Mumford v. DavisMumford v. Davis
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Beasley
The issue is the effect in a renewal action of admissions made by default under
Mumford originally filed suit, pursuant to state law and
Within six months, Mumford renewed the action, as permitted by
Officer Davis, both individually and in his official capacity, and the mayor and aldermen in their official capacities representing the city moved for summary judgment. They were granted summary judgment in their official capacities based on the finding that the
Davis was also granted summary judgment on the claims remaining against him individually. The court applied Petkas v. Grizzard, 252 Ga. 104 (312 SE2d 107) (1984), and concluded that it could take judicial notice of the entire record in the prior action, including the prior admissions which conclusively established that no material issues of fact existed as to Davis’ liability. On that basis, the court con-*149eluded that Davis was not liable as a matter of law.
Mumford contends that summary judgment on the state claims against Davis could not be based on the admissions in the prior proceeding.
The question involves the construction of
The plain language of the statute confines the use of admissions made pursuant to this discovery tool to the action in which they are made and forbids their use in a subsequent or other action. “[A]n action renewed pursuant to
The statutory prohibition was recognized in ETI Corp. v. Hammett, 152 Ga. App. 1, 2 (262 SE2d 211) (1979), in which it was held that an appellant which had waived any challenge to appellee’s dismissal without prejudice of an earlier action could not use appellee’s failure to respond to request for admissions in that case against him in the succeeding one. Williams v. Coca-Cola Co., 158 Ga. App. 139, 140 (1) (279 SE2d 261) (1981), acknowledged the interpretation given the statute in ETI Corp. and noted the significant distinction in useability between admissions contained in depositions or answers to interrogatories and admissions made under
Petkas does not change this. It recognizes that judicial notice relates to matters of fact, not law, that judicial notice is a substitute for conclusive evidence. See Stone v. Lenox Enterprises, 176 Ga. App. 696, 697 (1) (337 SE2d 451) (1985). Petkas approved the trial court’s taking judicial notice of “records on file in its own court,” that is, judicial notice of the “physical record in the first suit before the same court,” id. at 108, when determining if the action before the court complies with the renewal statute,
Nevertheless, it is precluded by
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Birdsong, P. J., and Andrews, J., concur.