Moynihan v. Hills Co.

146 Mass. 586 | Mass. | 1888

Knowlton, J.

The defendant’s request for a ruling that upon the evidence the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, was rightly refused. There was testimony tending to show that the plaintiff was using the machine in a proper manner, and that he did not know it was out of repair. This would warrant a find*591ing that he was in the exercise of due care. The fact that the machine broke, in the manner described, from the use for which it was intended, was evidence that it was defective and unsafe, and the fact that the defendant was then using it in its business, if left unexplained, was some evidence of the defendant’s negligence. White v. Boston Albany Railroad, 144 Mass. 404. But, beyond that, it was proved that the rod which broke was designed to carry one iron ball weighing about one hundred and thirteen pounds, and that under the defendant’s direction the machine had been reconstructed, and the rod made to carry two such balls. There was also testimony that it had been subjected to a use which caused the iron in the rod to vibrate while under a strain, and which tended to crystallize it and make it brittle, and that there had been no inspection of it to ascertain its condition for nearly two years before the accident. The defendant’s secretary and treasurer, who was also its superintendent and one of its directors, testified that the rod was slightly discolored at the place of the fracture, as if the break was not fresh, and that it appeared to him as if the iron had not freshly parted. Upon this evidence it was for the jury to decide whether or not the defendant was negligent.

The court was also requested to rule, that, if the accident happened by reason of negligence of Marcil, the plaintiff could not recover. This ruling was refused, and the jury were instructed that negligence of Marcil in making the repairs and reconstructing the machine would be negligence of the corporation, for which the corporation would be answerable if it was the sole cause of the injury. The principal question in the case is whether or not this instruction was correct.

The rights of a plaintiff who has been injured by defective machinery of a defendant for whom he was working, depend upon the contract, express or implied, under which he was employed. In making a contract for service, if the business is to be carried on by many persons working together in a factory, the parties naturally contemplate the existence of machinery, tools, and appliances, and the presence of other employees, who will be fellow servants of him who is contracting to serve. In the absence of an express stipulation, the master impliedly agrees to provide and maintain reasonably safe and suitable machinery and appliances, *592so far as the exercise of proper care on his part will secure them, and the servant agrees to assume all the ordinary risks of the business, and among them the risk of injury from negligence of his fellow servants. This obligation which the master assumes is personal, and pertains to him in his relation to the business as proprietor, and in his relation to the servant as master. It has been repeatedly held that he cannot discharge it by delegating the performance of his duty to another. Ford v. Fitchburg Railroad, 110 Mass. 240. Kelley v. Norcross, 121 Mass. 508. Killea v. Faxon, 125 Mass. 485. Elmer v. Locke, 185 Mass. 575. Lawless v. Connecticut River Railroad, 136 Mass. 1. Flike v. Boston Albany Railroad, 53 N. Y. 549. Hough v. Railway, 100 U. S. 213. And if he employs agents or servants to represent him in. the performance of this duty, they are to that extent agents or servants for whose conduct he is responsible.

The very nature of the implied contract created by the hiring, whereby he undertakes to use proper care in always providing safe tools and appliances, is inconsistent with his delegation of the duty to a fellow servant, for whose negligence he is not to be' responsible. His obligation involves the exercise of every kind of care and diligence which is necessary to give him knowledge of the condition as to safety of his machinery and appliances, so far as such knowledge is obtainable by reasonable effort. His duty relates to the condition of these articles when they come to the hands of his servants for use, and the performance of that duty must carry him just so far into details as it is reasonably necessary to go, in view of the nature and risks of the business, to enable him reasonably to protect his servants from a danger’ which he should prevent.

It is obvious that difficult questions arise’ in cases of this kind in determining the implied obligations of the respective parties under peculiar circumstances. In many kinds of business the condition of a machine as to safety is constantly changing with the use of it, and it is safe or unsafe at a given moment according as it is properly or improperly used and managed by the servant who operates it. Moreover, certain kinds of repairs can be conveniently and properly made, under direction and supervision, by servants regularly employed in the business. In such eases both, parties to the contract of service must be presumed *593to have contemplated that, to a certain extent, fellow servants would be employed by the master to do work in keeping the machinery safe. Work negligently done within that field, if an accident should happen from it, would seem at first to introduce a conflict between the obligation of the master to hold himself liable for want of due care in keeping his machinery safe, and the obligation of the servant not to claim damages resulting from negligence of a fellow servant. It becomes necessary therefore to consider the rights of the parties in such cases. The application, in each particular case, of any general rules which may be laid down will involve a consideration of two questions of fact: First, what is the nature and character of the business, and the usual and proper general method of conducting it ? Secondly, in such a business, what is reasonably necessary to be done on the part of the master to secure for the use of the workmen machinery and appliances which will always be reasonably safe ?

First, there is that class of cases in which the condition of a machine as to safety is constantly changing with its use, so as to require from the persons tending it, as a part of the ordinary use of it, reconstruction or readjustment of parts, as they become worn out or displaced, from materials or new parts supplied by the master for that purpose. Such work is a part of the regular business of the servant in using the machine, and not of the master in maintaining it. Negligence in doing it is, as to all other employees, negligence of a fellow servant. So far as the condition of machinery depends upon this kind of attention, the master does his duty if he employs competent and suitable persons, and supplies them with everything needed for their work.

A second class of cases includes those in which repair or reconstruction of a machine is necessary, of such a kind as is commonly done, or may properly be done, under the direction of the master, by servants engaged in the general business. Both parties to the contract must be presumed to have contemplated that such work would be done by fellow servants of the employee, and he must therefore be held to have assumed all risks from their negligence in doing it. But this, it must be remembered, is a part of that work for the results of which, in the completed machine, the master agrees to hold himself responsible, so far as *594good results can be insured by his exercise of proper care. And so he is bound to bring to this department of the business, either in his own person or by an agent, such intelligence, skill, and experience as is reasonably to be required in one to whom in an important particular the safety of others is intrusted, and he is bound also to be reasonably diligent and careful in the use of his faculties. One who represents him in this field is not acting as a fellow servant with his other employees, within the meaning of the rule which we are considering, but is his agent or servant, for whose care and diligence he is accountable.

There may be still a third class of cases, in which a machine is of such a kind, and the nature of the business in which it is used is such, that the parties could never reasonably have contemplated that any servants employed in the business would build or reconstruct it. A proprietor might buy such a machine, or send an agent or servant to buy it. In either case the purchase would be in the line of the master’s duty, and he would be liable for the consequences of negligence in making it. He might hire privileges and men in a machine-shop in a distant city, and build it there. His servants in that work would not be fellow servants with an employee engaged in an entirely different business. And under the doctrine of respondeat superior he would be held liable for the consequences of their negligence. If he saw fit to construct or reconstruct it, in the same way, in or near the building in which it was to be used, the result would be the same. Upon our hypothesis it would be •inconsistent with his implied contract to employ fellow servants of his employee in this work, and he therefore could not relieve himself from his general obligation as to the safety of his machinery by setting up that his servants in the construction or reconstruction were fellow servants with his employees in the business in which it was to be used.

It is believed that the decision in every case in this Commonwealth founded upon alleged negligence of a master in relation to his machinery, tools, or appliances, will be found, upon the view of the facts taken by the court, to be governed by the principles which we have stated. Elmer v. Locke, 135 Mass. 575. Johnson v. Boston Tow-Boat Co. 135 Mass; 209. Rogers v. Ludlow Manufacturing Co. 144 Mass. 198. Holden v. Fitch-*595burg Railroad, 129 Mass. 268. Spicer v. South Boston Iron Co. 138 Mass. 426. McGee v. Boston Cordage Co. 139 Mass. 445. Arkerson v. Dennison, 117 Mass. 407. Gilman v. Eastern Railroad, 10 Allen, 233, and 13 Allen, 433. King v. Boston & Worcester Railroad, 9 Cush. 112; S. C. 129 Mass. 277, n. See also Northern Pacific Railroad v. Herbert, 116 U. S. 642; Benzing v. Steinway, 101 N. Y. 547.

The facts in this branch of the case at bar are undisputed. The defendant was carrying on the business' of manufacturing and finishing straw hats. The plaintiff was injured upon one of several heavy iron machines operated by steam power, manufactured for the defendant in Norwalk, Connecticut. The defendant reconstructed this and three other machines, so as to make them press the brim of hats as well as the crown, they having originally been built to press the crown only. This very materially changed the machine. Mitchell Marcil, who had charge of the work, testified that, after they got the castings and everything ready to put on it, it took him and three other men about four weeks to rebuild it.

None of the officers of the defendant corporation were mechanics, or men having practical knowledge of machinery. They left the reconstruction of the machines entirely to Marcil, to be done upon his own judgment. He also had charge of the machines all the time, and was directed to see what was needed to be done, and to do it. Assuming that this was a machine upon which the defendant might, under its implied contract with the plaintiff, employ his fellow servants in the work of reconstruction, it is evident upon the undisputed testimony that Marcil, while he did some work appropriate for an ordinary servant, was, in relation to the reconstruction and to the charge of this machine, set to do the master’s duty. The defendant’s officers were personally incompetent to use that skill and judgment in regard to keeping these machines safe which the law required of the defendant, and they left to Marcil the whole business, not only of determining what should be done in reconstructing the machines, and how it should be done, but also of determining what was their condition as to safety when they were finished, and of supervising them in reference to their condition afterward. Taking charge and having supervision of the reconstruction, *596and of the machines afterward, was a part of the master’s duty under his implied contract with the plaintiff. Inasmuch as the defendant assumed to do it through Marcil, it is liable for the consequences of his negligence. To hold otherwise would be to permit a master, who is incompetent to perform a duty which the law puts upon him in relation to the condition of his machinery, to relieve himself from all responsibility for the performance of it by employing another to represent him. In the opinion of a majority of the court there was no error in the instructions.

Exceptions overruled.