Case Information
*2 STAHL , Circuit Judge
. In this case, Ms. M., acting on
behalf of her daughter O.M., brought suit against the Falmouth
School Department ("Falmouth"), alleging that it failed to provide
O.M. with a "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE") as
guaranteed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. In an earlier decision, we
held that Falmouth did not deny O.M. a FAPE and did not breach the
terms of her individualized education program ("IEP"). M. v.
Falmouth Sch. Dep't,
I.
Ordinarily, we review a denial of a motion to amend a
complaint for abuse of discretion. Morales-Alejandro v. Med. Card
Sys., Inc.,
Ms. M waived her inappropriate design claim. She did
not include it in her original complaint in the district court and
she did not raise it after Falmouth argued in the district court
that, assuming the IEP did not require Falmouth to provide SPIRE
instruction to O.M., there would be no ground for concluding that
Falmouth had denied O.M. a FAPE. It is well settled in this area
*4
of law that "[c]laims not articulated to the district court cannot
be raised on appeal, even if they had been pressed before the
hearing officer." Hampton Sch. Dist. v. Dobrowolski,
Ms. M. cannot avoid this rule by amending her complaint to respond to the adverse decision she received from this court in Falmouth I. We generally do not "allow plaintiffs to pursue a case to judgment and then, if they lose, to reopen the case by amending their complaint to take account of the court's decision." James v. Watt, 716 F.2d 71, 78 (1st Cir. 1983). In our view, "[s]uch a practice would dramatically undermine the ordinary rules governing the finality of judicial decisions, and should not be sanctioned in the absence of compelling circumstances." Id. Ms. M advances no such compelling circumstances here. She could have pursued an inappropriate design claim originally in the district court, just as she had at the administrative hearing. She chose not to do so and is now bound by her choice.
Ms. M. argues that, before our decision in Falmouth I, she was not "aggrieved" by the findings made as to the design of O.M.'s IEP and therefore could not have pursued her inappropriate *5 design claim earlier. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). We disagree. Section 1415(i)(2)(A) provides that "any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under this subsection, shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section . . . in a district court of the United States." (emphasis added). Ms. M. was aggrieved by the hearing officer's decision to reject all of her claims for relief. She was thus entitled to bring suit based on any theory included in her administrative complaint.
Accordingly, the district court properly denied Ms. M's
motion to amend under the law of the case doctrine. "The law of
the case doctrine precludes relitigation of the legal issues
presented in successive stages of a single case once those issues
have been decided." Cohen v. Brown Univ.,
Our holding in Falmouth I was clear: Since we hold that O.M.'s IEP did not specify that she was to receive SPIRE instruction during her third-grade year, and because Ms.
M. does not contend that Falmouth violated her daughter's IEP in any other way, it *6 necessarily follows that Falmouth did not breach the IEP's terms and thus did not violate O.M.'s right to a FAPE. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court's determination that Falmouth violated O.M.'s IEP and VACATE the accompanying damages award.
We decided the legal issue whether Falmouth violated
O.M.'s right to a FAPE in our first decision, based on the sole
theory properly presented to us at that time. The district court
correctly concluded that our resolution of this legal issue was
the law of the case and that, absent compelling circumstances not
present here, introducing a claim that could have been raised
previously would be inappropriate. Cohen,
Falmouth seeks attorney fees and costs from Ms. M.'s attorney for the defense expenses incurred after our decision in Falmouth I. The IDEA permits a prevailing state or local education agency to recover attorney fees if a plaintiff filed a cause of action that was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation" or "continued to litigate after the litigation clearly became *7 frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II).
The district court denied Falmouth's request for attorney fees because it found Ms. M.'s argument on the motion to amend was not frivolous. Falmouth II, 2017 WL 2303960, at *2.
Because Falmouth did not appeal the district court's denial of attorney fees, it has waived the issue and cannot recover its fees and costs expended in the district court. The only question presented to us is whether, by appealing the district court's ruling, Ms. M. has continued to pursue this case after litigation had clearly become "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II).
We will not award attorney fees to Falmouth for the expenses it incurred in this second appeal. Ms. M.'s appeal raises nonfrivolous questions as to the proper scope of the law of the case doctrine and the circumstances under which a complaint may be amended post-appeal. Moreover, the district court invited Ms. M. to appeal its ruling, stating that if it had erred in finding the law of the case doctrine applied, "it is up to the plaintiff to seek a reversal of this ruling by appealing it to the First Circuit." Falmouth II, 2017 WL 2303960, at *2. Under these circumstances, we do not find an award of attorney fees warranted. Affirmed.
Notes
[1] At approximately the same time, Ms. M. petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review our decision in
Falmouth I. The Supreme Court denied her petition on October 2,
2017. M. v. Falmouth Sch. Dep't,
[2] Ms. M. states that she raised this claim at her administrative hearing, and Falmouth has not challenged this contention.
[3] In Falmouth I, we declined to award attorney fees because
Falmouth had not requested them.