Muir v. Town of NewburghMuir v. Town of Newburgh
In December 2005 the respondent Northeast Realty Holdings, LLC (hereinafter Northeast Realty), acquired 11.72 acres of the 141-acre parcel, and applied to the Planning Board for subdivision/site plan approval to subdivide those 11.72 acres, and to construct a hotel and restaurant on one resulting parcel and a commercial warehouse on the other. On March 30, 2006 the Planning Board rendered a favorable report on Northeast Realty’s “sketch plan” pursuant to
Contrary to the respondents’ contention, the petitioner, who alleges that he resides approximately 1,000 feet from the project site and would suffer visual, noise, traffic, and water impacts different from the public at large, had standing to commence this proceeding pursuant to
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding on the merits.
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the Planning Board’s SEQRA review was not rendered invalid by virtue of the fact that it occurred after the March 30, 2006 determination rendering a favorable report on Northeast Realty’s “sketch plan,” since this determination was neither practically determinative of the matter nor a significant authorization (see Matter of King v Saratoga County Bd. of Supervisors, 89 NY2d 341, 349 [1996]; Matter of Tri-County Taxpayers Assn. v Town Bd. of Town of Queensbury, 55 NY2d 41, 46-47 [1982]; Matter of East End Prop. Co. #1, LLC v Kessel, 46 AD3d 817 [2007]). The Town of Newburgh zoning regulations provide that a favorable report “shall in no way imply immediate or eventual approval status” and that it “is merely intended to convey to the applicant the relative assurance that the development as conveyed is basically conforming to the Master Plan of the Town of Newburgh and its implementing land use regulations” (
Further, the Planning Board’s July 6, 2006 determination that the project was in conformance with the earlier SEQRA findings statements, that there were no new adverse significant environmental impacts that had not been previously addressed, and that the preparation of an SEIS was not warranted, was not arbitrary or capricious and is supported by the evidence (see
In light of our determination, we need not address the petitioner’s remaining contention. Miller, J.P., Covello, Eng and Chambers, JJ., concur.