111 Mich. 487 | Mich. | 1897
Complainant, in January, 1895, became the purchaser from the State of the 78.89 acres of land in controversy, under a tax deed; the State having become the purchaser at the annual tax sale in December, 1893, the lands having been sold for the delinquent taxes of the year 1891. This bill is filed to quiet complainant’s. title under his tax deed.
“All lands which have been or may hereafter be returned to the auditor general as delinquent for taxes, and upon which any taxes are now or shall hereafter remain unpaid, after their return to the auditor general under the provisions of this act, or to the several county treasurers of the State under the provisions of Act No. 200 of
These provisions would seem to be clear. But it is contended that the provisions of section 125, which reserves all rights which have accrued to any person under-the previous tax laws, and section 126, which, after repealing contravening acts, provides that such repeal shall not destroy or affect any rights which may have accrued or which may hereafter accrue under such acts or parts of acts while the same were in force, are inconsistent with the provisions of section 60, and indicate that it was not the intention that proceedings to enforce the collection'of the' tax assessed under the law of 1891 could be taken under the law of 1893. It is asked, “Is not the right to own and hold property one of the dearest vested rights known to the law?” The answer is, of course, obvious. But we think it clear that section 125 and section 126 were not directed to the reservation of these- rights, but to the protection of such rights as accrued tmder the -previous acts. The right of defendant or his grantors to own this property was not derived under the tax laws.
It is next said that section 71 of the tax law of 1893 shows that the legislature did not intend to shorten the periods of sale and redemption of lands delinquent for the tax of 1891. This section gives the form of the certificate of sale, which contains the statement that the purchaser will be entitled to a deed of conveyance in one year from the 30th day of September next following. It is evident that, in copying this certificate into the law of 1893, a mistake occurred, as it was taken bodily from the certificate provided for by the law of 1891. But other sections of the statute of 1893 make the intention of the legislature clear as to the date of redemption. Section 70 provides that certificates shall be given to each purchaser of the lands and interests bid off by him, showing the
It is next contended that, if the law of 1893 be construed to apply to the taxes for the year 1891, it hastens the time of sale of lands delinquent for taxes, and cuts down the period of redemption provided by the previous law, and is to that extent unconstitutional, in that it violates section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, prohibiting enactments by the State impairing the obligation of contracts, and article 6, § 32, of the Constitution of Michigan, in that it deprives persons of their property without due process of law. We think neither of these positions is tenable. A labored argument is made to show that the relation between the State and the owner of the land is a contract relation, for the reason that the taxes assessed become a debt to the township from the person to whom they are assessed. But the proceeding is essentially in invitum, and the proceeding on a sale of land is a remedy for the delinquency of the taxpayer. The law affecting the remedy is in such cases subject to amendment, even though the time fixed for the sale or redemption be shortened. 25 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 410; Black, Tax Titles, § 353; Baldwin v. Ely, 66 Wis.
It is evident that the provision for the sale of State tax lands at private sale is not one for the benefit of the original owner, as the period of redemption fixed by the statute is precisely the same whether the State or an individual becomes the purchaser. Section 78 provides that'—•
“All lands heretofore or that may be hereafter bid off to the State for taxes, which have not been redeemed or
Section 84 provides that—
“Any person may purchase any State tax lands by paying therefor the amount for which the same was bid off to the State, with interest on the same at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum from date of sale, together with the other taxes remaining a lien on such lands at the time of the purchase so made, with the interest thereon at the rate provided in this act. Upon making payment as above, such purchaser shall be entitled to and receive a certificate and a deed conveying all the right, title, and interest of the State to such tax lands acquired or accrued by virtue of the original salp or sales to the State.”
The contention of defendant has some support in the fact that the legislature in 1895 apparently deemed it necessary, or at least wise, to amend section 84 by inserting “State bids” before the words “State tax lands.” This is, negatively, perhaps, a legislative construction of the previous act. On the other hand, it is evident that the auditor general’s department construed the words “State tax lands” to include all lands of which the State had become purchaser, either upon the original sale or upon a second sale to the State. Turning to section 70,' we find a use of the words ‘ ‘ State tax lands ” consistent with this construction, and which, we think, shows the sense in which the term “State tax lands” was used. This section provides, in substance, that, in case a sale of lands cannot be made at the annual sale, the county treasurer shall bid off the same in the name of the State, and in such case the county, township, school, and other taxes assessed on the lands so bid off to the State, and the interest and charges thereon, shall remain a lien upon said lands, and any person or persons who shall afterwards purchase such lands of the State, as State tax lands or otherwise, shall be liable for, and shall pay, all taxes then remaining unpaid. We think the sale was regular.
The decree of the court below will be affirmed.
The distinction sought to be drawn by counsel between “State bids” and “State tax lands” is not the precise distinction recognized by the auditor’s department. Lands bid to the State are there regarded as “State bids ” before, and “ State tax lands ” after, the expiration of the redemption period. In this connection it will be observed that the statute (section 78 et seq.) does not in terms provide for a second bidding off to the State, and, in practice,'lands once bid to it are merely carried upon the State books until purchased by individuals, either at the annual sales or at the office of the auditor. In the present case, the lands were bid off to the State in December, 1893, and complainant bought at private sale January 15, 1895, after the period for redemption had expired, and after one regular public sale had intervened.—Reporter.