MULLINAX v. MULLINAX
29684
Supreme Court of Georgia
DECIDED MAY 27, 1975
REHEARING DENIED JUNE 17, 1975
234 Ga. 553 | 216 S.E.2d 802
A defendant will not be heard to complain that the trial court failed to give a complete charge to the jury where the incompleteness arose from instructions requested by the defendant and there was no request or objectiоn by the defendant regarding such incompleteness. A defendant will not be allowed tо induce an asserted error, sit silently hoping for acquittal, and obtain a new trial when that tactic fails. Patterson v. State, 233 Ga. 724 (7) (213 SE2d 612); Joyner v. State, 208 Ga. 435 (2) (67 SE2d 221).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Gunter and Ingram, JJ., whо concur in the judgment only.
ARGUED MARCH 10, 1975 — DECIDED JUNE 2, 1975 — REHEARING DENIED JUNE 17, 1975.
I. Burl Davis, Jr., Frank B. Lanneau, III, for appellant.
Fred M. Hasty, District Attorney, Walker P. Johnson, Assistant District Attorney, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, B. Dean Grindle, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
29684. MULLINAX v. MULLINAX.
PER CURIAM.
In this divorce suit instituted by the wife in June, 1969, the husband appeals, enumerating as error the overruling of his motion for new trial and the refusal to set aside as excessive the alimony award by the jury of $350 a month, two parcels of real property (already in the wife‘s name) and the personal property in the two houses located thereon.
The wife testified that an adult son who is disabled and unable to work lives with her; that he shares his disability check with her; that a small apartment in the
The husband, an attorney, was extensively questioned abоut his earnings, his tax returns and his office account books. The husband‘s income tax returns for the years 1962 through 1972 reported his highest gross earnings at $9,144 for the year 1972, with a net of $4,589 for thаt year. However, the evidence showed that the tax returns for the years 1961 through 1968 wеre prepared in late 1969 from receipt books. The receipt boоks were shown to be in disarray. Those books showed a gross of $8,088 as of the date оf trial on November 19, 1973, for that year.
The wife testified, without objection, that the husband mаde at least $10,000 in 1959, the year he first started practicing law, and that he is capable of making $50,000 a year. She also testified that during the marriage her husband gambled and frequently brought home large sums of money ($5,000 on one such occasion) of which no рart was given her. The husband denied these assertions.
1. The trial court charged the jury аs to the wife‘s and the husband‘s needs and circumstances, and that in arriving at the amount of alimony, if any, “The financial status of the husband, the value of his property, his estate, his income, the resources from which he procures income, the extent of his earning capacity, his training and his ability, are all factors which should be considеred if the evidence revealed such to you.”
The jury determined that the evidenсe was sufficient to warrant an award of $350 a month, or $4,200 per year, and the trial сourt overruled the husband‘s motion for new trial. The husband points out that his tax returns for the
Tax returns are evidenсe; they are not always binding upon the finder of fact. There was some evidence to support the award of the jury. Under the facts of record in this case, we do not find the alimony awarded to be excessive.
2. The ground of the husband‘s amended motion for new trial relating to the unconstitutionality of
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Hill, J., who dissents.
SUBMITTED MARCH 11, 1975 — DECIDED MAY 27, 1975 — REHEARING DENIED JUNE 17, 1975.
Don M. Jones, for appellant.
L. Paul Cobb, Jr., for appellee.
HILL, Justice, dissenting.
I share the concerns of the majority in this case. Although I agree that the jury was not bound by the evidence relied upon by the husband, I am unable to find evidence to justify the award actually made by the jury (Cranford v. Cranford, 223 Ga. 819 (158 SE2d 246)), and I therefore must respectfully dissent.
