Case Information
*1 United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 99-2193
PEDRO MUÑIZ CORTES аnd the estate of CLOTILDE DIAZ SUSTACHE,
composed by PEDRO ANGEL MUÑIZ DIAZ, LUIS MUÑIZ DIAZ, JOSE ISMAEL MUÑIZ DIAZ, MARIA ANTONIA MUÑIZ DIAZ, MARIA ELENA MUÑIZ DIAZ, LYDIA MARIA MUÑIZ DIAZ, JORGE M. MUÑIZ DIAZ, MIRIAM MUÑIZ CABAN, and DIANA MUÑIZ CABAN,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
INTERMEDICS, INC., SULZER INTERMEDICS, INC., ABC COMPANY AND
XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge] Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
Ulpiano Falcón Matos, with whom Roberto Rafols Dávila was on brief for appellants. Joseрh J. Leghorn, with whom Maria De Los A. Garay and
Manuel E. Andreu Garcia were on brief for appellees. *2 October 3, 2000
2
BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellants Pedro Muniz Cortes and the estate of Clotilde Diaz Sustache appeal from the district court's order of summary judgment dismissing claims against defendant-appellees. We affirm.
I.
On December 14, 1994, Clotilde Diaz Sustache had a pacemaker surgically implanted at the Hospital Bella Vista in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico. The pacemaker was manufactured by Intermedics. After this pacemaker failed, a second Intermedics pacemaker was implantеd. On August 18, 1995, following the failure of the second pacemaker, Diaz Sustache died.
On January 12, 1996, appellants filed a complaint against Intermedics and others in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico. Appellants sought damages from Intermedics pursuant to Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, alleging that "manufacturing defects, design defects and/or insufficiеncy in the warnings of the pacemakers and/or electrodes implanted in the deceased were the proximate and immediate cause of her death." On August 8, 1997, the Superior Court entered partial summary judgment in favor of Intermedics on the ground that the *4 Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360c et seq., preempted appellants' claims. [1] Appellants did not appeal from the superior court's order of judgment. Rather, they filed another complaint against Intermedics and others, this time in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. There, appellants reiterated their claim that Intermedics acted negligently under Article 1802 of the Puerto Ricо Civil Code; they also alleged that Intermedics failed to comply with Food and Drug Administration regulations with regard to the pacemaker. Intermedics moved for summary judgment on the grоund that appellants' claims had already been adjudicated by the Superior Court of Puerto Rico and therefore were precluded. The district court allowed Intermedics' motion for summary judgment on the *5 grounds of "res judicata and/or collateral estoppel." Muniz Cortes v. Intermedics, Inc., 63 F. Supp.2d 160, 165 (D.P.R. 1999).
II.
Appellants contend that the district cоurt erred in
determining that preclusion barred their complaint. We review
a summary judgment de novo, viewing the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether there
exists a genuine issue of material fact. See Sheehy v. Town of
Plymouth,
Federal courts must give full faith and credit to final
judgments of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico courts. See
Baez-Cruz v. Municipality of Comerio,
In order that the presumption of the res judicata may be valid in аnother suit, it is necessary that, between the case decided by the sentence and that in which the same is invoked, there be the most perfect identity between the things, causes, and persons of the litigants, and their capacity as such.
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3343. Although this provision speaks of "res judicata," it additionally permits issue preclusion or collateral estoppel. See Baez-Cruz, 140 F.3d at 29. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has held that when an issue "essential to the prior judgment is actually litigated and determined by a valid аnd final judgment, the determination is conclusive in subsequent litigation among the parties." Felix Davis v. Vieques Air Link, 892 F.2d 1122, 1124-25 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Pereira v. Hernandez, 83 P.R.R. 156, 161
(1961)).
Appellants contend that res judicata does nоt apply
because the superior court's preemption ruling deprived that
court of subject matter jurisdiction. It is true that a
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not
сonsidered to be "on the merits," and therefore is without res
judicata effect. See Northeast Erectors Ass'n of BTEA v.
Secretary of Labor, Occupational Safety & Heаlth Admin., 62 F.3d
37, 44 (1st Cir. 1995); 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller
& Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4436 (1981)).
We have some doubt about the proposition that a
dismissal on preemption grounds is not merits-based. But even
assuming arguendo that res judicatа does not bar the federal
district court from adjudicating appellants' claims, the
*7
doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents the court from
rehearing the issue of preemption.
[2]
Dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction precludes relitigation of the issues
determined in ruling on the jurisdictional question. See
Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra; cf. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n v. Guilford Transp. Indus., Inc.,
Appellants also take issue with the district court's conclusion that there existed "perfect identity between the things, causes, and persons of the litigants" as required under the Puerto Rico law of preclusion. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3343. They point out that the complaint filed in the superior court was limited to commonwealth law, while the complaint filed in federal district court alleged that the pacemaker failed to comply with FDA regulations. Therefore, appellants argue, their "causes" were not identical with the meaning of § 3343.
The fact that appellants advanced different legal
theories does nоt undermine the identity of causes, because the
commonwealth law claim presented in the superior court arose
from the pacemaker failure, just as did the claims later
presented to the federal district court. See Boateng v.
InterAmerican Univ., Inc.,
*9 Finally, appellants contend that they are exempt from the usual rules of preemption on the ground that "its application would defeat the ends of justicе, especially in the presence of public policy considerations." Baez-Cruz, 140 F.3d at 30 (citing Pagan Hernandez v. University of Puerto Rico, 107 P.R. Offic. Trans. 795, 807 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omittеd). We see nothing in the facts of this case to support such an exception. Appellants freely chose to litigate in the superior court and then to forego appeal; "public policy does not require giving them a chance to revisit [those] choice[s]." Id.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Intermedics. Because we decide this case on preclusion grounds, we do not reach the issue of whether appellants have a private right of action against Intermedics undеr the Medical Device Amendments, 21 U.S.C. § 360c et seq. Affirmed.
Notes
[1] The superior court based its determination on 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a), which provides: Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement– (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.
[2]
As noted supra, the district court's opinion rested on the
dual grounds of res judicata and/or cоllateral estoppel. See
Muniz Cortes,
[3]
Intermedics concedes that the superior court may have erred
in holding that the claims were preempted in light of reсent
Supreme Court law. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,