delivered the Opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' reversal of the trial court's denial of attorney fees pursuant to section 13-17-102(4), C.R.S. (2010). See Munoz v. Measner,
We now reverse the court of appeals. We hold that the plain language of section 13-17-103(1) requires the trial court to make specific factual findings with regard to the application of the section's enumerated factors only when granting an award of fees, not when denying an award, as occurred here. Instead, when denying attorney fees, the trial court must make sufficient findings such that adequate appellate review can be exercised. We find that the trial court's denial of the Measners' fee request was supported by sufficient findings, including the proper claim-by-claim analysis, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request.
1.
The case before us began as a dispute over an approximately 700 square foot parcel of land ("the Parcel"). The Parcel is located between the property of the Munoges and Devon Measner. The Munozes began this action by filing a quiet title action and seek
The trial court bifurcated the quiet title and trespass actions, and tried the quiet title action in January 2008. The trial court concluded that the Munozes had become legal owners of the Parcel through adverse possession. The Measners appealed that ruling, and the trial court's decision was affirmed. See Munoz v. Measner, No. 03CA2205,
While the appeal was pending, the Mu-nozes amended their original complaint to include claims against the Measners for outrageous conduct, nuisance, and slander of title. The Measners filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted as to both defendants on the slander of title claim, and as to Linda Measner on the trespass and nuisance claims. The court found that the Munozes had failed to produce sufficient evidence that would give rise to any disputed issue of material fact. However, the outrageous conduct claims against the Measners and the trespass and nuisance claims against Devon Measner survived summary judgment. The court set the trial date for November 13, 2006.
On October 26, 2006, counsel for the Mu-nozes filed a motion to withdraw from the case. Soon thereafter the Munozes also requested that the court dismiss their counsel, citing insufficient case preparation. A motion to continue was filed so that the Mu-nozes could find a new lawyer. In response to this motion, the court vacated the trial set for November 18, 2006, and issued an Order to Show Cause why the case should not be dismissed. A hearing was held on the Order to Show Cause on November 18, 2006, at which time the court dismissed the remaining claims with prejudice due to the Munozes' failure to prosecute.
On November 22, 2006, the Measners filed a motion requesting attorney fees for the trespass, nuisance, outrageous conduct, and slander of title claims. The court conducted a hearing on the motion on August 8, 2007. On January 15, 2008, the trial court denied the Measners' request for attorney fees. The court held that the Measners were not entitled to attorney fees because section 13-17-102(4) requires a court to assess attorney fees only where the action "lacked substantial justification." The court reasoned that the Measners had failed to demonstrate that the Munozes' claims lacked such justification. As the trial court stated, "(elven though [the Measners] prevailed on their summary judgment motion on the trespass, nuisance and slander of title claims, that does not prove that they were frivolous, groundless or maintained in bad faith.... [The Munozes] attempted to present evidence in good faith to support their claims.... However, the Court found that such evidence was insufficient and failed to generate material issues of fact as to these claims. 1
The Measners appealed and the court of appeals reversed the trial court. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that the claims did not lack substantial justification (and that therefore a fee award was not appropriate) without analyzing each claim individually, according to the factors enumerated in section 13-17-103(1). The court remanded the case to the trial court for further findings on the issue of attorney fees. We granted certiorari 2 and now reverse the court of appeals.
IL.
The general assembly has declared that the courts "of this state have become
The attorney fees analysis begins with seetion 18-17-102(4), which states that the "court shall assess attorney fees if ... it finds that an attorney or party brought or defended an action, or any part thereof, that lacked substantial justification." Thus, the first step of the analysis is to determine whether the action in question (or any part thereof) "lacked substantial justification." In making that determination, the court should consider whether the action was "substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious." § 18-17-102(4).
As the court of appeals observed, seetion 13-17-102(4) must also be read in conjunction with section 18-17-108(1), which further assists the court in determining when an award of attorney fees is appropriate. Munoz,
We disagree with that portion of the court of appeals' analysis, however, that requires a trial court to make specific findings accord
Section 13-17-108(1) states that "/w/hen granting an award of attorney fees, the court shall specifically set forth the reasons for said award ..." (emphasis added). By its plain terms, the language requires "speci-file}" findings regarding the factors only when the trial court is "granting" a fee request, not denying one. Here, because the trial court determined that an award of attorney fees was not appropriate, it was not required to specifically set forth its analysis of the section 18-17-108(1) factors in order to deny the fee request.
While the trial court need not set forth with specificity its reasons for denying a fee request under the section 18-17-108(1) factors, however, it still must "make findings that will permit meaningful appellate review." Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Auslaender,
After an examination of the record, we find that the trial court's findings in this case are sufficient for us to perform such a review, and conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Measners' fee request. After the August 8, 2007 hearing, the trial court found that even though the Munozes did not prevail on their claims, those claims were not frivolous, groundless, or brought in bad faith. According to the trial court's order, "[the Munozes] attempted to present evidence in good faith to support their claims of trespass, nuisance and slander of title against [the Measners]. However, the Court found that such evidence was insufficient and failed to generate material issues of facts as to these claims." The trial court was addressing the Measners' primary argument for fees (which they reprise here) that because the trial court found that the Munozes' claims could not survive summary judgment, the claims "by definition" lacked substantial justification under section 183-17 102(4). As the trial court properly held, simply because a claim lacks merit does not mean that it was frivolous, groundless, or vexatious under section 13-17-102(4). Remote Switch Sys., Inc. v. Delangis,
We also disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the Meas-ners' fee request on a claim-by-claim basis. Munoz,
Although the trial court stated that it had arrived at its conclusion after having reviewed the entire record of the case, we read that statement simply as an indication that the trial court had studied the case before coming to a decision, not as an indication that it failed to consider the Measners' fee request on a per claim basis. Indeed, after making that statement, the court went on to consider the Measners' fee request on a per claim basis. For example, the court noted that the Munozes' "trespass, nuisance and slander of title claims" did not lack substantial justification and that the Munozes "attempted to present evidence in good faith to support their claims of trespass, nuisance and slander of title," but such evidence was insufficient. 5
In sum, we find that the trial court's denial of the Measners' fee request was supported by sufficient findings, including the proper claim-by-claim analysis, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.
IIL.
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the court of appeals.
Notes
. In their motion for fees, the Measners requested fees related to the outrageous conduct claim as well as the other claims described by the trial court. The trial court did not specifically mention the outrageous conduct claim in its holding denying fees (although the claim is referenced earlier in the order). Because the parties proceed on the assumption that the trial court denied the entire fee request, we do so as well.
. Specifically, we granted certiorari on the following issue:
Whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's denial of attorney fees pursuant to § 13-17-102(4), C.R.S. (2008), because the trial court did not use the factors laid out in § 13-17-103(1), C.R.S. (2008), to assess whether attorney fees were warranted.
. The full text of section 13-17-103(1) is as follows:
In determining the amount of an attorney fee award, the court shall exercise its sound discretion. When granting an award of attorney fees, the court shall specifically set forth the reasons for said award and shall consider the following factors, among others, in determining whether to assess attorney fees and the amount of attorney fees to be assessed against any offending attorney or party:
(a) The extent of any effort made to determine the validity of any action or claim before said action or claim was asserted;
(b) The extent of any effort made after the commencement of an action to reduce the number of claims or defenses being asserted or to dismiss claims or defenses found not to be valid within an action;
(c) The availability of facts to assist a party in determining the validity of a claim or defense;
(d) The relative financial positions of the parties involved;
(e) Whether or not the action was prosecuted or defended, in whole or in part, in bad faith;
(f) Whether or not issues of fact determinative of the validity of a party's claim or defense were reasonably in conflict;
(g) The extent to which the party prevailed with respect to the amount of and number of claims in controversy;
(h) The amount and conditions of any offer of judgment or settlement as related to the amount and conditions of the ultimate relief granted by the court.
. See § 13-17-102(4) (the court shall assess fees if "upon the motion of any party or the court itself, it finds that an attorney or party brought or defended an action, or any part thereof, that lacked substantial justification") (emphasis added); § 13-17-101 (fees are appropriate when "an action, or part thereof" is deemed groundless, frivolous, or substantially vexatious) (emphasis added); and § 13-17-103(1)(e) (court should consider whether action was prosecuted "in whole or in part" in bad faith in determining whether to assess fees) (emphasis added).
. We note that the Measners' fee request asked for reimbursement for all attorney fees spent on this litigation. While the request went on to attempt to explain why each claim would qualify for reimbursement, at no point did the Measners submit documentation to the court indicating that they could show how many fees were accumulated on each individual claim. Furthermore, at the hearing held on the attorney fees motion, a senior partner at the firm representing the Meas-ners testified that there was significant interrelationship, not just between the various claims, but between this case and the prior quiet title action.