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Mr. & Mrs. Doe Parents No. 1 v. State, Department of Education
58 P.3d 545
Haw.
2002
Check Treatment

*1 58 P.3d 545 1, indi Mrs. PARENTS NO.

Mr. and

vidually Ad Litem for and as Guardians 1; child, Minor Girl No. minor Doe

their No. Mrs. Doe Parents and Mr. and

individually Litem Ad Guardians child, Doe Minor Girl their minor 2, Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Ap

No.

pellees,

v. Hawai'i, DEPARTMENT

STATE EDUCATION, Defendant-

OF

Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Norton; Nor Marie Valerie

Lawrence J. 1-10; 1-10;

ton; Does Does Jane John 1-10; Corporations Partner Doe

Doe 1-10;

ships Enti and Doe Governmental

ties Defendants.

Nos. 23901.

Supreme of Hawai'i. Court

Nov. 2002. 5th, 2nd and

As Amended Dec. *7 (Anne

Mark S. Davis L. him Williams with biiefs), Livingston the of Davis Levin Grande, for plaintiffs-appellant/ci’oss-ap- the pellees Parents No. and Jane Doe Doe No. 1, and Doe No.2 and Parents Jane No. 2. Doe Fell, General, Deputy Attorney Charles P. the defendant-appellee/ci'oss-appellant Hawai'i, Department State Education. MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, RAMIL, JJ., ACOBA, J., coneun'ing and and separately. LEVINSON,

Opinion cross-appeals, of the Court arguing J. The DOE the court, reasons, circuit for various erred in plaintiffs-appellants/cross-appellees The holding plaintiffs it liable to at all. In the appeal1 this consolidated are two minor chil- (1) essence, that, pursuant DOE the contends respective parents dren and their [hereinaf- (STLA), Liability to Hawaii’s State Tort Act ter, collectively, “plaintiffs”], all of whom (HRS) Hawai'i Revised Statutes ch. 662 consented their disclosure (1993 Supp.2001), it is & immune from the identity in connection this case.2 Doe (2) that, plaintiffs’ claims and if even Parents No. 1 are retired Lieutenant Colonel immunity, STLA sovereign does afford it Cynthia Ira Steven Davis and Davis, and (a) the circuit determining court erred in daughter, Jane No. 1 Melony Doe is then* negligent negligence it had been and that its Fay (Melony). Davis Doe Parents No. are injuries legal plaintiffs’ was a cause of the Benjamin George Draughn Mary (b) plaintiffs required that the were not Draughn, and No. 2 daugh- Jane Doe is their physical injury pre- establish order ter, (Nicole). Draughn Nicole State of The vail on NIED them claim. (DOE) Department Hawai'i of Education the defendant-appellee/cross-appellant. cross-appeal, As to hold the DOE’s we them complaint, plaintiffs named as a (1) to plaintiffs follows: the extent that the codefendant, and subsequently the DOE filed predicate negligence their and NIED claims against, cross-claim Lawrence Norton J. negligent retention and su- DOE’s (Norton), (the Melony’s girls’) and Nicole’s Norton, pervision of that the STLA’s inten- teacher; Norton, however, did not enter an exception tional tort does not insulate the trial, appearance at the circuit court dis- (2) that, liability; DOE from under the cir- him, parties’ missed all of against claims case, of this cumstances could III.B, party section and he is not infra physical injury; obtain relief the absence of appeal.3 to this (3) that, insofar as the. DOE should have plaintiffs appeal judgment anticipated reasonably threat foreseeable court, students, posed first circuit Honorable Sabrina DOE was subject presiding, awarding plain- duty steps S. McKenna to a to take whatever forty-nine percent tiffs of them dam- total reasonable to ensure that he did not molest ages—i.e., Nicole; damages Melony foregoing amount of $432,200.00 Draughns collectively duty only ran not students $429,251.00 custody, amount DOE’s but the Davises also the students’ collectively—on negli- them parents; that the DOE breached the (NIED) gent Melony infliction of emotional distress care that owed to and Nicole (a) respective claims appeal, parents reinstating the DOE. On them Norton, plaintiffs challenge appor- acquitted circuit in con- court’s after he had been molestation, liability prior tionment of allegation between the nection with *8 Norton, advancing arguments sup- conducting reasonably thorough several without a (b) port of them contention that investigation, failing supervise the DOE should or re- to them in total of liable amount then- strict Norton’s conduct once he had resumed damages. exhibiting prior the behaviors led to plaintiffs' appeal proceed- appellate 1. The in this matter was docket- the remainder of the trial and 23899; ings. appeal ed under No. the defendant’s was January docketed under No. 23901. On 2001, this court of ordered consolidation these wife, plaintiffs Marie 3.The also named Norton’s appeals briefing disposition and under No. Norton, Valerie a com- as codefendant their argument January 23899. Oral was heard on plaint, against and DOE filed cross-claim However, 2002. her. court circuit dismissed plaintiffs' against prior claims Marie Norton Initially, plaintiffs proceeded with their trial as the DOE no evi- insofar advanced However, against pseudonyms. supporting lawsuit under dence at trial her, its cross-claim trial, plaintiffs judgment in time that the matter went to court favor circuit entered against to the of connec- moved mainland consented to the Marie Norton and the DOE in of their disclosure identities connection with tion with the DOE’s cross-claim. However, (c)

accusation, respect during and like Mélony and Nicole Nоrton. questioning semester, during again fall the 1991 that Norton exacting their disclosures year, fourth and fifth them, 1994-95 school several in violation of the DOE’s had molested so, molesting grade students accused Norton doing given apparent policy against own relating circumstances Before generally them. administrators are school (d) Melony and Norton’s molestation of Nicole inquiries, and to conduct such trained during year, we set respec- the 1994-95 school forth notify Melony’s failing and Nicole’s Mokapu which a Nor- the circumstances under parents of their accusations tive (6) of molestation. ton; student first accused Norton negligence was that the DOE’s plaintiffs’ psychological legal cause resulting from Norton’s foreseeable

trauma 1. T.Y.’saccusation Melony Nicole. molestation semester, Shortly into the 1991 fall student, plaintiffs’ appeal, throughout we hold grade As to the identified fourth “T.Y.,” apportioning liabili- proceedings circuit court erred accused these Norton and, there- ty touching the DOE and Norton her fondling between her breast and bare fore, to the thigh. appears routinely that the DOE liable It that Norton Thus, damages. passes they full extent their hall so that for the issued to students judgment during circuit final vacate the court’s him in classroom we could visit his their routinely hugged to the circuit and remand matter lunch recess and them judgment entry of an final for the amended to start afternoon left their classes. opinion. with this consistent had fondled her in T.Y. asserted Norton giving of these

the course her one routine during was him hugs while she alone with I. BACKGROUND February Eventually, on lunch recess. Background A. Factual was indicted connection with allegation charged with commit- January Nor- T.Y.’s the DOE hired On in the graders Mokapu ting Ele- the offense sexual assault third fourth ton to teach During period, [hereinafter, degree.6 this five-month mentary “the school” School “investigation” administrative into Ka- DOE’s “Mokapu”], which is located within the (KMCAS), allegation primarily by T.Y.’s was conducted Corps Marine Air neohe Station Estomago, vice-principal Mókapu’s Donna military At the time base.4 United States hired, allegation time the was made. did not conduct Norton was DOE history checks background criminal indicted, Sosa, After Norton John employees.5 prospective teachers or other Superintendent, DOE Windward District prior his- Although Norton had “an extensive conducted “second” DOE administrative DOE tory pedophilia” time that the allegation. into “investigation” T.Y.’s Sosa him, history was not reflected hired action, any, sought what if to determine any public records. take, including should whether rec- year-and-a-half teaching Superintendent, During his first ommend DOE’s school, Toguchi, parents, as well that Norton be terminated at the students and Charles administrators, teaching position. to a faculty and came or reinstated con- as school 6.Although Mokapu faculty circuit administra- not enumerated court's 4. The school and its fact, employees findings presume the base com- we that Norton tors are DOE whom *9 707~732(l)(b) grants permission charged violating to enter KMCAS. mander with HRS (1993), proscribes part in relevant "know- per- ingly subjectfing] to contact another however, sexual Norton, Subsequent hiring to years is less than old." son who fourteen Pursu- adopted apparently rules re- administrative (1993), §HRS “sexual ant to 707-700 contact” history background quiring checks criminal touching “any part in relevant means employees. into new rules went for new parts person sexual or other intimate not exempted all sala- on June but effect actor, directly Norton, .. . whether married employees, such who had been ried continuously employed as 30, 1990, through clothing material from or other intended June since parts.” application. to cover the sexual or other intimate retroactive child, ducting investigation, occasionally his Sosa solicited and to a armhis would encircle received information recommendations the child’s waist. Sugino, from Emiko the DOE’s Personnel Estomago, Unbeknownst to the HPD de- Gordon, Director, Jaequelin the DOE’s Wind- assigned to tective the case had instructed Specialist,

ward District Personnel and Mókr parents speak to to school T.Y.’s not officials Schlosser, apu’s principal, James and vice- until he notified them that free to principal, Estomago. jury acquitted After a Consequently, do Estomago so. when ob- January Norton on 1993 in the criminal T.Y. and her bus served mother the school arising allegations, trial out of T.Y.’s 24, 1991, stop morning September on the teaching to position DOE reinstated him a them, approached inquired whether she conducting without further administra- seeing be T.Y.’s mother later investigation tive into the matter. The re- morning, nega- shook her mother head mainder this subsection details Estoma- tively, Estomago appealing to to con- go’s investigation initial “school-level” Similarly, parents fused. an T.Y.’s attended subsequent Sosa’s investiga- “district-level” evening open house Norton’s classroom on tion of T.Y.’s accusation.7 25, 1991, September nothing but said either Estomago daugh- to Norton or about their Estomago’s a. investiga- “school-level” allegations. ter’s tion 26, 1991, September Estomago On tele- Estomago Mókapu’s vice-prin- Donna phoned Crecelius to discover effort 1991, and, time, cipal September at that why she had been contacted either Ching principal. Carol was the school’s Late parents checking T.Y.’s or the HPD. After 23, 1991, September afternoon HPD, Estomago with the informed Crecelius approximately p.m., military 4:30 or 5:00 assigned that the HPD to detective the case (CID) Investigation Criminal Division inves- parents speak had instructed T.Y.’s not to Crecelius, tigator, Michael who was also anyone about the matter until the detective student, parent Mókapu aof informed Esto- Subsequently, them do so. directed mago T.Y.’s 27, 1991, accusation and that CID was September requested T.Y.’s mother referring the Honolulu matter Police daughter that her be removed from Norton’s (HPD) Department investigation. for further Estomago granted classroom. the mother’s Estomago, According to informed Crecelius request, but her to meet with asked Norton allegation “heads-up,” as a her of the rather and school administrators to discuss T.Y.’s matter, than “formal” as a and forewarned replied allegations. T.Y.’s mother she expect request parents her to from T.Y.’s Estomago’s request first wished to discuss girl from be removed Norton’s with her husband. Estomago grade fourth class. informed September T.Y. On was in the Ching allegation evening. of T.Y.’s process moving belongings her out her classroom, during evening September attempt- Also Norton desk Norton’s 1991, Estomago telephoned explain story” Norton. Accord- ed to “his side of the to T.Y.’s mother; ing Estomago, “typical procedure” to it is T.Y.’s mother “did not react” talk reported to the staff member involved when Norton. Norton incident Norton, “something” According Estomago, Estomago apparently arises. but did However, usually report Ching. there were numerous children his Norton did during report classroom his class Ching recesses when that T.Y. later visited him session, and, thus, during specifi- not in did not his classroom lunch with a he recess cally being group recollect T.Y. alone him. other children and had solicited confirmed, however, him; many Ching hug of the told Norton that T.Y.’s often, hugged usually him he should children when mother be informed visit that, desk, spoke appeal’s relayed report was seated to have Norton’s vestigation apparent practice subsequently, 7. The DOE’s when con- district *10 teacher, leveled investigation. such an accusation is ducts "district-level” the school conducts initial "school-level” in- evening, Ching 1991 until Nor- Estomago. Later that re- the matter from mid-October telephone mid-February T.Y.’s 1992. call from mother ton indicted turned was visit to informed her of T.Y.’s Norton and

during recess. investigation .b. “district-level” Sosa’s 4, final Ching’s day as was October An in the was indictment T.Y. case re- day, following Estomago principal 19, which, February as we turned on became, acting principal until sometime noted, committing accused Norton of November, ap- when James Schlosser was According degree third assault. sexual pointed Mokapu’s principal. HPD Detective Sosa, indictment, at around the time of the with Tejada respect first contacted the school “jurisdiction” over the DOE’s he obtained 11, 1991; allegations to T.Y.’s on October investigation into Norton’s al- administrative Tejada Estomago informed that he Detective leged misconduct. Norton T.Y. interviewing both and would be investigation with his in connection indictment Sosa had learned Estomago cautioned matter. The detective inquiry result a media late the after- class- that Norton should not remain February Shortly noon of thereaf- 1992. investigation. pending criminal room ter, he the situation with Donald discussed However, “surprised” HPD in- that the Superintendent Nugent, the DOE’s Assistant vestigating believing T.Y.’s the matter Services, and, subsequently Personnel false, Estomago allegations to be surmised Specialist District evening, with Personnel admonition based the detective’s Gordon. (insofar necessity upon caution rather than learned of indictment as a Gordon had Tejada yet investigated mat- had not Sugino’s inquiries result of that afternoon. ter), disregarded suggestion, the detective’s attempts After to contact unsuccessful it to and did not communicate of her Estomago, spoke Gordon with Schlosser superiors. Mokapu’s principal, Ching, who relat- former week, following on October Estomago investigatеd “had the inci- ed that superior—the Estomago first informed her Estomago’s “investigation dent” in- Deputy Superintendent, District Jac- DOE’s dicated that the accusation was unfounded.” queline Heupel—of investigation; the HPD’s Ching military that she asserted believed Heupel Estomago instructed discuss investigated CID had the matter had However, on incident further. October so, “dropped” Ching it. Even informed Gor- 30, 1991, Estomago Deputy contacted Attor- side,” T.Y. don be on the had safe “[t]o Suzuki, ney as well Russell as the General grade fourth been transferred to another Director, Sugino, Personnel because a DOE’s T.Y.’s class and that mother “seemed be telephone school counselor had received with this solution. satisfied” parent regarding allega- call from T.Y.’s Yet, unable, when became Moka- Because Sosa Gordon tions. Schlosser November, despite repeated attempts, pu’s principal in neither contact Estoma- their go anyone evening, him until later that Sosa in nor informed Schlosser else directly Norton investigating HPD was Norton that T.Y. structed Gordon contact placed molesting him her. and to inform him would be on accused Mean- while, promptly teaching, leave.8 did Norton remained and the administrative Gordon Shortly p.m., 7:00 granted January him on so.9 after Sosa succeeded tenure investigation contacting discussed with while the HPD’s was still Schlosser and Indeed, “steps regarding according Estomago, him what pending. [the] take school, students, teachersf,] “nothing happened parents, more or was said about” appears Spe- Although 9. circuit DOE Personnel court found that Schlosser It another cialist, "placed” Nagaue, on leave on the Barbara had advised Gordon administrative Februarj' placed evening record should reflects that Norton administrative leave, suggestion who that it was Gordon first informed Norton of that Gordon shared Sosa, it. action. and that Sosa decided to follow DOE’s *11 teaching the need to with” Esto- position. [the] review records been removed from his mago. any No other student came forward with allegations against additional Norton after Estomago first indictment learned learning of the indictment.10 Sehlosser, from and her reaction was one “horror” because in [her] she “believed heart afternoon, arranged meeting That Sosa nothing there was that had tran- Gordon, Sehlosser, Ching, with and Estoma- spiredf.J” learned When Sehlosser of the go “clarif[y] to order notes and state- Sosa, it indictment from was the first he had ments”; meeting, the course of the Sosa of T.Y.’s heal’d accusation Norton. “stressed the seriousness matter indictment, discussing Estomago While pointed importance out person- of DOE “investigation” informed Sehlosser her bring types nel to to these of cases closure.” allegation during of the initial fall semes- The circuit court inferred that Sosa had ter had unearthed “no to evidence substanti- meeting faxed the results of this to DOE allegations. ate” T.Y.’s Sugino. Personnel Director In a memoran- following morning, February The on prepared by Sugino, February dum dated Estomago, Sosa contacted who to Superintendent 1992 and directed “on per- “briefed” him from the incident her Toguchi, Sugino asserted that “[i]nitial re- spective.” morning, spoke Also that Sehlosser view of the situation indicates that con- the students Norton’s class sub- investiga- cern surfaced last fall and an assemblies, sequently, during two conducted tion was conducted the school. It was important which he noted that it was to determined at time that the concern “judge gossip” about the matter and that adequately resolved.” the school counselor would be available 20, 1992, throughout February Also on day During Sosa transmit- for the students. Norton, assemblies, ted a memorandum to upset which con- some children became allegations being placed and scrutinized their firmed Norton was on a fellow ten-day students to had pay determine who accused Nor- administrative leave with ton, a “beloved” teacher. Parents also be- that would “be [Sosa’s] he contacted office upset upon learning during report[ specified came had ] that Norton this leave to 2, 1992, point verity charge. 10. At some before March at which indicate children hug time il was forwarded to DOE Windward District flock him him do indeed and are Gordon, Specialist prepared Estomago return, Personnel hugged in but there have been no re- "Summary a memorandum entitled of Teach- ported improprieties presently beside what is Norton,” Response Larry which the er/Parenl charged. expressly her circuit court found reflected bias summary This is affixed to a cover directed sheet Norton, favor and which states full as Sehlosser, bearing date Gordon follows: 2, 1992; however, summary March cov- warm, caring, together Ching’s Mr. Norton has been a friend- er sheet are attached to "sum- ly, very responsive mary teacher fellow staff Septem- of events” that occurred between member. He has extended himself to the com- bearing ber 1991 and October staff!,] munity getting into activities signature February Ching's date 1992. beyond day. thal extend the work predictable. re- His routine school is At testimony, During Estomago her was asked morning in the cess time his room is full of by plaintiffs’ on cross-examination counsel stay in children who choose to the room. At whether, allegations time that "these came lunch, usually he walked his children up," anyone thought consulting expert about an cafeteria, [sic] come the office use the pedophilia to determine whether Norton fell Xerox and then returned to his classroom!] pedophile profile. Estomago responded: into a open kept the children to return Not when there hadn't been reason to inves- always to. His had it. room children in tigate. just get I wanted to some information apparent thought It he well going of facts. I wasn't that a assume community overwhelming as an number of person guilty. I I collected whatev- mean[J parents expressed support their for him facts, I er and went with the trust high him because their children hold in such relationship been built on and had never had esteem. indication, mean[,] I actually never. I never had nothing There is been re- parent only ported give approach child me. I credence to the likelihood of the only good. charge—nothing in his words or actions to heard So the frame was from that. *12 problems.” “from place part administrative] DOE’s further Gordon’s [the with an fur- of the conference conclude investigation.” appears nothing It that minutes entry, occurred, however, which asserts that ten-day pe- until the ther 4, 1992, at expire, was to on March agreed [the] riod due that [i]t [DOE] was necessary expedite to it was Sosa pursue which time HSTA would avenues to to maintain on impor whether Norton trial. This is [Norton’s criminal] determine transiency popu leave. administrative tant because of the Mokapu Elementary If School. lation 2, 1992, transmitted March Schlosser On time, long many potential delayed for a Estomago’s “Summary of Teacher/Parent longer no in Hawaii. witnesses would be Gordon, Larry Response to Norton” to Mr. to his attor Norton was advised 3, 1992, supra March 10. On Sosa note ney get depositions potential from witn request Toguchi to transmitted a that esses.[12] Norton’s administrative leave DOE extend investigation completed 11, 1992, and a “until the May Sugino On informed Sosa regarding” made Norton’s em- decision is prosecutor assigned that to Norton’s case Toguchi ployment appears to have providing copy status. with a would the DOE be day on request approved Sosa’s either of T.Y. that had videotaped interview been event, 4, 1992, and, any approved March Advocacy at the Children’s Cen- conducted later, writing on request ter, a week jury Sosa’s transcript grand as a as well 10,1992. March Sugino’s proceedings. memorandum Sosa Sugino *13 meeting opened by noting Sosa the that he memorandum, the Schlosser stated that he support could Schlosser’s recommendation to Norton, requested had contacted inter investigation table the until the conclusion of him representative, view with and his HSTA trial, Norton’s criminal or he could recom- viewing” to offered “share a of the video Superintendent mend to the DOE disci- such tape initially replied with Norton. Norton plinary suspension, reassignment, action as that would attorney, he consult his but that or termination. Sosa that “want- asserted he cooperate he to with wanted the DOE. How ed say,” to hear what had to that [Norton] so ever, representative Norton’s HSTA subse would, his hopefully, decision in- be better quently informed Schlosser that Norton’s at present meeting formed. Those at this ini- torney had advised Norton talk not to to tially particular the that clarified documents anyone about the case. memo Schlosser’s time, had up been shared with to Norton that randum closed with the that observation produce after which agreed Gordon to docu- “[o]ur consideration of the outcome of the attorney ments that Norton and his believed will fairly case to allow the [DOE] yet provided had not been to them.14 Nor- judge regard Mi-. Norton’s conduct with to attorney supported ton’s Sehlosser’s recom- this accusation.”13 mendation and that trial remarked Norton’s August was to on scheduled commence 26,1992, On June mailed a memoran- Sosa delay possible. but that was Moore dum to Norton that reiterated the substance recommendation, supported also Schlosser’s memorandum, of Schlosser’s June that, “earlier[,] remarking the did an school videotape, renewed his offer to view the investigation charges and found the at that invited Norton to a about conference groundless time to that be the Marine matter: Corps[,] through whatever mechanism part of As in- [DOE’s] administrative they investigate things, [use to] did so and assault, alleged vestigation of I sexual charges groundless[.]” found the to be videotape, and I viewed would like to Moore advocated that Norton “should be you opportunity afford to view this kept pay thing on and' until full benefits this your videotape, give and to version of the adjudicated competent through has been giving allegations, facts rise to the and to court.” respond questions I which videotape, Norton his concerning declined view the statements made attorney remarking already had student.... During done so. of meet- remainder my secretary call Please on before ing, ques- posed specific Sosa number July 1992 to schedule or this decline Norton, tions to which he had formulated conference. videotape, viewing after connection accepted participate attempt Norton the offer T.Y.’s accusation and Norton’s Sosa, and, consequently, day conference with on to confront T.Y.’s mother July belongings Sosa and Gordon met with T.Y. had her from Nor- removed trial, specifi- prudent point 13. At that he allow Sosa testified did not seemed at that time to recommendation, cally process recall Schlosser’s but did to take course those because recall that people position gather be in a would he evidence that would determine whether was agreement. was an there We talked about it guilty charge. guilty particular of that Sugino investigating with Mrs. and those of us that[,] the case as time went on in terms of the matter, It is unclear from the record whether Norton investigation of that he indict- regarding subpoenaed ed[,] DOE's documents get and we were able to information investigation their wheth- regarding of T.Y.’saccusations or particulars of the We wer- case. child, being generous simply shar- family, er the DOE was en't able to talk to the ing purposes any parties for the police, get its documents with him of those informa- indicted, tion. And since his criminal trial. deputy attorney general’s suggestion, to answer re- ton’s classroom.15 declined layed by Sugino, Sosa contacted Nor- questions, invoking “consti- Sosa any of Sosa’s obtaining option of right light ton to “offer[liim] to remain silent” tutional fit- charge [his] him. Sosa medical examination determine pending criminal teaching meeting by indicating During duties.” that he ness resume concluded conversation, telephone notify regarding “made it Norton of his Sosa would decision recommendation, to [Norton] [he] but that further clear needed additional Schlosser’s necessary information” deci- [his] event “to base review At sion to return the classroom.” [Norton] information was obtained. additional *14 that, trial, in also Norton in the event acknowledged point this Sosa informed Sosa an investigation, had Norton declined to submit to such exami- administrative his nation, options attempt he “would re-think “pretty [his] much stonewalled” his subsequent inform of [Norton] [his] information. deci- obtain opted sion.” Norton to discuss Sosa’s offer 13, 1992, Superintendent Togu- August On so, attorney doing with his after refused notified Norton that he would remain chi explanation. it without pay “until deci- administrative leave Regarding foregoing, the testified at investigation of Sosa regarding is made the sion trial as follows: against you complaint serious made the Well, your of and that parents one of students” the were faced with a situation of we meetings” regard- employee “should be available we that’s he where had had been 14, 1992, August ing period matter. As of Sosa out of for that the classroom all,” many I’m no information at than T.Y.’s time. not sure how months it “had Consequently, upon already—on paid videotaped allegations. leave. We had no connection, questions posed re- In this 15.The that Sosa to Norton circuit court received (1) garding unsigned T.Y.’s concerned whether: accusation into evidence an and undated hand- underarm, back, memorandum, authenticity he had touched T.Y.'s bare her written of which blouse; (2) to, by reaching parties stipulated appears or her breast under her to have that Sosa, thigh however, had touched T.Y.on her arm her bare he been directed to Sosa. testified time; T.Y., had, fact, any in specific he said to he had that ment; nonetheless, no recollection of docu- my hug?” proceeded "Where’s and had testimony then his does not cоn- had, her; hug practice, as a he matter of flict with its substantive content. The memoran- fact, then, hugged hugs children in asked Sugino suggested dum noted had that that Sosa " regarding questions con- them. Sosa’s Norton’s telephone Norton to 'feel him out’ on the frontation with T.Y.’s mother were couched possibility Independent of an Medical Exam a follows: knowledgeable specialist is in the area who proposed specialists— sex abuse" and two such you spoke that to her the [T.Y.’smother] states "Dr. one whom was Jack Annon”—between class, day transferring that her [T.Y.] choose he whom Norton could in the event did approximately which was one week after not select own. The his memorandum asserted reporting by daughter She initial her to her. that, ”[i]f the examination that there indicates her, you up that came to her and asked claims problem, teaching no can return to a [Norton] you[,]” you "... can told ... I talk to and then position” [Sugino] that and noted ”[b]oth her[,] "I [T.Y.] don't doubt that whatever suggest the AG's office call be this made saying, lying[J” she is and then it was followed trial, put anything writing.” we At before with[,] lying.” "I don't believe that she is not Annon, testified, Ph.D., expert in Jack as an "the Basically^] tape in the confusion there was was, pedophiles,” treatment of that someone what with further over clarification, that statement but once, asking DOE indeed contacted him you [were it comes out ... whether he would be available to undertake an ly- saying] you "don’t believe that she teacher; responded examination of a that he ing.” be, would the DOE him but never contacted you that she [T.Y.’smother] slates told regard. further person in most sexual abuse cases the would not, touching my deny would So the child. trial, are, deposition 17. At confirmed questions. you Sosa testi- questions three One: Did mony that Secondly, your it was "not uncommon” for the DOE [T.Y.’s mother]? talk to employees undergo your if viewpoint, "to ask some was the essence con- what three, review, physical sort of medical whether it be a [A]nd versation with [T.Y.’s mother]? or[,] case, review, mother,] say you grand- in this mental a matter "I [T.Y.'s am [d]id gathering figure process, in pa men- ... more information in a these kids”? That is also particular tioned. case.” information non-teaching or little information other than for the 1992 fall to a semester videotape regarding allegations, position, subjected than being rather to disci- action, plinary investigation and we not able to conduct a because “our thor- ough time, investigation. regarding your At point allegation concerns misconduct indicates insufficient evi- going through other issues were process [ie., disciplinary dence to take action at this other tidal terms time.” Norton’s criminal trial] and sort of

thing charges. and on those e. The DOE’s conduct Norton’s after So the if I issue was—and remember acquittal charges the criminal along line—during somewhere the T.Y. matter summer, union asked if we would be placing posi- him into back the classroom (1) The assumes that Norton’s ac- tion. So we needed make some deter- quittal charge “absolved” him of mination not—obviously, as whether or having molested T.Y. safety our concern was for January On jury Norton’s put or not kids—whether we should him criminal trial guilty” rendered “not verdict. *15 back in the classroom. So then the discus- 25, 1993, January Effective the DOE rein- sion possible came around to the examina- previous fourth-grade to his stated Norton give tion of a physician medical us some teaching position any conducting without fur- regarding person’s information this state investigation. ther Each of admin- the DOE ability functioning mind and at that appears istrators to have involved believed point. that’s So the context as to how the jury’s guilty” that “not syn- was verdict discussion came about to consider that as onymous beyond with a determination rea- option. an fact, was, sonable that doubt Norton inno- However, being Indeed, denied that Sosa aware cent.18 a letter to KMCAS base purpose command, 2, 1993, of such an February examination would have dated Sosa not- that, been to Norton acquittal,” determine whether was in ed fact “[i]n [his] view pedophile fact a or psychologists longer Mokapu, that the two that T.Y. was no student proposed by perform support by parents the DOE to the exami- “indications nation, administration,” specialists the school and supra note the school were teaching Norton “deviant was reinstated to his former sexual behavior.” becausé, position, summary, both “[i]n trial, that, acknowledged At Sosa so far as investiga- administrative criminal knew, he attempts the DOE made no further tion/prosecution processes essentially have investigate the matter once Norton re- absolved Mr. Norton[.]”19 fused to submit to the examination. offered Nevertheless, September In acquittal Sosa the interim between Norton’s reinstatement, reassigned informed Norton that he would be made no at- like, Estomago you testified that "it was Norton would like himself to return Moka- know, acquilted[,'|[a]nd everyone that, puf]” he was believed although circuit found so[,] only right that it was that it be because he Schlosser that he did not recommend testified innocent[,][b]ecause good he was a man that teaching position, that Norton be reinstated to a maligned. appeared had been That’s how he, nonetheless, was "in favor Norton re- testified, everybody.” Schlosser "I had faith that turning to the school.” gone through this had a trial ... and [that] so[,] emerge[;J truth ... would because he February 19. Sosa's 1993 letter to Lt. Col. exonerated, he came back and I assume[d] response Messere was in to Messere’s letter not- that he to teach.” In was fit a memorandum ing requesting Norton’s recent reinstatement and January Sugino dated noted that tire "your review of this matter to administrative action, prosecu- DOE could "take based on” determine is in the whether reinstatement acquit- tor’s been [Norton] "statements parlies, specifically^] best interest of all most that, upon ted” ”[b]ased the information of residents of installation children at- whose acquittal,” reassign [Norton’s] the DOE could commander, Mokapu tend The base school.” Sugino’s position.” Norton to "old his memo- Crawford, Col. Richard had directed that Mes- supported randum also reflects Schlosser time, sere, his executive officer at the write the teaching Norton's reinstatement his former position: my understanding letter. Col. had that the DOE "It was Crawford assumed Schlosser[,] present "in-depth investigation” principal, Mr. Jim and Mr. conduct de- do,” touch- right against thing against physically despite the that his cious tempt, fact obtained, longer any might no ing manner that self-incrimination students or to him submit to the question Indeed, Norton misinterpreted. be- when Sehlosser Nor, psychological proposed examination.20 hug- been seen came aware Norton had DOE, indeed, during any had the time students, that, if to Norton ging he remarked investigation, sought medical rec- Norton’s accused, he it had been he had been attempted to or interview his Mends ords anywhere a kid.” Howev- “wouldn’t be near sum, despite his family In members.21 er, thought union that Norton’s because contrary to Lt. Col. representations precluded any contract differential treatment Messere, acknowledged at trial Sosa teachers, impose among did not Sehlosser investi- had the DOE’s Norton “stonewalled” Norton’s conduct restrictions investigation and that had gation subject any special supervision. him to him and “any in favor of’ produced evidence issuing hall practice “absolve” Norton resumed had failed to him. students, fifth passes including fourth and to Norton “advice” Sehlosser’s (as after girls light ham grade colored his reinstatement T.Y.’s), him so that could visit been reinstated, during lunch While the students recesses. Norton was Schlos- Soon after him, him, “judi- visiting would offer them “cautioned” it was the ser because friends, viewing family acquittal well as spite criminal trial. members and Norton's in the officers, military psychological examina- an initial conference with other including Judge have Norton submit to a General, undergone psychological Col. Craw- Advocate tion. Had Norton "grounds” to opined ford was advised absent some Dr. it would Annon examination. *16 so, preclude from enter- unlikely do he should not Norton would have avoided have been that he military go job. ing in In if, fact, base to his order pedophile he detection as a in was one. meantime, when was i-eturned the indictment reinstating Had the DOE insisted on Norton early an Crawford had issued order advise, heeding foregoing Dr. Annon without barring entering from the base. After Norton suggested precautions be would have numerous acquittal, never informed Norton's Crawford was any taken to avoid further incident such as "in- DOE had such an that the not conducted T.Y.; by alleged example, Dr. Annon advised and, indeed, investigation,” depth "was told DOE instruct to leave his class- that the Norton everybody [DOE] at the head of tire administra- open physi- room door all times and to avoid tion, Sosa, way up gentle- all the to Mr. that the contacting cal contact with the them children highly thought a well- man was of and he was hours, that the DOE at all after school as well they respected teacher. And that didn't think child; prohibit being Norton from alone with a substantiated, allegations [he] and that addition, he would have instructed DOE However, worry." Crawford testified shouldn't regarding might what raise "red "indicators” that, him that it had not had the informed flags.” investigation completed (specifically, had he opinion, light In Dr. of the informa- Annon's they psychic had done no evaluation "known DOE, reinstating then available to Nor- tion tire any inquiry background”), his he would not into any teaching position imposing without ton to automatically precluded enter- have Norton from upon but, his children or rather, restrictions contact with the again ing would have once the base likelihood, taking any precautions regard constituted in this in all consulted his advisors it "a real risk” to the children. In the event that requested precautions would have that additional taken, pedophile, were established Norton was supervision, in order such as increased be rein- protect Dr. Annon would not have recommended the children. any under statement conditions. consulted, Dr. Annon would 20. Had he been suggests 21. The record had the DOE done infer informed the DOE that it should not have niece, Bassen, so, may have in- Norton's Diana the basis of his that Norton innocent on DOE, subsequently as informed a formed she acquittal in a criminal trial and would prosecutor in that Norton had molested cyclical regarding the DOE nature educated was between her on three occasions when she pedophilia and the characteristics common twelve, ages of ten and one of tire incidents pedophiles. He further informed would have cousin, year youn- involving her who was a also being peers his and the them that well-liked Pretrial, parties disputed ger tiran she. not a which to rule children was also basis letter; admissibility eventually, was, fact, how- Bassen’s pedophilia, with a but consistent out pedophile profile. ever, evidence the circuit court received it into have ad- Dr. Annon would DOE; objection by investiga- the DOE does not without the DOE to conduct an extensive vised admissibility including challenge appeal. background, inter- the letter's Norton's tion into C.P., candy hugs Amy girls reported and solicit from the before as A.C. herein classes; Arakaki, left to attend their time, afternoon Mokapu’s vice-principal at the not, however, routinely hug boys would that Norton had rubbed A.C.’s chest beneath Apparently, him. that visited Norton was second, outer shirt but over inner only passes hall teacher issue shirt.23 Norton had visit him invited A.C. to purpose simply visiting with children dur- recess; during lunch she did not because recesses, ing opposed lunch to ensuring recess, being during like outdoors she they completed unfinished homework accept standing Norton’s invitation assignments. According two or three times a week. early January approximately one girls, as A.C. sat in a chair near Norton’s semester, spring or two weeks into the desk, Norton, own chair seated his some Schlosser became aware that Norton had A.C., said, away here, two feet from I “Come issuing passes hall recommenced to students. a hug.” want her A.C. rolled chair closer to passes Schlosser was “concerned” about the Norton, up, pushed stood the chair under- because, according deposition to his testimo- desk, hugged neath Norton’s Norton. “confusion,” ny, they caused as students She then chair retrieved the from under- would “collect” them and use them without sitting neath Norton’s desk and resumed proper authorization. was not He “con- proceeded it. Norton to rub A.C.’s shoulder cerned,” however, using about Norton hand; and neck with left he tickled her passes in order to alone with a female neck, then moved his down hand across her student; frequent- this was because he would chest, between the two shirts that she wore. ly during roam halls lunch recess and He rubbed her chest for several seconds. observe numerous in Norton’s room. children Moreover, harbored “no Schlosser concern attempted away A.C. move Nor- being inappropriate” [Norton] about with the ton, pressed but her Norton back into the To contrary, appears, children. chair; point, at that what she did know conveyed early Schlosser Janu- C.P., friend, present do. who was A.C.’s (before ary allegations further frightened at the time and when she became surfaced), against Norton that Schlosser be- slip saw Norton’s hand between A.C.’s two preroga- should lieved teachers have the *17 doors, Running shirts. to one of the room’s physically interacting tive with and touch- yelled to to “come on” she A.C. because ing students.22 elass[room],” “by friend theirs was our and, presumably, it was time for afternoon allegations against

2. The 1995 Nor- begin. up to A.C. and ran to classes stood ton, including predicate that those C.P., girls proceeded and both then their present matter afternoon class. a. accusation that AC.’s Norton mo- in C.P. n presence her lested afternoon, requested Later that that A.C. IS, talk Friday, she and C.P. be excused from January the afternoon of On class students, gradе fifth vice-principal; two identified school or the counselor deposition testimony might misinterpreted per- 22. trial Schlosser's are be and that Schlosser and entirely regard Thus, sonally disagreed not consistent with to whether policy. ap- with this post-reinstate- approved of Schlosser Norton’s pears that Schlosser "cautioned” Norton ment conduct in ing with students connection visit- touching any might the students in manner that testimony, hugging; deposition in his misinterpreted, (Schlosser) be also informed Norton that but he "believe[d] Schlosser asserted that that teach- personally he was in favor teachers physically be ers should touch able interact and touching appropriate manner. students an students”; however, at trial he testified expect hugging he "not [Norton] that did to be previously appears It that touched Norton had children,” though touching [or] children even he fourth-grader A.C.’s chest once when she was a visiting “in of” the was favor children Norton’s semester, that, during the 1994 fall but when recesses, during despite classroom lunch T.Y.'s reported prior A.C. had incident to her allegations. testimony, deposition Schlosser’s mother, responded proba- was her mother that it however, suggests aas matter of DOE "un- bly an accident. policy,” generally spoken teachers were discour- any aged touching from manner students that busy, parents and C.P.’s to dis- girls relat- of AC.’s was consent because former Schlosser, addition to to Norton. incident to Arakaki. them statements ed close Arakaki, nonetheless, meeting with describing kept conduct A.C. his scheduled Norton’s get simply any him that she not want to Norton asserted did Norton order to tell previously Norton had allegations into trouble discussion A.C.’s C.P.’s ac- prior had A.C. that student postponed. informed be Norton related would past. Ara- touching attorney him of her in the cused had him Schlosser advised kaki memorandum directed anyone. drafted discuss the matter with and also regarding the incident Schlosser Schlosser, allegations Melony’s and Nicole’s who “off- b.

attempted to contact campus” day, by telephone. 17,1995, Tuesday, January provid C.P. On speaking with did succeed in ed with the names other stu

Arakaki Schlosser Meanwhile, evening. present until she Schlosser whom believed had been dents she approximately telephoned 2:30 allegedly Norton at the time he Norton’s classroom him, result, message received his p.m., on left As a Wed rubbed A.C.’s chest. p.m. 18, 1995, at approximately call 6:30 She nesday, January return sum Schlosser allegations A.C.’s eight informed approximately to ten students moned placed being on administrative them in con into his office and interviewed holiday), Tuesday (Monday was a leave as of Among accusation. these nection A.C.’s investiga- Melony so that the school could conduct and Nicole. Schlosser students Nicole, Norton that tion. Arakaki further informed Melony and well interviewed students, yet able to inform Schlosser she had not been on the follow second time allegations, 19,1995.24 January but that Schlosser ing day, Thursday, A.C.’s contacting him in to schedule be order interviews Melo- Schlosser’s with him. meeting first ny and Nicole Saturday, January at the re- On Melony and mother, Schlosser Nicole met with interviewed quest A.C.’s Schlosser Wednesday. A.C., C.P., mothers; separately issued He excuse i-espective and them them, summoning slips office them his to be informed of the A.C.’s mother asked girls afternoon Both felt them classes. Schlosser assured “status” incident. being princi- nervous about summoned an in- mother that he would conduct A.C.’s office, pal’s why know did not he had sum- independently HPD vestigation inves- them, initially they moned believed tigation might On the conducted. had been “in trouble.” Neither called day, both A.C. were same Schlosser interviewed C.P., principal’s office pre- before. who confirmed what *18 viously told Arakaki. Schlosser “believed them, he interviewed Schlosser When absolutely.” [A.C.] girl had asked each whether she observed 16, 1995, Monday, January holiday, anything unusual in Norton’s classroom dur-

On Norton, ing Friday. confirming that lunch on He had each recess Schlosser contacted describe, using diagram had placed and of them he he was on administrative leave Norton, room, A.C., him, princi- scheduling meeting in the drawn of Norton’s where school, located at time place to take and had Norton pal’s office of different C.P. been Apparently, following day allegedly to discuss touched A.C. neither on the order However, Melony nor had witnessed inci- Nicole AC.’s accusation. DOE’s not, Melony during this Specialist at and Nicole did District dent. Windward Personnel interview, Honda, time, inform Schlosser that Nor- Schlos- initial Francine instructed Tuesday, previously in a January post- ton had touched each them ser them that had made feel “uncоmfort- pone meeting with Norton so that he manner his and obtain the gather could more information able.” [Norton], that, go "when we also inter- Schlosser record reflects that Schlosser H.D., Melony’s our in the course of butt[s]” and Nicole's he sort rubs viewed one of friends, who, Nicole, girls hug. Melony reported giving each like

(2) Schlosser’s second interviews Me- spring of the 1995 semester which Norton lony mid Nicole touched her in a manner that was “uncom- fortable.” One the incidents occurred in Thursday, January On Schlosser 1994, approximately October a week before again Melony once summoned Nicole her, hugging Halloween. As he was Norton time, his questioned office.25 This he both placed fingers two of his the back inside time, girls at asking the same them whether pocket pants, rubbing of her “butt” her for Norton had ever touched them. Both Melo- seconds, approximately five to ten until she ny practice and Nicole described Norton’s away Throughout walked from him. hugging them before left to attend af hug, kept course this Nicole her arms at reported ternoon classes and that Norton her sides did not return hug. Norton’s had touched them in a manner made Although she believed Norton had been “uncomfortable”; girl them feel physi each rubbing intentionally, her buttocks and de- cally way demonstrated Norton had spite the fact that the incident made her touched her. “uncomfortable,” she did not angry become subsequent In a proceeding criminal because she did not realize what Norton against arising Melony’s out Norton “wrong.” had done was As a result of the accusations, Melony Nicole’s testified incident, changed also Nicole the manner hug the course of a routine she for before left Norton, hugged shortening she class, hugged her afternoon Norton her in permitted amount of time that hugs she manner that she did not think was “okay” Nonetheless, apparently last. on two oth- and that made her feel “uncomfortable.” occasions, er Norton rubbed waist her hug point during This occurred at some similarly in a buttocks “uncomfortable” man- 1994 fall visiting semester. had She been ner. recess; during Norton the lunch before leav- ing, give Nicole identified one the incidents hug,” she “went to him a dur- while her, ing put which Norton had rubbed hugging my “he hand her buttocks as down back down, having early January occurred go and then and as start[ed] and he having my touched involved much the behavior sitting me on butt.” Norton was same time, Melony him; Norton had hugged at the while described. she stood beside sitting position, her from a hugged while Nicole was hug her with his left arm. This standing dropped before him. His hugs hands “different” than other she had received Norton; down her back and “rubbed” her buttocks made her “fe[e]l uncomforta- hand, approximately “back and forth” for five to ble” because his left which he had seconds, away. “cupped,” stop ten until she walked came to a on her She buttocks (over clothes) forming girls described a line so that approximately her five sec- leaving all a hug could receive before away untO onds she walked from Norton. Although girls their afternoon classes. Melony “really testified that she was mad” line, they “doing behind her in were hug, Norton but that because she did and, apparently, other stuff’ at the anyone time did not tell about it at time because rubbing observe Nicole’s but- she “didn’t think it law” Melony, any- tocks. Like Nicole did not tell get did not she want to Norton into trouble. *19 one about the incidents she did because not hug, Melony As a result of the altered the get to herself Norton; want or Norton into trouble. manner in hug in- she Moreover, him, Nicole did not know whether the standing of to stead next or in front of touchings “big enough” were someone tell approach she would him from behind his Instead, “put about. tried to it Nicole be- hug chair and him over back. forgot it.” [her] hind about proceeding against At the same criminal Norton, interviewing of Nicole described three incidents dim- In the course them on 1995, 19, ing Thursday, January first the 1994 fall semester and the told weeks Schlosser However, trial, Melony 25. At Schlosser testified that second interview. the circuit court version—i.e., girls’ Nicole came to see him of their own accord and found the that he summoned that he did not them class more summon them—to be credible. very adequately had to—to with that sensi- deal Melony and Nicole that what Norton criminal, Thus, them but that neither of unique done was as- tive and issue.” Sehlosser However, trial and in a trouble. that, initially once he had interviewed serted that he pretrial deposition, testified Sehlosser students, “investigate” he did not further believed, allega- time he heard their A.C.’s, H.D.’s, Melony’s, allega- or Nicole’s tions, consti- that the conduct described tions. “brushings,” inappropriate rather than tuted Yet, “fondling.” in his touchings or sexual c. Nоrton in connection Prosecution deposition testimony, of Sehlosser admitted A.C.’s, Melony’s, and Nicole’s with what a criminal he did not know constituted accusations sexual offense. believing girls had Apparently that both as is unclear to who informed record inci- respective parents the disclosed them military or of the HPD Melo- either the CID him, they had described to Sehlosser dents However, as ny’s allegations. Nicole’s had gilds’ that he parents did not inform the 17, 1995, HPD was January conduct- them, relay nor what the

interviewed did he ing investigation—at least with re- own girls regarding to him Norton. had stated accusation, Melony’s not gard to A.C.’s if however, happens, girls As it neither Moreover, ini- appears and Nicole’s. hugs parents Norton’s had told their about tially, military investigated CID Melo- being office called into Schlosser’s about 24, January ny’s allegations did around “d[o] Sehlosser not interviewed.26 anything” waiting for the 1995, because he was case to the HPD. transferred her girls’ parents contact him. believed He event, eventually prosecuted any Norton was con- inappropriate “[i]t [him] and, in allegations, with connection A.C.’s it’s any type investigation duct because separate prosecution, with connection Indeed, he policy not to do that.” [DOE] Melony’s and accusations.27 He was Nicole’s parents, supra to H.D.’s note stated allegations indicted in connection A.C.’s January him who had contacted on Eventually, January on 1995. on No- she, H.D. to them that because had revealed pled Norton no contest vember too, “patted by on butt” Nor- had been forth in the charges set indictment relat- ton, not believed that he “could interview” May 3, It ing A.C. was until allegations. According to H.D. about her however, finally terminated the DOE Sehlosser, “Chapter 19 Hawai'i Adminis- [of Norton on his misconduct with A.C. based Rules ... states that 8] trative Title May Norton On was sentenced [ease], [the] kind misconduct school of sexual incarceration; year sentencing at his one investigation; up that it is not to do hearing, pri- had Norton admitted that he investigation, agencies do be- people history pedophilia.28 are not trained school level cause had, sentencing Melony’s Melony hearing, had re- at the con- mother learned that that Norton 26. Pretrial, ported being police from a molesting touched fessed to two dozen children. detective, 25, January telephoned admissibility who her around evidentiary parties disputed being her the case was 1995 to inform article, contending newspaper the DOE first handled the HPD. Nicole's mother in a admission was contained Norton’s accused molest- learned that Norton been proceeding. in the criminal sealed document Sunday ing newspaper A.C. from a article on a court, however, the article The circuit allowed 1995; morning January speaking while evidence, noting into that it not consider "would article, her of about the Nicole informed Nicole of matter it on the basis the truth asserted with her and of Norton’s Schlosser’s interviews molestations," but, rather, admitting prior hugs. purpose limited issue dam- “it for the ages [p]laintiffs viewing article.” prosecuted appears It that Norton was Thus, finding heading of fact under par- *20 regard allegation to H.D.’s because her with damages,” facts the cir- "additional relevant testify in a trial. did not wish her criminal ents that, sentencing hear- “[a]t cuit found May regard, published In this in an article on history prior pedo- ing, admitted his Norton 16, 1996, reported that the Honolulu Advertiser philia.” attorney prosecuting Keith Kaneshiro announced Meanwhile, KMCAS; regard Melony’s precluding entering and him from accusations, (6) notify parents Nicole’s Norton was indicted and “before them child is 2,May prosecution vigorously by any employ- 1996. The official or [DOE] interviewed Melony’s urged parents potential and Nicole’s aby to have ee about sexual abuse teach- daughters cooperate prosecuting in employees their er.” Because various DOE duties, foregoing plaintiffs so he would disabled breached the May 1997, molesting In other children. contended was liable them arising Melony’s proceeding criminal out of negligence failing for its “for to have exer- trial, inju- and Nicole’s accusations went to but cised reasonable due care to avoid the jury ry[,] resulted in a mistrial because the could cir- which was foreseeable under the verdict; not reach a both families in- cumstances.” jury’s formed that final vote had been that, plaintiffs alleged further The as a in favor eleven of conviction and one for conduct, result of Norton’s and the DOE’s acquittal. Norton was retried in December grievous Melony and Nicole both “suffered 1997; jury acquitted him. injuries, permanent and mеntal and emotion- Similarly, plaintiffs alleged al distress.” Background B. Procedtiral girl’s parents “individually that each suffered On November while the criminal grievous and mental and serious emotional proceeding Melony’s connection with and subjected injuries arising distress out of the allegations pending, girls’ Nicole’s children[,] required minor their parents, capacities in their individual and on family counseling extensive to the entire and daughters, complaint behalf of their filed perma- which has in substantial resulted and lia, against, inter a Norton and the DOE. The plaintiffs nent emotional distress.” The complaint asserted several distinct claims for sought “compensatory punitive damages and (1) relief, among tort them an intentional against compensatory ... dam- [Norton] and (2) Norton, against “in respon- claim a claim ages arising as to all out Defendants their ” superior against deat the DOE Norton’s therefore, injuries” and, prayed “general, (3) negligence against employer, claim special punitive damages provided by and separate independent DOE “as a and tort law[.]” wrongful from the acts and omissions DOE, complaint, its answer (4) Norton,” negligent infliction of emo- alia, sovereign immunity inter as a asserted to all tional distress claim “as defendants.” event, defense contended against As to claim their superceding tort Norton’s intentional DOE, plaintiffs part averred relevant plaintiffs’ injuries. Coupled cause of the the DOE “had a to each of the answer, with its the DOE asserted cross- (1) [pjlaintiffs” meaningful to: “conduct a alia, claim, inter Norton. investigation background prior” search trial, parties stipulated At that Norton Norton; (2) reinstating supervise Norton’s history prior pedophi- had an “extensive behavior,” practice “unusual such as his lia,” dispute and the DOE did he had “secreting during himself his classroom Melony plaintiffs molested Nicole. The issuing passes lunch hour hall testimony transcripts of introduced young girls,” given prior allegations; T.Y.’s gave criminal girls in connection with the (3) police promptly notify the and student’s evidence, prosecution of Norton into and nei- parents, learning allegations of a girl ther testified at the civil trial student; teacher’s abuse of the sexual however, testified, parents All matter. four employees monitoring “in train its James, expert Beverly in clinical as did investigation involving of matters sexual work, specializing social childhood trauma. incompe- to avoid abuse its teachers and tent, plaintiffs did not contend that either allega- investigations harmful of such injured tions”; physically Melony or Nicole had been urging” military to “avoid them, at least not “persona grata" sta- Norton’s molestation withdraw Norton’s non required vouching” him medical personally tus “avoid in the sense either Rather, military asserted that “in a manner that care. resulted” *21 contemporaneous voluntary of a in nature.29 Because injuries psychological their were Norton, bankruptcy proceeding involving the plaintiffs’ psychologi- the testified that James plaintiffs’ all the and re- circuit court dismissed permanent cal were disorders regard treatment, against With quanti- claims him.30 quire which she extensive DOE, not, however, the plaintiffs’ against claims the circuit plaintiffs make The did fied. lia- that the was not any precise court determined DOE to isolate the sources effort plaintiffs sundry ble to the under the doctrine psychological disorders them that, traumas; respondeat superior for Norton’s molestation example, testified James (molestation Melony of stu- psychological in- and Nicole assessing plaintiffs each being scope the em- “to- dents not within his juries damages, she considered the circumstances, including ployment), but that the DOE was liable Nor- tality” of the plaintiffs negligence and the on NIED girls, of the the school their molestation ton’s court ruled that of tes- claims. The circuit further investigations, criminal and the effect 662, STLA, did the It the HRS eh. not insulate proceedings. in the criminal tifying that, its appeal, liability significant the DOE does analysis NIED. discuss the circuit court’s plaintiffs’ We the nature extent contest III. injuries. part in relevant section infra action, but "no specifically, all conducted” their tort the record reflects that More 29. against developed post may judgment traumatic nor [Norton] six be obtained addition, Melony syndrome. monetary has devel- may any In [plaintiffs] request stress oped oppositional award disorder, attachment defiant as to without further order of this [Norton] disorder, and deficit disorder. More- attention lirpe present matter court.” As of the over, James, plaintiffs’ expert, characterized 2000, January appears proceeded it to trial in Melony's psychological injuries as and Niсole's that no further order had issued from the bank- parents "developmental injuries.” tes- All of ruptcy court. feelings helplessness their to their tified as difficulty trial, appears parties After that the informed being protect coping with not able to that, Melony's the circuit court on December respective and Nicole’s children. their anger length discharged preex- bankruptcy about also testified their court had Norton's mothers by having isting dismissing plain- been informed and frustration over In debts. its order girls with the or their Schlosser of his interviews against tiffs’ claims and the DOE's cross-claim impacts Norton, In to other revelations him. addition the circuit court remarked relevant family dynamics the Davises and on the part as follows: hug girls Draughns, both have been unable It now come to the court’s attention that respective psy- result of fathers as a their their bankruptcy on December this case ' injuries. parents chological girls' The testi- also preexist- with Lawrence J. Norton’s closed girls' respec- regarding in the fied the contrasts ing discharged. debts deemed Norton molested tive behavior before after matter], [present In Plaintiffs' claims and Melony regard, suf- we note them. this Department Defendant State Hawai'i of Ed- psychological problems before fered from some against ucation’s cross-claim Lawrence J. Nor- her. Norton molested this ton had not been resolved due to court’s understanding bankruptcy re- case plaintiffs' against claims The dismissal open. mained July as On came about follows. Norton The new information received the court voluntary bankruptcy peti- Norton filed preexisting J. indicates that Lawrence Norton's bankruptcy petition, the of his tion. As plaintiffs’ result discharged. debt has been deemed naming Norton a defen- tort action as ’ powers, Pursuant to inherent this court its automatically stayed, apparently by op- dant was remaining claims therefore orders ... However, filed of statute. on motion eration against [the Lawrence J. Norton in Defendant pres- bankruptcy plaintiffs in the court to, matter], present including, but not limited matter, bankruptcy court modified ent Plaintiffs' and Defendant Slate of Ha- claims stay. bankruptcy noted that automatic The court cross-claim, Department wai'i of Education's only stay plaintiffs' the automatic affected hereby prejudice. are dismissed Norton, against against his but not those claims judgment, Subsequently, in final the circuit bankruptcy court noted also codefendants. foregoing incorporated court order as fol- bankruptcy proceeding, as a result of the [c]ourt’s lows: "Pursuant order dated attorney funds hire lacked the against Law- March claims Defendant defending against plaintiffs' represent him in rence J. Norton were dismissed because bankruptcy Consequently, or- claims. bankruptcy.” discharged appeal, On "pro- plaintiffs’ tort action could dered challenge parties none the circuit court’s cooperation participation with the full ceed [Norton], respective including their claims Nor- appearance a trial dismissal of discovery [might] be ton. and as to such witness *22 “ omitted). circuit court Similarly, pari determined that ‘[l]aws in mate- plaintiffs’ damages ria, matter, total upon subject follows: the same shall ” Nicole, general $400,000 damages of other,’ and be construed with to each reference “ $50,000 special damages of and, and for each of thus, may ‘what is clear in one statute damages $200,000 parents, general her of upon explain in what called aid ” special damages $15,000; similarly, and of (quoting § doubtful in Id. 1- another.’ HRS $400,000 Melony, general damages of (additional omitted). (1993)) citation $50,000 special damages and of and for each parents, general $200,000 of damages her B. Findings Fact And Conclusions Of Of $13,750. special damages and Because Law conduct, however, Norton’s a also sub- Duty 1. care causing plaintiffs’ inju- stantial factor in ries, the court circuit determined that ... duty, a The existence of “degree causing DOE’s fault” in is, such relation whether a exists between plaintiffs’ injuries forty-nine percent. community parties impose will Accordingly, judg- the circuit court entered legal a obligation one for the benefit ment, regard plaintiffs’ negli- other—or, simply, more whether the gence and NIED in claims favor plaintiff interest of a who suffered against DOE, and in an protection legal invasion is entitled representing forty-nine amount percent of expense entirely of a defendant—is damages;31 total regard their but with question of law.... claim, respondent superior circuit Dep’t, Police Hawai'i Honolulu Ruf v. judgment court entered in favor of the DOE (citations 972 P.2d plaintiffs. and omitted) (some points ellipsis added and original). in Accordingly, some this court II. REVIEW STANDARDS OF reviews a trial court’s of law with conclusion Interpretation A. Statutory regard duty of care defendant interpretation “The of a statute ... plaintiff owes to a in a action “de question [,] is a of law reviewable de novo." In novo right/wrong under the standard” Doe, 20, 1995, (citations omitted). re Born on such, Jane June 95 review. Id. As Hawai'i “examine[s] court the facts an (citations, quotation signals, and brackets [i.e., question swers] the whether the defen omitted) points (ellipsis original). in In con plaintiff dant if duty owes the of care statute, struing a “our obligation foremost so, scope duty] being of that without give to ascertain effect intention required give any weight to the trial legislature, pri (citations omitted). which is to be obtained court’s answer to it.” Id. marily language contained the This is because a trial court’s “conclusion Id. statute itself.” 20 P.3d at 624 binding upon appellate law is not court [an] (citations omitted). Moreover, “we must read freely appeal] and is for its [on reviewable statutory language omitted) (some (citations the context of the en correctness.” Id. omitted). tire statute and it in a construe manner brackets added and some purpose.” [the statute’s] consistent with Id. duty legal 2. Breach causation (citations omitted). “may We also consider law, spirit of the and the ‘[t]he cause'which there was breach Whether not, i.e., legislature induced the to enact it whether there was ” meaning.’ (quoting part discover its true failure on the defendant’s exercise 1-15(2) (1993)) (additional care, question HRS citation reasonable for the trier Specifically, capacities, the circuit court Ni- their circuit awarded individual $98,000 parents, capacity cole's their awarded general damages as Nicole’s Nicole's mother father $7,350 Melony's guardians damages parents, special ad litem and in their $98,000 Melony's litem, guardians general Melony’s capacity ad each and and father mother $196,000 $6,375 damages damages general damages special special in the amount of $24,500 damages in the amount of each. each. *23 rule[,] III. prevailing fact. ‘under DISCUSSION of “For the by ... the duty is bounded foreseeable that, matter, emphasize As an initial we range danger,’ of and ‘reasonable foresee- dispute that Nor- appeal, parties do not very prototype ability of harm is the of the Melony Nicole. Nor do the ton molested and pass upon must in question a of [trier fact] parties disagree regarding nature and in of conduct particularizing the standard wit, injuries, plaintiffs’ extent of the ”it.’ the case before plaintiffs various each of the suffer from Hotel, Inc., Gateway likely per- 69 psychological v. Waikiki Knodle disorders are (1987) (cita- Moreover, P.2d not dis- Haw. manent. the DOE does omitted) (some findings brackets and pute tions added circuit courts of fact vis-a- omitted) (ellipsis in points original). some vis and not taken its the actions taken reasonably Similarly, presence of a investigating in employees “[t]he course T.Y.’s, A.C.’s, Melony’s, reports between the defendant’s close connection and Nicole’s !&[,] rather, injury, plaintiffs improprieties; conduct and of Norton’s sexual likely duty import was more acts disputes legal ^whether the breach DOE of these causing Finally, parties than not substantial factor and none omissions. of the of[,] normally question complained is pretrial harm challenge the circuit court’s ” (citations Id. [trier fact] for the too.’ admissi- rulings rulings concerning or its (some omitted) and bility brackets added some of exhibits. omitted). Accordingly, absent uncontrovert- the issues raised in the DOE’s Because only from one inference ed evidence potentially outcome-disposi- cross-appeal are drawn, reasonably questions of can plaintiffs’ appeal, tive of those in the raised legal duty causation constitute breach points we of error that the DOE address fact, appeal only reviewable on questions cross-appeal in its before address- advances See, e.g., Taylor-Rice v. for clear error. ing plaintiffs in their those raise 60, 69-70, State, 979 P.2d 91 Hawai'i appeal. Knodle, (1999); Haw. at 1095-96 384-85. Cross-Appeal A. The DOE’s clearly ‍​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‍finding of A fact erro (1) argues court: The DOE that the circuit (1) “when the record lacks substantial neous wrongly concluded that the STLA did not (2) support finding, de evidence immunity liability cloak the DOE with from support of the spite substantial evidence (2) NIED; alleged negligence for its finding, appellate court is nonetheless plaintiffs’ wrongly that the NIED concluded and firm that a with definite conviction left compensable in claim was the absence Doe, made.” In re Jane mistake been (3) wrongly physical injury; imposed “nеw (citation Hawai'i at 623 omit upon concluding that the duties” DOE “ ted). ... ‘Substantial evidence’ credible only “a DOE owed the quality is of [that] evidence sufficient students, supervise but to take such reason- person probative [as] value enable able measures would be reason- taken caution” to a conclusion. reasonable draw students”; injury parents able avoid (citation quotation signals and some omit finding employees clearly erred ted) (ellipsis points original). duties”; “new breached the

clearly finding that breaches erred Credibility Witnesses C. causing a substantial factor in were each Of plaintiffs’ psychological injuries. address We an appellate “[I]t well-settled arguments the DOE’s seriatim. dependent pass will issues credibility of upon the witnesses and the Sovereign Immunity evidence; province is the weight of the (1993), Doe, 662-2 trier fact.” re Jane Pui'suant HRS “the (citations, immunity liability for ... waives its Hawai'i at 20 P.3d at 623 State omitted). points employees the torts of its shall be liable quotation signals, ellipsis (1985), in the same and to manner the same extent 105 S.Ct. 87 L.Ed.2d 38 private that, aas individual like circum- posits under plaintiffs’ inasmuch as the stances!;.]” that, This in so court has held negligence and NIED claims out of’ “arise providing, “definitely legislature ex- battery Melony Norton’s assault and pressed purposes the intent misrepresentation Nicole or Sosa’s determining liability [the] of the State tort military, sovereign immunity retains its cases, accepted all the tort relating law claims, liability pursuant for those *24 private parties Upchurch applicable.” is v. 662-15(4). §HRS State, 150, 151, 112, Haw. 51 454 P.2d 114 response, plaintiffs contend (1969). However, “exceptions” several to the negligence that their and NIED claims general immunity waiver of from tort claims against directly the DOE do not “arise out (1993 § in Supp. are set forth 662-15 HRS & girls.32 of’ Norton’s molestation of the The 2001). that, Consequently, we held “if a plaintiffs negligence observe that their private party would be under liable the cir- predicated upon NIED claims are breaches cumstances[, would then] State also be of the DOE’s that care were commit liable, except for claims [those] enumerated by employees ted than Ac Norton. 152, § in [HRS 662-15].” Id. at 454 P.2d cording plaintiffs, simply to the because 114. girls Norton’s molestation of fore The DOE invokes “the intentional tort” seeable result of the unreasonable conduct 662-15(4), exception, § set in forth HRS employees other DOE not transform does argue plaintiffs’ it is immune from the them and NIED into claims negligence and NIED claims. The intention claims that out “arise of’ Norton’s conduct. exception provides al tort part relevant general sovereign the STLA’s waiver The STLA modeled after the Fed 662-2, immunity, (FTCA), § apply does not HRS eral Tort Act Claims 28 U.S.C. assault, 1346(b) “[a]ny arising battery, See, claim seq. §§ out of e.g., and 2671 Fi et arrest, imprisonment, State, 369, 383-84, gueroa false false v. malicious 61 Haw. 604 libel, slander, prosecution, 1198, (1979); process, State, Rodrigues abuse of P.2d 1206 v. deceit, (1970). 509, misrepresentation, 52 Haw. 472 interference P.2d 517 662-15(4). § with rights.” Accordingly, contract may, HRS this court the absence Shearer, 52, Citing authority,33 v. 473 United States of other turn law U.S. to federal case 392, argue Coley, Ga.App. also terms ‘'as- Human 247 Resources v. ’’battery,” 165, employed (2000). sault’’ and in HRS 544 S.E.2d 170-71 To the extent 662-15(4), pan § should be construed materia conduct—touching Melony that Norton’s Ni- assault, battery, penal proscribing statutes therefore, (and, in an cole "uncomfortable” "of- thus, offenses; and sexual because Norton's con- context) in the fensive” tort manner—constituted duct not have constituted a criminal "as- tortious, criminal, necessarily but not assault "battery” sault” or originally in 1957 at the time the STLA battery, clearly within ambit his conduct falls enacted, plaintiffs posit exception. of the STLA’sintentional tort Melony his molestation of and Nicole does not and, 662-15(4), § fall therefore, within ambit HRS cite, parties 33. The our do own research that the is not shielded sover- unearthed, any has not Hawai'i decision that claims, eign immunity against their even if their "arising phrase construed the out of” as do, fact, claims "arise out of" Norton’s con- Indeed, 662-15(4). § employed in HRS the Ha- view, Contrary plaintiffs’ legisla- duct. appellate § wai'i courts have cited to HRS 662- express ture’s tery” enumeration of [and] "assault bat- 15(4) infrequently part, for the most exception—as within the intentional tort State, 624, passing. v. 637 See Towse 64 Haw. n. as, generally, well more within State Tort 1, 696, (1982) (agreeing 647 P.2d 698 n. 1 Liability whole—clearly Act as a evinces an in- properly party circuit state dismissed "battery,” tent "assault” and as well as the plaintiffs' impris- because defamation and list, false remainder be construed the context precluded un- criminal) onment claims state (rather Thus, of tort than law. 662-15(4)); City County § v. 662-15(4)’s der HRS Orso plain § context of HRS and unam- Honolulu, 242, 241, 56 Haw. 534 P.2d biguous lаnguage legislature’s reflects the intent of 489, 490, (1975) (in damages sovereign immunity 492-93 action for to retain liability state’s defamation, arrest, "arising imprisonment, for false false tort claim out of” an tortious, criminal, alia, holding, employee’s prosecution, rather than and malicious assault inter battery 662-15(4) person. Department immunity § another See retained in HRS any employee” of federal omission of construing parallel provisions of PTCA scope of guidance construing government acting the STLA. “while within Cf. Ltd., Agency, v. employment, Reliable Collection cir office or under [or her] Schefke 425, 52, 408, Hawai'i States, if a where the United cumstances that, previously (noting having dealt “[n]ot claim private person, would be liable to the § claim HRS 878-2 with a retaliation under place ant law in accordance with the ..., construing may look in HRS 378- we (Quot the act omission occurred.” where 2, analogous interpretations of ‘to federal States, v. 487 U.S. ed in United Sheridan ” guidance’ courts for laws the federal n. 101 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Inc., Am., Shoppe v. 94 Haw (quoting Gucci (1988).) substantially provision This simi (2000)) 377, 14 P.3d ai'i §§ lar 662-2 and 662-3. Like the to HRS (additional omitted)); v. citations State Cri STLA, “[a]ny apply FTCA does 282, 287-88, sostomo, 94 Hawai'i assault, arising battery, out false claim “[bjecause (noting [Ha 878-79 *25 arrest, imprisonment, prose false malicious 24(c) Rule Procedure] waii Rule of Penal libel, slander, cution, process, of mis abuse (1996)] nearly to its is identical federal [ deceit, representation, or with interference i.e., counterpart, Federal Rules of Criminal 2680(h) rights[.]”34 § 28 contract USC 24(c) (1999),[ this court ] Rule [ ] Procedure 1, 108 Sheridan, (quoted at n. in 487 U.S. 394 guidance” may parallel federal law for look 2449). S.Ct. (citations omitted)). urges adopt that we the reason- The DOE (USC) 28 Pursuant to United States Code ing plurality of the United States Su- of 1346(b), § the district courts of the United which, Shearer, Court, preme that the in held jurisdiction are vested “exclusive States exception FTCA’s intentional tort “encom- against civil on claims actions United sounding in 473 passfes] negligence.” claims States, damages injury money for for or 57, U.S. at 105 3039. Vernon Shearer personal injury or S.Ct. property, or death loss Army. wrongful private was in Id. negligent act or the United States caused or er, changes, City County applicable than non-substantive not other minor was County City 662-15(4) Honolulu); language § of HRS has not been Salavea v. Hono- 51, lulu, 216, 2, originally 2 Haw. 222 n. 517 P.2d n. it Two 55 55 altered since was enacted. J„ (Levinson, (1973) concurring dissenting) standing reports purpose note committee that 662-15(4), (noting § against permit "under HRS 'Slate' of the STLAis "to tort claims arising negligent employ- torts is not agents”); liable for intentional acts from of its [state] State, 70, 74, Haw.App. 255, v. 6 Rep. Littleton No. in ees.” Sen. Stand. Comm. 829, (in Journal, 526; general 832-33 discussion Hse. 1957 Senate at see also STLA, that, observing 1030, § [HRS] “under 662- Rep. in House Stand. Comm. No. 1957 15(4)[, exempt liability is from in situa- Journal, state] purpose," at 926. To "effectuate this liable”), person might private tions where a 662-15(4) § to be "[c]ertain deems claims HRS 220, (1985); affirmed, 68 Haw. 708 P.2d 824 scope” of the STLA. Sen. Stand. [the] outside State, 616, 620-23, Fogarty Haw.App. v. 705 255, Journal, Rep. No. in 1957 at Comm. 526; Senate 72, (1985) (observing that state em- P.2d 76-77 Rep. also Hse. Stand. Comm. No. support ployee’s misrepresentations could claim Journal, Thus, 1030, 926. in 1957 House at assumpsit relief in tort or in and hold- for either language reflecting, than as the STLA’s that, 662-15(4) § ing tort while HRS barred plain, itself makes STLA waives misrepresentation, claim of claim for breach immunity "arising claims out of” the state’s could, warranty implied nonetheless, sounding assumpsit employee negligent acts of a not "aris- state but againsl under be maintained state torts, ing his her intentional out of” or 661-1(1) though (Supp.1984), §HRS even such history legislative STLA's is little assistance. assumpsit employ- an claim be based Publ'g misrepresentations); Co. v. ee’s Mitsuba STLA,however, the 34. FTCAcontains Unlike State, 771, Haw.App. "excep- "exception” an to the intentional tort alia, (1980) (holding, circuit did inter court tion,” provides part which in relevant dismissing abuse defamation its discretion apply "any arising ... claim out FTCAshall against claim and Office of Pro- state Consumer arrest, assault, battery, imprisonment, false false “proper partfy],” tection neither was a because prosecution” process, as a abuse of or malicious 662-15(4)). citing §HRS investigative or the "acts omissions of result of Moreover, history of tire Stales legislative law enforcement officers United the STLA's 2680(h) (quoted in legislature Government^]” USC first codified STLA scant. The Sheridan, 2449). n. 487 U.S. at 394 108 S.Ct. amended times. Howev- 1957'and has several at 3039. off inescapable phrase S.Ct. While “it ‘arising out Army away battery’ from was enough he of assault [or] broad base stationed, serviceman, encompass sounding negligence,” another Private An- claims 57, 105 Heard, kidnapped drew id. at 3039.35 and murdered him. S.Ct. mother, administratrix, as Shearer’s however, plaintiffs, observe that a ma- attempted to sue United States under the jority Supreme of the United States Court FTCA, claiming Army’s negligence that the apparently has retreated from the Shearer her caused son’s death. Id. at 105 S.Ct. plurality’s draconian view the in- FTCA’s specifically, 3039. More she claimed that the exception, noting tentional tort subse-

Army, which knew that Private Heard was Sheridan, quently acknowledged the Court dangerous because he had been convicted that, “in at least some fact situations^] manslaughter by a German as- while injury an directly caused signed Army Germany to an base battery liability will preclude assault (1) “negligently carelessly failed [ ] government negli- [federal reasonably exert sufficient control over” gently allowing the assault occur.” 487 him, persons “to warn other U.S. at 2449. S.Ct. The salient large,” “to ... remove [him] facts before the Sheridan Court duty.” military active Id. at 105 S.Ct. follows: finishing After his shift a naval medical hospital, aide Can- consumed In a decision in which Justice Powell took the. *26 wine, rum, quantity of large and other justices part, no four of the United States beverages. packed alcoholic He then Supreme Court it believed “clear that re belongings, including some of his a rifle spondent’s battery claim arises out of the ammunition, bag and into a uniform and 54-55, by committed Private Id. Heard.” later, quarters. his left Some time three According S.Ct. to the Shearer corpsmen lying naval found him face down plurality, recasting “[n]o of semantical events stupor in a the drunken on concrete floor can battery alter the fact that the was the hospital building. They attempted of a of immediate cause Private Shearer’s death room, him emergency take but he and, consequently, respondent’s the basis of away, grabbing bag broke the reveal claim.” Id. at plu S.Ct. 3039. The ing sight the barrel of the At the of rifle. rality noted that Shearer’s mother could not rifle, corpsmen They the fled. neither 2580(h) by § of [28 USC] “avoid reach Carr, nor took further action to subdue framing complaint her negligent terms of appropriate alerted the he authorities that prevent battery,” failure the assault and heavily brandishing was intoxicated and reasoning § that 28 USC 2580 not “does weapon. that evening, Later Carr fired merely bar or battery; claims assault for physical injury shots caused to one sweeping language it excludes claim petitioners property damage (em battery.” arising out assault Id. car. their phases in original). Accordingly, the Shearer plurality provision held that “this ... In suing cov 108 S.Ct. 2449. U.S. FTCA, ... negligence government ers] claims that sound in but federal under the battery general stem from a [federal committed contended that “the rule”— Thus, g]overnment ie., employee.” “[government Id. federal view, plurality’s express employ- Shearer torts of its “the words liable intentional respondent’s against they the statute bar claim inapplicable ees”—“was because were (citation government,” relying, the [federal id. not on the fact that Carr awas omitted), quotation signals g]overnment employee [federal internal because as- when he sion,” plurality 35. The Shearer observed that its inter- because the FTCA ac- focuses "the battery pretation employees." exception of the assault and tions Id. at 105 S.Ct. 3039 such, original). (emphasis with the "line of in- was ing inconsistent cases hold- As the FTCA’s g]overnment may exception apply [federal be held tentional tort does not to cases negligently failing prevent em- liable the inten- in which the intentional tortfeasor is not an non-employee government. supervi- ployee torts tional under its of the federal 2680(h) designed pre- them, negligence USC] rather saulted but on ... employees government who clude. [federal other rifle.” Id. prevent use of the failed hand, governmental where On the independent liability is of the assailant’s facts, majority Upon foregoing status, possible it to discern employment Appeals for the States Court of United (as- intentional tort two distinct torts: plaintiffs’ had Fourth Circuit held battery) government and the sault precedents, spe- claim foreclosed it. no negligence precipitated Where States, cifically Hughes v. United F.2d placed negligent supervision reliance is on Cir.1981) curiam) (4th (per (affirming principles, respondeat superior plaintiffs’ negli- dismissal of district court’s government action cause of postal it gence claim because arose out really be to “arise out of’ the cannot said employee’s with two minor sexual indecencies battery; on rather is based assault not as girls while his mail route and result separate of a le- government’s breach supervisor’s purported negligence in allow- gal duty. position ing him to where came remain he pled into cоntact with children after 397-98, 108 (quoting Id. at S.Ct. 2449 offense), Thigpen guilty to similar sexual (internal omitted) 824) F.2d citations (4th Cir.1986) States, 800 F.2d 393 omitted) v. United (some quotation signals internal (affirming plain- court’s dismissal district (emphasis original). split Recognizing claim it arose out of circuits, tiffs’ because appellate among the federal corpsman’s naval sexual with two indecencies split majority mimicked between girls hospitalized at minor while dissenting opinions in the Fourth Circuit’s Navy’s and not hospital naval as result opinion, Sheridan the United Su- States offending corpsman). negligent supervision preme granted “to decide Court certiorari Sheridan, n. 395-97 & 487 U.S. plaintiffs’ is one whether” “claim Winter, however’, Judge S.Ct. 2449. Chief battery ‘arising out of an assault or within *27 397-98, at dissented. Id. 108 S.Ct. 2449. 2680(h); majori- meaning § the of’ USC ty of the Fourth Circuit’s the Court reversed view, Judge In Chief Winter’s cases such opinion. at 2449. Id. 108 S.Ct. Hughes Thigpen, neg- which involved initially Court observed The Sheridan negligent ligent hiring su- or retention exception to the tort the FTCA claims, intentional pervision inapposite were to situa- all “unquestionably enough was broad to bar [federal “the for the tions which basis entirely on an and bat claims based assault g]overnment’s alleged liability nothing 398, 108 tery.” (emphasis at Id. S.Ct. employment do with assailant’s status.” the However, original). citing v. United States Stevens, quoted by Id. at 397. As Justice Muniz, 374 U.S. S.Ct. writing majority, for the Sheridan Chief (1963) (holding that a federal L.Ed.2d Judge had of Winter believed “claims prisoner, by in who was assaulted other negligent hiring supervision” and/or mates, damages against the could recover essentially grounded in are the doctrine prison negli officials United States because cases, respondeat superior. In these the assault), gently prevent the the failed liability arises, all, government’s only if at Court, noted, as we have acknowl Sheridan employment relationship. the because of situations!,] edged in at the “that least some employ- If the were not a federal assailant injury directly by an fact was caused ee, independent would be no basis there liability battery preclude assault or will not the against government. for a suit It is against gjovernment negli [federal the for allegation govern- this that an situation allowing Id. at gently the assault occur.” negligence legitimately can ment be seen 398-99, 108 S.Ct. 2449. [28 as an the USC] effort ‘circumvent’ 2680(h) bar; view, quite just it “two § is this situation— the Sheridan Court’s why liability possible only might explain Muniz’s government where is different theories perpe paychecks—that federal claim did not ‘arise out of the assault” [28 because of the 399, 108 by the Id. at plaintiffs], trated other inmates.36 at the time he shot at [the Carr theory S.Ct. 2449. first inso imposing liability would no basis for there alleged prison government,” far as officials [federal Muniz the on the insofar as he negligent, his “claim not did arise sole was not on time he shot at the the ly, and, therefore, predominately, or plaintiffs acting even out of the assault.” not with- theory, upon Id. scope employment. Under the focus of his federal Id. Thus, negligent acts or omissions of federal em 2449. Sheri- S.Ct. assault, view, ployee rather than which is dan Court’s did not waive FTCA “simply part sovereign immunity liability considered of the causal link any alleged Thus, injury.” arising Id. it was not the first in- Carr’s conduct involvement,” but, stance, “assailant’s individual merely even had his conduct been rather, Yet, negligence the “antecedent negligent. [federal Id. not- Sheridan Court employees]” from claim which Muniz’s simply ed that the case before it did not arise However, theory. conduct; rather, under first arise from Carr’s majority “exclusively attempted the Sheridan relied government to hold the federal theory, negligence second makes clear that liable “the [federal exception simply inap tort g]overnment employees intentional who allowed a fore- plicable fall scope to torts that battery outside seeable assault and to occur.” 1346(b)’sgeneral [28 USC] waiver” sov Consequently, con Sheridan Court ereign immunity for the conduct of federal plaintiffs’ negligence strued the claim as one 400, 108 employees. Id. at S.Ct. govern to hold the did seek federal theory, espoused by Under the second on the was a ment liable sole basis Carr Court, excep- tort Sheridan intentional scope employee acting federal within the [FTCA],” tion is “read the rest of the rather, employment; his the court construed and, therefore, “appl[ied] only to claims that claim as which “the one would otherwise be authorized the basic employees who other Government allowed sovereign immunity.” waiver of Id. Since battery may assault and to occur foreseeable only sovereign immunity waives FTCA liability a basis for furnish Government injuries personal “for negli- ‘caused entirely independent [the intentional gent wrongful act or omission of How employment tortfeasor’s] status.” Id. employee acting the Government while ever, expressly Sheridan Court did scope her] within the [or office question answer the on the basis of which employment,” id. at 108 S.Ct. 2449 certiorari, granted U.S. *28 (citation omitted) (some emphasis added ultimately held 108 insofar as it S.Ct. original), excep- tort some in the intentional exception not the tort did intentional “only applies arising tion out of cases Rather, apply plaintiffs’ the the claim. by employees,” id. at assaults federal government, “by held that the Court federal such, 108 2449. S.Ct. As the Sheridan Court voluntarily adopting regulations prohib reading of believed the better Muniz possession the of naval it[ed] firearms the excep- was that the FTCA’s intentional tort require[d] personnel and that all base apply prison tion did not inmates because the firearm,” report presence of as such actually who assaulted Muniz not were feder- undertaking “by voluntarily well as further employees. al Id. at 83 S.Ct. 1850. person visibly a provide care to who was armed,” had, Accordingly, it, Mary visibly as to the facts before drunk under law, nothing responsibility Court “assumed ... “[i]f [a] Sheridan observed land ‘perform “good of task a [its] more was involved here than the conduct Samaritan” result, pursued eventually 36. Muniz lost his vision his The other inmates Muniz into one Sheridan, eye. prison right “alleged prison’s that the dormitories. 487 U.S. Id. Muniz negligent failing prison guard provide opted A 399 n. 108 S.Ct. 2449. officials were enough guards and, instead, prevent assaults ... and in not to intercede ry, locked the dormito- mentally choosing letting prisoners, "apparently some to confine the alterca- of whom abnormal, intermingle supervi- adequate Id. The without tion[.]” other inmates then beat Muniz unconsciousness, skull; fracturing a sion.” Id. as ” (2d denied, Cir.1989), F.2d Id. S.Ct. careful manner.’ omitted) (some (citations broadly,” “interpreted ‘arising out having brackets added light of the original). holding negli federal consequently, some “that a voluntary assumption aof government’s supervision necessarily gent hiring or claim duty, wholly was “good which Samaritan” underlying arises out of an assault or bat did “arise of’ from and not out distinct tery”). employment, fact Carr’s federal however, Circuit, adopted a Ninth The happened employee to be federal Carr narrow FTCA’s tort view the intentional irrelevant; expressly the Sheridan Court States, Senger exception. 103 F.3d v. United appropriate in this noted that “it [was] (9th .1996), exemplary in this re Cir negligent hiring, case consider whether Senger gard. court its sister viewed training negligent supervision, negligent reasoning circuits’ as flawed on the basis provide liability may under ever basis immunity gov granting broad to the federal assault or the PTCA for a foreseeable bat employee negligence for the ernment one by g]overment employee.” tery [federal simply foreseeable 8, 108 because result n. Id. at 402-03 & S.Ct. negligence employee’s was that another fed Sheridan, the federal cir In the wake employee eral would commit an intentional agreed, generally cuits have with notable tort was FTCA’s inconsistent exception Ap United Court of of the States purpose ‘provide “to a forum for the avowed Circuit, plaintiffs peals for Ninth that a against gov resolution of claims the federal govern against negligence claim the federal by injury govern ernment caused predicated the federal ment ” negligence.’ (quoting Id. at 1441 ment’s hiring, training, supervision government’s 1502, 1504 States, Bennett v. 803 F.2d United employee an who commits foreseeable (9th Cir.1986)). demarcating Rather than plaintiff is sub intentional tort excep tort boundaries the intentional within, by, barred sumed therefore solely upon tion whether the tort- intentional exception tort FTCA’s intentional because employee, or was feasor was federal a claim from intentional tort- such stems Senger drew a line between relationship employment with the feasor’s entirely theory respon- on a claims “based and, therefore, government federal said which, view, superior,” deat in its were fore employee’s “arise out a federal intention of’ by exception, the intentional tort closed See, ally e.g., v. tortious conduct. Leleux “independent negli predicated upon claims (5th States, 178 F.3d Cir United gent gov [federal acts or omissions .1999)(holding that action “causes of distinct legal [plain that are causes ernment excepted intentional [the those under harm,” scope outside tiffs] fell exception] are tort nevertheless deemed exception, if tort intentional even governmental underlying barred when plaintiffs directly harm caused claim can conduct ‘essential’ employee’s intentionally federal tort. fairly be to ‘arise of conduct that read out 1504). Bennett, (citing F.2d at also See action,” excepted cause establish *29 (9th States, Brock 64 1421 v. United F.3d (citation omitted)); i.e., tort an intentional Cir.1995) (holding employee’s negli an (5th States, McNeily v. F.3d 343 United gent supervision predicated claim on Forest Cir.1993) (holding “plaintiff cannot supervise failure su plaintiffs Service’s excep tort avoid the of the intentional reach” subjected, pervisor, raped who had her and complaint “by framing his [or her] tion harassment, continuing and to her to sexual prevent negligent the terms failure eoworkers, supervise who harm”); her had retaliated excepted Ryan v. also United (N.D.Ill.2001) against Equal filing for a claim with States, her the F.Supp.2d alia, States, Employment Opportunity Commission (citing, inter Franklin v. United (10th Cir.1993); supervisor, by 1492, 1499 the was not the barred F.2d Westcott (8th exception); FTCA’s intentional tort Morrill City, 901 v. Omaha F.2d Cir.1987) States, (9th Cir.1990); States, v. F.2d 1426 United and Guccione v. United (2d Cir.1988), reh’g (holding negligent supervision claim ad F.2d 1035-37 dancer,” by “go-go Navy vanced who plain the noted that its review of the FTCA’s perform history hired club for enlisted language legislative men no unearthed raped was by explanation why who assaulted and Congress enlisted as to would waive man, by immunity not barred sovereign liability FTCA’s intentional from for claims States, exception); Kearney tort supervision v. arising negligent United out of of federal (9th Cir.1987) 815 F.2d 535 (holding patients—but wards—such as inmates and negligent supervision claim predicated upon immunity retain with respect to claims aris- employee’s federal an Army ing release of offi by neg- out of intentional committed acts cer, initially for rape, supervised detained who ligently employees. subse federal Id. wife, quently view, plaintiffs murdered In was not Bennett court’s the intentional by exception’s barred FTCA’s tort exception). “arising language ap- intentional tort of’ out peared “appl[y] equally to batteries Bennett, pre-Sheri.dan upon decision employees nonemployees.” federal relied, Senger which the Ninth Thus, Id. the Bennett court concluded that policy Circuit observed that underlying predicating application of the FTCA’s exception the FTCA’s tort intentional “was to exception solely tort upon intentional wheth- government liability insulate the from for (as opposed er intentional tortfeasor powerless prevent acts it was or which negligent employee who was some of a unusually would make defense lawsuit manner) employee was a federal was “irra- (citation difficult.” 803 F.2d at 1503 omit- tional.” Id. ted). view, In the Bennett court’s a third person’s battery “especially assault or Consequently, dif- the Bennett court held that prevent ficult to where known exception there no tort did not FTCA’s intentional behavior,” history of similar why, government which negli- insulate the federal from a law, person’s gence at common a third predicated upon crime or claim its failure to “ him, intentional tort an ‘independent, investigate hiring constituted a teacher before ” would, intervening cause’ generally he had application where admitted in his speaking, preclude a defendant’s employment antecedent valid bench warrant re- legal being outstanding regard from cause of an the mained Okla- person’s injuries. assaulted or charge battered Id. homa criminal “[ojutrage [pjub- (citation omitted). [djeceney,” upon The Bennett court em- lic as well as its retention however, that, it, phasized, case supervise before failure to the teacher after his plaintiffs had upon put supervisors not based them claim conduct on notice that he of respondeat superior, the doctrine molesting under was children. Id. 1502-03. The court, therefore, would have asserted as the Bennett deemed federal tortfeasor, employer government’s negligence”—rather intentional' “own than assault, government kidnapping, rape federal was liable inten- teacher’s tional legal tortfeasor’s acts omissions commit- several students—to be “the cause thus, scope employ- injury ted within the of his or her sued on” held Rather, plaintiffs ment. Id. at 1503-04. exception tort did not FTCA’s intentional predicated preclude obtaining them claim the federal relief government’s negligent supervision, hiring, government’s negligence. for the federal Id. investigation intentional tortfea- Although appears the Ninth to be Circuit sor, i.e., upon negligent acts and omis- lone federal circuit court embrace the employees sions other than the assailant. “narrow” view of the intentional tort FTCA’s exception, supreme a few state courts have

Expressing disagreement adopted its respect with the similar constructions with plurality’s apparent respective liability Shearer distinction be- their state tort acts. The held, Court, Supreme assailants are employees example, tween who federal Idaho for has 1504-05, not, claim, and those a negligent who are id. at the in the context of retention (ITCA)— regarded Bennett court the “historical evi- Idaho Tort Act the Claims drawing exception a dence” such distinction as “far which tort contains intentional (similar 662-15(4)), provides from clear.” at Id. 1504. The Bennett court which HRS 66 protect entity duty make efforts part governmental “a reasonable relevant danger. a A out its from such breach which students ‘[a]rises liable claim

is not ” Durtschi, negligence.... duty battery,’ v. of that constitutes Doe of assault [or] (1986); [Thus, 466, 1238, actions not neces- teacher’s] [do the 716 P.2d 1243 110 Idaho cause, 647, sarily] supervening constitute a Barowsky, 129 Idaho Kessler v. see also (1997)—does 641, [does] tortious conduct not immunize the school district’s 931 P.2d 648 battery. liability out of the assault and the arise a district from under school Rather, the roots of the assault bat- exception tort where stu- intentional ITCA’s negligence. tery in the district’s own [lie] whom the a teacher dents were molested reasonably antic- “should have school district negligent Id. at 1244. context of the tort.” ipated ... would commit an intentional claim, supervision Supreme the Idaho Court Durtschi, Eschewing at 1245. 716 P.2d subsequently has that the ITCA’s inten- held intentional tort of the FTCA’s construction not, therefore, exception tional tort had exception federal courts that most long who a bar as “those constitute so plaintiffs’ negli- which the adopted under supervise reasonably should have barred, gence claims would have been subject anticipated super- them that those clearly “[i]t court reasoned that Durtschi Kessler, battery.” 931 vision would commit a immunity negligent to a to afford unsound P.2d at 648. force, intervening because defendant Finally, we note that Massachusetts anticipation [or her] of which made his very similarly reject- Supreme has Judicial Court about ex- negligent, brought conduct intentional a “broad” construction ed Durtschi, 1244 pected harm.” 716 P.2d at Massachu- exception tort contained (citation omitted). such, As the Durtschi See, e.g., Act. v. setts Tort Claims Dobos injuries arose that “the children’s court ruled Driscoll, 634, 558, Mass. 537 N.E.2d school negligence out of the basic (1989) (holding supervisory that “where the injuries and that their “were district” had, had, allegedly or should have officials consequence dis- of the school foreseeable public employee’s knowledge of assaultive retaining [the teacher] trict’s conduct, behavior, supervisor’s it is the rath- knowledge proclivities.” despite full of his conduct, employee’s than er intentional Id. 1243. negli- that is true focus” of the claim). gence hand, On the DuHschi course, recognized plaintiff “of court repeatedly held that the STLA We have battery merely point to an assault and cannot liberally “should construed effectuate claim, simply on occur based its and then purpose compensate victims of rence, negligent the state was negligent state officials conduct of em preventing agree, it.” at 1245. We inso ployees manner in the same same essence, is, else far as such claim in little private person in like circum extent as Shearer, recasting,” than “semantical 656, Shaner, 665, v. 57 Haw. stances.” Breed 55, 3039, attempts to 105 S.Ct. U.S. 436, Rogers (citing v. 562 P.2d superior negli respondeat claim in cloak a State, 378, P.2d 51 Haw. inten gence clothing so as circumvent the (1969) (refusing to 381-82 “emasculate” the However, exception. we also tional tort broadly construing the “discretion STLA government entity should agree, where “the exception “operation ary to include function” anticipated reasonably [its] one employees)); al level acts” state Ha cf. tort,” would commit an intentional employees Community Union v. waii Federal Credit Durtschi, 716 the STLA’s Keka, Hawai‘i 11 P.3d exception insulate tort does not intentional (“ liberally con ‘Remedial statutes are entity liability. As governmental from suppress perceived evil and strued to ” opined: the Durtschi remedy.’ (Quoting advance Ci the enacted Inc., Realty, danger Query eri v. Hawai'i fact Leticia that the foreseeable (1995) (brackets omit intentional or criminal misconduct ted).)). case, irrelevant; being a ... That we believe school district had *31 Ninth precisely theory liability the Circuit and the Idaho and Massa It is such a that high chusetts courts have articulated the bet exception the STLA’s tort pre intentional exception, view of tort cludes, ter the intentional allegedly negligent where the act opposed espoused by the “broad” view the “assault, employee the is asserted bat majority appellate of the federal courts. tery, arrest, imprisonment, false false mali latter, Adoption of grudging the construction libel, prosecution, cious process, abuse of irrationally pur the restrict remedial slander, deceit, misrepresentation, or inter pose compensate the STLA to victims of rights.”38 ference with contract HRS negligent employees.37 the conduct of-state 662-15(4). words, § plaintiffs’ In other the respondeat superior claim must out “aris[e] present matter, plaintiffs’ In the negli the of’ and battery girls Norton’s assault of the gence duplicitous and NIED claims are respondeat because his molestation of them is superior of them claim. the sole Under latter, DOE, plaintiffs’ basis of plaintiffs against the claim posit the the the his em employer, vicariously ployer, as Norton’s for the liable DOE. girls molestation of the because Norton’s hand, plaintiffs’ On negli- the other the of molestation within scope acts occurred gence and NIED predicated claims are not DOE; employment of his with the the con girls Norton’s se. per molestation employees, duct of other DOE such as Nor Rather, posit plaintiffs that other DOE supervisors, ton’s is irrelevant the DOE’s employees—specifically, Estomago, Schlos- potential liability, only because the material ser, duty a legally Sosa—breached question is whether Norton’s molestation of injuries.39 plaintiffs’ caused plain- The gii’ls a act negligent constituted that was tiffs’ theory negligence—predicated, scope employment. See, within of his is, upon the acts and omissions of Norton’s e.g., Wong-Leong Independent v. Hawaiian not, therefore, supervisors—does “arise out Inc., Refinery, 76 Hawai'i of’ (1994) (“to Melony Norton’s Ni- molestation respon- under [a] recover contrary, cole. To the Norton’s superior molestation theory, plaintiff

deat a must estab 1) Melony and Nicole arises out of negligent employee, lish: act Estoma- words, go’s, Schlosser’s, negli- and Sosa’s other breach of that is antecedent 2) gent legal plaintiffs injury; reinstating cause of acts and omissions negligent failing supervise act employee’s agree was within the him. We with the (citations omitted)). employment” scope Supreme Idaho disbelief Court’s note, view, ception plain departs meaning, 37.We in our federal courts no from has adopted FTCA, have support history view of legislative “broad” in the of the exception and, end, FTCA’sintentional tort undermine the "irrational”—waiving in the immu- purpose remedial the FTCA. "broad’’ view nity governmental alleging that a claims em- essentially posits premise the innocuous that the ward, ployee negligently supervised pa- remedy negligent FTCAaffords for the conduct tient, inmate, nonemployee or some under therefore, employees, of federal control, government’s preserving but immu- exception impliedly tort intentional munity retains im- nity liability alleging gov- from claims that a liability arising from for all claims out of negligently employee supervised ernment anoth- employee’s federal intentional torts. The Bennett, government employee. er 803 F.2d view, however, adopting the courts "broad” 1504-505; Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441-43. also hiring, negligent training, reasoned that a supervision gov- claim arises the federal such, plaintiffs’ 38. As to the extent that the base only directly ernment because the assailant who their and NIED claims on Sosa's mis- plaintiff’s damages committing caused representation military that the in- to the DOE’s employee. Although intentional tort is a federal investigation ternal him, Norton had "absolved” adopting of the cases the "broad” view most not do 662-15(4). the claim is barred HRS say expressly, they impliedly so shift all exception focus of intentional tort Indeed, that the claim employee's extent intentional tort to intentional tort- interrogation girls employment. Schlosser's and his Such a feasor’s cus, shift of fo- federal respective parents accepted, failure to inform sweeps neg- once within their of their its ambit hiring, legally ligent training, supervision revelations to him caused some of their claims. observed, however, injuries, directly impli- Ninth As the Circuit has Norton's conduct cated at all. "broad" construction of the intentional tort ex- *32 Moreover, to the extent creating an molestation. acts of legislature, ... NIED negligence and plaintiffs’ liability for ac- governmental exception to allegation battery, upon the predicated claims are arising out of assault tions interrogation girls agencies thereby state that Schlosser’s intended relieve public notify girls’ parents from of them duty safeguard the his failure from inju- rea- of their legally [or whom know to be caused some employees accusations 662-15(4) all, anticipate ries, implicated will dan- sonably become] § is not should HRS However, Surely legislature ... 662- gerous. supra, ... 39. HRS note see 15(4) plaintiffs that school dis- frоm precludes not have intended expressly could duty misrepre- [to stu- ignore their tricts could liable for Sosa’s holding the DOE known child parents] military and retain in- dents that the DOE’s sentation impu- Norton, total in the classroom molesters investigation “absolved” ternal nity[.] accompanying text. supra- note 38 and Durtschi, 716 P.2d at 1245. negligence NIED plaintiffs’ 2.The foregoing discus on the Based claims negli

sion, plaintiffs where a we hold claim, to hold against the seeks gence negligence claim State prevail on them To vicariously a state em establish, liable for prepon the State plaintiffs had to “assault, battery, imprison (1) false ployee’s evidence, that the DOE derance of the arrest, ment, prosecution, (2) malicious care, false duty the DOE owed them libel, slander, misrepresen (4) process, abuse breached, causing ac thereby legally tation, deceit, with contract or interference words, there injury to In other tual them. respondeat su rights” the doctrine of under negligence primary elements to are four is, § 662- pursuant to HRS perior, the State claim: 15(4), plaintiffs claim. immune from the recognized by duty obligation, A 1. However, negligence plaintiffs where the law, to con- requiring the defendant liable for the claim to hold the State seeks conduct, for to a certain standard form than employees other conduct of state against unreason- protection of others tortfeasor, pursuant alleged intentional risks; able retention, super hiring, negligent theories of part to defendant’s 2. A failure on the like, vision, does plaintiffs claim or the required: conform to the standard hired, necessarily of’ the re “arise out duty; breach of the tained, supervised employee’s intentional reasonably A close causal connection knew, Rather, or reason if the State tort. resulting in- conduct between the anticipated, that one of ably have should jury; and tort employees commit intentional resulting damage 4. Actual loss or owed a person to whom the State of another. the interests care, negli liable for the the State is in a employees Co., Ltd., who were gence of those Dairy Partners v. Island Ins. Road precautions position to take reasonable 92 Hawai'i omitted). anticipated (citations harm. against the However, actual alleged where foregoing, we fur light alone, injury psychological distress hold, is for plaintiffs to the extent ther a balance between is a need to strike claims there negligence and NIED predicate them fraudulent claims “avoiding the trivial or and su negligent retention upon the DOE’s thought inevitable due Norton, to be inten have been that the STLA’s pervision injur[y],” on the subjective of [such] nature exception does not insulate tional tort hand, underlying “promoting one liability; given that the law,” i.e., “compensat purpose reasonably should alleged that have the DOE have sustained emotional ing persons who would molest anticipated that Norton wrongful conduct injuries attributable to the super negligent gilds, their retention Minor, others,” Camper v. on the other. Norton’s not “arise out of’ vision claims do *33 (Tenn.1996); 437, juris 440 Rodrigues, 915 S.W.2d see also “Hawai'i ‘became the first Freeland, 152, 147, recovery v. 96 Hawai'i 28 Guth diction to without [for NIED] allow (2001) 982, that, (noting in general, P.3d 987 showing physically harm’ manifested to prompted recovery courts to limit for are plaintiff’ (quoting Campbell v. Animal (1) tempo emotional because it “is distress Quarantine Station, 560, 557, 63 Haw. 632 (2) trivial,” rary “may imag and often it (1981))). 1066, Thus, P.2d 1068 an NIED (3) easily feigned,” “may and is ined nothing claim is more than a defendants, seem unfair to hold ac whose alleged injury claim in which actual is merely financially negligent, tions were re wholly analyzed psychic “utilizing and is ordi- sponsible appears for harm that remote from Larsen, nai-y negligence principles.” 74 conduct”); actual Larsen v. Pacesetter 41, Haw. at at (citing 837 P.2d 1293 Rodri Inc., 40, 1, 1273, Systems, 74 Haw. 837 P.2d 174, 520-21). gues, Haw. at 472 P.2d 52 at 1292, granted part reconsideration in Although Rodrigues that 650, established part, denied in 74 Haw. 144 843 P.2d an NIED claimant did not to (noting recovery need establish NIED for physi or generally difficulty she was or because restricted “the himself herself fraudulent, trivial, injured by distinguishing cally between the defendant’s conduct in injuries psychological and serious will result in unlimited purely order to recover for a liability” held, injury, consistently gener and because of “the fear mental we have as a matter, impose distress will recoveries burdens al plaintiff must establish disproportionate culpabil defendants to their injury predicate property some either to or 172-73, Rodrigues, ity”); 52 Haw. at 472 person to another order himself or herself jurisdictions at P.2d 520. Different have de negligently to recover for inflicted emotional veloped sundry variants of what is known.as Guth, 150, distress. Sеe 96 Hawai'i at 28 rule,” which, “physical injury gen under 984; Roes, P.3d at Hawai'i John & Jane 91 erally speaking, plaintiffs dis emotional 474, (collecting at 985 P.2d at 665 cases accompanied by physical tress must be prin which this court has “subscribed to the see, injury symptom, ‍​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‍e.g., Camper, or 915 ciple ‘recovery negligent for infliction of cases); (surveying at S.W.2d 440-43 John & by physically emotional distress one not in Roes, FHP, Inc., v. Jane 1-100 Hawai'i jured generally permitted only when there 470, 5, 661, n. 473 & n. 985 P.2d 5& physical injury property or [to] ‘some inju (noting physical variations of the person’ resulting another from the defen ” rule, ry e.g., plaintiff rules that must (quoting dant’s conduct’ Ross v. Stouffer experience “physical impact,” or exhibit (Hawai'i) Ltd., 454, Hotel 76 Hawai'i Co. physical symptoms attributable to his or her (1994) (brack 879 P.2d 1048-49 distress, emotional or be the “zone of omitted) (emphasis ets and some citations danger” by negligent created the defendant’s original))). foregoing principle, howev conduct), separate genuine the wheat er, been “modified somewhat” HRS psychological distress claims from chaff (1993), requires predicate 663-8.9 of trivial or fraudulent claims. injury to NIED physical claimant before may damages negligent he or she recover This court was the first eschew distress, infliction of emotional where he or “physical injury” such rules we when held psychological she claims that distress Rodrigues plaintiff may that a recover solely damage property or arises out distress, negligent ab infliction emotional Roes, objects. material & John Jane any physical sent manifestation of his or her at 474 n. at & n. Hawai'i & 985 P.2d psychological injury physical pres or actual such, currently As the law as it stands danger, within a rea ence zone “where a constituted, Hawai'i is that an NIED claimant must es [person], normally sonable tablish, prov cope incident her burden of adequately be unable with the mental (i.e., ing injury of a actual the fourth element engendered stress circumstances claim, generic negligence Dairy Road Rodrigues, at the case.” 52 Haw. Partners, 114), 520; Roes, at 92 Hawai'i at P.2d John & Jane Hawai'i injured by (noting physically 985 P.2d at 664 due someone was conduct, plaintiff him “NIED” claim. Conse- be it the stantial with them defendant’s purely for them quently, See & in order to recover self or herself someone else. John Roes, com- psychic injuries, n. would be 91 Hawai'i 474 & Jane precedent predi- pelled by our establish a at 665 n. 6.& physical injury person guaran- as a cate However, present unique cir- eases *34 trustworthiness of them claim. tee cumstances, provide as- requisite which See, Guth, e.g., 28 at 96 Hawai'i at P.3d psychological dis- plaintiffs that surance 984; Roes, Hawai'i at John & Jane 91 trustworthy genuine, we have tress is much, at 665. The DOE asserts as exceptions] to to “carve out [ ] not hesitated plaintiffs noting none of the had been that recovery general psychic [for that our rule injured by As- physically Norton’s conduct. only injury standing permitted alone] is suming arguendo, that Norton’s molestation injury to predicate physical is a where there Melony and not constitute Nicole would someone, person.” plaintiff be it a or a third physical injury, we requisite believe original). In (emphasis John & Jane that the circumstances nonetheless Roes, example, “exposure that for we held matter, present in & present like those John HIV-positive ‘involve[s] blood circumstances Guth, recogni- Roes and in warrant Jane genuineness seri- guarantee ” exception general to the yet tion of another Rodrigues, (quoting ousness of the claim’ plaintiff seeking requirement that re- 519), and, P.2d at at there- Haw. solely es- dress for emotional distress must fore, exception permit- an that we carved out injury per- predicate physical to a tablish a plaintiff] alleges, [the where ted “relief son. alia, exposure HIV-positive actual inter blood, a predicate whether or there Reinstating a accused of teacher at physical harm.” 91 Hawai’i position to a of trust child molestation (some P.2d at 667-68 brackets added (and puts generally him or her in close unsu- Guth, original). Similarly, in we some in children, proximity pei*vised) with without exception in recognized involv- another cases least, is, ascertaining very it at the first ing mishandling corpses, because we actually likely than or she is more he with that “those who are entrusted believed accusation, certainly, as we innocent of preparation for burial of a dece- the care explain fully III.A.2.a more sections infra duty body a reason- dent’s exercise b, foreseeable,” “particularly renders it encompassing obligation able care” Roes, 91 Hawai'i at see John & Jane causing negligently avoid emotional distress (citation omitted), P.2d at teach family immediate members decedеnt’s may molest one of his or her students. er pre- that the who wei-e aware defendant was simply, are Put where such circumstances funerary pur- paring body for the decedent’s in fact present, and the teacher molests 154-55, 28 989- poses. 96 Hawai'i at P.3d at student child in attendance while the view,” “minority (adopting under school, we believe self-evident plaintiff claiming that which the the defen- trauma, resulting psychological child’s as well negligent preparing in the course of dant was parents, cir “involve[s] of the child’s family for body of an immediate member guarantee genuine [that] [its] cumstances burial, funeral, crematory purposes, could or Rodrigues, 52 seriousness[.]” ness and See alone, standing for emotional distress recover negli 472 P.2d at 519. Haw. at Like establishing that his or her “emotion- without HIV, gently exposing person negligently phys- al itself in a [had] manifested] distress placing child in an environment where he injury”). ical unsupervised she accused is left molester, undertaking any rea plaintiffs

To that the child without the extent can be attempted to ascertain whether it present in the matter establish sonable effort damage” anticipated that will molest loss of them the accused the “actual element solely again, negligence by proving [molestation] that the “makes the threat claim psychological possibility of a feared much more real DOE’s resulted speculative worry.” injury, and far more than a See “negligence” claim is consub- them Roes, John & part Jane Hawai'i 985 should realize that action his or her Annon, necessary protection at 667. the words Dr. another’s ... does uncontradicted, impose upon not of testimony duty itself him or whose rein her (brackets omitted)). stating take such action” acquittal after without person requiring undergo psychological Whether owes another a rea sonably protect imposing any evaluation and foreseeable without restric harm a person depends upon third wheth subjecting tions his conduct or him to imposition er the circumstances warrant supervision heightened constituted “a real duty. of such a supra risk” the children. See note 20. case, being That urges us If, example, “spe is a there preclude

vain to from recover- cial relationship” between defendant and all, ing damages of their simply *35 be- plaintiff, the or between the defendant a and prove cause not predicate physical did a person, third then the defendant owes the turn, injury then, person. to a We to plaintiff “duty a to control the conduct of challenges DOE’s person to the circuit court’s deter- prevent [the] third so as to him or her minations as to causing physical plaintiff.” the remainder of the ele- from harm to the Touchette, 298-99, plaintiffs required ments that to 82 Hawai'i at 922 P.2d at Fernandez, psychic (quoting establish order to 352-53 71 recover for their Cuba v. Haw. 627, 631-32, (1990) injuries—ie., care, 1208, 1211 duty duty, (quot breach 801 P.2d (Second) legal ing 315, § causation. Restatement of Torts at (1965))).

122 Accordingly, because of the Duty a. care “special relationship” shared a com between passengers, mon carrier innkeeper and its matter, general As a person “a possessor or guests, his her a of land duty affirmatively does not have a to act to (who open public) holds his or her land protect person by another from harm” a invitees, and his or her custodian and person. Corregedore, third Lee v. 83 Hawai'i ward, his or imposes upon her the law (1996). 154, 159, 324, Thus, 925 P.2d 329 “ duty steps former to take reasonable to prerequisite any negligence ‘[a] to action is protect from latter foreseeable harms. duty by of a the existence owed the defen “ ” 299, Cuba, (quoting Id. at 922 at P.2d 353 71 plaintiffs[ dant to ‘require[s] ]’ 631-32, (quoting Haw. 801 at at P.2d 1211 to [defendant] conform to certain stan (Second) 314A, § Restatement of Torts at protection dard of [the conduct ” (1965))). not, 118 314A The “section list” is plaintiff] against risks.’ unreasonable at however, exhaustive, and other circum (quoting Maguire 925 P.2d at 328-29 may “special engender stances relation 110, 112, Corp., v. Hilton Hotels 79 Hawai'i ship,” such that the defendant will owe the 393, (1995), 899 P.2d 395 Birmingham v. plaintiff duty precau to take reasonable Publications, 359, Fodor’s Travel 73 Haw. plaintiff protect tions to from the conduct 70, 366, (1992)); 833 P.2d 74 see also Tou 299, person. of a third Id. at 922 P.2d at 353. Ganal, v. 82 chette Hawai'i 922 P.2d 347, rule,” Thus, (citing, “general 352 as expressly we held if the (Second) 314, § Restatement Torts at 116 has into a custodial relations State entered (1965): hip40 person, fact particular “[t]he that the actor realizes or with a then the (Second) 40. The Restatement of Torts 314A stances. The defendant not liable where he [or is provides part "[o]ne relevant is re who she] neither nor of the knows should know un by quired voluntarily law to take who takes (Second) reasоnable risk[.]” Restatement custody under such of another circumstances e, (1965). § 314A Torts Comment at Correl- deprive [or to her] normal atively, has if noted even opportunities protection duty a ... is under plaintiff "special defendant and rela share to the other” "to protect take reasonable action tionship,” the defendant will become liable to physi them unreasonable risk of injury person plaintiff for an that a third commentary cal harm[.]” this section upon plaintiff inflicts reasonably unless the harm was duty "special remarks that that a relation See, Lee, e.g., foreseeable. Hawai'i ship” only imposes a defendant “is one to 160, at 925 P.2d at 330. exercise reasonable care under the circum [or, may person duty to ular as the circumstances an affirmative conduct owes State warrant, steps whatever affirmative steps prevent harm-— take take reasonable protect another] owed or should reason are reasonable which the State foresees ward, foreseeably only ably anticipate—befalling its either those who are endan gered by only respect hand or that of another. his or own the conduct her 161, Lee, See, at 83 Hawai'i at 925 P.2d e.g., risks hazards whose likelihood those (“[w]hen party unreasonably in the custodial one [or omission] the conduct made another, jailed Roes, of a the case care of Jane 91 Hawai'i dangerous.” John & duty prisoner, 473, custodian exer (quoting Rodrigues, 985 P.2d at 664 521). ordinary care for the 174, Thus, cise reasonable if it 472 P.2d at Haw. person protection of the life health partic that the reasonably is not foreseeable Harrell, custody” (quoting City v. injured expected if plaintiff ular will be of Belen 711, (1979))); 601, id. 603 P.2d 93 N.M. occurs, harm in fact the defendant does (Levinson, J., dissent at 344 duty reasonably plaintiff pre owe that quoted ing) proposition (agreeing with the See, expected e.g., v. harm. Acoba vent the State, Belen); 61 Haw. Figueroa v. Tire, Inc., 92 Hawai'i General 376-80, 604 P.2d 1202-04 (1999) (“[a]n gen actionable juvenile to (judicial Hawaii commitment subject erally owed foreseeable *36 Facility placed the Youth State Correctional risk harm ed to an unreasonable of created duty to under the to exercise reasonable care by (quoting negligent actor’s conduct” suicide). juvenile’s prevent the Honolulu, City County 61 Seibel v. of (1979))). 253, 532, 257, P.2d 536 Haw. 602 partic duty to a Absent a to adhere Similarly, synonymously, if harm but not by of virtue of the ular standard care State foreseeable, reasonably is the defendant not person third plaintiff either duty will not be to breached the deemed (or, sharing “special relationship” alterna of that he to a care or she owes foreseeable tively, a statute or administrative because 385, See, Knodle, plaintiff. e.g., 69 Haw. at regulation mandates that the defen rule or 383, 388, (noting P.2d 385 that what is 742 at care, of particular to a standard dant adhere the circumstances of reasonable under see, Jeyte, v. 88 e.g., Tseu ex rel. Hobbs of given negligence purposes case deter 90-92, 344, 85, P.2d 350-51 Hawai'i 962 mining the defendant’s conduct whether 154, (1998); Haw. Upchurch, 51 at duty his or of care “is marked breached her is, 115), gener any person, is at the State danger” range by out the foreseeable “ordinary ally required only to care” exercise thus, probability there must “some affirmatively to activities it undertakes sufficiently [a harm serious that reasonable Up harm prevent foreseeable to others. person] precautions prudent would take 152, 114; church, Haw. at 454 P.2d at 51 (citations omitted)). to it” avoid also, Lee, 162, Hawai'i at 925 P.2d at e.g., 83 (“[i]n general, anyone an affir who does foregoing general princi With the duty to others to act under mative mind, ples argu we address the DOE’s [person] [a] reasonable exercise care challenging the circuit court’s deter ments protect against an unreasonable to [others] mination that DOE owed each of the arising to out of act” risk of harm them negligently duty to refrain from Touchette, at (quoting 82 Hawai'i them, or, inflicting emotional distress (Sec (quoting P.2d 355-56 Restatement words, precautions to take reasonable ond) a, Torts 302 Comment to risk that Norton avoid foreseeable (brackets omitted) (1965)))) (emphasis Melony molest and Nicole. would original). Yoshimoto, 333, Quoting 56 Haw. Miller v. (1975), the circuit Regardless of source of duty under duty, liability for court noted that the DOE is particular a defendant’s “reasonably requisite supervis[e] public school stu- to the standard failing to adhere required during attendance and by preposition that “the dents their care limited Moreover, presence relying on partic from at school.” obligation to refrain defendant’s our citation in Lee of v. by Eisel Board Edu- bé sexual victims of molestation cation, teacher; Md. 597 A.2d 447 (holding duty school owes a counselor misrepresentations d. to not make of fact attempt use prevent reasonable means to rely representations others who student’s if suicide he or she is on notice by regard- made DOE administrators ideation), student’s suicidal and Brooks v. ing directly issues that concern and Logan, Idaho 903 P.2d 73 students; impact safety (holding school district and teacher were properly e. conduct interviews stu- subject statutory duty to exercise reason- may dents who be victims sexual able supervising pre- care in students and teacher, by a molestation and to imme- them), venting harm to cir- foreseeable diately parents contact the of such stu- that, cuit court concluded because the DOE dents, good unless cause exists position parent” stood “in the of a with re- parents. contact the students, gard to its specifical- the DOE was challenges DOE also the circuit court’s ly subject duty only “a supervise No. COL which concluded that “these students, [also] but to take such reasonable only duties extend not students them measures as would be taken reasonable selves, students, but parents parents injury to avoid to students.” See reasonably because foreseeable Lee, (dis- 83 Hawai'i at 925 P.2d at 341 parents foreseeably students also be tinguishing Eisel and Brooks the record endangered breaches of these duties.” eases, before it on the basis in those merely The DOE that it maintains owes stu care, protection, “children [were] under the supervision during dents a of reasonable supervision control and respective of them school; required sup their attendance schools, a role which the Brooks court ‘de- ’ ” port position, of its cites Kim v. parentis scribed as (quoting one loco *37 State, 483, 491-92, 1376, 62 Haw. P.2d 616 Brooks, 79)); Eisel, 903 P.2d at see also (1980). Thus, perceives 1381-82 the DOE (“the A.2d at 451-52 relation a school ruling “greatly the circuit court's as ex- pupil analogous vis[-]a[-]vis a to who one pandfing]” the standard care to parentis, stands in loco with the that a result must conform in superintending its conduct special duty school is under to exercise Indeed, public Hawaii’s schools. the protect a pupil reasonable care to view, imposed DOE’s the circuit court “new (as Lee, harm” quoted 83 Hawai'i at that, essence,” upon it “in duties” hold it “to 341)). 925 P.2d at detectives, attorneys, the standard of care particular exception The takes DOE to the health mental counselors.” (COL) circuit court’s Conclusion of Law No. argues The DOE the circuit court that, case, 35 to the effect on facts of the this erroneously predicated its conclusions with requisite the standard of care the “included” respect duty the the owed to following specific “duties”: findings regard plaintiffs the on its with a. reasonably thorough conduct ad- injuries foreseeability by the of the suffered investigation ministrative of T.Y.’s alle- vein, plaintiffs. In this DOE con- Norton, gations against so as to avoid that, tends n possibility similar actions court, [according to circuit the DOE ...; against other students could foresee that: supervise

b. adequately employees, (1) teachers, [Melony including interview of posi- [Schlosser’s] who in a are students; potential Nicole] as to the injury tion to cause witnesses assault A.C. would result statements e. provide adequate training to its ad- molested; girls too were issues, in appropriate ministrators such (2) proper methodology girls military for nor [n]either conduct- investigation, ing investigations, pedo- police, in administrative the course them philia, procedures directly parents and the for inform conduct- would assaults; ing may ] interviews of students who sexual [ Miller, (3) inquiry this specific into the In court held [Schlosser’s] upon Melony duty reasonably supervising assaults nature of Norton’s State “has a their and Nichole would exacerbate emo- public during Hawai'i school students of an that the distress such extent tional presence required at their attendance never effective witnesses girls could be leaving school and while the students are subsequent Norton in a criminal day immediately after school school trial; P.2d at over.” 56 Haw. result, juries not two [a]s (citing Lindberg, v. 49 N.J. Titus [Melony’s allegations Nicole’s] find (1967)). duty A.2d of “reasonable credible; and supervision general supervision entails acquitted, Norton would be sec- needs, students, danger specific or a unless time, charges. ond sexual assault dangerous likely ous or be situation calls urges Miller, hold that such harms The DOE us to specific supervision.” Id. stu reasonably not foreseeable there- school, public dent at a intermediate fore, predicate imposition of should eye struck in left with a rock thrown her Finally, any upon “new duties” it. the DOE Yoshimoto, students, of her one fellow while event, mere foreseeabil- asserts campus way walking across the school on her harm, alone, standing not a ity of the shortly home after had been classes dis upon predicate basis which to sufficient day. missed Id. at for the duty imposition of of care. result, eye had 1196-98. As a left Miller’s view, court was the circuit correct our replaced eye. Id. at artificial ran, concluding that the DOE’s alia, sued, at 1198. Miller inter Nicole, Melony only to but their re- State, claiming that the school’s administra reasonably parents, it was spective because negligent in tors and su teachers been the students and them foreseeable both pervising at the students time of the incident. parents would suffer emotional distress P.2d at trial Id. 1196. The court event Norton molested students. State, judgment in entered favor of the circuit Nor do we construe the court’s conclu- appealed. Miller regarding duty of care sions appeal, On that rules and held any- imposing DOE owed regulations adopted “pro- that the DOE had Rather, thing as we “new” the DOE. necessary guidelines require- vid[ed] the below, supports our law explain case *38 personnel ments for the of the State edu- DOE, that circuit court’s the determination perform system supervisory cational to parentis, standing in loco owes and students 340, duties.”41 Id. at 536 P.2d at 1199. We parents duty steps take their to reasonable noted that numerous reasonably to school administrators prevent foreseeable harms to and teachers had been stationed around the its students. staff, rules, regula prevent physical set relevant immediate to harm to the 41. This court out the tions, policies of supervision." and that the Board Education [or her] students under his Id. (see statutory adopted pursuant authority Teachers, to 4210.1). gener (quoting DOE OPR at 292-12) length HRS at some Miller. See ally, obligated supervision to were the "[a]ssist 337-40, Miller, Haw. at P.2d at 56 536 1198-99. school, intermission[,] pupils during before and essence, rules, regulations, policies these and 338, after Id. at P.2d at school." 536 1198 recognized public repeatedly "[t]he that schools 1900-01.1). Moreover, (quoting at DOE OPR safety and their have a concern the welfare of policies regulations the DOE’s official and man vicinity in the of the school students immediate give” dated the DOE "[attention that "shall go regular and after the come before safety personal to the of each student while on 339, day." (quot Id. P.2d at school ing at campus engaged in or school-connected activities Regulations of the De Official Policies 4210). off-campus.” (quoting Id. OPR at DOE Education, partment of State of Hawai'i 1970 included, alia, "provi This "attention” inter 1970) [hereinafter, (adopted OPR”] Oct. “DOE at safeguard sion to from tire of services students Thus, 4230). obligated principal to "de of those fail to conform deviate behavior who to ploy her] members such a manner [or his staff compatible with tire standards of conduct best supervisory responsibilities in that their shall Id. at P.2d at safety interests of all.” personal of all students” and to clude resources, 4210). (quoting DOE OPR at [or her] additional outside his "seek at injury classroom; school hallway time Miller’s for the manner her outside purpose supervising depar- the students’ Kim was inside the teacher’s classroom at day, later, but ture for the that one large no had been the time. Id. “Minutes male student, specifically assigned supervise to newly-enrolled grader the area tenth grounds injured. time, the school where Miller was teacher did not know at that entered 340-41, at Id 536 P.2d at 1200. Absent the room and determinedly advanced evidence that area in aggressively which Miller was Id. towards” Kim. at injured dangerous likely “was in character or at P.2d 1378. The fled teacher the class- dangerous room, known seeking because of principal’s vice-princi- deviant others,” thereby assistance, conduct or of pal’s students occupied both of of- whom “requiring specific supervision,” adjacent this court fices to the classroom. Id. at subject duty Meanwhile, held the school was not to a 616 P.2d at intruding single out either or Kim, the area Yoshimoto. pummeled student who sustained “seri- injuries” Id. at 536 P.2d at explained 1200. We ous Arriving quick- as a result. Id. scene, ly on the principal and the vice- apparently principal, ‍​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‍difficulty, some ov- duty supervision [t]he of reasonable does ercame Kim’s assailant or- and “restore[d] require provide person- [DOE] State, der.” Id. Kim claiming sued the supervise every portion nel of the school injuries legally his caused DOE’s buildings However, campus if area. failing adequately police, specific certain areas known are control, supervise the classroom where dangerous, [DOE] as or [DOE] should attacked, hе had been as in “other- well a specific have known that area danger- neglecting adopt wise measures to ensure ous, or [DOE] or should have knew safety.” judg- Id. The trial court entered may known certain would students or in favor appealed. ment of the State and Kim dangerous conduct a manner themselves Id. at 616 P.2d at 1378. others, duty welfare of [the DOE’s] supervision require reasonable appeal, On we reiterated the DOE’s specific supervision of those situations. duty reasonably supervise “en- students students, ‘general However, supervision tails unless Id. because Miller had failed needs, specific dangerous likely to be establish that DOE had breached the dangerous specific her, supervi- situation calls for duty it of care that owed this court ” 491-92, sion.’ Id. at 616 P.2d at affirmed 1381-82 the trial court’s judgment favor Miller, (quoting 56 Haw. at P.2d the State. 1199). With respect to whether the school’s ground- 1200-201. Because the Miller administrators and teachers “should have ed care DOE owed danger been aware the imminent policies regulations, Miller the DOE’s propensity intrusion a student with a did discuss whether shared violence,” this court stu- relationship” determined “special with students and their *39 disruptive previous day dents’ behavior the parents. not such give “was that would rise [conduct] Kim, duty In we to held DOE probability to a an invasion the class- Miller, care that we had in articulated with- by proclivity room another a student with out further elaboration as to its source. Sev- 492, harm.” Id. at 616 P.2d at 1382. This high eral school students engaging were that, peril court therefore held was “[a]s behavior,” i.e., “disruptive “giggling, scooting foreseeable, reasonably neither known nor chairs, whispering, gesturing]” and some imposition no there was basis” for of a “apparently at that Kim—a [was] directed” duty “specific supervision” upon DOE school—during at new student class. 62 cope danger.” “to with the Id 1378, Haw. at at 616 P.2d 1383. disrup- Although classroom express The teacher rebuked the neither Miller nor Kim 485, ly at P.2d “special tive students. Id. at 1378. a determined that there was rela following day, tionship” The teacher overheard its between either unruly Lee, conversing several students an or parents, students its students’ as noted, duty a use approval two middle have to reason- school] we with to we cited have attempt prevent a a jurisdictions [stu- that able means to held on of a stands in the shoes suicide when are notice dent’s] school or school district in- parents a when the suicidal student’s student child adolescent student’s custody. judice [,] issue sub ... A.2d [at] 456[ ]. the school’s Eisel tent.” The employee, addition, high Lee whether the State that a was In another court held Corregedore, duty a to Antho duty owed had a rea- Manuel school teacher exercise Haw ny prevent high his a preventing Perreira to suicide. school sonable care [,] At ai'i at 925 P.2d at 326. the State P.2d student’s Brooks suicide. Services, However, Hawaii’s Office Veterans’ both Eisel Brooks [at] 79[ ]. employed Corregedore distinguishable as a Veterans’ clearly State from the instant are IV; at the he com Services Counselor time victim in in- case. the suicide While suicide, Perreira, Perreira, case, independent, a Vietnam mitted disabled was an stant man, veteran, “regularly” forty-two with and “received year met old adult “Eisel’s help Corregedore.42 wrongful Id. In a an involve[d] from” claim suicide adoles- estate, cente,]” Eisel, death claim maintained Perreira’s at and Brooks 597 A.2d plaintiffs Corregedore fourteen-year-old asserted involved suicide of “the subject duty, arising Brooks, Jeffrey to an affirmative 75. 903 P.2d at Brooks.” Perreira, relationship Thus, freedom, professional with his as while Perreira had the adult, “prevent suicide.” Id. at Perreira’s to enter or leave the Veterans 326, 328; id. 177 n. 925 P.2d at accord Administration Clinic and the Office (Levinson, J., dissenting) Services, n. 3 accepting refusing- 925 P.2d at 348 Veterans’ only that “assert (noting pleased, as sui- medical treatment duty a to take Corregedore owed Perreira in Eisel and Brooks chil- cide victims (em care, controlf,] prevent action reasonable suicide” protection, dren under omitted)). appeal, majority schools, a phasis supervision respective On of their Corregedore not owe this court held did a role which the Brooks court “described 172-73, Brooks, P.2d duty. Perreira such a parentis." one in loco impose duty Likewise, (declining a original). at 342-43 such (emphases at 79 upon Corregedore a matter of common recognized Eisel court “the doctrine holding relating ch. law and that HRS pupil a a vis a the relation of school vis benefits, impose rights analogous veterans’ did who in loco paren- to one stands duty tis, statutory Corregedore a of care a the result that school under suicide). prevent special duty Perreira’s care to exercise reasonable Eisel, protect pupil from harm.” con lengthy policy In discussion added; (emphases quota- A.2d at 451-52 view, majority’s in the Lee siderations omitted). tion marks and citations ultimately against imposing militated upon Corregedore prevent sui “to Perriera’s courts also based Eisel Brooks cide,” Lee, 166-72, 83 Hawai'i at holdings imposed them statutes majority distinguished the Lee protect duty on children from schools Eisel, Eisel and Brooks as follows: Maryland suicides. “General Assembly quite ha[d] aware in which a made clear We are of one instance [through Youth [at Suicide Prevention held “school counselors but, rather, them, Corregedore in the referred the not a vices veterans "counselor” *40 being psychiatrist, psychologist, appropriate professionals a or sense of he to whom counseled professional, although had re health mental directly prob who could address the veterans’ training "in mental and sui ceived some health , Correge Id. at 327. lems. at P.2d Lee, military.” prevention cide in the while job required description expressly dore’s him to essence, In Hawai'i at Corregedore P.2d 326. related to their needs refer veterans for services "identifying veterans in assisted problems. and Id. at 156 & n. 925 P.2d at 326 explaining problems, or and the their concerns 1; 179-80, P.2d & n. id. at 349-50 also prob options to deal the available to them with J., (Levinson, dissenting) (discussing the duties P.2d He lem.” Id. at at 326-27. requisite Corregedore’s employment). to psychiatric psychological provide did ser prevention Programs duty that of respect Act] School to of care that school the youth important public policy, Nicole, suicide is an acknowledged to owed the Eisel court and that local schools should be at the “special relationship a between a defen Eisel, prevention of forefront effort.” person duty dant and suicidal a creates 597 A.2d at In a to 453. clear reference suicide,” prevent to a foreseeable but noted the distinction between adults and chil- attempts duty “[r]ecent to extend to dren, the Eisel court noted that Act “[t]he prevent beyond suicide custodial or thera not view ... as dfld] troubled children pist-patient relationships have Id. failed.” standing independently, live or on to die Nevertheless, the Eisel court believed a Likewise, their own.” Id. at in 454. of distinguished number factors ease be Brooks, “legislature the Idaho [had] enact- finding it from fore “those cases an absence 33-512(4),” § ed I.C. which “created a stat- any duty” of on the basis that “the custodial duty utory requir[ing] a school district relationship between the suicide victim and reasonably in of to act the face foreseeable hospital defendant was than that of harm” affirmatively risks of and “to act to patient jailer prisoner.” and Id. at prevent foreseeable harm to its students.” (1) 451. Those factors were: suicide Brooks, 903 P.2d 79. In contrast to (2) adolescent; in of Eisel was that an children, school adults such Perreira the school’s conduct at issue was its Eisel greater personal autonomy have much reported failure to communicate the child’s decision-making respect freedom to with father, suicidal ideation her than a rather their own health care. physically prevent failure to sui the child’s Lee, (some 83 Hawai'i at at 341 cide; relationship that the school between ellipsis points brackets added and some counselor students was “not devoid original). overtones,” therapeutic reflected Eisel, (thirteen-year-old plaintiff Ni- job description official of school counselors father) brought wrongful cole Eisel’s a death specific qualifica and Nicole’s counselor’s Maryland action Board Edu- tions; Maryland Court cation, argued in which he that “school coun- (the resort) Appeals state’s court last duty selors have a to attempt to intervene previously recognized that “the relation a prevent a student’s threatened suicide.” 597 pupil analogous vis[-]a[-]vis school one During preceding A.2d at 448. the week her parentis, who stands in with result loco suicide, Nicole informed several friends that duty special school under a suicide; she intended commit these friends protect pupil exercise reasonable care related Nicole’s intention to their school Id. at 451-52. For the last harm[.]” counselor, who, turn, it to related Nicole’s Appeals proposition, Maryland Court of school counselor. Id. at 449. Both counsel- (Second) cited, alia, inter the Restatement knowledge ors confronted Nicole with their (1965), Torts at 130 we discuss friends, statements to her but her Nicole Id. at 452. infra. making denied thosе statements. Id. Neither counselor, however, par- informed Nicole’s view, foregoing In the court’s Eisel ents or school administrators about Nicole’s open question that “it factors reflected intent to commit suicide. Id. at 450. duty attempt prevent whether there is suicide, means, an adolescent’s reasonable specific appeal

The issue whether case, including, par- duty by warning in this the school had breached its care open failing parents of Eisel court resolved this to inform Nicole’s her re ent.” The “variables,”43 ported question by considering suicidal ideation. Id. at 448. With six conduct, court, Specifically, considering policy preventing future the Eisel danl’s tort, harm, recognize duty whether to defen- addressed: the extent of the burden to the community consequences dant foreseeability plaintiff, of harm to the imposing resulting care exercise degree certainty plaintiff that the suffered breach, availability, liability cost injury, and the the closeness of connection between prevalence injury in- of insurance for the risk the defendant’s conduct and suf- *41 fered, the moral blame attached to the defen- volved. 78 harm,” ably in risks of that counselors the face of foreseeable led to hold “school

which (citations omitted). Thus, duty to a use reasonable means to at 79 id. they attempt prevent a suicide are when its own applied court Brooks construed of a student’s on notice child adolescent precedent as follows: intent.” Id. at 452-56. suicidal Previously, when the have ruled that we Brooks, plaintiffs (Jeffrey Brooks’s In 33-512(4), it cre legislature I.C. enacted estate) high family alleged Jeffrey’s that statutory duty requires a [that] a ated English district teacher the school school reasonably in face district to act school duty a “take affirmative action owed Czaplicki v. risks of harm. of foreseeable from and assist students who suffer detect 326, Dist., Gooding 116 Idaho Joint School at 903 P.2d depression suicidal ideation.” (1989); 331, 640, 645 Doe v. 775 P.2d specifically, 75-76. More 466, Durtschi, 1238 Idaho 110 duty a claimed that the school district owed (1986). statutory again discussed this We Jeffrey’s parents his suicidal ten- to warn No. duty in Minidoka Dist. Bauer v. Sch. dencies, had, which, alleged, albeit (1989). 586, Idaho P.2d journal, conveyed in a which he elliptically, statutory opinion we noted that this kept part English assignment an exemplifies duty role of to the the state 75, 79. had read. Id. at which teacher school, which is described children a role (1) regard, In this the Brooks court held: 588, 778 parentis. as one in Id. at loco voluntarily a that the school had not assumed favorably quoted from a P.2d 338. We had, help duty Jeffrey because his teacher Washington pointed opinion[,] which out students, past, helped in the other troubled duty to its that “the a school district owes (2) 78; relationship that a custodial did id. at pupils anticipate reasonably is fore ‘[t]o 78-79; warn, give duty a rise to id. dangers precautions and to seeable take (3) that, (I.C.), Idaho but under the Code custody protecting the children its “protect duty owed a health school ” dangers.’ Id. at P.2d at 340 such students,” § 33- (citing id. I.C. morals Dist. (quoting v. Anacortes Sch. 512(4)),which, Carabba Supreme pre- as Idaho Court established, P.2d statutory duty No. “created a Wash.2d cedent (1967)).[44] requires a school district to act reason- [that] (citations, duty” quotation whelming [imposing a] A.2d at 452 internal favor 597 signals, omitted). original obligate parents, brackets As counselors to inform factors, (1) burden; court "slight” these the Eisel believed: deemed Eisel foreseeable, given (6) that the Nicole's suicide was imposing duty parents inform intent, knowledge of and that defendants had her appear their child’s suicidal ideation "would not certainty degree of that she the fore- suffered impact on” to have substantial adverse percent; harm hundred seeable was one relating legislative insur- scheme to the school’s Maryland, youth prevention suicide was large.” community coverage ance "or on the policy, important public reflected Id. at 452-456. enactment of the Youth Suicide Prevention Programs Act and the suicide School numerous 44. The court had observed that school Carabba prevention programs a result of established as “anticipate duty district owes its students reasonably Act; (3) that there was "so little connec- dangers pre- and to take foreseeable duty breach of contended [the] tion between custody protecting the cautions children allegedly resulting and the harm” that no for[] duty (citations dangers.” from such omitted). Thus, 435 P.2d at 946 imposed, act should be insofar as a child’s “may a child the school sue deliberate, not be said to "a of suicide could resulting injuries failure district from its intervening precludes act [that] intentional and child,” may protect the "a because school district finding responsible for the [the school] injuries liable for sustained as a result of be negligent where, by virtue of Suicide harm” the Youth supervise ac- supervision or failure to Act, Programs are Prevention School schools omitted). (citations tivities of its students.” position to be in a to intervene effective- deemed The Carabba court noted that basis ”[o]ne "community ly; reflected a sense the Act imposed upon thus the school district emo- that there should be intervention based on relationship par- found in between therefore, tional indicia of suicide” Id. at ties.” failure to moral blame attached school’s intervene; (5) voluntary relationship. child consequence It is not a "the of the risk possi- compelled great relatively she] school. He must [or that even a remote to attend [wa]s so yield discipline bility tipped ... over- obedience to school rules and suicide” "the scales *42 Thus, law[,] See, previous physical under our case we risk of unreasonable harm.” Touchette, 298-99, have a e.g., determined that school district has 82 Hawai'i at duty, exemplified 83-512(4), application § a to at A particularized I.C. 352-53. affirmatively prevent act to in greater foreseeable of this rule is set forth detail in (Second) Therefore, § harm to its students.... we of Torts Restatement question (1965), [Jeffrey’s provides: find that of whether which a duty help teacher] had to for seek required by One who is to or law take Jeff[rey] essentially question a is that has voluntarily custody who takes the of anoth- already by been addressed this Court. er[,] under circumstances such as to de- Accordingly, duty find that we there is a prive [or her] the other of his normal a or [that] arises between teacher school power self-protection subject of or to him duty a pre- district and student. This has likely persons [or her] to association with viously recognized her], been Court duty harm him is to [or to under simply duty to exercise reasonable care so control exercise reasonable care to supervising they students while are at- persons prevent conduct of third tending school. intentionally harming them from the other conducting so or themselves as create Brooks, (some brackets added an unreasonable risk harm to him [or original). and some her], if the actor view, In our Miller and Kim are reconcila- (a) or knows has to know that he reason acknowledgment ble with tacit Lee’s that the ability [or she] has the to control the con- special relationship shares with its persons, duct the third students, which, believe, we extends to the Kim, (b) or knows should know of the necessi- parents students’ as well. Miller and ty opportunity exercising such con- subject expressly held the DOE is trol. reasonably duty to supervise students. In cases, question

both the students had been § Comment 320 remarks that the rule injured alleged as an result of respec- their alia, applicable, inter or other “teachers negligent supervision. Id, school’s Impli- tive persons charge public of a school.” then, edly, purpose requiring the DOE § 130. b Comment clarifies supervision to exercise reasonable over the foregoing is “[t]he true because circum- par- students entrusted to them their custody stances which the of another under ents—under, note, law, compulsion we may is taken and such as to maintained (1993)45—is § see HRS 298-9 ensure deprive protection him ... of [or her] provide the children’s educational custodians who, present, if someone would be under with a in which them safe environment duty protect him Id. at [or her]....” 130- reasonably protected against will be foresee- child[,] sehool[,] “a 31. Because while in reasonably can able harms the DOE or deprived protection [or her] his anticipate. should parents guardian,” “the who takes actor custody properly re- [the] child is Moreover, contexts, in other we have give him quired protection her] [or [of] rule, approved forth in set the Restate custody which the or the manner (Second) (1965), § 314A ment Torts deprived him Id. at [or her.]” is taken required by who is law to take ... “[o]ne 131. . custody of another under circumstances such observed, deprive pursuant her] as to the other normal As we [or § opportunities protection required that chil is under” a to HRS the state protect thereby, deprived “to [him her] dren attend school legislature repealed § pursuant HRS formulated and 298- enforced stat- and, currently, provisions set are forth protective .... ute The result is that the custo- § (Supp.2001). § 302A-1132 HRS 298-9 HRS dy mandatorily teachers substituted for currently pro- provided-and HRS 302A-1132 parent. that of the compulsory of children vides—for the attendance (citations omitted). at school. *43 safety rеasonably specifically to and welfare fore- ensure the protection from them the reasonably or normally anticipates, if it parents that them students harm seeable a Washington Supreme reasonably anticipate, particular should Court provide. The that, so, Miller, doing in the state to harm. In the record failed estab- reasoned custody protective reasonably of his or usurps parent’s a lish or should that the DOE knew child, it that of school replacing unsupervised with anticipated her have that an area Carabba, thus, dangerous; and administrators. See grounds teachers school 946-47, supra in note duty specifically super- 435 P.2d at discussed a DOE not owe to did in with agree, and accord the rules reasonably We not vise area it was that because (Second) of expressed in the Restatement in- plaintiff that would be foreseeable §§ that the 341-42, Torts 314A and we believe jured 56 Haw. at there. relationship”—i.e., a “special a Kim, DOE shares Similarly, in because 1200-201. parentis in quasi-parental or loco custodial reasonably DOE nor should neither knew students, its which obli- relationship—with particular that would a student foreseen gates the to exert reasonable care DOE another, duty specifi- it a harm did not owe welfare, safety ensuring and student’s each cally supervise to either the assailant or reasonably parent. In prudent as a Haw. harmed him. 62 student words, DOE its students the other owes significant for 616 P.2d at 1381-82. What is duty precautions to rea- take whatever are however, present purposes, is that in neither anticipates, prevent sonable to harms duty reasonably to Miller nor Kim could may anticipate, reasonably should befall or if supervise arise under circumstances that, it is should them. Because foreseeable not, instance, did in the first owe DOE harm befall a student because DOE general duty anticipate to to fore- students foregoing duty, the student’s breaches the harms and whatever seeable take reasonable will, least, parents very at the suffer emo- steps necessary prevent harm. distress, duty only runs not tional the DOE’s exemplify the like Eisel and Brooks Cases students, parents but to as well. to its them knows, if proposition a school or reason- foresee, Thus, ably and as should that a student intends we read Miller Kim suicide, duty to take specific aspect general commit then arises addressing a steps prevent the child’s sui- to which the DOE must reasonable standard of care least, cide, superintendence public including, very to warn the conform its or her prop parents guardian child’s his or schools. Miller Kim stand duty Eisel Brooks to stu suicidal ideation. Both the osition that the DOE fulfills by reasonably supervising expressly recognized specific parents courts dents and duty attending parents or warn of their child’s suicidal school students while are general arises out of school’s participating gener in school activities. Our ideation duty reasonably anticipate and Kim of al Miller foreseeable characterization harm duty providing one of “reasonable to students and exert reasonable DOE’s as prevent supervision” encyclopedically de care to that harm. does application of the standard of care scribe the duty Accordingly, we hold that the all must conform under circum to which it care the DOE owes students stances, particular simply but enumerates is, level, general duty parents them aspect duty DOE’s to students and precautions necessary rea take whatever are particularized pre contexts parents safety sonably to ensure the welfare cases. sented those custody and the children to its entrusted Furthermore, that the antici control harms DOE as this noted Kim, pates, anticipate. Al generalized supervision reasonably should both Miller expressly so in the though where is “on no we have not said does suffice the DOE aware, tice,” past, readily apparent foregoing reasonably it is should be relationship” duty “special safety arises specific danger there is a words, with its the DOE shares students welfare of students. re steps parents, policies them which the DOE required affirmative DOE take case,46 tis, thus, into obligates ceived evidence well students Miller, reasonably anticipate, those this court relied as would a Thus, reasonably supra prudent parent, harm confirm. foreseeable note whether and to take whatever action is reasonable to the DOE’s characterized as one *44 protect a from student that foreseeable students,” supervision “reasonable of its as Figueroa State, harm. v. 61 Haw. Kim, we in a “special” did Miller and or as Cf. (1980) (“The State’s duty, parentis,” “in loco to exercise reason duty to Michael exercise reasonable care protect able care student from foresee relationship from arises the created between harm, able as the Eisel and Brooks courts the two as a result of commitment Michael’s did, duty does not alter what the DOE’s Boys’ by Family to the Home Court and quintessentially entails—to exercise reason long custody, so as in law he was in ensuring able care that students are edu provides that the director of social services in any cated a safe environment from free guardian person every shall be the of the of See, risks e.g., unreasonable of harm. Boys’ child committed to or at [the received Brooks, 79; Carabba, 903 P.2d at (1976); § Home]. HRS 352-9 see Restate 946-47, supra in discussed note 44. It there (Second) 314A(4).”). ment Torts not, fore follows that the circuit court did suggests, “greatly duty the DOE expand” the matter, however, As a final we note of care that the DOE owes to students and may inartfully the circuit court parents expressed their when it the self- characterized “included” duties the DOE’s evident, namely, (1) that the DOE’s reasonably stems obligations to: “conduct a relationship, paren- thorough its custodial investigation in loco administrative parties any 46. The pal appropriate supervisor have not cited to statute directed in- general responsibility superintendent codifies DOE's for the form the (or and the teacher district However, safety supervisor) and welfare of appropriate students. of the com- appeal copy record on plaint investigation contains completed, DOE’s after "die regulations policies relating administrative suspension pay whether without determine[ ] misconduct, discipline, to student school Any should be recommended.” recommenda- seizures, offenses, reporting police searches and suspended teacher tion should be with- arrests, interviews and and restitution for pay vandal- writing, specific out be made in must contain negligence. Presumably, ism and documentation, information with and be trans- regulations adopted pursuant these to HRS superintendent. re- mitted the district With (1993), § 296-71 which that the mandates board spect Melony to Schlosser’s interviews of promulgate governing of education rules them, regarding Nicole Norton’s molestation of incidents”; any "[r]eporting of crime-related policy the circuit court found that the DOE had a event, regulations these were in effect the time any "requiring] that he conduct interviews not Mokapu. that Norton molested students at Sec- alleged possible victims in sexual misconduct regulations, pertaining tion 8-19-1 of the school cases because level administrators "[pjhilosophy,” "purpose DOE's *45 students who “properly conduct interviews of reasonably not one a bal- foreseeable is of may a victims of sexual molestation be probabilities. danger of “That the ance teacher”; “immediately and contact the probably will more than otherwise not be good parents of such students unless cause particular a does encountered on occasion parents.” The cir- not to contact the exists dispense with the exercise of care.” foregoing the cuit court’s characterization of Co., Tullgren Amoskeag Manufacturing v. conjunction should be read in as “duties” (1926). 82 N.H. 133 A. 8 The findings relating specific to the with its probability “there is some test is whether gen- its by which the DOE breached means sufficiently [a of harm serious reason- care the facts this case. So duty eral of on of prudent person] pre- and take able read, not, did the circuit court DOE the Id,.... it.” the cautions avoid “As responsibil- urges, impose “law enforcement” increases, gravity possible of harm the DOE’s administrators inves- ities apparent of its need likelihood occurrence or to hold tigate allegations of child abuse duty correspondingly generate a less to a standard of care DOE administrators “[ajgainst precaution.” And professionals requisite to mental health risk, probability, gravity, of must and Rather, attorneys. high- the circuit court every utility in be balanced case the that, lighted particular on conduct type question.” of conduct it, that, record before was unreasonable (some Id. at 742 P.2d citations therefore, constituted breaches the DOE’s omitted) (some brackets added some duty ensuring care in exert reasonable original). safety and welfare of its students. circuit found that the The court DOE duty

b. Breach of duty that it to the breached care owed respects, only three several there was breach of “Whether <?.[,] not, present purposes. duty was a which are relevant i whether there failure First, court fоund that part reason the circuit the DOE’s defendant’s exercise care, reasonably in question thorough able for the trier fact.” failure conduct 383; Knodle, allega vestigation Haw. at connection T.Y.’s Inc., was Amfac, against Haw. tion unreasonable. Sec also Bidar v. (1983). Generally, ond, court found the circuit unreasonable P.2d properly failure train its DOE’s adminis defendant’s conduct measured person regarding problem pedophilia, prudent trators “what a reasonable that, presumably, they an such would have [the] would ... have under circum done posed danger that Norton determining ticipated even stances” in whether there acquitted of criminal duty though he had been been breach care owed to Third, Knodle, charges cir Haw. at T.Y. matter. plaintiff. omitted). (citations However, cuit court found Schlosser’s interviews “[t]he at 384 in Melony and his mythical pru and Nicole failure [the conduct of reasonable parents they reported to person vary form them of what will with the situation with dent] him was unreasonable.47 is confronted” because [or she] command—i.e., representation mis- to KMCAS base circuit court also found that Sosa’s argues pending The DOE because circuit Norton’s criminal the outcome of trial, than, defining did, of care that erred as it remove Norton plaintiffs, clearly teaching it position. the DOE owed to the from a finding erred in that the DOE breached Nevertheless, acquitted once Norton duty. The that “it acted within DOE asserts matter, foregoing criminal the T.Y. applicable the standard to DOE em- care impediments in to the administrative DOE’s contends, ployees”—which, generally it vestigation alleged into Norton’s misconduct supervise it students unless is on notice that matter, longer present. were no For that special specific su- circumstances necessitate nothing precluded observing the DOE pervision—and reasonably was not proceedings. the criminal Instead of resum that Norton foreseeable would molest Melo- ing investigation acquit its Norton was after DOE, ny According and Nicole. ted, however, inaccurately “[fjrom view, educator, objective an acting assumed, naively apparently without consult within the school duties of administrators advisors, ing legal acquittal Norton’s personnel, believing, and other DOE signified jury had determined that he during from all of the available facts adduced beyond was innocent a reasonable a doubt. prosecution Norton[,] investigation assumption patently This unreasonable. *46 support that was no there evidence T.Y.’s. See United States v. Assortment 89 One allegations, be on that would not notice Nor- Firearms, 354, 361, 1099, 104 U.S. S.Ct. Melony presented specific ton risk to and (1984) (observing L.Ed.2d 361 that “an precisely, argues, More in Nicole.” the DOE acquittal charges prove on criminal does not light allegations the fact no that further innocent; merely that the defendant it against approximately Norton arose for proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as half, year specific, and a that it had “no guilt” jury’s acquit his that a verdict warning Melony that advance Nicole ting a “in criminal [a] d[oes] defendant action risk were at from Norton’s unknown deviate not negate possibility preponder that a Accordingly, nature.” concludes DOE ance of evidence could show” that plaintiffs. duty” that it “fulfilled its to the activity engaged defendant had in the regard

With investiga criminally prosecuted she was DOE’s he or and, thus, holding tion of the T.Y. incident and its reinstate that “the difference in the Norton, Estomago’s proof ment of we believe that relative burdens of in the criminal and investigation” application civil precludes initial “school level Sosa’s of the actions investigation, subsequent estoppel”); “district level” doctrine of collateral accord State been, cursory they may v. Tuipuapua, biased as have 83 Hawai'i 152 n. (1996) reasonably point n. that through (observing conducted P.2d (1993) acquitted Norton crimi “provides ‘[a]n at which was in the 712A-11 HRS proceedings arising acquittal proceed nal out criminal of T.Y.’s accusa or dismissal Estomago ing preclude proceedings tions. Neither nor was able shall not civil under Sosa ” omitted)); concerning chapter’ (emphasis Norton or T.Y. Mars interview acquit Society latter’s accusations until Norton was land v. International Krishna Consciousness, 119, 125-26, 657 ted. Norton was counseled to invoke his 66 Haw. right (agreeing in the oth against self-incrimination face of 1039-40 with Estomago’s attempts to elicit er that had issue sub Sosa’s courts addressed the judice acquittal Similarly, holding the HPD in that “an “version” events. zoning prosecution T.Y. and criminal for violation of a structed her mother not discuss pro Quite literally, judicata school. not res a civil the incident ordinance is very ceeding zoning was could do for the there little the DOE enforcement text, tion, investigation supra accompanying that the DOE's administrative into note 38 and alleged arguments challeng- in the T.Y. matter Norton’s had misconduct we do not discuss DOE’s Be- absolved Norton—was unreasonable. ing Sosa’s the circuit court’s determination that we have that the is immune cause held misrepresentation a breach of the constituted liability extent to the duly plaintiffs. that the of care DOE owed misrepresenta- their claims arise out Sosa’s ordinance”); Leong history pedophilia Honolu not af- and Mew Sun v. extensive does because, Co., Ltd, analysis Rapid gravity “[a]s our lu 52 Haw. fect Transit increases, possible apparent (observing that harm likelihood its occurrence need be corre- acquit fact civil was “[t]he [a defendant] spondingly Id. at 742 P.2d at less[.]” proceedings (brought ted the criminal (citation omitted). Thus, only there need him in connection with the accident possibility be a reasonable had the DOE proceeding]) of the civil [that the basis investigated, anticipat- would have least evidence, is not [it] admissible nor should potential posed ed the threat Norton jury”). by counsel to On be mentioned thus, and, imposed would have some reason- assumption, the basis its unreasonable chil- able restrictions his contact with any investigation DOE believed that further dren, precluding gathering him from such might purpose that it undertake was without recess, during in his students room lunch thus, justification summarily reinstat requiring him to adhere the DOE’s conducting any Norton further ed without “unspoken policy” that teachers not touch reinstatement, inquiry into matter. any might students manner be misin- more, unreasonable, the cir without or, indeed, terpreted, forbidding him from clearly ruling. cuit did not err so touching at all. students the absence reasonably pru- We do not that a believe determination that had not actu- parent have what the DOE dent done claimed, ally molested T.Y. as she we hold least, very reasonably prudent At did. reasonably that the DOE antici- should parent legal sig- would have ascertained the potential pated posed Noi'ton threat acquittal allow- nificance Norton’s before and, therefore, that it students was reason- ing him unsupervised contact with his or her ably that he would foreseeable molest *47 Upon discovering acquittal child. that an students. adjudication a finding was not of inno- Furthermore, foreseeability that doubt, cence—beyond a reasonable or other- once, Norton would so increased after do acquittal contrary, wise—and to the reinstated, being issuing he resumed hall merely signified had prosecution that passes, gathering (par students room his people failed to twelve that Norton convince ticularly fifth graders female fourth and with doubt, guilty beyond a was reasonable we hair) recesses, light-colored during hug and reasonably par- prudent that a are convinced ging they departed them as his room. All of permitted ent would not have Norton unfet- precisely given this conduct is what rise had a nut- tered to his or her child. access It place. to T.Y.’s accusations the first shell, that the DOE should have known require specialized training does not or edu actually question Norton molested whether professional cation as health mental and, therefore, open T.Y. remained an one trigger to an alarm such conduct that Norton investigation into should have resumed posed potentially Mókapu to risk students. misconduct, confronting alleged Norton's noted, Indeed, as we we no doubt have have him, least, very videotaped at with T.Y.’s would, reasonably parent prudent that a accusations, from the that his free shield learning again that Norton was once right had afforded self-incrimination exhibiting pattern precise of behavior prior acquittal. him to his gave allegations, that rise to T.Y.’s have re circumstances, then, Under “there such, stricted his access to them child. As sufficiently probability some of harm [was] that we hold it was unreasonable at that [—i.e., Norton molest a serious that would point specifically for the DOE to failed pru- Mókapu reasonably that a student—] supervise to Norton and restrict him from [parent] precau- passes [have] take[n] dent would issuing “hugging” hall and students. Knodle, ease, Haw. at tions avoid being it[.]” That circuit court did (citation 742 P.2d omit- clearly finding brackets that err the DOE’s failure ted). is, ultimately, supervise That it unknowable Norton or restrict his conduct duty that whether would have concluded constituted a that it owed the DOE breach plaintiffs. had T.Y. or his Norton molested unearthed omitted). regard, neg We further hold that the circuit In this “a defendant’s correсtly ligence determined that Schlosser’s need have been the whole cause interrogations Melony only bringing Nicole consti or the factor in about duty enough negli tuted breaches the DOE’s of care. harm. It that [i]s his or her Indeed, testimony acknowledged he his gence causing was a substantial factor regulations precluded injuries.” DOE’s him Id. [the] conducting (citations, such brackets, interviews that he emphases at 1100 omitted). professionals aware mental health prong “contemplates The second specifically trained conduct them so policy ... whether there are concerns or potential as to minimize psychological prevent imposition of law that rules might trauma that girls. disclosure cause liability negligent party although on the gainsaid Nor can it Schlosser acted clearly [or her] a cause of the unreasonably failing promptly notify Id. injury.” resultant at 1101 girls’ respective parents (citation regarding omitted). their dis him, closures to insofar he advanced no failing

reason for to do so. present it purposes, signifi For (1) cant the circuit court found Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s (a) reasonably DOE’s failures to conduct a findings the DOE breached the thorough investigation administrative in con (1) plaintiffs by that it owed to the reinstat- (b) allegations nection with T.Y.’s rea ing conducting Norton without a reasonable sonably supervise after reinstat investigation to ascertain whether had him, (2) ed Schlosser’s failure conduct (2) alleged, failing molested T.Y. as she had Nicole, proper Melony interviews of supervise Norton or restrict his contact girls’ to inform Schlosser’s failure aware, after children Schlosser became parents respective reported of what aware, or should have become that Norton causing to him were all substantial factors very gave had resumed the conduct rise injuries. plaintiffs’ accusation, prior per- to T.Y.’s Schlosser’s sonally Melony interviewing and Nicole and Although argument with re DOE’s inducing them disclose to him whether spect legal prong the first the test for them, notwithstanding Norton had molested *48 clear, appears causation is than it it less that that requisite his awareness lacked the “any contending is that that the conclusion training to minimize the trauma associated type failure to conduct a different of investi disclosures, with such Schlosser’s fail- gation legal plaintiffs’] was a cause" of [the notify girls’ parents ure to of them disclo- damages speculative best.” The to him. sures employees, general actions of its defends the ly observing that their assessments of Nor Legal causation

c. credibility ton’s and T.Y.’s not “arbi trary, capricious, clearly that an We have held “actor’s erroneous” such that, negligent legal presumably, conduct is a cause harm the circuit court should not (a) another if his or conduct her substan have determined otherwise. The DOE also harm, tial in bringing appears factor about the to believe that the circuit court (b) relieving negli there no rule of law the actor should not have that the determined liability legally in gent employees because of the manner which conduct its caused negligence plaintiffs’ damages in forty-nine percent his or her resulted of the Taylor-Rice, plaintiffs’ damages harm.” 91 Hawai'i 979 because the included omitted). (citations directly ultimately P.2d at 1100 and brackets trauma un caused presence first prong proceedings The successful criminal test Nor legal Correlatively, “contemplates causation factual deter ton. contends that the DOE negligence plaintiffs’ participation mination that the of the in the criminal defendant likely proceedings against was more than in substantial factor Norton conducted bringing complained Melony’s in about the result of.” connection with and Nicole’s accu (citations Id. intervening superceding, 979 P.2d at 1100-01 is a sations cause Nevertheless, Thus, urges § damages48 cumstances[.]” theft the DOE us to HRS 662-2. that, any 663-10.5, its § hold that “in pursuant extent em ease HRS negligent, negligence them ployees were government entity is determined where legal plaintiffs’ damages. cause of along be a tortfeasor with one or more other tortfeasors, entity government be shall perceive no error in the circuit We clear percentage for no more than that share liable regarding legal court’s determinations causa damages govern- attributable to the plaintiffs’ respective trauma tion. That the entity.” Undertaking apply HRS ment that with Norton’s includes associated moles Nicole, matter, Melony § present tation of as well in circuit 663-10.5 participation subse associated them “percentage determined proceedings quent conducted con criminal plaintiffs’ damages that was share” girls, nection with his of the two molestation forty-nine “attributable” to the DOE was See, Taylor-Rice, e.g., 91 Ha is irrelevant. percent of the total. (“a wai‘i at 979 P.2d at 1100 defendant’s plaintiffs urge hold The us to negligence need not have the whole been DOE is liable to them for all of theft dam- only in bringing cause or the factor about the ages, merely forty-nine percent. rather than harm”). Moreover, part such trauma is that, They argue under the circumstances subject very harm that the DOE was to a case, § does not limit HRS 663-10.5' prevent, steps to take reasonable liability negligence. Citing (a) the DOE’s foreseeability given the that Norton’s mo clause, nonretroactivity the statute’s criminally prosecuted lestations (b) expressly applicable acquitted, given to “causes Norton could be Dr. An- renders ” testimony, supra pe non’s acts or occur- note action based omissions acquitted dophiles of criminal were often ring on or June see 1994 Haw. after charges. (emphasis L. Act 4 at add- Sess. ed), plaintiffs key posit “since the negligent Insofar as the acts con- DOE’s negligent employees act” of the DOE’s tributed to conditions that facilitated predicated negligence theft claim for relief molesting girls, neg- Norton’s the DOE’s 19, 1993[,] January “on Nor- occurred when ligence causing was a substantial factor put ton was the classroom without injuries. [b]ack plaintiffs’ Accordingly, we hold having undergone appropriate administra- clearly that the circuit court did not err investigation,” finding §HRS 663-10.5’s nonre- legally the DOE’s tive plaintiffs’ psychological troactivity inappli- caused the various clause renders the statute injuries. to theft claims. contend cable The consequently that the circuit court erred Plaintiffs’Appeal

B. nonretroactivity construing the statute’s *49 STLA, clause to bar claims that “accrued” before Under the the DOE “shall be such, plaintiffs posit June 1994. As the liable in the same manner and to the same private erroneously extent as a individual under cir- that the circuit court determined like unnecessary duty prong, require equally 48. As ex- to the second the DOE enumerates that, policy principles” pansive hiring qualified several "sound tends, it con- of with the individuals liability." "support imposing newly required special expertises. not The breach-of-duly analy- posits DOE with its im- [T]o the extent that the circuit court sis, analysis legal the circuit court’s causation posed police, prosecutors, the duties upon is tainted because it was "based the un- upon personnel, DOE have counselors should expansive precedented, imposed duties” that it recognized the coordinate immunities that these DOE, upon According DOE. to the the their actors in the fulfillment of duties.... reasons, sup- policy principles For these sound impose upon if Court were to new duties liability port imposing upon not the DOE. perform independent investigations the DOE to noted, we have we not believe that the As do occurring grounds of crimes adjudications on school imposed upon court "new duties” the circuit guilt, the would be un- policy It DOE. therefore follows that “sound At a time the bearable budget intolerable. when disturbing principles” not in favor of taking do militate for the is DOE such hit from provide DOE’s responsibilities the circuit court’s determination the its education to its students, injuries. special negligence legally plaintiffs’ a new and caused the education such plaintiffs’ III.A, swpra the and NIED As discussed section the (1) plaintiffs claims not is did “accrue” until well after DOE liable the for its June 22, 1994, i.e., earliest, employees’ negligent of Norton in at the when retention Norton (2) January 1993, Nicole, and, Melony negligent Sehlosser’s su- molested at the pervision of latest, Norton he once became aware plaintiffs when the became aware that that Norton issuing passes had resumed hall Thus, had plaintiffs so. the done gather grade so that he could fourth and fifth § being inap- maintain that—HRS 663-10.5 girls in his “hug” classroom and continued to plicable—the court circuit should have deter- (a period spanning them the time between mined that the for DOE liable them Norton’s teaching position reinstatement to a the full extent damages, private of their as a January 1993 and his molestation of A.C. employer would be under like circum- (3) 1995), January interroga- Schlosser’s stances.49 Melony January tions and Nicole Sehlosser’s failure inform their agree We and hold that the circuit respective parents their accusations limiting liability erred the DOE’s against questioned Norton after plaintiffs. plain language of HRS girls. Accordingly, §HRS 663-10.5 does not § nonretroaetivity 663-10.5’s clause focuses apply to plaintiffs’ claims to extent upon specific acts or omissions that they upon negligent- are based the DOE predicate claim, and, therefore, plaintiffs does, ly retaining Norton. The statute how- applicability keyed the clause’s is not to when ever, apply to the alternative bases plaintiffs action cause “accrues.” The plaintiffs’ claims DOE as to legislative § underlying intent HRS 663-10.5 them, would operate to limit the lia- DOE’s clearly entities, governmental to insulate bility [plain- “percentage share of the DOE, being like the from held accountable damages to” tiffs’] attributable Sehlosser’s plaintiffs degree than more fault Norton, negligent supervision of his interro- employee’s associated tortious contri Nicole, Melony gations of and his failure plaintiffs bution injury, to the under circum girls’ parents inform respective injury legally in which stances is caused their accusations. only by employee’s not government tor- conduct—i.e., Yet, tious his or § her act omission because HRS 663-10.5 bringing is a substantial factor in apply plaintiffs’ about not to the does claims plaintiffs injury—but upon also the conduct extent are based the DOE’s other, Norton, is, nongovernmental, negligently retaining tortfeasors. Thus, noted, inquiry plaintiffs the relevant focused we have liable to “in the plaintiffs when claim for “ac relief same manner and to the same as a extent” which, crues,” given plaintiffs private Generally that a claim individual would be. may individual, speaking, private negli “accrue” until he or she discovers whose injury, may long gence legally person injury, often after the time causes another employee engaged person when the state in the full extent liable See, legally plaintiffs’ resulting damages. e.g., conduct that has caused the Rather, (Second) injury. plain language § of HRS of Torts Restatement (“[o]ne nonretroactivity injured by requires 663-10.5’s clause the tort another government damages determination of when a enti entitled recover the other *50 ty’s harm, employee present, engaged past, prospective, the act or for all and omission tort”).50 entity being legally by for which the is held the liable. caused explained § § 49. [HRS ] As note HRS 663- tortfeasors as defined in 663-11 is infra 10.9, generally abolished,” joint and subject exceptions. abolishes several to several HRS tortfeasors,” liability among "joint as defined "joint § mean 663-11 defines tortfeasors” to implicated present §HRS not in the is persons jointly severally or more liable "two and matter. injury property, person for in tort the same judgment has been recovered whether not § apply present HRS 663-10.9 does not the against (Emphases all or of them.” add some provides § matter. HRS 663-10.9 in relevant ed.) Because the circuit court dismissed part "[j]oint liability joint that and several for (1) battery. A circuit common law definition of defen- Accordingly, we hold apportioning liability battery between or she “inten- court erred dant causes when he therefore, (2) tionally bodily plaintiff the DOE and causes contact plaintiffs full liable to the for the the DOE is way justified by plaintiffs appar- in a not damages. supra of See section extent then- by privilege, wishes or and the contact ent III.A.2.C. against plaintiff’s in fact harmful or Torts, Dobbs, § Law will.” The 52- of

IV. CONCLUSION (2000) (citations omitted). As Norton analysis, vacate foregoing Based on the we Melony “against Nicole touched both judgment final and remand id., the circuit court’s will[,]” he committed common [them] entry to the circuit court for the the matter battery. exception tort law of Thus judgment final with an consistent of amended liability arising “any state tort claim out opinion. 662-15(4) (1993 battery[,]” Supp. ... & 2001), implicated. ACOBA, Concurring Opinion of J. developed Two of cases lines reached, I concur in the result but differ immunity regard governmental an when reasoning supports analysis employee negligently supervised by hired or likely to the result. As these issues are government, an tort commits intentional cases, my position I forth reoccur in our set against person. majority third The (1) under the that: the State is immune plaintiffs courts hold that inasmuch as Liability independent Act when State Tort of action “arises out of’ an cause intentional negligence governmental legal cause tort, by governmental the claim is barred employee’s intentional tort an foreseeable See, States, immunity. e.g., v. Leleux United (2) person; mental against a third serious (5th Cir.1999) (“Only negligent 178 F.3d 750 Rodrigues v. adopted stress standard conduct, scope within the of em (1970), undertaken State, 52 Haw. ployment and unrelated to an excluded tort

applies psychic injury claims of suffered may basis a cause action.” form the for by parents, the minor them added.)); (Emphasis v. Franklin exception “physical a new United rather than (10th Cir.1993) (8) States, rule; injury” by F.2d owed Defen- (“the argument Department to avoid tort dant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant [the advanced (DOE) liability presеnt to the Plaintiffs is based in the case should be act] of Education relationship parentis rejected attempt special on the loco as an ineffective recast battery competent and not some formulation an affirma- (surgery on claim without consent) duty; prevent tive rests negligent DOE’s failure claims, primarily of a defined battery”). dismissing on absence well “In these administering procedure allegations courts have often underscored the belief teachers; by criminal behavior an intentional tort formed the basis of the obligation pay the full amount of DOE’s by declaring plaintiff action could joint liability damages rests several express statutory lan ‘circumvent’ rather Norton’s dismissal than Lawrence J. guage liability act] tort ‘artful [the foregoing propositions ease. is, pleading,’ battery negli an assault or are in seriatim. discussed gence avoid dismissal of the suit.” K. de Jonge, Recovery Tort Under Federal I. Negligence Claims Act Governmental actions, offensively touch- Which Leads to Intentional Tort

Norton’s Nicole, ing Melony plainly Employee, within the 30 Ariz. L.Rev. fall Governmental apportionment liability prejudice plaintiffs’ does not be claims Norton with authorize action, note, (an party chal we that neither tween the DOE Norton. See v. Associ Ozaki lenged appeal), liable in *51 on Norton cannot be Apartment Discovery Bay, 87 ation Owners of of such, plaintiffs. DOE and tort to the As the 265, 5, 644, Hawai'i 270-71 n. 649-50 954 "joint Norton are not tortfeasors” as defined (1998). n. 5 and, therefore, §HRS HRS 663-10.9 663-11 497, 122, 100 (1955)). Recovery [hereinafter Under 76 S.Ct. L.Ed. 48 Addition (citations omitted). Shaner, 656, the ally, ] FTC:A in Breed 57 Haw. v. (1977), P.2d 436 it was directed “the eases, opposing In a second line of courts Liability liberally State Tort Act should be on independent gov- focus of the nature the purpose its construed effectuate com negligence ernmental that allows the inten- pensate negligent the of victims conduct occur, tional tort such negligent as the 665, employeesf.]” state officials and Id. at hiring supervision employee, or of an omitted) (citations (emphasis P.2d at 442 hold the cause of action is rooted added). The second line eases and the act, negligent not the intentional tort itself. underlying See, comports rationale them best ‍​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‍States, e.g., Senger v. United 103 F.3d (9th Cir.1996) with a liberal construction the Act. (“[G]ranting broad immu- nity purposes would be inconsistent that, require This latter line cases Act], of the [Federal Tort Claims which is to negligent claim hiring supervision or ‘provide a forum for the resolution of claims against government, it succeed must be government injury the federal knew, government established that ” by government’s negligence.’ caused should have an employee’s pro- known about States, (Quoting Bennett v. United 803 F.2d pensity to commit an intentional tort.1 Such (9th Cir.1986).)); 1502, 1504 v.Doe Durtschi approach an premise does State’s 110 Idaho liability person to a respondeat third on su- (“We legislature, do not by believe Idaho i.e., perior grounds, imputing wrongful creating exception governmental an liabili- employee act of simply an to the State be- ty arising for actions out of assault and bat- relationship. an employer-employee cause of tery, thereby agen- intended relieve state (“These Senger, See 103 F.3d at 1441 cases from any duty safeguard cies public distinguish negligence between based entire- employees whom know to dan- (which ly theory on respondeat superior gerous.”). adopting minority “Courts give liability part cannot on rise of the applied principles rule have tort traditional United States under the [Federal Tort that, although arrived the conclusion gov- Act] Claims for the intentional torts of injuries plaintiffs’ directly resulted from employees)....”). ernment batteries, assaults or them claims were rea- sonably alleged to have in negligence” roots holding Our in this case means that government. Jonge, of the Recovery K. de battery exemption apply and the does FTCA, supra, at Under the party State is liable to third for its own independent State, negligence, negli such as the by Rogers

As stated this court in v. gent hiring supervision employee, if (1969), of an Haw. pur 459 P.2d 378 knew or should known that pose compensate Act State is “to victims likely an negligence governmental employee to commit the conduct of inten tional activities in tort and the State’s circumstances unto those in like cause, i.e., factor, legal private person which a would substantial be liable[.]” (quoting injury party. Id. at 459 P.2d at 381 third Indian tortious suffered (“It Towing States, clearly Co. v. United 350 U.S. See P.2d at 1244 Durtschi occurrence, parameters qualifica- negligent 1. The established that the state was in not preclude unnecessary litigation. tion should bility Lia- preventing example, present in the it. Fоr plaintiff merely would not attach if a claims clearly not be case school district preventing negligent that the State was in not an (the knowledge if it had no liable co-defen- Durtschi, happening. In intentional tort from proclivities. dant’s] withstand order to dis- Supreme expressly the Idaho Court noted exception under the intentional tort missal case, government under the facts its "the knew which, plaintiff prov- [establish] facts if must employees or should have known that one of its en, governmental would demonstrate that the likely an was thus, to commit intentional tort” reasonably entity anticipated should have distinguishable the case was from the cases employees one their would commit inten- recognize liability that failed to under the inten- tional tort. exception. tional tort 716 P.2d at 1245. plaintiff merely point A cannot to an assault claim, battery simply and then based *52 90 (1992)). FHP, 1273, In immunity negligent to a P.2d 1293 this court to afford

unsound force, inju exception “physical an to the intervening the the held that defendant because ry” employees rule was when airline very anticipation which made conduct created brought expected unknowingly the handled human immunodefici negligent, has about (HIV) States, ency (Citing 457 virus contaminated blood. harm.” v. See Gibson United (3d Cir.1972).)); Bennett, 477, 1391, 1395 citing to 803 id. at 985 P.2d at 668. While F.2d (“[B]ecause Rodrigues, government general a stan F.2d at 1503 the established the prevented crime dard on the seriousness of mental notice and could have based stress, by exposure govern applied this court HIV by ... exercise of due care government categorical exception general to the employees, was liable rule a ment recovery permitted only that when negligence.”). for the facts rule its own Under case, injury to predicate person. there was some independent conduct of this DOE, negligent supervision of Nor e.g., the Guth, court Subsequently, this estab- ton, in which it should under circumstances inju- exception physical lished another children, a posed have known he risk to rale, policies ry holding that “the behind inju in causing a factor Plaintiffs’ substantial NIED cause action HRS 663-8.9 thus, from ries the State is immune allowing arising support a claim NIED for suit. negligent mishandling corpse.” from (footnote 154, P.3d 96 Hawai'i at 28 at 989 II. omitted). explained by majority It was view, minority that “we believe that the Rodrigues, first In this court established require plaintiffs dis- does not emotional injury predicate physical is not re- injury, in a physical tress to manifest itself quirement negligent for infliction of emo- approach.” Id. I the better reasoned As (NIED) Haw. tional claim. See 52 distress case, categorical approach noted in that (“We 472 at 519-20 hold that P.2d produce can lacks “a cohesive rationale and may be found where serious mental distress results!,]” unjust 158, id. at 993 constituted, normally [person], a reasonable (cita- (Acoba, J., dissenting) concurring and adequately cope would be unable to omitted), general as opposed tions to a rea- engendered by circum- mental stress standard: sonableness case”). Rodrigues reasoned stances determining appropriate [T]he measure longer can said no “[i]t an alleged action- whether advantages gained courts adminis- distress] in this [for able claim emotional tering claims mental distress reference Rodrigues— n jurisdiction is that set forth in categories outweigh burden to narrow is, 174, person, whether a reasonable nor- plaintiff.” thereby imposed Id. at constituted, mally suffer severe Rodrigues 472 P.2d at 520. After was decid- ed, however, mental distress under circumstances recovery court this ruled the case. requires generally for emotional distress injury property person physical some 159, 28 P.3d at 994. resulting the defendant’s conduct. See case, majority instant creates Freeland, 157, 147, Guth v. Hawai'i yet exception injury” the “physical another J., (Acoba, concurring P.3d rule, subjected time for school children dissenting). by a to unauthorized contact teacher and then, Nevertheless, parents Predictably, this court has com of such children. been “Recognition “physical injury” negligently psychic rule inflicted pelled to abandon the Indeed, tort, injury light experiences. independent as an like the life of real life it, experiences compel ... injury has cannot be physical rule been criticized straitjacket.” distinguishing be confined in a doctrinal Id. It “inadequate method will, “physical injury” worthy unworthy apparent that the rule tween claims.” John FHP, us, Inc., press this v. as cases come before & Jane Roes Hawai'i categorical exceptions. ex (quoting Larsen create more Inc., periences Haw. of more than three decades Sys., v. Pacesetter *53 159-160, liability (Acoba, J., shown fears of unlimited “[t]he Id. at 28 P.3d at 994-95 true[,]” (brackets omitted) proven (quoting Camp have not concurring dissenting) id. Station, added). Quarantine bell v. Animal (emphasis likely 63 Haw. “Those most affect (1981)), likely ed who are those are also most to legal psychic security that the interest in greatest suffer inap the over such [distress]” independent protection: to entitled propriate child, touching of a id. at 995,—and P.3d at parents plainly a child’s gained advantages by [T]he the courts in fall within this formulation. administering by claims of mental distress categories reference to narrow was out-

weighed by thereby imposed burden III. the on plaintiff the and that in the “interest free- findings The court made several hundred dom from negligent of infliction serious of regarding major fact four negli- acts of independent mental distress entitled to gence. court, According to the these acts legal protection.” negligent investigation “include” the DOE’s Rodrigues, (quoting 52 Haw. at subsequent acquittal; negli- to Norton’s the 520). 472 P.2d at gent supervision Norton, particularly of after repeatedly engaged issuing in passes hall “Applying Rodrigues [the standard ] re- children; and hugging lack of turns reason and the train- symmetry to the law and ing easily implementation of standards re- presented resolves the issue inus and/or First, abuse, garding allegations including of sexual this ease.” Id. there would be near agreement Principal the per- universal that “a interview reasonable Schlosser notify parents as a or failure parent [such son child of such children’s re- child], constituted, normally may garding potential be unable abuse.2 cope adequately with the mental stress It would less than be accurate not to ac- engendered” by perpetrated by the acts Nor- knowledge facing difficulty in the DOE ton, id., physical even in the absence of resolving allegations of assault sexual as it injury. Second, Rodrigues precedent “is attention, brought particularly jurisdiction question our on and controls light conflicting views. facts and While who claim entitled mental distress perspective this court faultless resulting from” conduct of Norton and hindsight, allegations be must considered the DOE. Id. presented in the context to the DOE. Here Rodrigues a “limitation instructs that large parents there awas number of right recovery, as in all “extremely upset” children who were cases, obligation is that the defendant’s longer teaching Norton “would no be their particular refrain from conduct is owed children[.]” On the advice of counsel and the only to foreseeably those who are police, respectively, nor neither Norton T.Y’s endangered by only the conduct and parents provided per- information DOE respect to those risks or hazards whose Additionally, acquitted sonnel. unreasonably likelihood made the conduct arising allega- criminal trials out T.Y’s dangerous.” Haw. at P.2d at subsequently, Melony’s tions and and Ni- (citations omitted). Rodrigues, Under accusations, demonstrating cole’s further then, the nature risk defines difficulty discerning truth of T.Y.’s result, scope liability. devising As a original charge assessing potential a rule as to who should recover in this might pose risks that Norton the future. case, justification affording there is I right likely many findings those do not sue to most believe the suffer mental “indicating” negligence distress because [child are “foreseeably are judg- abuse] those taken as an of factors for enumeration af- ” by wrongful ing governing conduct. conduct of future DOE fected allegation majority rejects neg- Corps 2. The the final tor Air Sosa to the Kaneohe Marine Sta- ligence, misrepresentation tion Administra- Base Commander's Executive Officer. reasons[,] teachers, ling taking into consideration principals, administrators.3 myriad with a personnel charged relationships human of our soci are social and tasks, of which is to Corregedore, not the least ety.” 83 Hawai'i *54 Lee v. obligation of accomplish primary 324, (1996). then- edu- 166, Generally, a 925 P.2d view, cating my negligence In children.4 duty a affirma “person not have to act does apparent is in the grounded in this case tively person harm.” to another from protect proce- of clear definite DOE absence and However, 159, at P.2d at 329. as the crimi- administering accusations of dures notes, majority “special where is a there nal behavior. may a a l'elationship,” then defendant owe duty to the conduct of third [the] “control disposition matters cannot be The of such person prevent as a from accomplished appropriately matter as to him or her so policy or ad hoc administra- causing plaintiff.” internal school Ma physical'harm to the action, ques- (citations 71, resolution such tive jority opinion 58 P.3d at 582 generally beyond pur- the normal omitted). tions are Here, special apparent it is a professional No written' view of educators. parentis relationship of in loco exists be regulation pei’taining or to such mat- policy students, and the tween the DOE was entered into this case. ters evidence duty relationship gives rise to a of rea separate must be There a administrative protect sonable to from fore care students determining track established for such com- seeable harm. irrespective pendency or out- plaints majority any Allegations of But on and indi come of criminal case. continues recog- may or criminal must duty abuse behavior be cates that a arise the DOE because separate as a distinct and nized matter “required ‘ordinary to exercise care’ day-to-day operation of a To school. affirmatively to it undertakes activities type, future of this avoid occurrences Majority opin prevent harm[.]” foreseeable personnel, a protect both and DOE children 72, (citing Upchurch, v. ion 58 P.3d defined, procedure coherent and uniform for State, 154, 112, 51 Haw. 454 P.2d resolving by such mattei*s must be enacted (1969)). appeal's to This be a reference See, Regotti, e.g., Negligent or statute. rule (Second) § 302 com Restatement Toi'ts Sexually Hiring Retaining Abusive (1965).5 recently ament But as this couirt Teachers, Rep. 73 Ed. Law 339-40 v. stated in McKenzie Hawai‘i Permanente (1992) (listing suggestions for school officials Inc., Group, Med. 98 Hawai'i 47 P.3d teachers). sexually regarding abusive (Second) (2002), that “Restatement § a not itself does create establish IV. merely legal duty; type describes negligent Id. at 47 P.3d at 1213 act.” general, In is “i*eluctant to im this court (emphasis original). Quoting duty comment pose of our soci new members sound, ety compel of section this couirt logical, without noted: describing protect against findings an risk of In hundred them unreasonable 3. the several (he DOE, arising committed the court them out of act. harm to "indicating” depict the word used conclusion findings overall merely who to act are more duties of one restricted, omits negligence. Inasmuch these general are confined situa- may negligence, they "indicate” do not special tions where there is a relation between independent liability. singular each establish gives and the other which rise to actor duty. the distinction act and As to between agree I do not with some of the characteriza- omission, or "misfeasance” and "non-fea- actions, personnel their tions of the DOE ’’ sance, § 314 and the actor Comments. by majority. forth If set act, duty [or her] under no other to comment 5. This states: may negligent within to do so conduct failure only negli- This Section is concerned Section, the rule stated in this but it does conduct, gent character of the actor’s subject liability, [or her] him because of duty [or with his to avoid unreason- her] duty. absence of anyone general, an risk. In who does able affirmative a, (Second) § comment Restatement Torts 302 duty to is under a others act added). (emphasis at 82 [person] exercise care of reasonable Inc., only with the Section 302 concerned tment 68 Haw. (1986) (citations omitted). conduct,

negligent light character of the actor’s In duty recognized legal relationship and not with the actor’s to avoid the well be student, general, anyone unreasonable risk school and we not called tween are duty who does an act is affirmative under on anew to make a calculus.

to others exercise the care of reason- person protect able them V. arising unreasonable ham them out Relying (Supp.1994),6 663-10.5 HRS dtity the act.... the actor is under no If *55 DOE, govern- a the court held that the as act, to the his [or her] other to do failure entity, forty-nine per- mental was liable for may negligent so be conduct unth the rule damages, apportioned cent the total its Section, stated in this but it does not 663-10.5, § amount. The 1994 version of subject liability, [or her] him because of (Supp.2001),7 joint since amended abolished duty. the absence liability governmental party and several for a (brackets omitted) (emphases original). occurring for “acts or omissions on after” explained It was that “the fact that [the 22,1994, June the date it was enacted. HRS negligent conduct falls defendant’s] under § (Supp.1994). majority 663-10.5 The re- § the rubric of 302 Restatement does not jects the court’s view and holds that HRS per duty establish se owes to the § inapplicable 663-10.5 is and does not limit [plaintiffs]; only it the manner in describes liability. majority the DOE’s The further may negligent duty which he be he owed a if (1) concludes that Norton and the DOE are 301, [plaintiffs].” Id. at 47 P.3d at “joint by tortfeasors” as defined HRS (emphases original). Similarly, 1214 (2) (1993), § 663-11 inasmuch as Norton and conduct, itself, negligent DOE’s does not tortfeasors[,]” “joint the DOE are not HRS children; duty create a school care to (Supp.2001), § generally 663-10.9 which re- rather, duty special this arises out of the joint pealed liability, and several does not relationship between the DOE and the chil (3) apply, “[b]ecause the circuit court dis- any dren. To the extent other basis for [Plaintiffs’ missed the claims to, opinion majority is alluded see at ..., prejudice Norton cannot be liable 72, (“[r]egardless 58 P.3d at 583 of the source plaintiffs[,]” Majority opinion in tort to the particular duty”), disagree of a I must n.50, and, hence, n.50, 87-88 58 P.3d 598 necessary so this case to extend our (4) damages. is liable all State for holding. “Duty legal is a conclusion depends upon disagree analysis. ‘the sum total of I must with this I those 663-10.5, policy agree abolishing joint § considerations of which lead the law to that HRS entities, say particular plaintiff liability government entitled to and several ” (1) 170, view, protection.’ However, Rodrigues, inapplicable. my 52 Haw. at 472 is joint (quoting § on P.2d 519 Prosser Torts 53 at Norton and the DOE are indeed tort- (3rd (2) 663-10.9, ed.1964)); 663-11; § Ing, 332 Blair also v. 95 feasors under HRS (2001) 247, 259, prohibition against joint Hawai'i and several lia- (citations omitted); Cootey bility, “in- apply v. Sun Inves does not because this case pertinent part liability 6. This statute states in as follows: for the acts or omissions of its officers § employees. entity 663-10.5 Government as tortfea- sor; joint liability. abolition of and several Notwithstanding provisions of sections (3) only apply This Act shall to causes 663-17 and 663-11 to section upon occurring action based acts or omissions entity government case where is determined on or its date. after This Act effective along to be a tortfeasor tortfeasors, with one or more other (4) upon approv- take effect its shall entity government shall be lia- al. percentage ble for no more than that the entity. share of added.) (Boldfaced original.) (Emphasis font in damages government attributable to the § no 7. The amended version of HRS 663-10.5 section, longer qualifying "occurring contains the words purposes liability For of this government entity shall include or after” the enactment. its vicarious on date statute’s Act”). exception purposes of the Uniform volvfes]” the intentional tort “liable[,]” statute, ban; obligation employed such the DOE’s term “subject pay judgment is based its several to suit been construed mean i.e., joint liability, obligation equity.” its as a tortfea- in a court of law or Tama- liable damages Gama, 74, 75, pay all the caused it and sor De 51 Haw. 450 P.2d shiro v. Norton, (internal judg- apparently quotations because Norton omit proof. ted); County City ment v. see Petersen Honolulu, 51 Haw. 462 P.2d VI. (1969) (“whether may contribution person depends upon from a whether the hold, maintain, appeal, Plaintiffs On we original liability plaintiff could have enforced misapplied by that HRS 663-10.5 was her], against him [or [or she] had he chosen negligent acts court because DOE’s occurred Stores, so.”); Gump to do v. Walmart argue date. Plaintiffs before effective (App.1999), Hawai'i in establishing that the court as the erred grounds, on 93 Hawai'i overruled date, pertinent date cause action “ (2000) (Under UCATA, P.3d 407 ‘liable’ “accrued!,]” i.e., the dates of the assault *56 ‘subject suit’ or in a court of means ‘liable Plaintiffs, than the date of DOE’s rather ” Tamashiro, (quoting equity.’ law or 51 negli- negligent acts or omissions. DOE’s 75, 1000)); at Haw. at 450 P.2d Karasa failing complete in gence investigation cf. Co., 77, 80-81, wa v. Ins. 88 Hawai'i 961 TIG allegations of T.Y.’s after abuse Norton’s 1171, (omitting (App.1998) P.2d 1174-75 lia subsequent acquittal and the reinstatement discussion, bility holding but that “tortfea- position teaching on occurred ‘joint’ purposes if sors are of the Act 19,1993. January individually collectively or cause the same negligent act precipitating This occurred injury.”). 663-10.5, § date of HRS before the effective Tamashiro, In it was held that a “minor 22, By plain language of June 1994. thus, parent,” child liable in tort to his is 663-10.5, § did take HRS this statute not “subject joint he is to contribution to his on date effect the accrual cause Haw. [UCATA].” tortfeasor under the 51 at action, argues as the DOE court case, 79, P.2d 1002. 450 at In that rather, held, but on the of the “act or date injuries parents sued for sustained an omission” which the is Ac- on action based. automobile accident between automo- them notes, cordingly, majority as the bile, son, by their and a vehicle driven minor in applying this erred HRS 663-10.5 and 74, driven See id. at 450 defendant. joint not statute did absolve DOE from joined P.2d minól- at 999. The defendant liability. and several defendant, third-party attempting as a joint obtain contribution from the minor as a

VII. 74, at 450 at tortfeasor. See id. P.2d 1000. I the DOE and Norton are believe party third The trial court dismissed the “joint under 1939 tortfeasors” Uniform assumption complaint, on that a based (UCA- Among Tortfeasors Act Contribution legally minor from child immune suit from TA), §§ 663-11 to 663-17. HRS See Saran parents. id. This court See reversed 1, 685, Silva, 9, 78 illio v. Hawai'i 889 P.2d that a minor child liable for held 421, 693, denied, reсonsideration 78 Hawai'i joint contribution tortfeasor under the (1995) (noting P.2d 172 that Hawai'i 895 79, at 450 P.2d at 1002. In UCATA. See id. 1941). adopted 1939 version UCATA in so, doing this court term “lia- construed the (1993) “joint §HRS 663-11 defines tortfea- “joint severally phrase ble” liable persons jointly or sors” as “two more or technical, tort,” “having acquired severally injury liable tort the same ‘subject legal meaning to suit’ or ‘liable person property, judgment or whether not or ” 75, equity!.]’ Id. a court of law or 450 been recovered all some of (footnote omitted). P.2d at 1000 and citations added.). (Emphasis them.” See also Ginoza Saranillio, Takai, 691, (holding this court Haw. considered v. 40 691 rule, judgment to be common law which mandated does need recovered [party joint employee liability in a tort as] constitute a tortfeasor release of from “to

95 automatically defendants, other, employer action released the but was time- barred, respondeat superior liability. thereby destroying 78 See the disfavored statutory right Hawai'i 889 692-93. It was defendant’s to contribution.” explained joint that the UCATA definition of Id.

tortfeasors, liability “which is based on rath- v. Apt. But Ozaki Association Owners er negligence, than ‘is exceedingly broad and 265, Bay, Discovery 87 Hawai'i 954 P.2d goes beyond meaning the traditional IF], [hereinafter “Ozaki this court ” (quoting term.’ Id. Draper, Holve v. footnote, in a analysis, stated brief without (1973)). Idaho only parties damages as whom could Thus, this “plain court held that joint be are recovered tortfeasors. Id. at 270 unambiguous language of the version [of n. 954 P.2d at n. acknowl While abrogates UCATA] the common law rule edging ‘joint that “[t]he definition of tortfea- ” employee automatically of an release court, liability[,]’ ‘is sors’ based vicariously employer.” releases liable his/her quoting Dictionary, Black’s Law said that Id. at 889 P.2d at 696. parties jointly severally “cannot be and/or person liable with another unless who ‘[t]he jurisdictions Other have adhered to the has been harmed can sue recover from same view. New Amsterdam Cas. v.Co. Cf. (quoting both[.]” to Black’s Law Dictio Holmes, (1st Cir.1970) 435 F.2d (6th ed.1990) nary (emphasis origi (“liable in require present tort” does not nal)). language implies person Such that a liability to might particular whoever be a entity only joint can tortfeasor if plaintiff); MetroHealth Med. v. Center Hoff recovery possible. Gump also v. See Wal- mann-LaRoche, Inc., 80 Ohio St.3d *57 Stores, Inc., 417, Mart 93 Hawai'i 5 407 P.3d (1997) (a 529 N.E.2d contribution claim not is (“A Gump [hereinafter party II] is underlying barred the fact that the claim meaning liable within the of if section 663-11 comply ant failed to with the of statute limi injured person could have recovered defendant); as tation to the contribution damages in against party, a direct action Hayon Bottling v. Coca Cola Co. New of injured person pursue had the chosen to such 644, England, 442, 375 Mass. 378 N.E.2d 445 action.)” an (Quoting Velazquez v. National (1978) (“The term ‘liable tort’ ... is broad Ind., (9th 492, Cir.1989)); Presto 884 F.2d 495 in scope and not language imply suitable for II, 5, Ozaki 87 Hawai'i at 270 n. 954 at P.2d ing range applica a narrow or restricted of rationale, Following bankrupt 649 n. 5.8 a this tion potential within of the framework tort judgment-proof party or could never be con defendants.”); Miller, v. Zarrella 100 R.I. joint a sidered tortfeasor. 545, 673, (1966) (“[A] 217 A.2d 676 tort-feasor may such though, recover contribution even It should be further noted that the defini- reason, for plaintiff some who has ob employed by tion court was the Ozaki II judgment a against tained both of them is incomplete. An accurate rendition precluded enforcing liability from thereunder “[j]oint liability” of definition and several tort-feasor.)” against joint (Citing Puller Dictionary person Lato is that “[t]he Black’s Puller, v. Pa. 380 110 A.2d has can who been harmed sue and recover (1955)). MetroHealth, In Supreme Court wrongdoers from both or either one from of of a (if Ohio held that tortfeasor’s contribution wrongdoers goes she] he after both [or claim “merely did not fail them, because under not, however, of [or she] does re- lying comply claimant failed to awith statute compensation).” double ceive Black’s Law added). limitations as to the contribution defen Dictionary (emphasis at 914 dant.” N.E.2d at 533. joint liability The MetroHealth definition of and correct several recognized contrary position then, Black’s, court that a as two used indicates that plaintiff parties joint would allow a a may “wait file be considered tortfeasors against a complaint recovery only until claim if can one even obtained Ind., Tamashiro, Velazquez In v. National Presto F.2d at 1008 and (9th Cir.1989), However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Haw. at 75 n. 450 P.2d at 1000 n. 3. Appeals, explanation, ability without indicated indicated re- neither these cases covery necessary joint damages joint prerequisite torjfea- for status. The recover is a tortfeasor Petersen, Velazquez court cited to 51 Haw. at sor stаtus. liability joint Accordingly, I distin- rata shares of tortfeasors one them. [However,] among guish suggests that it themselves.... each II the extent Ozaki completely fully joint only if a tortfeasor is still liable party tortfeasor (citation injured person.” it. toward omit plaintiff can sue recover from Dobbs, ted)); also The Law Torts (2000) (several VIII. liability § at 413 means may judgment plaintiff obtain a “the analysis, foregoing the DOE Under the against both tortfeasors enforce joint Norton were tortfeasors. both; may plaintiff but originally “subject in a to suit or liable was compensa one actually collect more than although equity[,]” he was court law tion”). bankruptcy as the result of later dismissed stay. Accordingly, “subject to suit IX. equity” in a court of law or in HRS liable 663-10.9, joint repealed § may designate party generally § as a 663-11 HRS suit, party subject joint liability, bar if the and several would not re tortfeasor covery may ultimately in this subsequent if events ease. Inasmuch as DOE’s even Here, joint preclude recovery party. it a from that made tortfeasor an tort, forty-nine “involving” the DOE was action an intentional this the court found that fifty-one per percent excep and Norton was case comes within the intentional tort liable general repeal a court tion to liable. This court held that contained HRS cent I, § may non-party in its treat 663-10.9. See 87 Hawai'i 285- discretion Ozaki I, purposes apportioning party suit as 664-65. Ozaki ICA II, joint liability damages. Gump 93 Hawai'i is not reasoned several See action, § Plainly, did that in P.3d at 413. the court abolished HRS 663- 10.9(2)(A) states, “involving ... case. intentional tortsf.]” joint liability, and several de Under each 663-10.9(2)(A), As set forth HRS “completely fully toward fendant liable joint liability several “abol- injured person” for the full amount recovery ished” both economic and damages. Apt. v. Association Own Ozaki *58 damages “joint noneconomic tort- Discovery Bay, 87 Hawai'i ers of (A) involving: feasors Intentional torts[.]” 652, (App.), part 663 overruled in added.) “Involving” par- (Emphasis is the II, 265, 87 954 P.2d 644 by, Ozaki Hawai'i ticiple form of the “involve.” The word Accordingly, [hereinafter /”]. “Ozaki means, things, among “involve” “to may as both the DOE treated part as within or itself: IN- joint § pursuant tortfeasors to HRS 663-11. Collegi- Ninth New CLUDE.” Webster’s incapable paying appor If Norton was (1990). Dictionary ate 637 damages, percentage appar as was tioned case, torts, ently “involving” then liable An action the DOE became intentional it, accordingly, damages. all This is not one which has oí- for the Plaintiffs’ within trial, it, a part of Norton’s dismissal as as an intentional because includes concludes, action, majority therefore, apparently the but be tort. is not Such one severally only exclusively liable cause the DOE was for which concerns inten- torts, denoted, which, injuries suffered the Plaintiffs.9 See tional but as would I, Hawai'i at 663 Ozaki 954 P.2d at include an intentional tort as at least one stating (referring grounds stated to the UCATA and theories or which permit apportionment pro liability “would section found. addition, part by, if the the Plaintiffs P.2d found overruled Ozaki II, liable, (cita apply pure compara partially I Hawai'i omitted); (Third) negligence apportioning standard fault tions see also Restatement tive among (2000) (citing parties propo § involved. Torts I "[C]onsideralion all the Ozaki plaintiff's damage "negligent in tire calcu sition that and intentional tortfeasors lations, apportioned responsibility even where intentional tortfeasors are could be but that the involved, protect principle negligent adheres to that loss tortfeasor who failed to should best according respective be distributed be liable for the intentional share of should tortfeasor’s I, weli[.]”). comparative parties.” responsibility 87 Hawai'i at faults Ozaki (italicized Id. at 954 P.2d at emphas- (underscored added). original) emphasis

es

Here, tort, alleged the action an intentional

namely Therefore, the conduct of Norton. “squarely

this case falls within the HRS 663-10.9(2)(A)

§ category of cases ‘joint liability joint several

tortfeasors in [HRS as defined ] 663-11 ” [was not] abolished.’

58 P.3d 608

ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT ELUA,

OWNERS OF WAILEA

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. COMPANY, LTD.,

WAILEA RESORT corporation,

Hawai'i Defendant-

Appellee,

County Maui, Defendant-Appellant, Development Company,

Wailea a Joint

Venture, 1-10, John Does Jane Does 1- ‍​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‍ Corporations 1-10, Doe Doe Partner

ships 1-10, 1-10, Doe Entities and Doe

Governmental Units Defendants. Apartment

Association Owners of Elua, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Wailea

v. *59 Ltd., Company,

Wailea Resort Hawai'i

corporation, Defendant-Appellant,

County Maui, Defendant-Appellee, Development Company,

Wailea a Joint

Venture, 1-10, 1- John Does Jane Does Corporations 1-10, Doe Doe Partner 1-10,

ships 1-10, Doe Entities and Doe

Governmental Units Defendants.

No. 22412.

Supreme Court Hawai'i.

Nov. notes inform when Sosa 4, 1992, presumably on March before Also actually videotape had the DOE obtained the pre- Toguchi approved request, his Sosa arrangements for to “make the order Gordon, Norton, over a conference sided you your viewing by principal.” Sugino Norton’s Hawai'i State Teachers’ Associ- additional infor- “[w]ith remarked this (HSTA) Moore, representative, ation Samuel mation, position will in a [DOE] be better purpose of which was determine appropriate action.” In determine appropriate.” At ] action would be “what[ Sugino conveyed closing, importance conference, Norton informed the others investigation alleged of Norton’s mis- Sosa’s on that an warrant was issued “[arrest] thаt, “[b]eeause condm t and reassured Sosa 3,1992” arraignment his March and that rights recognize we the individual’s balanced 12, 1992, at to occur on March scheduled with our the welfare concerns plea he would enter time students, every effort shall be made assist guilty and a trial date would be set. Norton matter, investigation you your of this so reiterated, previously as he had related proper that a decision can be determined.” Estomago, any that he did recall circum- Subsequently, received and reviewed Sosa given rise T.Y.’s stances that would have trial, videotape. At Sosa asserted that, on the ad- accusations. Norton related objective looking about at what was he “was attorney, of his he had refused to take vice tape” presented on the and acknowl- [video] detector test and refused to answer lie edged enough that made him “concerned during investigation. HPD’s questions to sit down with Mi'. Nor- [he] wanted placed queried why he had been ton[,] [it,]” ... have him view and hear Nor- leave, which he “felt was administrative story.” ton’s “side judgment guilty.” response, that he was him Schlosser a memo at the conference told On June sent someone Sosa, “any protect recommending was to him and randum to administrative leave April purports meeting, par- found this Norton on 1992—which 12. The circuit court ticularly agreement expedite tri- copies "investigation Norton’s have attached notes” al, advising deposi- Schlosser, as well as Norton to obtain prepared Estomago, Ching, witnesses, potential reflected Sosa’s tions well March 1992 confer- as notes of Sosa’s bias in Norton's favor before Gordon's hope helpful ence—with the notation: "I investigation com- DOE's administrative you anything you. us know if need Please let plete. The circuit court found Gordon’s bias else.” she further reflected in a memorandum sent (Norton’s Norton, action on Lawrence Norton representa- [DOE] Moore HSTA tive), postponed until attorney, [criminal] the outcome and Norton’s Clifford Hunt. trial[,] which is scheduled this month.” In

Notes

notes adequately trained deal these issues.” discipline” upon school administered ill-behav- Although testimony, Schlosser’s both at trial is, ing part, "promote students and main- pretrial deposition, supports in his the circuit tain a safe and secure educational environ- finding, parties court’s neither the court nor the ment[.]” any policy. reflecting cite to document this Finally, we note that the record in this case point, particular regard More to the and with incident, investigation does include documentation to tire DOE’s of the T.Y. policies regulations during appeal that were in effect copy the record on contains a of the State Code, employment Norton’s with the DOE and that of Hawaii's “School Certified Personnel (5000 Series).” Regulations akin those Regu- are Miller, that this court set forth Policies and However, supra assuming note 41. apparently No. lation which was regulations polices Mokapu that such were still in effect the time Norton molested the students, effect, they clearly provides employees "[certified we note that reflected that demoted, may only suspended pay, responsibility without dis- the DOE bears not students, charged disciplined purpose supervise otherwise su- and/or but Regulation proper pervising reasonably [DOE] for cause.” No. 5110- students is to ensure their safety "imposing suspension relates to with- and welfare while are under teachers,” Indeed, pay imposes upon principal out and care. Sosa's testi- DOE’s control mony appropriate supervisor ”[r]esponsibil- present or an it[y,] matter further reflects concerns, upon receipt complaints, purpose investigation ... primary of his Nor- into etc., problems, thorough safety [to] conduct[ ] a investi- ton’s misconduct was ensure end, gation princi- matter.” into the To this students. Norton’s (2) Norton”; par- prudent reasonable allegations against “ade- “what is T.Y.’s including is marked out supervise employees, ticular circumstances quately (citations inju- teachers, position to cause range danger.” who are in a foreseeable students”; (some adequate omitted) ry “provide train- brackets added some in appropriate is- ing original). to its administrators This court has observed that sues, methodology proper such as the “necessarily [d]anger in context in- investigations, pe- conducting administrative recognizable danger, based volves conducting dophilia, procedures and the facts, existing knowledge of the some may who be victims [ ] interviews students may pos- harm some reasonable belief that teacher”; by a of sexual molestation follow,” sibly of what The test

Case Details

Case Name: Mr. & Mrs. Doe Parents No. 1 v. State, Department of Education
Court Name: Hawaii Supreme Court
Date Published: Dec 5, 2002
Citation: 58 P.3d 545
Docket Number: 23899, 23901
Court Abbreviation: Haw.
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