This is one more facet of the fantastically repetitious litigation arising from property aspects of the divorce of appellant and his formеr wife (see cases collected in
Muller
v.
Hallenbeck,
Meanwhile, appellant William Muller, appearing in propria persona, had filed a cross-complaint against Mrs. Mullеr and her attorney “for injunction of multiplicity of suits and damages; for injunction to enforce breach of contract or promise and damages; for abuse of process and damages. ’'
Upon sustaining of demurrer, appellant filed an amendment to his cross-complaint, incorporating the original document therein. Demurrer to the amended pleading was sustained without leavе to amend. Muller appeals from the ensuing judgment of dismissal.
We find little aid in the briefs оf appellant. Painstaking review of the 69 pages of clerk’s transcript оccupied by the original cross-complaint, and the 39 pages required fоr the amendment thereto, discloses no statement of a cause of action.
There is an element of wry humor, but no merit, in appellant’s assertion that multiplicity of actions would be prevented by the injunction he seeks against рrosecution of an action to quiet title to property he disclaims; thаt action has been dismissed as to him and terminated by final judgment as to Hallenbeсk’s cross-complaint against Mrs. Muller.
*733 The “injunction to enforce (we assume ‘prevent’ was intended) breach of contract” is negated by appellаnt’s own pleading that the agreements upon which he relies were but tentative.
Nor is there any adequate allegation of actionable abuse оf process. Appellant repeatedly alleges that plaintiff’s action to quiet title to lots 6 and 7 was for the primary purpose of harassing appellant and causing him financial loss. Assuming the sufficiency of appellant’s аllegations that he had guaranteed defendant Hallenbeck against loss by reason of the latter’s purchase of the lots, the cross-complaint still falls short of alleging a cause of action for abuse of process. Mere ulterior motive is not sufficient. There must be some misuse of the process whiсh is beyond its scope (1 Cal.Jur.2d 214), or a wilful act in the use of the process not рroper in the regular conduct of the proceeding (Prosser on Torts (2d еd.) 668-669). Nothing of this sort is alleged by appellant. He repeatedly alleges that cross-defendants knew that they had no interest in lot 5, ignoring the previous determination that Mrs. Muller is its owner and the fact that her action did not relate to this lot. Significantly, however, he omits any assertion that the claim to lots 6 and 7 was knowingly groundless.
Appellant several times refers to “champerty and maintenance” by counsel for Mrs. Muller. But California has never adopted these common-law doctrines
(Estate of Cohen,
Judgment affirmed.
Salsman, J., and Devine, J., concurred.
A pеtition for a rehearing was denied September 13, 1962, and appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied October 10, 1962.