Thе plaintiff sued the defendant in order to recover the amount due upon a certificate, or policy, of life insurаnce, issued by the latter to the former’s husband and payable to her as beneficiary. Two defenses were interposеd. In the first place, it was answered that the membership of the assured had lapsed, by reason of his failure to pay a сertain monthly assessment, and that he had not been re-instated. In *488 the second place, it was answered that this action wаs not commenced within six months from the date of the disallowance by the defendant of the plaintiff’s claim, as was required by thе contract of insurance. The plaintiff recovered a verdict for the amount of her claim and the judgment thereuрon entered was affirmed by the Appellate Division, by the unanimous vote of the justices. The first question raised by the defendant hаs been conclusively settled by the disposition made below of the case. Whether the defendant had waived the default of the deceased in failing to make due payment of the particular monthly assessment and had restored him to membership, as the plaintiff contended, the trial judge submitted to the jurors for their determination upon the evidence. It was purely a question of fact and has passed beyond our consideration.
The second defense to the action, that the сlaim was barred by the limitation of time fixed by the by-law for the commencement of an action, was held by the trial court to be untenable ; inasmuch as it appeared that the action was commenced before the expiration of thе six months allowed by the by-law, when reckoned from the time of the rejection of the claim upon the proofs of deаth presented. The language of the by law is that “action to recover payment on account of death or disability claims disputed by the association must be commenced within six months from the date of disallowance of claim.” In the samе article of the by-laws, in which the foregoing limitation is contained, it is provided that the sum to be paid to the beneficiary оf a deceased member “ shall become due and payable ninety days from the date of receipt of satisfаctory proofs of death.” The defendant-appellant contends that it was not obliged to await the presentаtion of formal proofs of death before rejecting the plaintiff’s claim . and, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to refuse to submit to the jury the question of the time at which the plaintiff’s claim was disallowed. The argument is that there was еvidence tending to show that, before the filing of proofs of death and the formal action taken by the defendant therе* *489 upon, the plaintiff’s claim upon the policy liad been “ specifically refused and denied ” and that more than sevеn months had elapsed thereafter before the commencement of this action. The assured died in February, 1901. Formal proofs of death were filed in June, following, and in July the defendant’s secretary communicated by letter to the plaintiff the stаtement that the board of management had denied her claim for the insurance moneys. This action was commenced in November, some four months thereafter.
The ruling of the trial court that the action had been commenced within the period fixed by the by-law was correct. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the agreement of the parties. The by-laws entered into the contract of insurance and they provided that the liability of the defendant to pay the amount of the insurance should not mature until “ ninety days from the date of receipt of satisfactory proofs of death.” Such proofs must, of course, consist in some substantial written form and must be served upon the defendant. Prior to the expiration of the ninety days, no action upon the policy could be maintained without exposing the plaintiff to the objection that it was prematurely brought. If, as сontended for by the defendant, the rejection of the claim was, actually, in March, the six months’ limitation would have expired before the expiration of ninety days from the disallowance of the claim upon the proofs. The time within which to сommence an action against the defendant could not begin to run, until it had acted in rejection of the plaintiff’s clаim upon the proofs presented by her.
The obligations imposed by the contract, in the respects we are considering, were, on the part of the beneficiary, to furnish satisfactory proofs as to the death of the assured, which the lаw would require to be done within a reasonable time, and to commence an action, upon a rejection of the claim for the insurance moneys, within six months thereafter, and, on the part of the association, either, to notify the сlaimant of the disallowance of the claim, when made upon the proofs, or to pay the same within ninety days after receipt of the claim. *490 The plaintiff complied with her obligation and there is no question but that the proofs were filеd by her within a reasonable time. She was notified of the refusal to allow her claim and, then, properly commenced her action within six months.
In view of the facts of the case, it becomes quite unnecessary to consider the question whethеr the amendment of the by-laws providing for a short statute of limitations, made after the deceased had become a member of the association, wits valid and binding. The consideration of such a question would turn upon the effect upon the сontractual relation of the member of his reinstatement after default in payment of his assessment. A by-law forfeited membеrship in such an event, but empowered the board of directors “ to restore the delinquent member ” upon his complying with cеrtain specified conditions.
For the reasons given, I advise the affirmance of the judgment, with costs.
Cullen, Oh. J.., O’Brien, Vann, Werner, Willard Bart- • lett and Chase, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.