MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Appellant, v. John REPASKY, Jr., Nathan L. Powell, Sandra A. Groeneveld, and Joseph D. Brammer, individually and each as the parent and representative of a minor child, Appellees. Municipality of Anchorage, Appellant, v. Sharon Long, Appellee.
No. S-8985
Supreme Court of Alaska
Oct. 26, 2001
32 P.3d 302
John E. Havelock, Anchorage, for Appellees John Repasky, Jr., Nathan L. Powell, Sandra A. Groeneveld, and Joseph D. Brammer.
Joe P. Josephson, Josephson & Associates, Anchorage, for Appellee Sharon Long.
Howard S. Trickey and Andrena L. Stone, Jermain, Dunnagan & Owens, P.C., Anchorage, for Amicus Curiae Anchorage School District.
OPINION
EASTAUGH, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995 and again in 1997, after the Anchorage Assembly enacted ordinances for the Anchorage School District‘s annual budgets and for the local source appropriations for those budgets, Anchorage Mayor Rick Mystrom invoked the item veto power and reduced the total amount of each budget and local source appropriation. Was this a valid exercise of the mayor‘s veto power? We hold that it was. We conclude that the item veto power granted by the Anchorage Municipal Charter extends to the assembly‘s school district budget and local source appropriation ordinances. We also conclude that Alaska law does not prevent home rule municipalities from granting this power to their mayors. We therefore reverse the superior court decision which held that the charter does not confer this power on the Anchorage mayor.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
These appeals concern the process used to determine the Anchorage School District‘s budgets and local source appropriations for 1995-96 and 1997-98. Anchorage is a home rule municipality.1 Per the Alaska Statutes, the Anchorage Municipal Charter, and the Anchorage Municipal Code, the Anchorage School Board must submit the school district‘s annual budget to the Anchorage Municipal Assembly for approval.2 The assembly may approve, reduce, or increase the total amount of the school budget and the amount of the local contribution to the school budget, but it may not modify individual
In February 1995 the school board submitted a proposed school district budget of about $353 million for the 1995-96 school year, about $87 million of which was to be appropriated from local sources. On March 28, 1995, the assembly enacted Anchorage Ordinance (AO) 95-60, which reduced by exactly $1 million dollars both the total amount of the district‘s proposed budget and the amount to be appropriated from local sources. On April 3 Mayor Rick Mystrom took what he termed a “line item veto action” and reduced the total amounts of the budget and the local source appropriation as approved by the assembly by an additional $2,344,430. The assembly‘s attempt to override the veto failed. The 1995-96 school district budget was accordingly reduced to about $350 million, about $84 million of which was appropriated from local sources.
The events in 1997 were similar. The school board sent the assembly a proposed budget of about $362 million for the 1997-98 school year, about $100 million of which was to be appropriated from local sources. A week later the assembly enacted AO 97-49, which reduced by exactly $1 million both the district‘s proposed budget and the proposed local source appropriation. Three days later the mayor exercised what he called his “line item veto” power and reduced by a further $2 million both the total budget and the local source appropriation. No motion to override this veto was presented to the assembly for consideration. The 1997-98 school budget was accordingly reduced to about $359 million, about $100 million of which was appropriated from local sources.
This litigation began when John Repasky Jr., and others, who had sued the Anchorage School District about another dispute, amended their complaint, challenging the mayor‘s authority to veto the district‘s 1995-96 and 1997-98 budgets. Both sides moved for summary judgment on the issue of the mayor‘s veto authority. While that action was proceeding, Sharon Long sued the municipality to challenge the 1997 veto.
The superior court consolidated the cases for oral argument and entered a decision resolving both cases. It ruled that the mayor did not have authority to veto the assembly‘s total school budget or the local source appropriation for the school budget. The municipality appealed in both cases and we consolidated the cases on appeal. The parties permitted the school district to file an amicus brief.6
III. DISCUSSION
May the Anchorage mayor veto or reduce the total amounts of the assembly‘s school budget and local source appropriation ordinances? We first consider whether the Anchorage charter grants the mayor any veto power over school budget and local source appropriation ordinances. If it does, we must then consider whether that power is “substantially irreconcilable” with the state education scheme reflected in Alaska law.
A. Standard of Review
We review grants of summary judgment de novo and will affirm if there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.7 We apply our independent judgment when interpreting the Alaska Statutes.8 Because the municipality‘s charter is a constitutional document9 and its code is a statutory document, we apply our independent judgment in interpreting the charter and code.
B. Overview of the Mayoral Veto Power and the School Budget Process
1. Local government and the mayoral veto
The Alaska Constitution vests “all local government powers” in boroughs and cities.10 It authorizes the voters of a first class city or borough to adopt a home rule charter11 and provides that “[a] home rule borough or city may exercise all legislative powers not prohibited by law or by charter.”12 Title 29 of the Alaska Statutes delineates both the powers and structures of local governments.
The Municipality of Anchorage is a home rule municipality.13 It was incorpоrated as a unified municipality in September 1975, when voters adopted by referendum its constitutional document, the Home Rule Charter for the Municipality of Anchorage.14 Its executive and administrative power is vested in the mayor.15 Its legislative power is vested in the assembly.16 Since 1990 subsection 5.02(c) of the charter has expressly granted the mayor both a general and a “line item” veto power.17
2. The education budget process
Article VII, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution mandates that “[t]he legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a system of public schools open to all children of the state....” To this end, Title 14 of the Alaska Statutes creates Alaska‘s public education system.18 The legislature delegated the state‘s authority to manage the operations of the schools to local school districts.19
The Anchorage School District is geographically coextensive with the Municipality of Anchorage.20 The municipality, as required by statute,21 established the Anchorage School Board22 and charged it with operating the municipality‘s schools.23 Although the school board is elected by the same voters who elect the municipal assembly, and is part of the municipality, “it is a legislative body with legal responsibilities which in important respects are distinct from those exercised by the assembly.”24 Further, while the legislature has delegated significant local control over education, this court has made it clear that the Alaska Constitution mandates “pervasive state authority in the field of education.”25
The relationship between the school board and the assembly in the school district budget process is established by
C. Does Subsection 5.02(c) of the Charter Give the Mayor Power to Veto and Reduce the Assembly‘s School District Budget and Local Source Appropriation Ordinances?
In interpreting a constitutional document such as the Anchorage charter,36 we first look to its language.37 We therefore begin with the text of charter subsection 5.02(c), which provides in pertinent part: “The mayor has the veto power. The mayor also has line item veto power. The mayor may, by veto, strike or reduce items in a budget or appropriation measure.”38
We first consider whether the charter gives the mayor power to veto the assembly‘s school budget ordinance in its entirety. We next consider whether the charter grants the mayor item veto power over the school budget ordinance such that the mayor may reduce its total amount.
1. The general veto power
The municipality argues that the first sentence of subsection 5.02(c) gives the mayor power to veto all assembly ordinances, including school budget ordinances, unless a specific prohibition provides otherwise. Repasky, Long, and the school district argue that because the charter does not expressly allow for a mayoral veto over the school budget, no such power exists.
The municipality‘s reading is more persuasive. First, the language of charter subsection 5.02(c) is sweeping. It expresses no limit on the general veto power. And charter subsection 16.03(a) supports the idea that subsection 5.02(c) grants a general veto power unless specifically enumerated exceptions apply. Section 16.03 established the former Anchorage Telephone Utility (ATU) and stated that the mayor‘s veto power did not extend to assembly actions concerning the appointment of ATU directors.39 No compa-
2. The item veto power
In 1990 the following language was added to charter subsection 5.02(c): “The mayor also has line item veto power. The mayor may, by veto, strike or reduce items in a budget or appropriation measure.”40 The municipality points out that this amendment came about because the municipality‘s 1990 Charter Review Commission believed it necessary to clarify whether the mayor had line item veto power. The municipality argues that even before the 1990 amendment, the mayor could reduce the total amount of the municipality‘s school budget appropriation and that the amendment simply “clarified” that “budgets” were also measures the mayor could reduce by veto. Long and the school district respond that this added language does not extend the line item veto to school budgets. They argue that the terms “budget” and “appropriation” as defined in the charter do not encompass the school budget.
A. The mayor has the veto power as provided in Charter section 5.02(c).
B. The mayor may not veto actions of the assembly concerning the adoption or abandonment of a manager plan of government as provided in the laws of the state or actions of the board of equalization or the board of adjustment.
C. The mayor may not veto actions of the assembly with respect to appointment of directors of the Anchorage Telephone Utility, enactment of legislation by the Assembly under Charter section 16.03(h), approval of the annual budget of the Anchorage Telephone Utility, and actions of the Assembly with respect to Anchorage Telephone Utility matters reserved to the assembly under the Charter.
a. Thе terms “budget” and “appropriation” in charter subsection 5.02(c) encompass the school budget.
The charter defines “appropriation” as “a unit of funding ... in the municipal budget.”41 Long and the school district argue that the school budget is not a “unit of funding ... in the municipal budget.” They think it significant that separate sections of the charter discuss the municipal and school budgets.42 The school district argues that this separation is highlighted by the mayor‘s ability to transfer unencumbered funds between departments within all appropriations except the school budget appropriation.43 Long and the school district therefore argue that the item veto extends only to the municipal budget and not to the separate school budget. The school district also asserts that the term “budget” in the charter does not encompass the school system budget, because the Charter Review Commission did not mention the school budget when it discussed the item veto and because we have held that the “assembly has no legislative power to make appropriations for specific items, programs or priorities provided for by the school board‘s budget.”44
The municipality replies that the Anchorage School District is part of the municipali-
We find the municipality‘s interpretation more persuasive. First, the school budget ordinance qualifies as a “budget measure” under subsection 5.02(c). A school budget ordinance is in appearance and substance a “budget measure.” Appellees provide no persuasive reason why it should not be treated as such.
Second, it is significant that the school district is governmentally part of the municipality,47 that the school district budget is for amounts that must be expended in order to operate public schools in the municipality, and that the school district budget includes amounts the municipality must contribute from local sources to operate the school sys-
Further, as the municipality points out, the charter uses the term “appropriation” in sections which deal exclusively with the school budget.49 This usage indicates that the charter framers considered the school district budget ordinance to be an “appropriation.” Subsection 6.05(c) directs the assembly to “appropriate” funds for the school district.50 The ordinance appropriating these funds is both an “appropriation” and an “appropriation measure” for purposes of the charter.51 Placing the topic of the school budget in a charter section apart from sections concerning other municipal budgets does not mean that the school budget is not part of the total municipal budget.
Finally, given its absolute and relative size, it is counterintuitive to think that the school district‘s local source appropriation is not part of the municipal budget. The 1997-98 local source school appropriation required the municipality to contribute $100,228,823; this was about twenty-nine percent of the district‘s total operating budget of $358,723,000.52 The local source school appropriation is also a very large part of the total municipal budget.53
b. The mayor has item veto power over the total amount of the school budget.
We have thus concluded that the language of subsection 5.02(c) granting the may-
Is a single-item appropriation an “item” for purposes of the item veto? The item veto historically originated as a reform measure conceived in part to prevent legislators from “logrolling” when enacting appropriations bills which necessarily address many subjects and need not be confined to a single subject.55 The item veto therefore typically addresses appropriations containing numerous items.56 But another historical purpose was to give the executive branch some ability to reduce a legislature‘s excessive appropriations57—a purpose still recognized as valid.58 Thus, the fact that the assembly‘s school
We therefore hold that the charter grants the mayor the power to veto the entire school district budget ordinance, or to exercise an item veto and reduce the total amount of the budget ordinance and the total amount of the local source appropriation.
D. Is the Veto Power Substantially Irreconcilable with State Law?
Having held that the municipality‘s veto power extends to the total amounts of school district budget and local appropriation ordinances, we must decide whether, as Long, Repasky, and the school district argue, state law impliedly prohibits that power.60
The Municipality of Anchorage is a home rule municipality and therefore has “all legislative powers not prohibited by law or by charter.”61 By contrast, a general law municipality “is an unchartered borough or city [with] legislative powers conferred by law.”62 In deciding whether the state has limited the powers of home rule municipalities, we first look for prohibitions, not grants of power.
State law can also prohibit a municipality from exercising authority “by implication such as whеre the statute and ordinance are so substantially irreconcilable that one cannot be given its substantive effect if the other is to be accorded the weight of law.”66 In general, for state law to preempt local authority, it is not enough for state law to occupy the field.67 Rather, “[i]f the legislature wishes to ‘preempt’ an entire field, [it] must so state.”68
But in the context of public education—a field subject to “pervasive” state control69—we have precluded even home rule municipalities from acting unless they were exercising power delegated by the legislature.70 A home rule municipality cannot enact an ordinance which conflicts with a state education statute.71
The relevant constitutional provisions are not determinative. One requires the legislature to “establish and maintain a system of public schools.”72 Another expresses an intention “to provide for maximum local self-government,” and provides that “[a] liberal construction shall be given to the powers of local government units.”73 Another provides that home rule municipalities “may exercise all legislative powers not prohibited by law or charter.”74
Two statutes are of particular interest here. Alaska Statute 14.14.060(c) is important because Long, Repasky, and the school district argue that it impliedly prohibits the disputed veto power. Alaska Statute 29.20.270(c)(1) is important because the legislature made its express prohibition on vetoing appropriation items in school budget ordinances inapplicable to home rulе municipalities.
1. Effect of AS 14.14.060(c)‘s silence about a mayoral role or veto
Alaska Statute 14.14.060(c) gives assemblies power to determine and appropriate the total amount of local moneys for their districts’ annual budgets. Repasky, Long, and the school district invoke this statute in making three main arguments to show that the state‘s pervasive authority over education precludes item vetoes of school district budget ordinances.
We are not persuaded that the absence of any reference in
Further, the statute addresses the legislative appropriation power. It does not give the assembly a veto-like power which might conceptually conflict with a mayoral veto or make a mayoral veto redundant. The Alaska legislature also would have recognized that municipal budget ordinances are legislative enactments which are typically subject to the veto or item veto power. Nonetheless, it did not prohibit exercise of the veto power in the school budget ordinance context in
We think it is important that the legislature, which would have known that the prohibition in
The dissent contends that it was not necessary to make
We therefore conclude, as the municipality argues, that the authority granted to the assembly by
Further, Repasky‘s first argument seems to rest in part on his assertion that the mayor was not unambiguously given this veto power. The same assumption may underlie the school district‘s contention that our decisions in Peninsula Marketing Ass‘n v. Rosier87 and Ross v. City of Sand Point88 foreclose the municipality‘s argument. In Rosier we determined that the Commissioner of Fish and Game could not use the commissioner‘s emergency powers to veto decisions of the Board of Fisheries.89 In Ross we held that a mayor could not override an employment decision of the city‘s grievance committee.90 These cases are distinguishable from the present dispute because the executives there relied only on implied veto powers.91 The executive in Rosier had no veto authority originating from another source.92 And the mayor in Ross could not veto the grievance board‘s decisions because the city had not granted the mayor any veto power93 when it created its personnel system as required by state statute.94 The mayor‘s statutory authority to appoint, suspend, or remove employees95 was not equivalent to a veto power.96 In comparison, we concluded above in Part III.C that subsection 5.02(c) of the Anchorage charter granted the mayor power to veto the assembly‘s ordinances.
Long, Repasky, and the school district cite two of our decisions, Tunley v. Municipality of Anchorage Sch. Dist.97 and Macauley v. Hildebrand,98 to support their contention
We held in those two cases that home rule municipalities had not been granted authority to act in educational policy matters delegated to the local school boards.99 In one, a municipality attempted to impose accounting controls over expenditure of funds already appropriated for operating the district‘s schools.100 In the other, an assembly attempted to determine which schools would be closed.101 Both cases concerned operational and policy choices broadly delegated to school boards. And in both cases the municipalities’ attempts to exercise authority did not arise from the limited authority the Alaska legislature had delegated to the municipalities.
That is not the situation here. The legislature expressly gave municipalities the power to approve or reduce the total amounts of the proposed budget and local appropriation. The mayoral veto is not substantially irreconcilable with that power.
2. Effect of AS 14.14.060(c)‘s time requirements
Second, Long, Repasky, and the school district argue that the process
3. Consequences of allowing veto
Third, reasoning that because courts do not read ambiguous legislation to reach absurd results,103 Repasky argues that allowing this veto would lead to “convoluted political consequences.” He anticipates that an assembly might take no action on a school budget ordinance, leading to automatic approval, in order to deny the mayor a veto opportunity; he also anticipates that a mayor might veto the ordinance just before the thirty-day window expires, in order to prevent an override vote. Further, he claims that permitting a mayoral veto would require the school budget to clear hurdles never intended by the legislature.
But we do not read
Repasky and Long‘s arguments demonstrate that the mayor‘s veto adds an extra political element to the school budget process, but they do not establish that the veto power irreconcilably conflicts with Title 14. Other parts of the municipal budget are enacted by the assembly and are subject to a mayoral veto.104 Allowing the mayor to veto
4. Implied prohibition summary
State law does not expressly prohibit home rule municipalities from adopting this veto power. Education is subject to pervasive state control in Alaska. But
Contrary to the dissent‘s argument,107 we are not favoring the constitution‘s home rule clause over its public education clause. We read Titles 14 and 29 of the Alaska Statutes to allow hоme rule municipalities to permit their executives to apply the item veto power to school budget ordinances. We thus adhere to a policy choice the Alaska legislature has already made.
We consequently conclude that
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude that Anchorage Municipal Charter subsection 5.02(c) grants the mayor the item veto power over the assembly‘s school district budget and local source school budget appropriation ordinances. We also conclude that
FABE, Justice, not participating.
I disagree with the court‘s decision to uphold the mayor‘s power to reduce the school district budget by veto. In my view, the court‘s opinion misinterprets Alaska law and disregards settled standards for resolving conflicts between state and municipal law. I would hold that our law narrowly delegates the power of school-budget approval to the assembly alone, expressly insulating its actions from reduction by veto.
I. STATE LAW PRECLUDES A MAYORAL VETO.
A. Constitutional and Statutory Framework
Public education in Alaska is a function of state government. Article VII, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution provides that “[t]he legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a system of public schools opеn to all children of the State.”1 We have consistently interpreted this provision as “a clear ‘mandate for pervasive state authority in the field of education.‘”2 The legislature has assigned primary responsibility for exercising this authority to local school boards.3 Because municipal revenues make up a large portion of a school district‘s budget, the legislature has also decided “to give municipal assemblies certain powers with regard to school board budgetary and accounting processes.”4 But the legislature has delegated none of the school board‘s budgeting power to mayors.
Although Anchorage is a home rule city,
The relationships between the school board of a city school district and the city council and executive or administrator are governed in the same manner as provided in
AS 14.14.060 for the school board of aborough school district and the borough assembly and executive or administrator.
Alaska Statute 14.14.060, the statute mentioned in the above-quoted provision, delineates a borough school district‘s relationship to its corresponding borough government. Subsection .060(c) expressly covers school district budgets and the appropriation of borough school funds, conferring certain narrow powers on the assembly and vesting it with specific responsibilities:
(c) Except as otherwise provided by municipal ordinance, the borough school board shall submit the school budget for the following school year to the borough assembly by May 1 for approval of the total amount. Within 30 days after receipt of the budget the assembly shall determine the total amount of money to be made available from local sources for school purposes and shall furnish the school board with a statement of the sum to be made available. If the assembly does not, within 30 days, furnish the school board with a statement of the sum to be made available, the amount requested in the budget is automatically approved. Except as otherwise provided by municipal ordinance, by June 30, the assembly shall appropriate the amount to be made available from local sources from money available for the purpose.
B. Alaska Statute 14.14.060(c) Gives Certain School-Budget Powers to the Assembly, but Not to the Mayor.
The plain language of
For instance, subsection .060(a) states that “[t]he borough assembly may by ordinance require that all school money be deposited in a centralized treasury“; but the subsection then specifies that “[t]he borough administrator shall have the custody of, invest, and manage all money in the centralized treasury.”5 Similarly, subsection .060(f) makes the school board responsible for custodial services and routine maintenance, but direсts that all major rehabilitation and repair be provided by “[t]he borough assembly through the borough administrator.”6 These provisions demonstrate beyond cavil that, in delegating specified school district powers to local government through
Common sense and plain meaning, then, point strongly to the conclusion that, in assigning the power to approve a borough school district‘s budget to “the assembly,” the legislature meant just that.
The court shrugs off this evidence of legislative intent, theorizing that subsection .060(c)‘s narrow delegation to the assembly implicitly carries with it the mayor‘s legislative power: “[A]s between the school board and the municipality, the legislature chose to delegate the final budget approval power to the municipality. In effect, the municipality has allowed its mayor to share some of the assembly‘s influence over the amount appropriated.”7
But the court‘s theory strains plain meaning, especially when subsection .060(a) is viewed—as it must be viewed—in conjunction with
The court‘s theory also violates
Thus, while the city undeniably has a legitimate stake in the school district‘s budgetary process, the state‘s interest is both constitutionally and economically supеrior. And because a school board‘s ability to capture adequate state funding depends on an early and reliable determination of local source funding, the board has a critical need to ensure that the municipal contribution is promptly determined, without being derailed by local politics. Alaska Statute 14.14.060(c) reflects these concerns: it strives to afford municipalities an opportunity to determine the amount of their local source contributions, but at the same time it protects the state‘s vital and overriding interest in early certainty.
Despite the court‘s assertion to the contrary, nowhere does
The first sentence of subsection .060(c) specifies that the board must submit its budget for the following school year to the assembly by May 1.16 While the first sentence suggests that the budget is submitted “for approval of the total amount,” the next sen-
Thus,
Neither the tight and comprehensive structure of this statute nor its underlying purpose leaves room for the “extra political wrinkle” of a mayoral veto. Assuming, then, that the court is correct in construing the Anchorage charter to “reallocate some of the assembly‘s legislative power,”20 this realloca-
C. Alaska Statute 29.20.270(c) Explicitly Prohibits a School-Budget Veto.
Alaska‘s laws regulating municipal government, codified in Title 29 of the Alaska Statutes, confirm the legislature‘s intent to use the plain meaning of “assembly” in Title 14‘s provisions establishing relationships bеtween school boards, assemblies, and mayors. Alaska Statute 29.20.270(c)(1) forbids a mayor from using the veto to “strike or reduce appropriation items in a school budget ordinance.”21
Although the court denies it, this unambiguous provision certainly does “expressly prohibit the municipality from conferring [the veto] power on its mayor.”22 While the court attempts to avoid the express meaning of the statute by finding an implied exemption for home rule municipalities under
Alaska Statute 29.10.200 provides that “[o]nly the following provisions of this title [AS 29.] apply to home rule municipalities as prohibitions on acting otherwise than as provided.” The statute then lists fifty-nine provisions of Title 29 that directly limit home rule municipalities from “acting otherwise”
The question framed by
Since
Hence,
II. THE COURT HAS APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD IN CONSTRUING STATE LAW TO ALLOW MAYORAL VETOES OF SCHOOL BUDGET ORDINANCES.
The court compounds these errors by applying the wrong standard to determine
But the court has fashioned a constitutionally lopsided standard: while heeding the municipality‘s call to honor the constitution‘s broad grant of home rule power, this standard all but ignores Repasky‘s equally compelling call to enforce constitutional language granting the state exclusive control over public education.
As already discussed, the Alaska Constitution‘s public education clause expressly provides that “[t]he legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a system of public schools open to all children of the State.”34 Our cases hold that “[t]his constitutional mandate for pervasive state authority in the
That the legislature has seen fit to delegate certain educational functions to local school boards in order that Alaska schools might be adapted to meet the varying conditions of different localities does not diminish this constitutionally mandated state control over education.[37]
In the case before us, then, when we gauge how broadly to apply
The court‘s standard might serve well when used to resolve conflicts between municipal home rule powers and ordinary statutes. But we have never used it to decide the validity of home rule actions that conflict with state laws rooted in the public education clause. To the contrary, our cases involving educational functions articulated a standard that would allow us tо interpret a statute like
Beginning in Chugach Electric Ass‘n v. City of Anchorage,39 we adopted a “local activity rule” as “an expedient method” to apply when home rule ordinances “either directly or collaterally impede ... implementation” of policies expressed in state laws.40
A year later, in Macauley v. Hildebrand,41 we considered a case involving a conflict between a home rule charter provision that required a school district to use the borough accounting system and a statute that allowed centralized accounting only if the school board consented.42 Reviewing the test that we adopted in Chugach Electric, we noted that “the determination of whether a home rule municipality can enforce an ordinance which conflicts with a state statute” hinged on “whether the matter regulated is of statewide or local concern.”43 Applying this formulation, we struck the charter provision, ruling that “[t]he outcome of the local activity test in the case at bar is dictated by Article VII, Section 1 of the Alaska Constitution [the public education clause].”44
We next dealt with conflicting state and home rule provisions in Jefferson v. State.45 There, we backed away from Chugach Electric‘s local activity rule. Using the constitution‘s home rule clause as the appropriate starting point for analysis, we enunciated for the first time a test based on the notion of substantial irreconcilability:
The test we derive from Alaska‘s constitutional provisions is one of prohibition, rather than traditional tests such as statewide versus local concern. A municipal ordinance is not necessarily invalid in Alaska because it is inconsistent or in conflict with a state statute. The question rests on
whether the exercise of authority has been prohibited to municipalities. The prohibition must be either by express terms or by implication such as where the statute and ordinance are so substantially irreconcilable that one cannot be given its substantive effect if the other is to be accorded the weight of law.[46]
The Jefferson test resembles the standard that the court applies here, and that test undeniably gives preference to municipal laws having close ties to the home rule clause. But Jefferson qualified its endorsement of the substantial irreconcilability test, declaring that this standard must give way when, as here, a home rule power butts against the mandate of the Alaska Constitution‘s public education clause.
The public education clause was not directly at issue in Jefferson. The conflict there arose between a city charter provision governing disposition of public utility assets and a state law precluding a city located within an organized borough from disposing of such assets after the borough exercised areawide power over the subject.47 Applying the “substantially irreconcilable” test, Jefferson resolved this conflict in favor of the state, finding the city‘s action to be irreconcilable with the state statute because the statute‘s “prohibition [was] express.”48 But Jefferson did not stop its analysis there. It proceeded to examine its newly adopted standard in light of this court‘s earlier case law, emphasizing that “[o]ur decision ... is in accord with this court‘s opinions relating to cases of conflict between local ordinances and state enactments.”49
Jefferson‘s discussion of Macauley v. Hildebrand is especially germane to the present controversy because the conflict in Macauley involved a statutory delegation of educational power implicating the public edu-
The statute involved in Macauley was an express delegation by the state legislature to municipal corporations of a constitutionally mandated legislative power. We reasoned that the language of the state constitution mandating maintenance of a school system by the state vested the legislature with pervasive control over public education. Thus, home rule municipalities were precluded from exercising power over education unless, and to the extent, delegated by the state legislature; and the local ordinance was therefore overridden by the statute.[50]
Jefferson‘s public education test, then, is the obverse of the test that the court espouses here: to invalidate a municipal action, the test looks not for an express prohibition or irreconcilable conflict, but merely for the absence of a specific delegation. Under the test that Jefferson articulates for public education clause cases, then, state law has the preference; it prevails in the absence of express delegation: “[H]ome rule municipalities [are] precluded from exercising power over education” except when that power is “delegated by the state legislature.”51
Our most recent decision addressing a home rule city‘s exercise of delegated public education power, Tunley v. Municipality of Anchorage School District,52 refines Jefferson‘s public education clause test by describing the circumstances in which an implied delegation of power may be found.
Tunley considered the scope of
Applying these principles here dictates the conclusion that
As the court itself acknowledges, the veto power adds a new wrinkle to the school budget process—“an extra political element” that was not previously there.56 Although this extra wrinkle undeniably serves local political interests by enhancing mayoral control over the school budget, it adds nothing of benefit to the statutorily established school budget process: the added political wrinkle is neither necessary nor helpful to promote consistency with any of
And at worst, of course, the veto power might prove to be far more than a mere wrinkle or minor hindrance. While local school districts are in one sense a part of municipal government, in another sense—their constitutional and statutory sense—they are independent state institutions that work locally with municipal government.57 And as this court has previously emphasized, “[n]owhere is the independent status of the Anchorage School Board more apparent than in school system budgetary matters.”58
The statutory delegation of power at issue here,
Apart from causing this kind of institutional distortion, shifting the balance of state and municipal power will also unleash anomalous procedural consequences. Whether the mayor plays any role in the school-budget approval process will become an arbitrary exercise in assembly timing: the assembly can choose to leave the mayor out of the loop
Finally, distributing the assembly‘s share of school-budget power is bound to have awkward institutional ramifications. A school board acts as its district‘s legislative body.61 Subsection .060(c) narrowly delegates this power to the assembly, effectively designating the municipality‘s legislative body as the board‘s legislative adjunсt. But in this adjunct capacity, the assembly serves the same executive as the board: the school district superintendent. By introducing the mayor to this institutional mix, the court adds a second executive head to the district‘s adjunct legislative body, creating a patchwork anatomy that invites institutional turmoil. The district‘s adjunct legislative body now must respond to conflicting signals emanating from separate heads on opposite sides of its torso.
I seriously doubt that any local government would have—or could have—devised such a strange process intentionally. And I am convinced that a state government dedicated to maintaining an independent local school system under Alaska‘s “constitutional mandate for pervasive state authority in the field of education”62 should not tolerate its continued existence.
III. CONCLUSION
Without a trace of irony, the court foretells the consequences of its decision: “Allowing the mayor to veto the school budget ordinance puts the appropriation process on footing equivalent ... to that of other municipal budgets.”63 Yet Alaska‘s constitution requires school districts statewide to stand on their own feet. By treating the school budget like “other municipal budgets” the veto power correspondingly treats the school board like an ordinary municipal agency, thereby divesting the board of its constitutionally mandated independence. As the
Notes
The mayor has the veto power. The mayor also has line item veto power. The mayor may, by veto, strike or reduce items in a budget or appropriation measure.
“Within 30 days after receipt of the budget the assembly shall determine the total amount of money to be made available from local sources for school purposes and shall furnish the school board with a statement of the sum to be made available.”(a) Except as provided in (c)-(e) of this section, the mayor may veto an ordinance, resolution, motion, or other action of the governing body and may strike or reduce appropriation items.
....
(c) The veto does not extend to (1) appropriation items in a school budget ordinance[.]
....
(e) The veto does not extend to an ordinance adopted under
The relationships between the school board of a city school district and the city council and executive or administrator are governed in the same manner as provided in
Except as otherwise provided by municipal ordinance, the borough school board shall submit the school budget for the following school year to the borough assembly by May 1 for approval оf the total amount. Within 30 days after receipt of the budget the assembly shall determine the total amount of money to be made available from local sources for school purposes and shall furnish the school board with a statement of the sum to be made available. If the assembly does not, within 30 days, furnish the school board with a statement of the sum to be made available, the amount requested in the budget is automatically approved. Except as otherwise provided by municipal ordinance, by June 30, the assembly shall appropriate the amount to be made available from local sources from money available for the purpose.
The assembly shall approve the budget of the school district as amended and appropriate the necessary funds at least 60 days prior to the end of the fiscal year of the school district. If the assembly fails to approve the school district budget and make the necessary appropriation within the time stated, the budget proposal shall become the budget and appropriation for the fiscal year of the school district without further assembly action.
The assembly may increase or decrease the budget of the school district only as to total amount. The school district may not appropriate or otherwise incur the expenditure of any funds, regardless of the source, in excess of the total amount of the budget, as approved by the assembly, without prior approval by the assembly.
Majority Opinion at 305-306;The Anchorage Telephone Utility shall be governed by a board of directors consisting of five members.... Exercise of the power of the veto by the mayor shall not extend to actions of the assembly with respect to appointment of directors.
(Emphasis added.) This limitation on the mayoral veto also appears in AMC § 2.30.100, which provides: 476 P.2d 115 (Alaska 1970).The mayor has the veto power. The mayor also has line item veto power. The mayor may, by veto, strike or reduce items in a budget or appropriation measure. The veto must be exercised and submitted to the assembly with a written explanation within seven days of passage of the ordinance affected. The assembly, by two-thirds majority vote of the total membership, may override a veto any time within 21 days after its exercise.
Id. at 122.“Appropriation” means а unit of funding provided for by the assembly in the municipal budget. An appropriation may be specific as to particular expenditures or general as to an entire department or agency as the assembly deems appropriate.
491 P.2d 120 (Alaska 1971).