M.R. v. StateM.R. v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Conover, Miller, Buchanan
CONOVER, Judge.
M.R., a 15 year old boy, was charged in five separate petitions filed simultaneously with three separate house burglaries, three thefts, one auto theft, one escape, and one charge of carrying a handgun without a license. At his initial hearing at which his mother was present, he waived his right to counsel, testified he knew and understood his constitutionаl rights to be represented by counsel, to have a speedy trial, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to remain silent and not testify, and the possibility of sentence to the Indiana Boys Schoоl if the court determined he had committed these offenses which, if he were an adult, would have been assorted felonies and misdemeanors.
He then testified he understood his rights, and no threats or promises had bеen made to get him to admit to these acts. He admitted his guilt as to each act of delinquency charged, and then gave testimony establishing his guilt as to each.
At the hearing‘s conclusion, the court found a sufficient factual basis to accept M.R.‘s admissions of guilt, found the petitions were true, and adjudicated M.R. to be a delinquent child. The court continued the disposition hearing to permit M.R.‘s evaluation by Arbor Hospital аnd in-patient treatment in a secure environment. At the disposition hearing held later, the court found nothing of a psychiatric or psychological character in M.R.‘s psychic makeup which required treatment, and subsequently awarded M.R.‘s wardship to the Indiana Department of Correction for placement in the Indiana Boy‘s School. M.R. appeals.
Restated, the issues this appeal presents are whether the trial court erred by:
1. determining M.R. knowingly waived his right to be represented by an attorney, and by not appointing one for him,
2. accepting M.R.‘s admissions he perpetrated the acts of delinquency with which he wаs accused,
3. determining there was a sufficient factual basis for accepting M.R.‘s admissions he perpetrated the acts of delinquency with which he was charged, and 4. awarding his guardianship to the Departmеnt of Corrections for placement at the Indiana Boy‘s School.
We affirm.
M.R. first argues the record demonstrates he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel because the court was required to also advise M.R. if he was unable to afford an attorney one would be appointed for him, and the trial court did not do so. Failure to so advise M.R. and his mother constitutes reversible error under Dearing v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 131, 95 N.E.2d 832, 836, he claims. We disagree. It is abundаntly clear from the record, M.R. was so informed on two occasions before entering his admissions.
First, M.R. and his mother, prior to M.R.‘s court appearance, signed a written advisement of rights which read, in part:
3. The сhild has a right to be represented by a lawyer at all stages of the court proceedings ... If the parents are unable to hire one, the Court will appoint a lawyer for him/her.
(R. 18). Further, although the trial court did nоt personally inform M.R. and his mother in court of his right to counsel at State expense, they previously were so informed by a videotape recording made by the same juvenile judge before whom M.R., accompanied by his mother, appeared. (Supp. R. 1).
The tape informed all persons about to appear in juvenile court of their various constitutional rights and the dispositional alternatives the juvenile court could impose, in minute detail.1 The videotape at its conclusion also told M.R. and its other viewers if they wanted further explanation of their rights or did not understand them, they should so inform the judge or juvenile referee. An en masse advisement of rights when coupled with a trial judge‘s personal interrogation of the defendant passes constitutional muster. cf. Snowe v. State (1989), Ind. App., 533 N.E.2d 613, 616; French v. State (1984), Ind. App., 472 N.E.2d 210, 212.
Dearing does not require a face to face advisement of rights by the trial judge. It requires that M.R. and his mother be fully informed of that right and knowingly waive it prior to M.R. making admissions of delinquency, as he did in this case. Given the judge‘s face to face instruction on M.R.‘s constitutional rights coupled with the prior written advisement of rights and videotape viewing, M.R. and his mother were fully advised of the right to counsel at public expense if they were indigent and desired representation by counsel. With such exhaustive advisements, the waiver оf right to counsel was made with knowledge of the right to counsel at public expense. Thus, the waiver of counsel at public expense was freely and voluntarily given. The trial court did not err in this regard.
M.R. next argues the trial court erred by failing to read the statutes he was accused of violating when the court read the charges to him. Further, he posits, the trial court also erred by not advising M.R. of the maximum possible sentencе which could result from his admission to each charge. Again, we disagree.
The statute covering juvenile proceedings,
The court read each individual charge to M.R. and his mother and each time received the assurance that both understood the allegations. (R. 169-174). Further, рrior to asking for M.R.‘s admissions or denials, the court informed M.R. and his mother that if the allegations were deemed true, M.R. could be sent to the Indiana Boys School. (R. 175). We find no error here.
Next, M.R. complains that becаuse his mother brought him to the police station when he violated his probation by running away and again after he had escaped from the police station, she had an interest adverse to his. Thus, he argues she could not lawfully waive his constitutional rights at the initial hearing. In support of his argument, he cites the commentary to
M.R. was not charged as an incorrigible, nor was his mother а key State‘s witness in any of the charges filed against him. Clearly, she had no interest adverse to M.R. at the time. She was a loving parent, obviously concerned about her son and his future.
M.R. also claims he and his mother did not meaningfully consult prior to the initial hearing. M.R. is wrong. There is substantial evidence to the contrary. M.R. and his mother both read and signed the Advisement of Rights form, and viewed the juvenile judge‘s videotape advisement of rights priоr to the initial hearing. A reasonable presumption arises from those facts they had ample time for, and in fact did, engage in meaningful consultation prior to the initial hearing. Clearly,
M.R. next maintains he did not admit thе allegations the court read to him because he responded “yes” to each, rather than “admit.” Acknowledging this is a “technical distinction,” he claims, “it underscores the failure of the trial court to asсertain whether [M.R.‘s] admissions were knowingly and voluntarily given.” Brief of Appellant at 26. We determined earlier in this opinion M.R.‘s admissions were knowingly and voluntarily given after a full advisement of rights. We have said enough on that scоre. We further determine a reasonable inference arises from M.R.‘s answers of “yes” to the trial court‘s inquiries he was, in fact, admitting each of the alleged acts as they were read to him.
M.R. next asserts therе was no factual basis upon which the juvenile court could accept his admissions of guilt because the evidence was insufficient to establish:
a. either that M.R. entered the dwelling with intent to commit a felony or that a breaking and entering occurred as to the burglary charges,
b. that M.R. intended to deprive the owner of the automobile‘s use or value,
c. that M.R. knew the handgun was in the purse he purloined as to the unlicensed handgun charge, and
d. that his detention was lawful, as to the escape charge.
We disagree.
As the State argues, M.R.‘s contention
Finally, M.R. asserts the juvenile court abused its discretion by not sending M.R. back to Arbor Hospital for further еvaluation rather than awarding his guardianship
Under
Here, M.R. аdmitted to committing nine acts, which if committed by an adult would have been felonies, three home burglaries, automobile thefts, theft of a police officer‘s purse and service revolver, and escaрe. Further, M.R. plotted an escape from Arbor Hospital where he had been sent in his best interests for evaluation. There are times in juvenile proceedings when the best interest of the juvenile and sociеty require commitment to the Boys School. The trial court correctly determined this was one of those times. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by so doing in this case.
Affirmed.
MILLER and BUCHANAN, JJ., concur.