May 16, 2006, claimant‘s long-time girlfriend, Amy Islas, received a telephone call informing her that her father, “Hawk,” was missing from her parents’ home on State Route 374 in the Town of Dannemora, Clinton County. Hawk had entered the woods earlier in the day to check on his minnow traps in a local stream and, after several hours passed without his safe return, was feared lost. Islas proceeded to her parents’ residence and, after stopping to pick up his son at a local gym, claimant arrived there as well and parked his Chevrolet pickup truck in the driveway.
Various employees of the State Police and Department of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter DEC), together with members of the Dannemora Volunteer Fire Department, responded to the scene and, with the assistance of a K-9 unit and a helicopter from the Department of Homeland Security, located Hawk. At approximately 12:45 a.m., Hawk emerged from the woods and was transported to a local hospital for evaluation.
In August 2008, and after being granted permission to file a late claim, claimant commenced this action against defendant alleging that its employees were negligent in guiding his vehicle onto the highway and into the path of oncoming traffic. A bifurcated trial ensued, during the course of which defendant took the position that none of its employees assisted claimant in backing out of the driveway on the night in question. The Court of Claims credited claimant‘s version of the events, however, finding that a DEC forest ranger did in fact assist claimant with backing out of the driveway and, further, was negligent in the manner in which he did so. The Court of Claims nonetheless dismissed the claim, concluding that—at the time of the accident—the ranger was performing a governmental function within the exercise of his discretion and, as such, defendant was immune from liability. This appeal by claimant ensued.
We affirm. “Although the State long ago waived sovereign immunity on behalf of itself and its municipal subdivisions, the common-law doctrine of governmental immunity continues to shield public entities from liability for discretionary actions taken during the performance of governmental functions” (Valdez v City of New York, 18 NY3d 69, 75-76 [2011] [citations omitted]). Thus, “even if a plaintiff establishes all elements of a negligence claim, a state or municipal defendant engaging in a governmental function can avoid liability if it timely raises the
As should be apparent from the foregoing, the availability of the governmental immunity defense hinges upon the performance of a governmental function and the corresponding exercise of discretionary authority. A governmental function generally is defined as one “undertaken for the protection and safety of the public pursuant to the general police powers” (Balsam v Delma Eng‘g Corp., 90 NY2d 966, 968 [1997]; accord Sebastian v State of New York, 93 NY2d 790, 793 [1999]), whereas a proprietary function is one in which “governmental activities essentially substitute for or supplement traditionally private enterprises” (Sebastian v State of New York, 93 NY2d at 793 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Here, crediting claimant‘s proof,2 it is apparent that the unidentified ranger was—at the time of claimant‘s accident—engaged in traffic control or regulation, which “is a classic example of a governmental function undertaken for the protection and safety of the public pursuant to the general police powers” (Balsam v Delma Eng‘g Corp., 90 NY2d at 968; accord Santoro v City of New York, 17 AD3d 563, 564 [2005]; Eckert v State of New York, 3 AD3d 470, 470 [2004]; see Lynch v State of New York, 37 AD3d 772, 773 [2007]), thus placing the ranger‘s asserted negligence “well within the immunized ‘governmental’ realm of municipal responsibility” (Balsam v Delma Eng‘g Corp., 90 NY2d at 968).
As to whether the ranger was engaged in a discretionary or
There being no dispute that defendant pleaded the governmental immunity defense in its answer, all that remains for our consideration is whether the record as a whole contains sufficient proof to establish that the ranger did in fact exercise discretion/reasoned judgment when assisting claimant in backing out of the driveway. Although claimant asserts that defendant failed to proffer any evidence to this effect, claimant‘s own testimony reveals that the ranger exercised discretion in assisting him in backing out of the driveway. Specifically, claimant testified that when he first started to back out of the driveway, the ranger was standing on the south shoulder of State Route 374. As claimant continued to back up, the ranger moved to the middle of the road and, by claimant‘s own admission, looked both east and west as he continued to motion claimant out of the driveway. Notably, claimant acknowledged that the ranger “was [being] cautious about what was coming from [the] direction of Dannemora.” Such testimony, in our view, is more than sufficient to establish that the ranger was—at the time of claimant‘s accident—engaged in a governmental function involving the actual exercise of discretionary authority and, as such, the Court of Claims correctly concluded that defendant was immune from liability. Claimant‘s remaining contentions are either lacking in merit or, in light of the foregoing conclusion, have been rendered academic.
Rose, J.P., Spain, Malone Jr. and Kavanagh, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.