12 Mont. 354 | Mont. | 1892
Appellant does not attack any of said findings on the ground that the same are not supported by the evidence.
The first point insisted on by appellant’s counsel is that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in that it is nowhere alleged that all the purchase price, or even that any part thereof, was paid at the time of making the purchase, or prior to that time, or that plaintiff became in any way responsible for such payment.
The allegations of the complaint are that said property “was purchased with the money of this plaintiff, and that defendant at all times since the same was conveyed to him held the same solely as trustee for plaintiff;” and again: “That, while the relations between plaintiff and defendant were as hereinbefore set forth, out of the earnings and money of this plaintiff she purchased the property hereinbefore set forth, and permitted the title to the same to be taken in the name of the said defendant;” and again it is alleged, in the amendment to the complaint allowed by the court, “ that the relations of plaintiff and defendant at all times when they lived together were intimate and confidential; that during all such time defendant exerted an
Appellant’s counsel cites and quotes some passages from the opinion of the court in Ducie v. Ford, 138 U. S. 591, in support of his contention that the complaint in the case at bar is insufficient in the respect above mentioned. It seems to us that a reading of that case will suffice to indicate the vast distinction between it and the one at bar, not only as to the facts involved, but as to the particular allegations under discussion. In the case of Ducie v. Ford, supra, the court found difficulty in ascertaining, from the allegations of the complaint, what proportion of the money necessary to make the purchase was contributed by plaintiff, and whether the various alleged contributions were made by plaintiff before or after the purchase was actually made. These inquiries were embarrassed and obscured by the peculiar allegations of the complaint in that respect, and finally, the uncertainty was deepened by the tender of an offer in the complaint to pay to defendant any residue which might be necessary to make up the one half of the funds required to purchase the property in question, which tender came long after the purchase and payment of the purchase price had been made by defendant. This was said to imply an admission that plaintiff did not know whether or not he had furnished, prior to the purchase, the consideration paid for the interest which he claimed. It seems in that case, as the court construed the complaint, it was shown that the purchase and conveyance were made (namely, the procurement of patent by defendant), and thereafter from time to time plaintiff furnished sums of money as his portion towards procuring one-half interest in the land. Upon this state of facts it was held that the complaint did not show facts sufficient to raise a resulting trust, because such trust must have arisen when the purchase was made, and could not have resulted in favor of plaintiff by reason of his having furnished the funds to make the purchase of the interest in question, when in fact it was not
Under such a state of facts, where one furnishes the funds used in the purchase, and the mere legal title is placed in the holding of another, a trust results in favor of the one whose funds purchased the property, “by operation of law;” and therefore the showing of that state of facts by parol evidence is not barred by the statutes. (Comp. Stats. §§ 217, 215, div. 5.)
Appellant’s counsel contends that the allegations set forth in the complaint as grounds for the cancellation of the instruments, whereby defendant procured from plaintiff the relinquishment and conveyance of said property to himself, are insufficient to support a decree to that end. Counsel argues that, where drunkenness of one of the contracting parties is relied on as ground for annulling the contract, such intoxication must be of a degree sufficient to disable the mental faculties and temporarily paralyze the will power, which was not found in this case. It is further urged by counsel for appellant that no misrepresentation was alleged or found to have been made by defendant or his attorney, or any other person, as to the nature and effect of said instruments which defendant procured from plaintiff; and that, if plaintiff was unfamiliar with the English language, she does not show that she made any effort to ascertain the nature, contents, and effect of said instruments; nor is there alleged or found any fact showing that defendant or any person misinformed plaintiff thereabout, or prevented her from obtaining full information on that subject. These points raised by appellant’s counsel must be admitted as being the state of the case, as shown by the pleadings and findings.
With these advantages defendant procured counsel to aid him, and with these circumstances of arbitrary and brutal dominance, intimidation, and oppression, without pretending to negotiate with plaintiff or consult her “free will” as to her property rights; but claiming to be absolute owner of her property, denying her rights, denouncing her claims as “ false and fraudulent” and “without any merit whatever;” but, as defendant says in his answer, “in order to avoid trouble with plaintiff and be relieved of the annoyance of her persistent and offensive demands, he offered to pay her any reasonable sum if she would cease to molest him.” These were the conditions under which plaintiff was led to relinquish her right to admittedly eight thousand dollars’ worth of property, in order to escape utter spoliation at the hands of this defendant. These were the terms dictated by defendant as the conditions on which he proposed to sever his relations with plaintiff. It may be a matter of surprise that he was so liberal in his settlement with her, considering his conduct altogether. But probably taking into account the many other benefits he had received from plaintiff, and that the only capital he had on the commencement of his business career with plaintiff was a trunk pawned at a neighboring bawdy-house, he arrived at the conclusion that he could consent to leave with plaintiff said portion of her property on parting company with her.
We have no hesitation in affirming the holding of the trial court that said conveyances were procured through duress and fraud, and ought to be canceled.
“First, was the relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant of such a nature as to make him. a trustee and her a cestui que trust? and, secondly, if such a relationship did exist, did he, as trustee, in the purchase of November, 1889, deal with her in such an open, fair, and candid manner as to permit the deeds to stand as valid and effectual? The plaintiff was a prostitute in New York when the defendant met her, about 1881. They seemed to have become attached to one another, and he lived with her in a house of prostitution for some time. They subsequently went to live on Twenty-Seventh Street, New York, where the plaintiff conducted a house of ill-fame. The defendant continued to live and cohabit with her. He says that he had about three hundred dollars during this time, but she says that he was so poor that she loaned him the money to redeem his trunk, which was in the possession of a woman who had kept a house of ill-fame where she had lived before she opened her own. I believe her, because he was perfectly idle, and because throughout her whole testimony she is corroborated upon so many material points by many of his admissions and by other and disinterested witnesses. The plaintiff’s business seems to have been reasonably renumerative in New York. A house was purchased for three thousand five hundred dollars; the legal title to this property was taken in defendant’s name. He admits that he had no money when it was bought, and the testimony proves that the entire sum paid for that property was derived from the plaintiff’s prostitution. The defendant does not deny that the prostitution of the plaintiff and of her associates furnished all the money to pay this debt. He was in no occupation whatever, but was wholly dependent for his board and clothes and home upon the plaintiff and the receipts of her ill-fame. He seems to have acted as a quasi purchasing agent or assistant manager of these several houses of prostitution, but, when it is remembered that he was comfortably fed and clothed and kept in idleness, it is doubtful whether his services as a purveyor were not fully offset by his lecherous and luxurious surroundings. But, however this may have been, if he had any claim at all against plaintiff, it would be for work, laboi’, and
In defendant’s answer he alleges that during all the period of his cohabitation with plaintiff he was a married man, and that plaintiff knew this. That allegation was not denied by replication. Upon this appellant’s counsel argues that plaintiff had no reason to believe defendant intended to marry her. The court found from the evidence that defendant promised to marry plaintiff, and that plaintiff trusted his promise. The evidence is not here for review. Testimony may have been introduced, without objection, showing the facts as found by the court. It is not impossible that defendant, although married, may have promised to marry plaintiff, and succeeded in deluding her into the belief that he could so arrange his affairs as to carry out that promise. The court, no doubt, found as the evidence showed. Nevertheless, the fact that it was alleged in the answer that defendant was married during said time, and not denied, does not materially affect the equities of this case. That fact may have lessened the reason for plaintiff to have confided in defendant’s promise. But there is ample showing that plaintiff trusted defendant, and he abused her confidence, and undertook to defraud her.
Affirmed.