Moya v. PeopleMoya v. People
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Campbell, Allen, Sheafor, Denison, Adams (en banc)
Affirmed.
- APPEAL AND ERROR—Sufficiency of Evidence—Criminal Law. In a criminal case, if the evidence is manifestly lacking in the probative effect given it by the jury, or otherwise so weak as to show bias or prejudice on the part of the jury, or if the jury palpably misconceived its value as proof, the Supreme Court may set aside a sentence pronounced upon it. But where there is enough legal competent evidence to sustain a verdict, it will not be disturbed on review.
- CRIMINAL LAW—Rape—Evidence. In a prosecution for rape, proper evidence that another than the accused was responsible for the pregnancy of the prosecutrix, is relevant and material.
- EVIDENCE—Hearsay. The general rule is that hearsay evidence, oral or written, is inadmissible.
- CRIMINAL LAW—Evidence—Declarations of Third Parties. In criminal cases, evidence of declarations of third parties showing criminal liability for the charge under consideration, is inadmissible, as hearsay.
- EVIDENCE—Criminal Law—Confession of Third Party. In criminal cases, evidence of confessions of third parties made out of court, and tending to exonerate the accused, is inadmissible.
Error to the District Court of Mesa County, Hon. Thomas J. Black, Judge.
Mr. A. B. Crosswhite, for plaintiff in error.
En banc.
Mr Justice Campbell delivered the opinion of the court.
Defendant Moya was convicted of statutory rape of a girl fifteen years of age and sentenced to a term in the penitentiary. He brings error. Three grounds are relied on in his brief: (1) Insufficiency of evidence; (2) error in the trial court‘s ruling sustaining the district attorney‘s objection to the defendant‘s offer of oral testimony which, as it is claimed, tended to show that pregnancy of the prosecuting witness was caused by another man; (3) the trial court‘s refusal to admit in evidence a letter supposed to have the same tendency.
1. If the evidence were manifestly lacking in the probative effect given it by the jury, or were otherwise so weak as to show bias or prejudice, or if the jury palpably misconceived its value as proof, we might set aside the sentence pronounced upon it. But there is enough legal and competent evidence to sustain the verdict. It is not tainted with any of the defects or vices for which reviewing courts may afford relief.
2. The second and third grounds may be considered together, for the conclusion which we have reached disposes of both adversely to the defendant. In cross-examining witnesses for the prosecution defendant‘s counsel sought thereby to show the relation between the complaining witness and one John Galvaldon—at the time of the trial in the State of Utah and beyond the court‘s jurisdiction—the avowed object being to show that he, Galvaldon, in their presence and hearing, admitted that he caused the pregnancy. Proper evidence of such relations is relevant and such testimony at the trial by Galvaldon would be relevant and material. But
The judgment of the district court being in accordance with our views is therefore affirmed.
I think Galvaldon‘s declaration and the letter should have been admitted. I concede that the great weight of authority is with the majority opinion, but I think the rule excepting from the hearsay rule declarations against pecuniary and proprietary interest a salutary one, and the reasons for likewise excepting declarations against what we may call a criminal interest are stronger. I agree with the dissenting opinion in Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, and with 3 Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 1476, 1477; and since the question is a new one in Colorado, I think we ought to follow reason rather than authority. See Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S. E. 843.
MR. JUSTICE ADAMS concurs in this dissent.