[¶ 1] William Hoffman, doing business as L.A. Wrecking, appealed from a summary judgment declaring his junkyard and auto grаveyard a public nuisance, enjoining him from permitting the storage of junk autos there, and granting Mоuntrail County the right to abate the nuisance. Because there are no genuine issues of material fact, we conclude summary judgment was proper. We affirm.
*903 I
[¶ 2] The relevant facts are undisputed. In response to Congress’s passage of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965, codified at 23 U.S.C. § 136, the Legislature in 1967 enacted N.D.C.C. § 24-16-03, which forbids the establishment and maintenance of “junkyards, auto graveyards, or scrap metal processing facilities” within 1,000 feet of “the nearest edge of the right of way of a highway on the state highway system unless permission has been granted by thе director” of the Department of Transportation (“DOT”), and declares junkyards established in violation of N.D.C.C. ch. 24-16 a “public nuisance.” Since 1979, Hoffman has operated an un-screenеd junkyard and auto graveyard within 1,000 feet of North Dakota State Highway 23 near New Town. Hoffman has nоt asked for or received permission from the director of DOT to operate his junkyard within 1,000 feet of the highway.
[¶ 3] In March 1998, the County sued Hoffman to abate the public nuisance creatеd by his junkyard. After a default judgment against Hoffman was vacated, the County moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the County’s motion and dismissed Hoffman’s counterclaim for damages arising from allegеd procedural irregularities occurring after default judgment was entered.
[¶ 4] The trial court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06. Hoffman’s appeal is timely under N.D.RApp.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const, аrt. VI, § 6, and N.D.C.C. § 28-27-01.
II
[¶ 5] Summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56 is a procedural device for promptly disposing of a lawsuit without trial if, аfter viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact or conflicting inferences that can reasonably be drаwn from undisputed facts, or if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law.
Jose v. Norwest Bank North Dakota, N.A.,
[¶ 6] Hoffman does not challenge dismissal of his counterclaim, but contends the County had no authority to enforce the provisions of N.D.C.C. ch. 24-16. Although N.D.C.C. § 24-16-03 allows the director of DOT to enforce N.D.C.C. ch. 24-16, nothing in the statutes indicates the director has exclusive enforcement authority. Statutes relating to the samе subject matter should be construed in harmony whenever possible.
See City of Bismarck v. Fettig,
[¶ 7] Hoffman argues his junkyard does not violate any of the Cоunty’s zoning ordinances, and therefore his business falls within the exception in N.D.C.C. § 24-16-11, which allows operаtion of junkyards and auto graveyards within 1,000 feet of a highway if they “are zoned under the authority of stаte law or which are not zoned under the authority of state law, but are used for industrial activitiеs as determined by the director.” Assuming Hoffman’s junkyard does not violate the County’s zoning ordinances, we decline to interpret the statutory phrase, “zoned under the authority of state law,” to mеan zoned in compliance with the County’s ordinances. Hoffman’s interpretation would allоw the County’s zoning ordinances to supersede federal law,
see
23 U.S.C. § 136; 23 C.F.R. § 751.1, and state law.
See
N.D.C.C. § 24-16-03. Although counties have general authority to enact zoning ordinances,
see
N.D.C.C. § 11-33-01;
Shaw v. Burleigh County,
[¶ 8] Hoffman argues the County is estopped from abating the nuisance becausе it allowed him to operate his business for almost 20 years. The equitable doctrine of estoppel is intended to aid innocent parties, not to uphold a wrong of any charaсter.
Perske v. Job Service North Dakota,
[¶ 9] Hoffman’s argument he is entitled to just compensation is еqually unavailing. Hoffman began his business long after N.D.C.C. ch. 24-16 went into effect, and the government’s exercise of its police power to abate a public nuisance does not entitle thе property owner to compensation.
City of Minot v. Freelander,
[¶ 10] We have considered Hoffman’s other аrguments and deem them to be without merit. We conclude there are no genuine issues of material fact and the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the County as a matter of law.
Ill
[¶ 11] The summary judgment is affirmed.