*3 TUTTLE, Before Judge, JONES, Chief Judge, JOHNSON, and District Judge. TUTTLE, Judge: Chief Appellant Mrs. is an unsuc- applicant cessful operate for a license to liquor a retail Georgia. Atlanta, store in brings She this action under 28 U.S.C. 13431 to § redress an deprivation rights of civil and under 28 U.S.C. 2201 to obtain rights. a declaration of her The Mayor, Clerk, and the Aldermen of Atlanta are defendants. In her com- plaint, Hornsby alleges that al- though she all requirements met qualifications, as to moral character of the proposed location store, prescribed for the holder of a re- tail license, applica- dealer’s her tion was denied “without a reason there- by Mayor for” Board Aider- men. This action is as “ar- characterized bitrary, unreasonable, unjust, capricious, discriminatory” and in contravention equal protection due clauses of the 14th Amendment. The complaint charges system also that a courtesy ward was followed in issu- liquor licenses; system ance under this allegedly granted only licenses would be upon approval of one or both of of the ward in aldermen which the store was to be located. This too is said to violation 14th Amend- constitute ment.
§1.
authorized
any person:
original
color of
[*]
“(3)
H« *
To redress the
jurisdiction
“The
State
law^o
'
law,
be commenced
statute, ordinance,
deprivation,
courts
any
civil action
shall have
privilege
any
Constitution
regulation,
rights
Act of
of citizens
custom or
Congress
immunity
the United States or
or of all
of the United States.”
usage,
providing for
secured
persons
any
by
right,
with-
equal
by
pro
process in administrative
it.
ceedings
Due
motion to dismiss
The defendants’
judicial
ground
has been
of a
nature
granted by
the court below
(cid:127)
conformity
generally
fair
polit-
only
said
complaint
concerned
Anglo-Saxon
by practices
jurisprudence,
question
not covered
ical
which was
Manney,
see Tadano
process provisions of the
the due
14th
usually equated
solely
dealing
mo-
which is
Amendment,
with
since
hearing,
voting upon
adequate
and fair
legislative body
notice
a
Administrator,
tives of a
legislation,
Opp
Cotton Mills
into
v.
524,
not draw
did
clause,
L.Ed.
since 312 U.S.
question the
Although
(1941).
adherence
allegation
strict
no
of discrimina-
there was
issu-
the common-law rules
hearing
evidence
tion.
court indicated
*4
v.
required,
the
is not
see Crowell
liquor
within
ance of
a
license
285,
Benson,
48,
22,
of
Mayor
285 U.S.
52 S.Ct.
the Board
of
discretion
the
gen
parties
(1932),
federal L.Ed. 598
must
a
the
that
and concluded
Aldermen
erally
opportunity
an
be
to know
allowed an
to entertain
court had no
Morgan
opposing party,
the
process.
claims of the
on
attack
773,
States,
1,
United
v.
result
subject
their
to cross-exam-
injured, but
evidence
disappointed applicant
addition,
greater.
ination.
In
public
injury
is much
to the
know,
opportunity
not
through
right
afforded an
expect its
to
public
has the
regulations promul-
reasonable
prescribed standards
observe
officers to
gated by
board,
objective
basis
adjudications on the
and to make
met
step
standards which had to
to obtain
insur-
first
toward
merit. The
Next,
ing
license.
failure
realized
expectations are
that these
denying
basis
board
reveal the
require
standards
is to
adherence
application
true,
would,
her
if
abe denial
uncon-
process;
absolute
due
of her
the board make find-
have
See
invites abuse.
trolled discretion
ings
based on the evidence
Fitzpatrick,
adduced
129 Conn.
505;
Francis v.
hearing. Moreover, appellees themselves
A.L.R.
Glicker
30 A.2d
Michigan
Commission,
pro-
indicate
mandates of
that the
Liquor Control
1947).
tection
not observed
award-
were
611
cert,
(5th
Frankfurter,
Cir.),
F.2d
(opinion
denied,
693
(1961)
of
340 U.S.
2d 492
J.).
823,
56,
very
71
they
(1950)
strict
S.Ct.
Also,
95 L.Ed.
have been
604
(judgment
complaint
forth
requiring
merits);
a
defendants on
facts
rights
damages
and for
protected
showing
to one barred from Las
of the
a-denial
Vegas
unsupport
“factually
merely
casinos as an
not
undesirable charac-
ter,
complained
Sawyer,
Marshall v.
301 F.2d
ed characterizations
639
malicious,
(9th
1962).
defendants,
Supreme
Cir.
Court,
of acts of
conspiratorial,
purpose
Pape,
Monroe v.
167,
for the
done
365
U.S.
81 S.Ct.
473,
gave
5
plaintiffs
(1961),
their constitu
L.Ed.2d
depriving
of
492
Todd,
approval
rights.”
198 ultimate seal
v.
McGuire
See
tional
construc-
cert, denied,
Cir.),
U.S.
tion
allegation
section
(5th
requiring
344
60
1983 not
F.2d
(1952).
purpose
835,
44,
649
L.Ed.
97
S.Ct.
discriminate.
73
Norris,
limita
Furthermore,
See Cohen v.
24,
at one time various
300 F.2d
29-30
specific (9th
1962)
propounded
(overruling Agnew
Cir.
were
tions
rights
v.
City
Compton,
protected
supra,
the statutes —see
cases).
and other
Compton,
Pape
F.2d
Agnew
City
upheld
Monroe
complaint
239
v.
alleg-
v.
cert, denied,
ing damages
1956),
illegal
226,
(9th
from an
231
search and
868,
959,
L.Ed.2d
1
seizure under color
77 S.Ct.
U.S.
state and
353
munici-
apparently
pal statutes,
(due
usages
(1957)
customs and
910
but not
allegations
any specific
discrim
protected absent
Accord, Egan
intent.
Ortega
persons);
Ra
Aurora,
514,
ination between
gen,
365 U.S.
81 S.Ct.
cert,
1954),
684,
(7th Cir.
(1961).
F.2d
L.Ed.2d
is,
It
there-
786,
940,
fore,
recognized
denied,
now
specific
that no
in-
(no
deprive
allowed
(1955)
action
tent
plaintiff
L.Ed. 1268
of his civil
rights
equal protection)
de
alleged,
need
Stringer
denial
see
—on
required
gree
Dilger,
Screws
action
of state
—see
States,
325 U.S.
United
that an
pur-
intentional and
(dis
(1945)
poseful
L.Ed. 1495
discrimination
necessary only
rights
senting
(civil
opinion)
statutes
under the act’s
sections,
criminal
of state
inapplicable
Pape,
supra,
act violation
Monroe v.
where
365 U.S. at
types
law)
of discrimination
on the
S.Ct. at
5 L.Ed.2d
or under
—and
*7
Hughes,
conspiracy
321 the
provisions,
covered—see Snowden
see Lewis v.
(1944) Brautigam, supra,
L.Ed. 497
64
88
227
F.2d at 127-28.
purposeful
(intentional
discrimination
or
Moreover, the case
Carr,
of Baker v.
case);
equal
De
required in
369 U.S.
