82 N.J. Eq. 63 | New York Court of Chancery | 1913
(after statement).
A preliminary objection was raised at the hearing, that complainants had failed to prove any right or title to the use of the name “Scientific American” as a trade njme or trade mark for their publications or otherwise, because of the failure to prove a conveyance of the same from Munn & Company, the original partnership who adopted it in 1845, or from Munn &
First. As to the defendants’ right to the use of the name “Scientific American” since the termination of the contract for its use.
The substantial facts which I find to be established by the evidence above stated in relation to the use of the name “Scientific American” by any of the defendants at the time of filing the bill and subsequently are as follows: By the original contracts of 1902 and 1904, one of defendants, the Americana company (of New York) was expressly' authorized by the complainants to use exclusively the name “Scientific American Compiling Department” for the purpose of selling the- “Encyclopedia Americana” in connection with subscriptions to the complainants’ periodical, the “Scientific American;” at the time of making the contracts of 1904 giving the exclusive use of the name,, the “Scientific American Compiling Department” had been previously used, not as the publisher of the work, but merely as a. selling name used by the Americana company, under whose name as publisher the work was published originally and at the time of making the contract of 1904; during the continuance of this contract (which by its terms extended to March 1st, 1906), the complainants without any express obligation under the contract to do so, did in fact co-operate in the prep
This confusion requiring attention and action on the part of the complainants to avoid responsibility, has already, in my judgment, caused an injury and damage to the complainants in carrying on their business as publishers of the “Scientific American” newspaper, and is a confusion against the further continuance of which, in the present and future publications of the “American^.” they are entitled to equitable relief as the only effective relief. The confusion results primarily and directly from the use of the complainants’ well-known and long established name, “Scientific American,” in connection with the name of publishers and sellers of a book of reference like the "Americana,” including in its volumes scientific and other information, the collection and compilation of which the “Scientific American” lias made a specialty for sixty years. The addition of the words “Compiling Department,” so far from distinguishing or disassociating the publisher and seller of the work from those of the “Scientific American” prima facie indicates a special and appropriate character of the association of the publishers of the paper with the publisher of the “Encyclopedia.” The latter is published by the “Scientific American •Compiling Department,” the natural and ordinary method of describing a department of the “Scientific American,” and of ■describing such a department as would be specially concerned with the compilation of information on scientific and other kindred subjects included in an encyclopedia. Both parties to the suit have from the time of their first contracts concurred in this view of the effect of this name “Scientific American Compiling Department” in connection with the encyclopedia, as ■giving it the benefit of this special information bureau or “Compiling Department” of the “Scientific American” newspaper, developed in their half century or more of its publication. In the stationery and literature of the “Scientific American Com
It must also be considered that the defendant, Americana Company, procured the original use of the name “Scientific American Compiling Department” for the purposes of the contract and solely on the faith of the contract and upon very substantial money consideration given, therefor, and under the contract and the dealings and course of business of the parties has received the benefit of the name and of the reputation of the “Scientific American” as an accurate and reliable compiler of information on a great number of topics, treated in such a book of reference as the “Americana.” On the termination of the contract they cannot, as it seems to me, equitably have the right to appropriate permanently and without compensation, as long as the corporation continues to exist and publish a work of reference, the benefit of the name “Scientific American” for that purpose. The continued use of the name after the expiration of the contract and the continued appropriation of benefits which had their origin solely in contract, comes, in my judgment, within the operation of the principle of estoppel, and upon this ground, as well as upon that of confusion actually arising from the use of the name in the corporate title, complainants are entitled to relief. These two grounds relate to the right to the use of the name, considered solely with reference to its effect as between the parties themselves by reason of their contracts and dealings and the loss or injury resulting to complainant by reason of confusion. And there is another consideration involved in cases of this character, viz., that of the public to whom the name “Scientific American Compiling Department” is held out as the publisher and seller of the “Americana.” No corporation has the right in assuming a name in which to carry on its business of publication, to adopt a name which prima facie and without explanation would fairly and reasonably indicate to a person dealing with it, of average and ordinary intelligence, that the work was the publication of another. The restrictions upon
Reaching this conclusion upon the question of the continued use of the name, merely as one of right in the respective parties, upon the termination of the contract, there remain to be next considered the further questions of the extent and scope of the relief as to the use of the name in the publication and the bar of complainants5 relief by reason of estoppel, laches or hardship.
Second. The extent and scope of the relief to which complainant is entitled in reference to the use of the name “Scientific American55 in connection with the publication and vending of the “Americana.55
Third. As to the equitable relief by injunction being barred on the grounds of estoppel, laches or hardship.
The defence of estoppel is based on the equities claimed to have arisen by reason of the license to use the name “Scientific American Compiling Department” in connection with the. publication of the “Americana” under the circumstances above detailed, and the defendants’ purchase of this right and expends ture of large sums of money in connection with the right or license and on the faith of it. These give it, as is claimed, a perpetual license, and complainants after receiving the consideration and permitting the expenditure, are estopped from setting up a right to enjoin the continuance of the use of the name in connection with the present or future publication. Defendants are entitled, in my judgment, to the benefit of all estoppels arising from the license to use the name, given by the contract itself, or arising necessarily out of this use under the contract, and this will include the right to retain the proper connection of the' name as to all editions published during the co-operation under the contracts, but cannot be extended beyond the contract, and to give defendants the perpetual right to the use of the name. So far as the defendants are entitled to the benefit of any estoppel arising out of the publication of the editions previous to 1912, they can be protected by the decree.
The claim of laches is not well founded. The disuse of the name “Scientific American” was formally demanded in June, 1911, and the filing of the bill (in December, 1911) was not such a delay as to deprive complainants of the right ever to apply for protection against its future use. The delay was considered
The objection of hardship was strongly urged against enjoining the further use of the words “Scientific American” in the corporate name, and the complications which may possibly arise by reason of the disuse of the name, in order to preserve the full benefit of all defendants’ existing property rights connected with the use of the name, should certainly be matter for careful com si deration, in fixing the time, terms and conditions upon which the decree for injunction shall go into effect. These may, if necessary, be made the subject of special reference or inquiry, but the difficulty of adjusting proper relief is not a basis for denying altogether the relief by injunction to which complainants are entitled. And all these difficulties and hardships now claimed to affect the absolute right of relief have arisen and been intentionally brought about by the defendants, since the termination of the contracts, or in anticipation thereof. ITp to April 1st, 1911, the capital of the “Scientific American Compiling Department” was only $2,000; it was only the selling agent for the “Americana Company,” and the outstanding contracts of subscription (fifty thousand or more), although taken in its name, had been delivered over without assignment to the Americana Company, which owned or controlled it, and on or about the date mentioned all of these outstanding contracts were assigned over by the Americana Company to Mr. Peale in consideration of his assuming its obligations. All of the contracts since that time taken by and in the name of the “Scientific American Compiling Department,” as the selling agent of the “Americana Company,” still belong to the latter company. Suits on any of these contracts whenever necessary heretofore seem to have been brought in the name of special assignees to whom they were assigned for the purpose, and if any provision or exception be necessary as to the use of the name for the purpose of retaining the benefit of any of these contracts, it can be
The hardship or injury to the present stockholders of the “Scientific American Compiling Department,” from the discontinuance of the name, if it be considered as reasonably to be expected, is also one that has been brought about after the termination of the contract, by the deliberate action of those who controlled the issue of the stock at that time. The stock was increased from $2,000 to $2,000,000 for the purpose of exchanging it for “Americana Company” stock, and this latter stock is all now owned by the “Scientific American Compiling Department.” Complainants had no notice or knowledge of these proceedings, for the knowledge and participation of Mr. Beach, who had, in April, 1911, become adversely interested, was no knowledge or notice to complainants.
The increase of stock cannot, as it seems to me, confer on the stockholders any individual or personal right as such to the perpetual continuance of a company name in derogation of complainants’ rights to the name. The question is altogether one of corporate right, and the only bearing which the personal holdings of stock has upon the question now at issue is whether the facts proved show that by reason either of their acts or neglect, the complainants can be held to have had such notice of the general issue of this increased stock and its circumstances, as now to disentitle them to complain of it, because of their own neglect. No such notice or responsibility on the part of complainants or any connection therewith appears except on the part of their Mr. Beach, who was adversely interested and participated in the increase of the stock, and there is no equitable ground, in my judgment, for denying relief in regard to the further use of the corporate name to which they may be entitled, on the ground of any supposed hardship to the stockholders who, without knowledge of any controversy as to the use of the.name, have purchased or acquired its stock by exchange since the termination of the contract. The terms of the decree can protect against the disturbance of any existing property rights, and apparently to stockholders the only loss or hardship is that resulting from the prima facie connection of the “Scientific
A decree for injunction will be advised upon the basis of this opinion, and as to the terms and conditions, if any, upon which it should be issued and the time when it should issue and take effect, I will hear counsel at the time of settling decree. In the meantime, or until farther order, the temporary injunction as issued is to remain in full force and effect. Defendants may apply for a settlement of decree or for modification of the temporary injunction on the basis of above opinion at the time of settling decree. I will hear counsel of complainants, if they desire upon the matter of complainants’ right to a decree for an account of profits which is also prayed by the bill.