31 Wis. 451 | Wis. | 1872
The questions in this case relate to the construction of a statute now found as § 57, 1 Tay. Stats., p. 1051, which reads as follows: ‘ ‘Whenever any laborer upon any railroad in this state shall have just claim or demand for labor performed on such railroad, against any person being contractor on such railroad with the railroad company, such railroad company shall be liable to pay such laborer the amount of such claim or demand : provided, such laborer shall have given notice to such railroad company within thirty days after such claim or demand shall have accrued, that he has such claim or demand: provided, such claim or demand shall have accrued within sixty days prior to the giving of such notice ; such notice shall be given in writing, and shall specify the particular nature and amount of the claim or demand, and shall be delivered to the secretary or chief engineer of such company, or to the engineer in charge of the construction of that portion of the road upon which such rabor was performed.”
The second section of the act, ch. 27, Laws of 1857, in force and occurring as section 40, ch. 79, R. S. 1858 (1 Tay. Stats., 1051, § 58), though since repealed by substitution of another act (see Burlander v. Railway Co., 26 Wis., 76), reads as follows: “No person employed by any railroad company, or by any contractor on any railroad, or who shall be in any manner engaged in the construction, repair, or operation of any railroad, or in any business incident thereto, whose wages are payable periodically, shall be liable to have any sum which may be due to him from such railroad company, or contractor, or other person, foy his wages as aforesaid, attached in the hands of the corporation or person from whom the same may be due, by any garnishee process, or other process whatever, unless as much as two months’ wages are due to such person.”
And further, in order to a proper understanding of the questions presented, it is also necessary that the provisions of the prior statute, entitled “ an act for the protection of laborers on railroads,” ch. 86, Laws of 1855, should appear. That statute, which was repealed by ch. 27, Laws of 1857, except so far as it extended its provisions to other incorporated companies, was in these words: “ All railroad corporations within this state " shall be responsible and obligated in law to the laborers on the line or lines of railroads being constructed by said corporations, and are responsible and liable to pay for all labor performed by said laborers severally, upon said road or roads, to the persons performing such labor; and it shall be the duty of said corporations to require of all contractors or subcontractors ample bond or other security, satisfactory to said corporations, conditioned
The act of 1857 was entitled “an act further to protect laborers on railroads.”
We have thus before us, at a glance of the eye, the begin ning and the end, and also the intermediate changes, of the legislation for the protection of laborers upon railroads, and likewise that upon the kindred topic and part and parcel of the same enactments, namely, the preservation and exemption of the earnings of such laborers from seizure or stoppage by process of law for the collection of debts. Both provisions sprung from the same policy, and were originated and enacted together. Both are parts of the same special system, designed for the protection of that particular class of persons. The act of 1855 was before this court and received a construction in Streubel v. Mil. & Miss. R. R. Co., 12 Wis., 67. The act of 1857 also came incidentally before the court, and was noticed in the same case. There is nothing in that case particularly pertinent to the questions here presented, except the reasoning of the court upon some points which may hereafter be adverted to.
The first and principal question here presented is, whether the words “ with the railroad company,” in the phrase “ being contractor on such railroad with the railroad company,” are words of limitation and restraint, signifying that the “contractor” must be one who has contracted directly or immedi
It is conceded by the learned counsel for the company, that the word “ contractor,” when standing alone or unrestrained by the context or by particular words, may mean a subcontractor or any person remotely engaged under contract and doing the work, as well as an original contractor. Such a person is a contractor as well as the original contractor. This has been frequently so decided, and such is the generic or more comprehensive meaning of the word. The question arises, therefore, whether the word as here used is to be taken in its generic sense, or whether it has been restricted as contended for by counsel. And here it seems proper to observe that we differ not at all from counsel as to the rules and principles by which the interpretation of statutes is to be governed. Courts cannot correct supposed errors, omissions or defects in legislation. The office of interpretation is to bring out the sense where the words used are in some manner doubtful, and where these are plain and unambiguous the court cannot depart from the language of the statute. This court has too often of late had occasion to repeat and enforce these rules, to permit them now to be called in question or disregarded. It is only where the intention of the legislature is ambiguously expressed, so as to be fairly capable of two or more meanings, that interpretation or any latitude of construction is allowable. It is only in such cases that the courts are at liberty to accept or act upon what is termed the doctrine of equitable construction. We admit, therefore, that if the language in question is fairly susceptible
If the legislature had intended clearly and beyond doubt the construction for which the learned counsel contends, it is highly improbable that they would have employed language which admits of such latitude of interpretation. It is very probable, in such case, that they would have confined the remedy of the laborer within such limits as would have removed all danger of misinterpretation, which could have been very easily done by the use of a single additional word. The legislature could have said directly or immediately “ with the railroad company,” or the word original could have been prefixed or used before the word “contractor,” and no doubt could have remained.
It being settled that the word “ contractor” signifies or may signify a subcontractor as well, or any person contracting for the construction of the railroad or of any part of it, with or under the original contractor, the reasoning of this court, or some portions of it, in Streubel v. Mil. & Miss. R. R. Co., supra, is not wholly impertinent by way of showing how the subcontractor may, in a general sense at least, and probably in the sense intended by the legislature, be said to be a “ contractor with the railroad company.” Speaking of the act of 1855, and of the work which had been performed by 'the laborers upon the railroad while the act was in force, this court said : “After its passage, and while it was in full force, the appellant (the railroad company) carried on the business of constructing its road, and, through, the agency of contractors and subcontractors, contracted with and employed laborers for that purpose. The laborers, through the same agency, contracted with the appellant to perform the labor, and, having done so, were entitled to look directly to it for their pay. The appellant, by prosecuting its work, assented to the obligation imposed by law to pay the laborers them wages ; and the laborers, relying upon such assent and obligation, performed their work. In this, as in all other cases where contracts are regulated by law, the parties are presumed to have acted with reference to it, and to have consented to such- conditions and duties as it imposed, and to have acquired such rights as it gave. Their acts are to be interpreted by it. The appellant, by letting its contracts and setting in motion the means by which laborers were employed, thereby agreed and promised to pay them. The laborers, by accepting such employment and doing the work,
Tbe foregoing reasoning, tbougb applied to a somewhat ¿Lif-erent subject, and resorted to for the purpose of establishing a somewhat different proposition, yet requires no explanation of tbe manner of applying it here, or bow it may be employed for tbe purpose of showing that, through tbe agency of tbe principal or first contractor, a relation of contract or of contractor may be said to have sprung up and existed between tbe company and a subcontractor in tbe sense above stated.
We are constrained, therefore, to differ with counsel upon bis premises, and that difference has led us to a different conclusion as to tbe intent and proper construction of tbe statute. It being a remedial statute and its construction in doubt, we think we are at liberty to construe it liberally for tbe advancement of tbe remedy and suppression of tbe mischief aimed at by tbe legislature. We are at liberty to take notice of tbe consequences wbicb would flow from tbe construction contended for by counsel, and to consider that sucb construction would, under tbe system of sub-letting or sub-contracting wbicb almost invariably prevails in tbe construction of railroads in tbis state, practically defeat tbe benign purpose wbicb tbe legislature bad in view in enacting tbe statute, and would, at tbe option of any and of every railroad company, render tbe statute a dead letter and a nullity upon our statute books. We are at liberty to consider tbe generally impoverished, degraded, ignorant and helpless condition of tbe class of persons whom tbe legislature designed to protect, and bow much they do or may sometimes stand in need of just sucb legislative assistance. And we are furthermore at liberty to presume, and must pre
And here we are reminded of the language of the second section of the act,which prohibits the attachment or seizure of the wages of such laborers by any garnishee process or other process whatever, and which, as it seems to us, serves strongly to elucidate and explain the intention of the legislature, doubtfully expressed and made known in the first section. "W"e speak of course of the act of 1857, where both sections were first introduced, constituting the entire body of the act, and were passed and approved as one law, and both of which have continued in force ever since, with the slight modification of section one above noted, which took place in 1860. The language of section two is, that “no person employed by any railroad company or by any contractor on any railroad, or who shall be in any manner engaged in the construction, repair or operation of any railroad, ” shall be liable to have his wages attached in the hands of the corporation or person from whom the same may be due, by any garnishee process, or other process whatever, unless, etc. It is very clear upon this language, that so far as the exemption of wages from attachment or other legal process was concerned, the legislature did not intend to make any discrimination between laborers such as were employed by a subcontractor and such as were employed by an original one in the construction of a railroad; and yet, if the interpretation contended for be correct, we are bound to suppose that the legislature did intend to make and did make, in the very same act and by the very same breath, that precise distinction between and classification of laborers 'engaged in the same kind of work with respect to the
In cases of doubtful construction the title of the act may also be referred to for the purpose of aiding in the interpretation. The act here was entitled an act further to protect laborers on railroads. Counsel notices what he terms this “ singular feature” of an act, intended, as he argues, to restrict instead of to enlarge .the rights of laborers on railroads as given by the act of 1855. The title aids the interpretation here given.
But another argument supposed very strongly to favor the position of counsel, is that drawn from the omission in the act of 1857 of the word “ subcontractor,” which occurred so often and was so industriously repeated in the preceding act of 1855. In general, the studied omission of such a word in the re-enactment or revision of a statute would be indicative of an intent to change or restrict its operation. But the case before us is not a revision or re-enactment with certain modifications and changes of an old statute, but the introduction and passage of an entirely new statute, embracing the same subject matter. The old statute was wordy, repetitious and awkward, and the phraseology of it, as well as many if not most of its provisions, were
Another question presented in this case is as to the sufficiency of the notice given the railroad company of the plaintiff’s claim. The statute requires that the “ notice shall be in writing, and shall specify the particular nature and amount of the claim or demand.” The notice here given was in writing and was as follows : “To the Sheboygan and Eond du Lac R. R. Co : Please take notice that the following named persons have claims against the Sheboygan and Eond du Lac R. R. Co., amounting to the sum set opposite their several names, for work and labor and services rendered on the construction of said R. R. between the 15th Nov. and the 15th Dec., 1871. August Mundt, $19.07. And they look to said company for their pay. Dated, Ripon, Dec. 27,1871.” The notice was signed by the attorneys for the present plaintiff, who were at the same time attorneys for several other laborers whose claims were included in the same notice. It is objected that the notice was defective in not naming the contractor or subcontractor for whom the work was performed, and argued that one object in requiring the notice was to apprise the company of the name of
The statute likewise provides that the notice shall be given to the company “ within thirty days after such claim or demand shall have accrued.” ' The claimant here ceased work November 23, 1871, and the notice was served December 30, 1871. The time of payment of the laborers was on the 15th clay of each month, and it was customary for them to wait until the 15th of the next month for payment for all work done by them after the 15th of the last month, and such custom appears to have entered into and been treated as part of the contract for labor. We are of opinion that the demand of the plaintiff did not accrue until the 15th day of December, 1871, and consequently that the notice was served within the time prescribed by the statute.
In conclusion, we remark that it would be doing injustice to our own feelings not to acknowledge our obligations for the assistance rendered by the very clear and able argument made at the bar by counsel for the plaintiff.
By the Court.— Judgment affirmed.