The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),
Having consulted dictionaries, the FLSA and other contemporaneously-enacted statutes, and related legal usage, we conclude that DLC is "an employer engaged in the business of operating taxicabs."
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
DLC runs a chauffeured car service in New York's Westchester County. Though one company, DLC operates under two names: DLC Ground Transportation Services and LSW Chauffeured Transportation
DLC's fleet consists mostly of five-person cars, but it also has some SUVs, luxury vans, and mini-coaches. DLC's vehicles are not metered, nor do they have "Taxi" or "Vacancy" signs on their roofs. DLC's drivers must dress professionally in a black suit, white shirt, company tie, black shoes, and black socks. They may not choose their own jobs or pick up passengers who hail them from the street; DLC's central dispatch, which passengers call to arrange for pickup, assigns drivers all their jobs. Drivers take the passengers wherever they want to go, generally relying on in-car navigation systems for directions unless the customer directs the driver to take a different route. Most trips are local (less than seventy miles), but passengers may book longer trips within the tristate area. Passengers often prepay their fares before trips begin.
During the time at issue in this case, most of DLC's work came from trips originating at the Westchester County Airport, where it operated a taxi stand. Its contract with the Airport required it to list itself as an Airport Trаnsportation Service and a Limousine Service in the NYNEX Yellow Pages. The second largest source of DLC's work came from passengers calling DLC's dispatcher to request pickup. DLC also received small portions of its business (less than 5% total) from contracts with:
(1) a local hotel that allowed DLC to keep a counter in its lobby to serve the hotel's guests, in exchange for DLC paying the hotel a commission for these rides; and
(2) PepsiCo to provide transportation to and from its offices as requested.
Finally, for some of its repeat customers, DLC would instruct its drivers to charge certain fixed rates, treat the passengers as "VIP[s]," and keep bottled water and newspapers in the car.
During the period relevant here, many of DLC's drivers worked more than forty hours every week, but DLC did not pay them overtime compensation. In 2003, a former driver sued DLC for overtime compensation under the FLSA. DLC responded that it did not have to pay the driver overtime because, as "an employer engaged in the business of operating taxicabs,"
II. Procedural History
On December 2, 2015, lead Plaintiff-Appellant Munoz-Gonzalez sued DLC in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. He and approximately twenty other named plaintiffs wish to represent a class of former DLC drivers who, like the plaintiff in Cariani , are seeking to recover overtime compensation under the FLSA. On July 12, 2017, the district court granted summary judgment to DLC. See Munoz-Gonzalez v. D.L.C. Limousine Serv., Inc. , No. 15-CV-9368 (JPO),
The FLSA does not define the word "taxicabs," but the Department of Labor's Field Operations Handbook (2016 ed.)
The district court entered final judgment on August 2, 2017.
DISCUSSION
We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. See Ramos v. Baldor Specialty Foods, Inc. ,
Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
I
This Court has never interpreted the taxicab exemption before. Both Munoz-Gonzalez's
A
Whether DLC is in the "business of operating taxicabs" turns on the meaning of the word "taxicab." The FLSA does not define "taxicab," so "we give the term its ordinary meaning," starting our inquiry with contemporaneous dictionaries. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro , --- U.S. ----,
Webster's New International Dictionary: Unabridged (2d ed. 1934) defines "taxicab" as "[a] passenger-carrying vehicle, usually a motor vehicle designed to seat five or seven persons, with or without a taximeter, maintained for hire on public thoroughfares or at public stations or stands, but not operated on a schedule." Id. at 2587.
Other contemporaneous legal sources use a similar definition to Congress's. Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) offered three rough equivalents:
• "[a] conveyance similar to a hackney carriage or old-fashioned hack or stage which is held for hire at designated places and has no regular schedule or route, but operates to carry passengers at any time to any point and subject to call." (citing Jarrell v. Orlando Transit Co. ,, 123 Fla. 776 , 668 (1936) ); 167 So. 664
• "[a] motor driven passenger conveyance propelled by electric or gas power, held for public hire, at designated places, charging upon a time or distance basis, carrying passengers to destinations without following any fixed routes." (citing Tuggle v. Parker ,, 159 Kan. 572 , 534 (1945) ); and 156 P.2d 533
• "[a] vehicle subject to contract by person desiring special trip from one point to another without reference to any prescribed legal route." (citing Jackie Cab Co. v. Chicago Park Dist. ,, 366 Ill. 474 , 215 (1937) ). 9 N.E.2d 213
Black's Law Dictionary 1631 (4th ed. 1951). And just three years after the taxicab exemption's enactment, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the word "taxicab" the same way. See Airlines Transp. v. Tobin ,
Webster's , statutory usage, and other legal sources thus suggest several crucial factors to consider when determining whether the taxicab exemption applies. Focusing on these factors, a "taxicab" is: (1) a chauffeured passenger vehicle; (2) available for hire by individual members of the general public; (3) that has no fixed schedule, fixed route, or fixed termini.
B
We next test whether focusing on these factors fits with the FLSA's structure. See,
When Congress enacted the taxicab exemption, it also exempted from overtime any employee who:
• worked in connection with operating or maintaining canals or waterways;
• worked for a local bus or trolley company;
• worked as a seaman; or
• was subject to ICC regulation under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (interstate bus and truck drivers), part I of the Interstate Commerce Act (railroad workers), or title II of the Railway Labor Act (airline employees).
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-393, § 11; see also
This makes sense. The transportation industry was already regulated, so extending certain FLSA protections to transportation workers could have resulted in regulatory conflict. See
In short, we see nothing in the structure of the FLSA that requires us to reconsider our focus on the three factors outlined above. This definition comports with the ordinary, contemporaneous understanding of "taxicab" and appears consistent with the overall structure of the Act.
C
That said, our Circuit has traditionally construed FLSA exemptions narrowly
D
In light of the preceding discussion, we conclude that there is no genuine dispute that DLC's drivers qualify for the taxicab exemption. First, DLC's fleet consists of chauffeured passenger vehicles, including town cаrs, SUVs, and luxury vans.
II
Munoz-Gonzalez makes several arguments to the contrary, largely relying on the Department of Labor's Handbook. The Handbook, which the district court relied on below, explains the scope of the taxicab exemption as follows:
The taxicab business consists normally of common carrier transportation in small motor vehicles of persons and such property as they may carry with them to any requested destination in the community. The business operates without fixed routes or contracts for recurrent transportation. It serves the miscellaneous and predominantly local transportation needs of the community. It may include such occasional and unscheduled trips to or from transportation terminals as the individual passengers may request, and may include stands at the transportation terminals as well as at other places where numerous demands for taxicab transportation may be expected.
Handbook § 24h01. The Handbook also offers examples of non-taxicab work including, as relevant here, "driving, in connection with ... an airport limousine service."
Drawing on the Handbook, Munoz-Gonzalez makes several arguments in favor of reversal. But to the extent that the word "taxicab" is ambiguous, the Department of Labor's Handbook lacks the force of law, and "is entitled to deference only to the extent that it has the 'рower to persuade.' "
First, Munoz-Gonzalez contends that DLC is not a taxicab company because it has contracts for recurrent transportation with PepsiCo and a local hotel, as well as accounts with various repeat customers. This means, he maintains, that DLC does not operate "without ... contracts for recurrent transportation" and thus does not qualify for the taxicab exemption. Handbook § 24h01. We disagree. Contracts like DLC's with the local hotel have long been common in the taxicab industry. See, e.g. , Hodges, supra , at 19 (observing that the Waldorf Astoria earned $30,000 annually from this practice in the 1910s). Moreover, we disagree that a taxicab loses its essence if it enters into a few corporate contracts of the magnitude of those at issue here.
To be sure, a company that received virtually all its business from recurrent contracts and corporate clients might not be "available for hire by individual members of the general public" under our three-part definition. See, e.g. , McKinney v. Med Grp. Transp. LLC ,
Second, Munoz-Gonzalez argues that DLC does not serve the "predominantly local transportation needs of the community" because passengers sometimes travel long distances within the tristate area. Handbook § 24h01. But there is no genuine dispute that DLC's trips rarely exceed seventy miles, and we do not take the Handbook to mean that a taxicab never travels longer distances. In any event, Munoz-Gonzalez's argument here is self-defeating, at least in this geographical area, because drivers who predominantly travel across state lines would also be exempt from the FLSA's overtime requirement. See
Finally, Munoz-Gonzalez argues that DLC is not "engaged in the business of operating taxicabs" because it really runs "an airport limousine service." See Handbook
Although certain upscale luxury cars are commonly referred to as "limousines," a secondary definition for the word "limousine" is a vehicle "used to carry passengers on a regular route , as between an airport and a downtown area." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1016 (4th ed. 2000) (emphasis added). This is almost certainly what the Handbook means by "airport limousine service." After using the term "airport limousine service," the Handbook references back to an earlier section that describes "buses/shuttle services/limousines carrying interstate passengers and their baggage to and from transportation terminals ." Handbook § 24c04 (emphasis added). And just three years after the taxicab exemption was enacted, the Fourth Circuit distinguished "taxicabs" from "airport limousines" because the latter have "fixed routes" while the former do not. Tobin ,
Accordingly, the Handbook uses the term "airport limousine service" to refer to shuttles that drive on a regular route between an airport and another location. The Handbook lacks the force of law and the term "airport limousine service" does not appear in the FLSA. But even setting these problems aside, DLC is not an airport limousine service for the same reasons that it is a taxicab company.
III
Finally, departing from both the text of the FLSA and the Handbook, Munoz-Gonzalez argues that DLC is not a taxicab company because:
(1) it controls its drivers' work;
(2) its cars do not look like taxicabs; and
(3) it advertises itself as a luxury car company.
As these factors are neither among those highlighted in our earlier analysis nor are they featured in the Handbook, we consider them of limited importance. But because some other courts have found these factors relevant,
Second, DLC's cars should not fail to qualify as "taxicabs" simply because they lack "Taxi" or "Vacancy" signs and taximeters, or because DLC's drivers must dress professionally in black suits, white shirts, and ties. The appearance of the car and dress of the driver do not weigh heavily in our consideration. Both go more to the marketing of the business than the core operation of the business itself. Taxicabs have come a long way since the "hackney carriage" of old, and no reasonable legislator would have wanted the scoрe of the taxicab exemption to turn on a car's aesthetics or its driver's couture. See also Hodges, supra , at 8-9 (noting that one of New York City's first taxicab companies required its drivers to wear "a uniform designed to emulate a West Point cadet's"). In short, no one ordering a "taxicab" would think twice if one of DLC's chauffeured cars arrived to pick her up. See, e.g. , Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth. ,
Finally, although DLC does indeed advertise some of its services in the Yellow Pages as luxury car transрortation (or "Limousine Services") rather than taxicab transportation, we do not believe that this should matter either. A taxicab is a taxicab is a taxicab; how a company markets its services or products does not change what it is for purposes of the FLSA. The factors we have noted above provide the more appropriate focus for assessing the applicability of the taxicab exemption.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment.
Notes
Because we are reviewing this case on appeal from a grant of summary judgment to DLC, the facts outlined below are either undisputed or viewed in the light most favorаble to Munoz-Gonzalez. See, e.g. , Raspardo v. Carlone ,
Munoz-Gonzalez also sued for overtime under New York state law and for unpaid minimum wage under the FLSA. The district court granted DLC's motion for summary judgment on the former claim because the state law at issue is co-extensive with the FLSA; Munoz-Gonzalez voluntarily dismissed the latter claim without prejudice before final judgment was entered.
The 1949 Act exempted all taxicab employees (not just drivers) from both minimum wage and overtime provisions (not just overtime). See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-393, § 11,
By "not operated on a schedule," Webster's almost certainly meant that, unlike a bus or trolley, cars do not make stops at set locations at set times. This phrase thus refers to the cars ' schedules, not whether drivers must report for work at set times.
To be sure, some dictionaries less contemporaneous than Webster's define "taxicab" a bit differently. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language: Unabridged (1966), for example, defines "taxicab" as "a public passenger vehicle, esp. an automobile, usually fitted with a taximeter." Id. at 1457. And the Oxford English Dictionary , cited by Munoz-Gonzalez, defines it as "[a] cab for public hire, fitted with a taximeter; esp. an automobile or motor-cab so furnished." 17 The Oxford English Dictionary 680 (2d ed. 1989). We conclude, however, that Webster's definition hits closest to the mark. See, e.g. , Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law 70 (2012) ("Most common English words have a number of dictionary definitions .... [A court should] assume the contextually appropriate ordinary meaning unless there is reason to think otherwise."). Random House 's definition encompasses too much, as both city buses and subway cars qualify as "public passenger vehicles." And Oxford 's definition places far too much emphasis on the presence of a taximeter. We are loath to conclude that a taxicab loses its essence if the driver removes the taximeter, or that legislators would (or did) hinge FLSA overtime liability on the presence or absence of such a meter. See, e.g. , Pettus v. Morgenthau ,
To be sure, Webster's emphasizes the lack of a fixed schedule and Congress the lack of fixed route, but this is almost certainly a distinction without a difference. A car that does not drive along a fixed route would have difficulty keeping to a fixed schedule, and it is hard to imagine a business model in which a car would drive passengers along a fixed route at random times.
We also note that in 2002, Congress amended its definition of "taxicab service," as used in Title 49 of the U.S. Code, to include a requirement that taxicab companies, among other things, not "primarily provide transportation to or from airports." Real Interstate Driver Equity Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-298, § 3(a)(3),
Congress later repealed the local bus and trolley exemption. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 21(b)(3),
On its website, LSW also advertises "motor coach[es]" for "sightseeing" tours in New York City. Assuming arguendo that these motor coaches might not qualify as taxicabs, drivers еmployed by DLC might not be covered by the taxicab exemption if they spent enough of their workweeks driving these coaches. See
Both parties agree that Munoz-Gonzalez's state law claims are coextensive with his FLSA claims, so they fail for the same reasons.
See, e.g. , Abel v. S. Shuttle Servs., Inc. ,