MOUNTAIN COMMUNICATIONS, INC., PETITIONER v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENTS T-MOBILE USA, INC., ET AL., INTERVENORS
No. 02-1255
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 18, 2003 Decided January 16, 2004
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Federal Communications Commission
Benjamin J. Aron argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Robert H. Schwaninger, Jr.
Charles W. McKee argued the cause for Wireless Carrier intervenors T-Mobile USA, Inc., et al., in support of petition-
Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out of time.
Stewart A. Block, Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, argued the cause for respondents. On the briefs were R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Catherine G. O‘Sullivan and Nancy C. Garrison, Attorneys, John A. Rogovin, General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, John E. Ingle, Deputy Associate General Counsel, and Laurel R. Bergold, Counsel.
Robert B. McKenna, Jr. argued the cause for intervenors Qwest Communications International Inc., et al., and amici curiae Verizon Telephone Companies. With him on the brief were Michael E. Glover, John M. Goodman, and Edward H. Shakin.
Before: SENTELLE and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.
SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge: Mountain Communications, Inc. is a paging carrier that petitions for review of an FCC order dismissing its complaint against Qwest—the local exchange carrier (LEC) serving the areas where Mountain operates—for charging petitioner two types of fees. The dispute between the carriers as to one of the fees evaporated at oral argument, but we hold that the FCC‘s decision as to the other was arbitrary and capricious.
I.
Mountain serves customers in three Colorado local calling areas: Colorado Springs, Walsenburg, and Pueblo. All three local calling areas are within the same Local Access and Transport Area (LATA), and Qwest is the provider of local service within each of those local calling areas. Calls from a Qwest customer to another Qwest customer in the same local calling area are local calls, but if a Qwest customer were to
Though Mountain services all three local calling areas, it uses a single point of interconnection (POI) with Qwest, as it is entitled by statute. See
Qwest has sought to collect fees from Mountain for these types of calls—calls that originate and terminate in Colorado Springs or Walsenburg but go through Mountain‘s POI in Pueblo. Qwest considers these calls to be toll calls, but does not charge its own customer—the caller—for placing such calls, perhaps because it lacks the technological ability to do so. See Starpower Communications, LLC v. Verizon South, Inc., 2003 FCC LEXIS 6245, at *23 ¶ 17 (Nov. 7, 2003) (attributing such a technological incapacity to Verizon). Instead, Qwest determines whether a customer‘s call is a toll call by comparing the number of the caller with the number of the person receiving the call. If both are Colorado Springs numbers, Qwest does not charge the customer a toll even if the call is routed to Pueblo and then back to Colorado Springs.
Mountain claimed before the FCC that the Commission‘s regulations, specifically
The Commission rejected Mountain‘s contention. The FCC said that in its TSR decision it had cautioned,
nothing prevents [the LEC] from charging its end users for toll calls completed [between local calling areas]. Similarly, section 51.703(b) does not preclude [the paging carrier and the LEC] from entering into wide area calling or reverse billing arrangements whereby [the paging carrier] can “buy down” the cost of such toll calls to make it appear to end users that they have made a local call rather than a toll call.
The Commission concluded that here, by establishing a POI in Pueblo and then asking Qwest for lines to connect local customer numbers in Walsenburg, Colorado Springs, and Pueblo to the POI, Mountain made it appear to Qwest customers that they were making local calls from Colorado Springs numbers to Colorado Springs paging numbers—even though they passed through a Pueblo POI. “By configuring its interconnection arrangement in this manner, Mountain prevents Qwest from charging its customers for what would ordinarily be toll calls to access Mountain‘s network.” Mountain Communications, Inc. v. Qwest Communications Int‘l, Inc., 17 FCCR 15135, 15138 ¶ 5 (2002). The Commission determined that Mountain had obtained a wide area calling service, which is similar to a wide area calling arrangement, and therefore Qwest was entitled to charge Mountain for that service.
II.
Although petitioner does not quarrel with the Commission‘s caveat in TSR—that the regulation does not prohibit a wide area calling arrangement—it insists that this case is no different than TSR; the Commission has simply turned 180 degrees without explanation, and adopted a position at odds with its own regulation and the statutory provision allowing Mountain to make use of one POI within a LATA. We are befuddled at the Commission‘s efforts to explain away its TSR decision; the facts seem—and are conceded to be—identical, but the results are opposite. In TSR, the FCC prohibited US West, the LEC, from charging TSR, the paging carrier, for the costs of transporting calls from US West customers to TSR‘s POI.1 In that case, just as in the present situation, the paging carrier served separate local calling
The Commission‘s attempt to stretch the concept of a wide area calling arrangement (essentially an agreement) to a wide area calling “service” is logically inconsistent with its TSR decision.3 The premise, according to the Commission‘s TSR
Unfortunately for the Commission, the exact same analysis could have been applied in TSR—but was implicitly rejected. Therefore the Commission has, just as Mountain has claimed, changed direction without explanation, indeed without even acknowledging the change.
Perhaps more fundamental, by abandoning the concept of a buy-down agreement between the parties and simply designating the service Mountain obtained as a wide area calling service, the Commission seemingly comes into direct conflict with its own regulation. See MCImetro Access Transmission Servs. v. BellSouth Telecomms, Inc., No. 03-1238, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25782, at *24 (4th Cir. Dec. 18, 2003) (holding that
The Commission, moreover, has not even tried to explain how its position can be reconciled with the statutory provision,
We therefore rather easily conclude that the Commission‘s decision on this issue is arbitrary and capricious. See generally, e.g., Ramaprakash v. FAA, 346 F.3d 1121, 1124–25 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
III.
In addition to the charges Qwest has assessed for delivering Qwest-originated calls to Mountain‘s POI, Qwest has also assessed “transit” charges for the delivery of calls originated by a customer of an entirely different network. If a non-Qwest customer wishes to page a Mountain customer, the call is routed to Qwest. Qwest then carries the call on its network—in like manner as if a Qwest customer had placed the call—to Mountain‘s POI. Mountain then assumes respon-
It is undisputed that Qwest need not absorb these costs; the only question is whether Qwest can charge Mountain for one of the five portions of this cost or must instead look to the originating carrier for all of the costs. It might well be reasonable for the Commission to authorize Qwest to apportion those costs, but we do not understand why the Commission did so. It did not explain why it rejected Mountain‘s contention that the originating carrier should be charged for all the costs. In any event, by indicating that Mountain could charge the originating carrier, it suggested that Mountain was essentially correct in claiming that the originating carrier should bear all the transport costs. At oral argument, Qwest‘s counsel obviated any need for us to decide this issue by indicating that Qwest would provide Mountain with the information necessary so that Mountain could charge the originating carrier for reimbursement. Under those circumstances, Mountain dropped that part of its petition.
* * * * *
Accordingly, the Commission‘s order is vacated in part and the case is remanded.
