68 A.2d 536 | N.H. | 1949
Because of the language used, it is certain that the testamentary clause under consideration did not create an estate in common. R. L., c. 259, s. 17.
An estate in joint tenancy in fee with the right or incident of survivorship was established unless the devise should be construed as a gift to the son and the sister as joint tenants for life, with remainder in fee to the survivor. Burns v. Nolette,
The language of Mrs. Mulvanity's will and the fact that the second and the third attesting witnesses were lawyers indicate that the draftsman was familiar with the meaning of the words "Joint Tenants" and other legal terms. Therrien v. Therrien,
"The estate contended for by appellant — a joint life estate with contingent remainder to the survivor, is of such an unusual nature that before a court would be justified in holding such an estate had been created, clear and unambiguous language to that effect would have to be used." Hart v. Kanaye Nagasawa,
Moreover, as the construction of a tenancy in common is favored by the law (R. L., c. 259, s. 17), so the idea of a joint tenancy that may be converted into a tenancy in common is preferable to one of a life estate with remainder, under which the right of survivorship cannot be affected. 38 Mich. Law Rev. 875, 884.
"It is settled in law that a joint tenant may alienate or convey to a stranger his part of interest in the realty, and thereby defeat the right of the survivor." 4 Thompson, Real Property (Perm. ed.), s. 1780. See also, Wentworth v. Remick,
Each of the questions reserved is answered in the affirmative.
Case discharged.
*529All concurred.