123 Kan. 735 | Kan. | 1927
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The action was one to foreclose a labor lien on an oil leasehold. Another lien claimant and a mortgagee were made parties defendant. Labor liens were denied, and the claimants appeal.
Crawford was owner of the lease. Hezlep contracted with Crawford to drill the well. Hezlep employed Moyer, a tool dresser, and Freshwater, a driller. The First National Bank of St. Marys held a chattel mortgage given by Crawford on the drilling equipment, to secure three promissory notes, two to the bank and one to Burns.
Moyer and Freshwater claimed they should have liens prior to the lien of the bank, because the bank, failed to prove any present
The well was begun in 1920.. The mortgage was given in November, 1922. Hezlep’s contract was dated October 29, 1925. The lien claimants say their liens date from commencement of the well. Hezlep contracted to sink what Moyer called an “old hole,” to a depth of 3,000 feet unless oil or gas were sooner discovered. This hole was partially filled up with shavings, and had 140 feet of casing and two strings of tools in it. Hezlep’s venture was not related to anything previously done on the well or lease, and for the purpose of liens accruing by virtue of his contract the well was commenced when he commenced work.
The statute giving a lien for labor and supplies furnished for drilling, completing, or repairing an oil or gas well does not treat the well as the mechanics’ lien statute treats a building. The me
The lien claimants say they should have priority over the mortgage because the mortgagee waived priority. This was a question of fact decided adversely to the lien claimants; on abundant evidence there was no waiver.
The court refused to award the lien claimants even secondary liens, and left them to their remedy against Hezlep, who employed them. Hezlep’s contract with Crawford provided Hezlep should be paid $4,000 on completion of the well. He did not complete the well, and had nothing due him. The lien claimants assert the court de-‘ hied their lines on the ground they were bound by Hezlep’s contract with Crawford. There is nothing in the record to indicate this is true. Findings of fact and conclusions of law separately stated were not requested, and the court found generally against the lien claimants. A basis for the judgment may be found in the facts now to be stated.
The items specified in Moyer’s statement of lien were the following:
“February 1, 1926, to March 10, 1926, 38 days at 88 per day......... 8304.00
“March 11, 1926, to May 3, 1926, 53 days at 810 per day............ 530.00
8834.00”
The items specified in Freshwater’s statement of lien were the following:
“November 10, 1925, to May 3, 1926, 174 days labor as driller at $12 per day..................................................... 82,088.00”
Each claimant testified he was to be paid for straight time, that is, for each day, whether he worked or not, and testified that he worked continuously. There was evidence Freshwater was not simply a driller, but was Hezlep’s agent, in charge of the work when
Time not expended in labor on the well is no more lienable than supplies not furnished, unless Crawford were at fault. (See Skinner v. Oil Co., 112 Kan. 742, 212 Pac. 684.) In Crawford’s contract with Hezlep, Crawford agreed to furnish equipment on the ground at the time the contract was entered into, and he did so. The contract contained the following provision relating to waiting time:
“The first party shall be paid at the same rate for time lost while waiting •on casing, fuel, or water, except that he shall not be paid for the first twelve hours of such delay.”
Freshwater testified there were days they did not go out to the well because they were out of water. In February, 1926, Crawford employed Freshwater to furnish water, and Crawford testified he performed his part of the contract. The general finding against the lien claimants acquitted Crawford of fault.
Because findings of fact and conclusions of law separately stated were not made, this court has no key to the court’s view of what the evidence proved, and has no key to its view of the law. From the face of the record this court is unable to declare the district court committed error which requires reversal of the judgment.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.