Appellants-Plaintiffs Gilberto Mulero-Rodríguez (“Mulero”) and his spouse, Gladys Ortiz-Margarys, appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants Ponte, Inc. and Haydeé Sabines (“Sabines”) in this wrongful termination case for their suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the “ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 626(c), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. The Muleros also presented claims under Puerto Rico Law 100, 29 L.P.R.A. § 185(a), Law 80, 29 L.P.R.A. § 146, and the Puerto Rico Civil Code for breach of contract and tortious conduct provisions. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
As always, in reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment, we presеnt the facts, drawn here from the district court opinion and order,
see Mulero Rodriguez v. Ponte, Inc.,
Maria Luisa Ponte (“Ponte”), one of the owners and officers of Ponte, Inc., began to work at the company in late 1991. She soon moved to restrict Mulero’s authority, limiting his ability to hire and fire employees by requiring her approval for personnel actions. During the course of 1992, Ponte and Mulero clashed over a series of issues, relating to Mulero’s job performance, employee bonuses, control over inventory, and Mulero’s interaction with other employees. Mulero’s employment wаs terminated on January 26,1993, by Sabines and her son-in-law Jorge Redondo (“Redondo”), who was not a Ponte, Inc., employee. Mulero was 47 years old. The appellants sued, alleging discrimination under the ADEA and Title VII, and the district court granted summary judgment for Ponte, Inc., and Sabines. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A. Title VII and ADEA Claims
In the summary judgment context, we review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo,
and “are obliged to review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor.”
LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co.,
We will uphold summary judgment where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to the interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
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judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). We are not restricted to the scope of the district court’s logic, but can affirm on “any independently sufficient ground.”
Mesnick v. General Elec. Co.,
[n]ot every factual controversy bars a litigant’s access to the Rule 56 anodyne:
[T]he mere existence of some alleged faсtual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, we apply the familiar burdеn-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
1. The Prima Facie Case
The parties agree that only the second element of the prima facie case, i.e., that Mulero met Ponte, Inc.’s legitimate job expectations, is in dispute. Finding little support in the depositions cited, and noting that the record did not include affirmative evidence of satisfactory performance, such as evaluations or appraisals, the district court nonetheless assumed that the plaintiffs satisfied the second element, on the basis of Mulero’s long history at Ponte, Inc. We take the district court’s reasoning a step further and find that plaintiffs did, indeed, fulfill the second element.
Mulero was at Ponte, Inc., for almost thirty years. During that time, he rose from being a driver to holding the posts of general manager and director, with the attendant promotions and pay raises. We have previously found that such evidence supports an inference that an employee’s job performance was adequate to meet an employer’s needs, even when the evidence did not extend all the way to the time of the discharge.
See Keisling v. SER-Jobs for Progress, Inc.,
*674 2. Ponte, Inc.’s Reason for Dismissal
The parties do not contest that defendants have articulated a non-discrhninatory reason for Mulero’s discharge, namely, that- he “made poor hiring decisions; argued reрeatedly with, threatened and vandalized the automobile belonging to, the company’s accountant, Luis Caeeiro [ (“Caeeiro”) ]; inadequately controlled inventory; permitted his children inappropriate access to the company’s resources; and misallocated bonus payments.”
Mulero Rodríguez,
3. Pretext for Discrimination
In their effort to demonstrate that Ponte, Inc.’s stated reason for Mulero’s dismissal was a pretext for discrimination, the plaintiffs weave a tale of discriminatory comments, pretextual business decisions, and favoritism. Finding little substance in the story, the district court held that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of demonstrating pretext and unlawful animus, in either the ADEA or the Title VII claim. We now weigh the evidence for each in turn, “focus[ing] on the ultimate question, [and] scrapping the burden-shifting framework in favor of considering the evidence as a whole.”
Mesnick,
a. The National Origin Discrimination Claim
The plaintiffs contend that Mulero was discriminated against because he is Puerto Rican, and the owners of Ponte, Inc., were Cuban and preferred to have a Cuban employee. As noted above, at this stage of our analysis, the Muleros “must introduce sufficient evidence to suppоrt two findings: (1) that the employer’s articulated reason for laying off the plaintiff is a pretext, and (2) that the true reason is discriminatory.”
Udo v. Tomes,
We turn first to the question of pretext. The defendants spell out a series of reasons for Mulero’s dismissal, listed above. In weighing whether the Muleros have presented enough evidence for a reasonable factfin-der to deem the cited reasons pretextual, we remember that the issue is not whether Ponte, Inс.’s reasons to fire Mulero were real, but merely whether the decisionmak-ers — Sabines and Ponte — believed them to be real.
See Woodman,
First, defendants present evidence that complaints made by Ponte, Inc., salesmen over a shortage of inventory acted as the “catalyst” for the decision to terminate Mule-ro. They argue that Ponte and Sabines met with the complaining salesmen in late 1992, because the salesmen were concerned about a shortage in the inventory and its impact on their clients and commissions. Mulero still had the responsibility for buying the inventory. Defendants present deposition testimony of Sabines and Ponte about the mеeting, as well as sworn statements by two of the salesmen. Defendants further attest that they *675 brought up the complaints with Mulero, and that the complaints “were the straws that broke the camel’s back.” Appellants’ Brief at 12.
However, the Muleros have offered evidence that the complaints were false. Mule-ro’s deposition testimony states that in fact a shortage of inventory was a regular occurrence at the end of every calendar year, because the company ceased purchasing between December 1 and January 15 so that inventоry could be taken. Although he testified that in 1992 he discussed with Sabines that he was behind in taking the inventory, he also testified that it was in fact finished in time and that he had no recollection of Sa-bines or Ponte — or the salesmen — complaining about a shortage of inventory. The Muleros also point out that, although they requested them, Ponte, Inc., has produced no business records in any way reflecting a shortage or lost sales or income based thereon. In sum, giving credence to Mulero’s testimony, a rational factfinder could find that there was in fact no shortage of inventory beyond the standard end-of-year freeze on purchases. This casts doubt on whether Ponte and Sabines actually believed the complaints, and whether they could have served as the catalyst for Mulero’s dismissal. The conclusion is not an inevitable one, but as the issues centering on the salesmen’s complaints involve real issues of fact, it should be left to the factfinders.
Second, according to Ponte’s testimony, the salesmen also complained that when they asked for merchandise Mulero would tell them to go ask Sabines or Ponte. The defendants argue that they found this attitude to be problematic, as Mulero still had buying and selling authority. Mulero testified, however, that if he ever said that, it was because he was no longer in charge of the salesmen. Clearly, an issue of fact exists as to whether the salesmen’s complaints on this point are a real reason for Mulero’s dismissal, as it is unresolved what the scope of his responsibility was.
Finally, Ponte attests that she started working at the company because of complaints about Mulero’s conduct made to her mother, Sabines. Mulero, however, testified that Ponte told him she was starting work at Ponte, Inc., “in order to relieve [him] of some work.” Mulero Deposition, at 102. At the same time, although he said they were not needed, she hired labor lawyers. While this is hardly condemning evidence, the reasonable factfinder could see Ponte’s dissimulation regarding her motives for becoming active in the company and her contemporaneous hiring of attorneys as further reason to disbelieve the defendants’ proffered reasons for firing Mulero.
Cf. Sinai v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
Having determined that the Muleros have marshalled enough evidence regarding pretext to defeat summary judgment on that point, we turn to the question of whether they can show that the real reason was national origin discrimination. The key evidence in the plaintiffs’ argument that Mulero was discriminated against because he is Puerto Rican is his testimony that Luis Ca-ceiro repeatedly commented to Mulero that Mulero was the only Puerto Rican running a Cuban company. Acknowledging that “[h]ad the comment ... been attributable to the defendants, it might have sufficed to satisfy the low threshold required to escape dismissal at this stage,”
Mulero Rodríguez,
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Review of the record in the light most favorable to the Muleros, however, leads us to conclude that a reasonable factfinder could in fact reasonably infer that Caceiro was in a position to influence Ponte, Inc.’s decision-making. Ponte took away Mulero’s authority over the salesmen, giving the responsibility to Caceiro. She also shifted Mulero’s inventory duties tо Caceiro, proposing to computerize the inventory system. When she changed the bonus system, Caeeiro’s bonus was increased. According to Mulero, Ponte trusted Caceiro’s word over Mulero’s. Finally, as the district court noted, Ponte “learned from Caceiro about Caceiro’s conflicts with Mulero.”
Mulero Rodriguez,
b. The Age Discrimination Claim
The district court found the record insufficient to demonstrate genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Mulero’s discharge was due to age-based animus. It focused on a comment Ponte made to Mulero in April of 1992, some eight months before his discharge, that hе was “too old to handle” the salespeople, and so was to be relieved of his supervisory duties over the sales force. The court found that this statement was followed by no additional evidence of age-related bias, and that, standing alone, it was too remote in time for a sufficient nexus to exist between it and the decision to terminate Mulero. We review the record de novo. As we have already found that the Muleros have produced enough evidence to support a finding of pretext, we turn directly to the question of whether they can show that the real reason was age discrimination.
There is no question that statements like Ponte’s, when made by a decision-maker, can be evidence of age discrimination.
See, e.g., Mesnick,
However, we agree with the district court that, standing alone, it is too remote in time to be linked with the decision to terminate Mulero.
See Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp.,
If, however, the Muleros have offered evidence to establish the needed nexus between *677 Ponte’s statement and the decision to fire Mulero, the statement may become pivotal. Unlike the district court, we find such a nexus in the record. Specifically, at the time she made the “too old” comment and altered Mulero’s supervisory duties, Ponte instituted other changes, including the method by which bonuses were apportioned. In the past, bonuses had been awarded in April on a seniority basis; she switched to a merit-based system. Ponte testified that she chаnged the system for two reasons. First, she wanted to provide an incentive to new employees. Second, she felt that the old employees gave all their loyalty to Mulero, and that they knew that no matter what they did, they would still get a good bonus. Thus the change was designed to change their work habits and “attitude problems.” Ponte Deposition, at 61. Under the new system, Mulero’s bonus was decreased — Ponte testified that she did not believe Mulero deserved the bonus he had previously been receiving— while those of several newer employees, including the younger Caceirо, were increased.
The policy change regarding the bonus system can be viewed in several ways. First, the change in the system was a business decision — which we will not normally second-guess.
See LeBlanc,
It also serves Mulero’s purpose here. Ponte’s “too old” comment is strong evidence. The Mulеros have found the needed nexus between it and Mulero’s dismissal in the bonus change, and in this context we find the combination of Ponte’s “too old” comment with the change in the bonus system disfavoring long-term — and therefore often older — employees troubling. Thus we think there is a material issue as to whether Ponte, Inc.’s real reason for firing Mulero was rooted in discriminatory animus.
Cf Conway,
Of course, the full presentation of evidence on both sides might alter this judgment and show that the plaintiffs fell just short and would be subject to a directed verdict. But at the summary judgment stage, with the obligation to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, we think that this ease could not be dismissed against [the] defendants.
Rubinovitz v. Rogato,
A final note. Without pointing to a specific example, the Muleros argue that the district court misapplied the summary judgment standard by founding its grant of summary judgment upon its acceptance of the defendants’ testimonial evidence as “substantial,”
see Mulero Rodríguez,
In making their allegation, the Muleros contend that the district court should not have credited Sabines’ and Ponte’s testimony because of their invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. The defendants retort that this issue was not raised below, and so, as this is not an exceptional case requiring a deviation from the norm, the Muleros are precluded from raising it here.
See Villafañe-Neriz v. FDIC,
B. Discovery
The Muleros next contend that the district court abused its discretion in refusing the parties’ joint motion to extend discovery.
2
See Ayala-Gerena,
However, the Muleros did not seek reconsideration of the district court’s denial of the parties’ stipulation for the extension of the discovery period. Nor did the appellants mention the need for further discovery in their part of the Proposed Pretrial Order; indeed, they cited the fact that “discovery [had] long since closed” in arguing that the defendants’ summary judgment motion was untimely and contravened Local Rule 312. Plaintiffs’ Proposed Pretrial Order, at 23. Further, the Muleros’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and
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their Surreply in Further Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment are both silent as to the district court denial of additional time for discovery, as well as to any need for additional discovery. Finally, the Muleros did not file a Rule 56(f) motion requesting additional discovery in order to oppose the Motion for Summary Judgment. In these circumstances, the Muleros have well and fully waived their right to argue this issue on appeal.
See Correa v. Hospital San Francisco,
C. The Supplemental Claims
Finally, the Muleros argue that the district court erred in entering a judgment on the merits on the Muleros’ supplemental Puerto Rico law claims. They argue that the summary judgment motion focused solely on the Title VII and ADEA claims, such that the Puerto Rico law claims were not even the subject of the motion. Accordingly, they posit, when it dismissed the Muleros’ federal law claims, the district court should have dismissed the supplemental Puerto Rico law claims without prejudice to their being refiled in a court of competent jurisdiction.
The defendants contend that the issue has not been properly raised before this court, as the Muleros failed to designate the dismissal of the supplemental claims as an issue on appeal, and so the appeal should be deemed waived. See Fed. R.App. P. 10(b)(3). Specifically, the Muleros’ first stated issue was that the court below erred in granting the motion for summary judgment and dismissing the action “as there existed genuine issues of material fact requiring trial.” Appellants’ Brief, at 1. The second stated issue regarded the discovery continuance. We agree with the defendants that the issues as presented do not encompass the question whether the Puerto Rico law claims should have been dismissed.
Moreover, even if the Muleros’ statement of issues encompassed the question now raised, it would still have been deemed waived. The defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment specifically requests summary judgment as regards both the federal and state law claims, as did their Reply to the plaintiffs’ Opposition, such that the district court did have the Puerto Rico law claims in front of it. The Muleros’ Opposition and Surreply, however, remained silent as to the Puerto Rico law claims: they argued neither that the Puerto Rico law claims should be dismissed without prejudice, as they do now, nor that the court should exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. Nor did they file a motion for reconsideration. In these circumstances, we find that the Muleros have indeed waived this argument.
See McCoy v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
CONCLUSION
For the reasons presented above, the district court’s denial of the joint motion to extend discovery is affirmed. The opinion of the district court granting summary judgment is reversed as to the Title VII and ADEA claims, and affirmed as to the pendent Puerto Rico Law сlaims. We remand this case to the district court for proceedings consistent with this decision.
Notes
. We note that the district court’s recognition that Mulero had been promoted over a 29-year period in which defendants undoubtedly knew of his Puerto Rican origin is not conclusive. As the district court found, only in late 1991 did Ponte, an acknowledged decision maker, begin to work at the company. A jury could infer from this and the policy changes she instituted that Ponte was a "new broom” and wanted to "sweep clean” according to her own prejudices, which had heretofore beеn ignored.
. The Muleros do not seem to address their argument to either of the Magistrate Judge’s two orders regarding discovery deadlines. Nonetheless, we note that, although they filed a motion seeking clarification of one aspect of the second magistrate's order (which was denied), they did not in fact file an objection to either order regarding the discovery deadline, and so any argument regarding the Magistrate Judge’s order has been waived.
See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a) (party must object to magistrate judge's order within ten days);
Pagano v. Frank,
. The discovery cutoff date was set for September 12, 1994, seven months after the defendants answered the complaint on February 11, 1994.