Mounts v. RavottiMounts v. Ravotti
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Howard Mounts appeals the decision of the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Kathy Ravotti. Two issues are presented in this case. First, is whether the complaint raised a statutory claim under
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} Ravotti1 is the owner and landlord of a duplex located at 3411 Powers Way, Youngstown, Ohio. The duplex has two apartments: an upstairs apartment and a downstairs apartment. Mounts was a tenant of the upstairs apartment for a short duration.
{¶3} The only means of ingress and egress to the upstairs apartment was through the door located on the back porch. Four wooden steps led up to the back porch. (Mounts Depo. 25; Exhibit 1 attached to Ravotti Depo.) While the back porch was covered with an awning, the awning did not extend over the steps. (Mounts Depo. 29). Thus, they were subject to the elements. (Mounts Depo. 29).
{¶4} During his tenancy, Mounts observed that whenever it would rain at a moderate rate, the wooden steps would flood. (Mounts Depo. 29-30). He explained that each individual step would hold water and then at the base of the steps it “would be like shoe deep when it basically like rained hard.” (Mounts Depo. 29). He further indicated that the back of the house had no gutters. (Mounts Depo. 31). Therefore, the rain water would flow off the roof and directly onto the steps.
{¶5} One afternoon in July 2004 while Mounts was a tenant, he exited his apartment, slipped on the first wooden exterior step and fell down the remaining steps injuring his back. (Mounts Depo. 32-33). He stated that it had been raining all day long and the steps were flooded. (Mounts Depo. 32).
{¶6} As a result of his fall and injuries, Mounts filed a complaint against Ravotti. In his first claim, he alleged that Ravotti failed to exercise reasonable care in
{¶7} Ravotti filed an answer on June 16, 2006. She asserted, among other defenses, that the condition of the steps was an open and obvious hazard which Mounts was aware of and that she had no duty to warn of it.
{¶8} Discovery then occurred. Both Ravotti and Mounts were deposed. Following discovery, Ravotti filed a motion for summary judgment. As to the common law premises liability claim, she contended that the condition of the steps was open and obvious thereby negating her duty to warn. As to a statutory duty for failure to remedy a defective condition, the steps, she claimed that the record fails to show that she had notice of the condition. She states she cannot be liable for a condition of which she had no notice. Lastly, as to the claims under
{¶9} Mounts filed a motion in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. In that motion he asserted that Ravotti failed to comply with
{¶10} Ravotti then filed a reply in support of summary judgment. She argued, once again, that she had no notice of the condition, and without notice under
{¶11} Following the motions, the trial court found that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that Ravotti was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mounts timely appealed from that order.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶12} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO APPELLEE, WHEN THERE ARE NUMEROUS GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND, THEREFORE, APPELLEE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.”
{¶13} An appellate court reviews a trial court‘s decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 314, 2002-Ohio-2220, at ¶24. Summary judgment is properly granted when: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66;
{¶14} Mounts’ complaint against Ravotti asserted two claims.2 The first claim asserted that Ravotti had a duty to exercise reasonable care, she breached that duty and that breach proximately caused Mounts’ injuries. Or, in other words, he is asserting a negligence claim.
{¶15} In order to establish negligence, Mounts needed to present evidence to show that Ravotti failed to act with reasonable care. In the landlord-tenant area, the standard of care can be established in one of two ways. Crawford v. Wolfe, 4th Dist. No. 01CA2811, 2002-Ohio-6163. See Robinson v. Bates, 112 Ohio St.3d 17, 2006-Ohio-6362, ¶25.
{¶16} The first way would be through common-law premises liability. Crawford, 4th Dist. No. 01CA2811, 2002-Ohio-6163, ¶21. However, under that theory, the open and obvious doctrine would apply. Robinson, 112 Ohio St.3d 17, 2006-Ohio-6362, ¶25. Therefore, if the danger was open and obvious, then the landowner, i.e. landlord, owed no duty of care to individuals lawfully on the premises, i.e. tenants. Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, syllabus.
{¶17} The second way the standard of care could be established is to look to statute. Crawford, 4th Dist. No. 01CA2811, 2002-Ohio-6163, ¶22-24. In Ohio, the Landlord-Tenant Act sets forth statutorily defined standards of care for landlords.
{¶18} Mounts’ brief appears to assert that his complaint brought a statutory cause of action under the landlord-tenant act. Specifically, he references
{¶19} “(A) A landlord who is a party to a rental agreement shall do all of the following:
{¶20} “(1) Comply with the requirements of all applicable building, housing, health, and safety codes that materially affect health and safety;
{¶21} “(2) Make all repairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition.”
{¶22} A landlord‘s violation of the duty imposed by
{¶23} Ravotti asserts in her appellate brief that this court should not consider the “statutory claim” because Mounts did not set forth “a claim for violation of any provision of
{¶24} As Ravotti recognizes, Ohio is a notice pleading state. This means a complaint is sufficient if it puts defendants on notice of the general claims.
{¶25} Furthermore, ”
{¶26} The complaint does not reference
{¶27} Thus, Ravotti had fair notice of the claim under
{¶28} Likewise, Mounts’ argued the statutory claim in his motion in opposition to summary judgment and Ravotti, similarly to her motion for summary judgment, argued it in her reply. She contended there was no evidence that she had notice of the condition prior to Mounts’ fall.
{¶29} Consequently, Ravotti‘s argument that we should not consider a statutory claim is deemed meritless. The complaint raises a statutory claim under
R.C. 5321.04
{¶30} The statutory arguments appear to be made under
{¶31} Hence, in order to survive summary judgment for the statutory claim, Mounts needed to show: 1) a violation of the statute; 2) that the violation proximately caused his injuries; and 3) that the landlord had notice (actual or constructive) of the defective condition.
{¶32} We will begin with whether there is evidence of a violation of