57 Md. 172 | Md. | 1881
delivered the opinion of the Court.
There are four appeals in this record which have been argued together, and will be disposed of in one opinion. Three separate petitions were filed in the Orphans’ Court of Cecil County, each asking that the Court would set aside and annul a former order of that Court, passed on the 14th of October, 1873, whereby, the order of that Court previously passed, admitting the will of Emily W. Magraw to probate, was annulled, the will set aside, and the letters testamentary of Adam R. Magraw were revoked. These petitions all make substantially the same charges, with such variations only as the peculiar relation of the several parties to the subject-matter made necessary. The main ground, upon which the applications are based, is the allegation that the order, which is sought to he annulled and set aside, was procured by the fraud, collusion and deceit of the parties in the various proceedings hv which the order was reached and secured. The charges are various and specific, and it will unnecessarily encumber and extend this opinion, to do more now than give the general character of the averments, as we have done. The petitions are all verified by the oath of the respective petitioners; and the answer, which for the purposes of this decision, cannot be considered, is also on oath, and it is proper to say indignantly denies each and every of the charges, and makes specific averments of facts wholly different from, and inconsistent with petitioners’ averments.
As we understand the order of the Court, and the agreement or statement of counsel accompanying it; and as we think the true interpretation of both to be ; the cases come before us on petitions filed in the Orphans’ Court of Cecil County, making certain allegations of fraud, collusion and deceit, practiced upon the Circuit Court and jury of Cecil County, and upon the Orphans’ Court of Cecil County, whereby a verdict upon certain issues affecting the will of Émily W. Magraw was procured, without evidence, and by consent and collusion, contrary to the facts as they exist, by which means the Orphans’ Court of
The power and right of the Orphans’ Court to revoke and rescind orders which have been obtained by fraud and imposition as an abstract proposition, has not been really questioned by the appellee’s counsel; and if it had been, it is too well settled, that it has such power to require discussion. Raborg vs. Hammond, 2 H. & G., 42; Montgomery & Spencer, Ex’es vs. Williamson, 37 Md.,
2. It is contended that the Court has no jurisdiction, “because He.m-y S. Magraw and Emily H. Rath von axe indispensable parties and have not been brought in. There can he no doubt of the correctness of the rule, that all persons having- an interest in the subject and object of the su'd must be made parties or the Court will not proceed to decision of the cause. The numerous authorities cited hy the appellee's counsel abundantly establish that as the true and general rule ; hut this case does not fall within the operation of the rule therein laid down. These persons hy the allegations of the petitions, are original petitioners in the case assailed and are non-resi
The case is being heard as if on demurrer, and we are called upon to say, whether assuming the statements of the petitions can be sustained by proof, and are true, the judgment should stand. If the facts be true, as we have said, the judgment is void; and these parties are already in Court upon proceedings instituted by them, and which have not been brought to final determination. If it were possible for parties to concoct and execute a fraud such as this is alleged to be, and after obtaining judgment, by removal from the State beyond the jurisdiction, could prevent its investigation, and possible rectification, it would be a reproach to the law or its administration. Situated as this case is, we cannot hold that the persons named are entitled to especial notice. That they know of it there can be little doubt, as the petitioner states that he mailed them copies of his petition, and certain correspondence about it is contained in the answer and brief of Adam R. Magraw. If any legal mode of reaching them by publication in the Orphans’ Court was authorized, as a matter of practice, it would have been proper to resort to it, and no doubt it would have been done ; but as the law makes no such provision in their favor; and as it is their own act, and the judgment procured by it, which is assailed, they must be held to be in Court to defend the proceeding which has been instituted, to set aside the judgment they procured. It is a motion in the same case which they must defend. That no injustice is thereby done them is abundantly apparent from evidence submitted to this
3. The appellee insists that the Orphans’ Court has no jurisdiction to set aside the judgment in the premises upon the case made by petitioner, because it is based on a verdict rendered in the Circuit Court, which has never been set aside by that Court, but remains of binding force on the Orphans’ Court. In other words, the appellee contends that proceedings to set aside the verdict should have been commenced in the Circuit Court, and until that is done and the verdict is set aside by the Circuit Court, the Orphans’ Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with its own judgment based on that verdict. There can be no doubt, as was decided in Price vs. Taylor, 21 Md., that it was the purpose of the law authorizing such proceedings before a jury to enable the parties thereby “ to control the action of the Orphans’ Court by the finding of a jury,” and it is equally clear that it is the duty of the Orphans’ Court “ to accept the conclusion of the jury and make it effective by proper orders or decrees.” The questions when tried and answered by the jury, are settled in accordance with their verdict rendered on the proof. But the verdict, which is thus binding on the Circuit Court, and conclusive of the questions submitted to the jury, is a ver
If the verdict in this case was procured by the means, and in the way which is alleged, it was void and not binding on the Orphans’ Court. If the certificate from the Circuit Court, upon which the Orphans’ Court acted, was' an exact and true account of the proceedings in the Circuit Court and of the verdict, it was misleading to the Orphans’ Court; and the proceeding was a fraud upon the Orphans’ Court and upon its jurisdiction.
The Circuit Court had hut one duty to perform-, and when that was done it was functus officio. Before it had certified the verdict and the Orphans’ Court had rendered their judgment based upon it, the'Circuit Court-could have heard and decided any motion for new trial upon whatever grounds it might have been rested; hut after the Orphans’ Court had finally disposed of the case upon the verdict, and set the will aside, the Circuit Court’s power over the matter was at an end. The Orphans’ Court having power to render the judgment must, by virtue of that jurisdiction, have the. inherent power to make due inquiry into any fraud, by which their action has been obtained, and to strike out the judgment, if found improperly or improvi
If it should be made to appear to the Orphans’ Court in any case after the framing of issues and their transmission to the Circuit Court for trial, and after verdict certified to them, that the Court had been induced to frame issues in a case where no such authority existed, the Court would not be bound to regard the verdict, but might at once dismiss the petition, notwithstanding the verdict; and if so, as all must admit, then if their judgment be entered on the verdict, and it be shown that the proceeding was not warranted, it would not only be within the power of the Court, but its duty, upon proper application to strike out such judgment. In Cain vs. Worford, 3 Md., 462, this Court said, where there is no dispute it is not; incumbent on the Court to send issues ; and for the reason that there is nothing of which the Court needs “ advertising.”
It is only in cases of “ contest ” that such proceeding is authorized by the statute. It was clearly not within the power of the Orphans’ Court, upon consent of the parties to this proceeding, without trial, or the verdict of a jury, after trial before it, finding the facts alleged to be true, to set aside a will whereby estates in remainder to infants and unborn children are given; to the enlargement of the estates of the parties consenting thereto, the destruction of the estates in remainder of infants, and persons not in being, and the destruction and obliteration of trusts, such as it is alleged, in the several petitions under consideration, that the will created. If so, it follows that it was not competent and proper to frame issues in a case where there was entire agreement between the parties, before the Court, as to the facts alleged. And who did not, for the purpose of such consent, represent
1. Because his only interest is that of creditor of the estate, and that gives him no right to contest the will. If it be true, that this appellant has no other interest than as creditor of the alleged testatrix, we aré of opinion he has no such interest in the question, whether the will was good or bad, as entitles him to controvert the action of the Orphans’ Court about it. He must have some interest under the will to give him standing in Court, to contest or defend it. Hoffar vs. Stonestreet, 6 Md., 303.
2. Appellee's counsel insist that this is a case where the parties petitioning, nrnst he held to the strict rules of pleading, and it is sought to apply the same test of sufficiency to these petitions, which is applied to a hill in chancery for injunction, when demurrer is interposed. To this view we cannot accede. Common law pleading has never been introduced or found practicable in the Orphans’ Courts. A demurrer, technically considered, has no place there. Constituted as those Courts are for special purposes only, and composed of Judges chiefly laymen, unskilled in the refined and technical distinctions of the law, and selected mainly because of their business
The petition of Mary Carson adopts Mr. Munnikhuysen’s petition as part of her petition, and alleges in addition thereto, that, she is a legatee under the will of Mrs. Emily W. Magraw, to the extent of five hundred dollars, and that in the month of December, 1814, She was paid by Adam R. Magraw, three hundred dollars of that amount, who promised 'to pay the balance, but though often requested and demanded of him, he has never done so. She also says that it' was paid by him as executor, as she-believed at the time ; and that she has “just learned the-fact of the revocation of the order admitting the will to-probate, and of the revocation of Adam R. Magraw’s letters testamentary, by reason whereof she cannot sue for the residue of the legacy due her. She is also a non-resident of the State. All that has been said in regard to thé several questions discussed in Munnikhuysen’s case, applies with increased force to the petition of Mary Carson. Being a legatee,.she has undoubted legal standing in Court. She alleges ignorance of the order now attacked ; and sug- • gests a fact of dealing with her -especially calculated to
The remaining case and question presented by tbe record, is whether the order of the Orphans’ Court, dated' the 14th of December, 1880, whereby the joint petition of the several appellants, for tbe appointment of an administrator pendente Hie, was dismissed was correct. In respect to that order we find no ground to disturb the action of the Orphans’ Court.
It is immaterial to the decision of this question, whether the Orphans’ Court had a discretion in respect to the granting of letters pendente lile altogether, or whether their discretion, by the terms of the statute, is restricted to the choice between the parties indicated in the statute as entitled to receive letters, when granted by the Court. By the express language of sec. 68 of Art. 93 of the Code,
In the several appeals of Howard Munnikhuysen, of Mary Garson and of Annie Garson and others, the order of the 20th of January, 1881, (whereby these petitions were dismissed,) is reversed with costs, and the cases are remanded.
On the appeal of Howard Munnikhuysen and others from, the order dismissing petition for administrator pendente lite, the order is affirmed with costs.